DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE

Volume V


10. Middle East Peace Negotiations (III): Until the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum (1997-September 1999)

Edited by Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi

PASSIA
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
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Volume VII: 2002-2005


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Introduction

Palestine has enjoyed geographic, religious and political centrality in the Middle East and has since the beginning of the last century been vulnerable to the plans and ambitions of foreign powers. The resulting conflicts have led to the dispersal and prolonged suffering of the Palestinian people, and during the past eight decades in particular the Palestinian people have fought continuously to defend their internationally recognized rights to freedom and independence.

The ambitions and policies of the various external powers involved over the years have had an undeniable impact on inter-Arab relations, and on the international relations of Arab states. They have also had a direct effect on shaping the history of Palestine and the evolution of its future. Despite this external pressure, the Palestinians have succeeded in defending and maintaining their Arab identity and political presence by organizing socio-economic institutions and a political infrastructure which have allowed them to challenge the power of the various conquerors in the ongoing national struggle. Having legitimate representation forced other parties to recognize and engage with them despite attempts to deny them their rights to self-determination and national independence.

This volume is one of a series that organizes key political documents covering the time from the pre-Ottoman period to 2007. This volume includes the text or excerpts of over 130 documents, covering the second period of the Middle East Peace Negotiations from 1995 to the Sharm el-Sheikh memorandum in September 1999. This brief introduction outlines the history of this period to provide a framework to guide the reader to the historical context of the papers.

Continuing Negotiations

During 1995, Palestinian and Israeli officials held numerous meetings and eventually signed the “Oslo II” Interim Agreement in Washington on 28 September, detailing the mechanisms for, and the limitations of, the extension of Palestinian self-rule to significant portions of the West Bank. The agreement divided the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, into Area A (comprising major towns where the PNA gains administrative control with Israel retaining certain security duties – excluding Hebron, to which Israel redeployed); Area B (with Palestinian villages coming under PNA civil authority, but with Israel retaining overall “security responsibility”); and Area C (Jewish settlements and “militarily sensitive” areas, where Israel remained in full control).

The sense of optimism which followed the long awaited Israeli redeployment from West Bank towns at the end of 1995 came to an abrupt end in early 1996, when Israel’s assassination of Hamas activist Yahya Ayyash (“The Engineer”) triggered a series of suicide bomb attacks on Israeli targets and violent responses on the part of the Israeli army. The urgently convened international summit on combating terrorism held in Sharm Al-Sheikh was not able to ease the tension and, by the end of March, another deadline for further Israeli redeployment had passed.
In April, President Arafat and PM Peres – replacing Yitzhak Rabin who had been assassinated by right-wing Israeli fanatic Yigal Amir - resumed their talks and confirmed the commencement of the final status talks in May. A few days later, the PNC met for the first time since 1964 on Palestinian soil and voted to amend the PLO Covenant in accordance with the Oslo stipulations.

Palestinian – and Arab – concerns and frustrations came to a peak when the extreme nationalist half of the Israeli electorate - openly opposing the Oslo process - returned Likud to power on 29 May, with Binyamin Netanyahu as the new Prime Minister. In August, these fears were confirmed when the Israeli cabinet voted unanimously to cancel restrictions on settlement development in the West Bank and Gaza, in a blunt disregard of the spirit of the Oslo agreements. This was followed by the provocative opening of a tunnel under the Haram Ash-Sharif compound on 24 September that led to violent clashes between Palestinians protestors and Israeli forces, during which 62 Palestinians were killed and over 1,600 injured (with 14 Israeli soldiers killed and 50 wounded).

Nevertheless, negotiations continued and in January 1997 the Hebron Protocol was signed, dividing the city of Hebron into H1 and H2, with Israel retaining full security control over the settlement enclaves in the H2 section and security responsibility for the rest of Hebron going to the PA.

The next crisis erupted soon after, when Israel announced plans to construct a new settlement ("Har Homa") at Jabal Abu Ghneim in Jerusalem, followed by the US House of Representatives 10 June vote to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The political situation continued to deteriorate when Israel responded to a 30 July double suicide bombing in Jerusalem’s Mahane Yehuda market with a total sealing of the Palestinian Territories and a widespread arrest campaign during which the army was authorized to operate “if necessary” inside Palestinian-controlled territory.

1998 began with increased Israeli settlement activity and a stalemate in the peace talks. The PA turned down proposals to override the third phase for redeployment, while Washington repeatedly asked Israel to carry out serious further withdrawal. Throughout the first quarter of the year, clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli army occurred frequently.

Under pressure from the Israeli opposition to achieve "peace with security", Prime Minister Netanyahu joined President Arafat on 23 October 1998 in signing the Wye River Memorandum, outlining a revised timetable for the phased implementation of the first and second further redeployments stipulated in the 1995 Oslo II Accords. Stage I was completed in November 1998, while the implementation of stages II and III (due by 31 January 1999) were indefinitely postponed by the Netanyahu government in December.

In spite of this, clashes continued between Palestinians and Israeli troops, and the release in December of Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin by the PA drew Israeli accusations of trying to stall the implementation of the agreement.

January 1999 saw Israel heavily criticized by European Foreign Ministers for not implementing the Wye River agreement. In February, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of a resolution calling upon Israel to cease all settlement construction immediately, the only two votes against coming from Israel and the US. Nonetheless, the rhetoric of Ehud Barak and Binyamin Netanyahu as they prepared for the coming Israeli elections left the Palestinians with little hope for the future. Barak's eventual election win
on May 17 was accompanied by his confirmation that he would make no concessions on the issues of Jerusalem, borders or established settlements in Palestinian territory.

In early July, the UN General Assembly upgraded Palestine’s representation, allowing it to put its signature as "co-sponsor" on proposed resolutions.

By the time Ehud Barak and Yassir Arafat met in Sharm Esh-Sheikh in September 1999, very little progress had been made in advancing the "peace process". Barak’s vow to dismantle illegal West Bank outposts was matched by an increase in settlement expansion, and sporadic violence continued to punctuate daily life among the Palestinians. The "Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations" laid out a three-stage timetable for the completion of the second further redeployment of Oslo II and was essentially an extension of the 1998 Wye River Agreement which had brought so little change to the lives of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian population was becoming increasingly disillusioned with the process of negotiation.

A Final Note

Although we have endeavored to make this publication as reader/user friendly as possible, one should be aware that there is some inconsistency in terms of the spelling of non-English words - names and places (such as Haram Ash-Sharif or Intifada) – since we adhered, wherever possible, to the original version rather than apply our usual spelling rules. It is for the same reason that the volumes contain a number of minor typographical errors such as the omission of apostrophes, inconsistent capitalization, and spelling mistakes found in the originals.

Footnotes included in the volumes - excluding those marked “the ed.” - are mostly those that appeared in the original texts though the readership note that the numbering will not necessarily be accordance with the original version.

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi
Chairman of PASSIA
UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE ORDER 12947 PROHIBITING TRANSACTIONS WITH TERRORISTS WHO THREATEN TO DISRUPT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, WASHINGTON, DC, 23 JANUARY 1995

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of America, find that grave acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists that disrupt the Middle East peace process constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

I hereby order:

Section 1. Except to the extent provided in section 203(b)(3) and (4) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3) and (4)) and in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date:

(a) all property and interests in property of:
   (i) the persons listed in the Annex to this order;
   (ii) foreign persons designated by the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, because they are found:
       (A) to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of disrupting the Middle East peace process, or
       (B) to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or services in support of, such acts of violence; and
   (iii) persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, any of the foregoing persons, that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons, are blocked;
(b) any transaction or dealing by United States persons or within the United States in property or interests in property of the persons designated in or pursuant to this order is prohibited, including the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of such persons;
(c) any transaction by any United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set forth in this order, is prohibited.

Sec. 2. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term "person" means an individual or entity;
(b) the term "entity" means a partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, group, or subgroup;
(c) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States; and
(d) the term “foreign person” means any citizen or national of a foreign state (including any such individual who is also a citizen or national of the United States) or any entity not organized solely under the laws of the United States or existing solely in the United States, but does not include a foreign state.

Sec. 3. I hereby determine that the making of donations of the type specified in section 203(b)(2)(A) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)(A)) by United States persons to persons designated in or pursuant to this order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in this order, and hereby prohibit such donations as provided by section 1 of this order.

Sec. 4.
(a) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and, as appropriate, the Attorney General, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States Government. All agencies of the United States Government are hereby directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this order.

(b) Any investigation emanating from a possible violation of this order, or of any license, order, or regulation issued pursuant to this order, shall first be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and any matter involving evidence of a criminal violation shall be referred to the FBI for further investigation. The FBI shall timely notify the Department of the Treasury of any action it takes on such referrals.

Sec. 5. Nothing contained in this order shall create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Sec. 6.
(a) This order is effective at 12:01 a.m., eastern standard time on January 24, 1995.
(b) This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

(Signed) WILLIAM J. CLINTON
THE WHITE HOUSE, January 23, 1995

ANNEX: TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WHICH THREATEN TO DISRUPT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
Hizbullah
Islamic Gama’at (IG)
Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS)
Jihad
Kach
Kahane Chai
Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi faction (PIJ)
Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas faction (PLF-Abu Abbas)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
PFP, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)

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US SENATE, RESOLUTION 69 CONDEMNING TERRORIST ATTACKS IN ISRAEL, 104TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION, 24 JANUARY 1995

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 24 (legislative day, January 10), 1995

Mr. Dole (for himself, Mr. Daschle, Mr. Helms, Mr. Pell, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Packwood, Mrs. Boxer, Mr. Robb, Mr. Ford, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Wellstone, Mr. Specter, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Brown, and Mr. McConnell) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION
Condemning terrorist attacks in Israel.

Whereas on January 22, 1995, a brutal and cowardly terrorist attack near Netanya, Israel killed 19 Israelis and wounded dozens more;

Whereas the terrorist group “Islamic Jihad” claimed credit for the January 22, 1995, attack in a statement issued in Damascus, Syria;

Whereas on December 25, 1994, a “Hamas” terrorist attack in Jerusalem wounded 13 civilians, including 1 American citizen;

Whereas on October 19, 1994, a Hamas terrorist attack in Tel Aviv killed 22 Israelis and wounded 48 more;

Whereas 110 Israeli citizens have been killed and hundreds more have been wounded in terrorist attacks since the Declaration of Principles was signed on September 13, 1993;

Whereas the Declaration of Principles obligates the Palestinian Authority to publicly condemn terrorist attacks, and to bring to justice perpetrators of such acts in territories under their control;

Whereas no perpetrators of these terrorist attacks have been brought to justice for their acts of violence by the Palestinian Authority;

Whereas the governments of Syria and Iran continue to provide safe haven and support for terrorist groups, including Islamic Jihad and Hamas, among others; and

Whereas continued acts of terrorism threaten the peace process in the Middle East: Now, therefore, be it;

Resolved, by the Senate, That -

(1) the terrorist attacks in Israel are condemned in the strongest possible terms;

(2) condolences are extended to the families of all those killed, and hopes are expressed for the rapid and complete recovery of all wounded in the January 22, 1995, attack;

(3) Chairman Arafat should, consistent with the obligations of the Declaration of Principles, publicly and forcefully condemn acts of terror against Israelis, take immediate steps to bring to justice those responsible for such acts, and implement steps to prevent future acts of terrorism in all territory under his control;

(4) President Assad should immediately end all support for terrorist groups, including safe haven, material and financial support, in all territory under his control; and

(5) the administration should undertake strong efforts to end the safe haven, training, and financial and other support granted terrorists by Iran, Syria and other states.

* * *

ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE CLOSURE OF THE AREAS, JERUSALEM, 29 JANUARY 1995

At the weekly Cabinet meeting today (Sunday), 29.01.95:
1. Within the framework of the Ministerial Committee on National Security, the Cabinet was briefed on ongoing security matters.
2. The Cabinet held a political discussion, after which the Prime Minister and Defense Minister concluded the following:
A. The peace process will continue - based upon the Declaration of Principles and the Cairo Agreement - while drawing and implementing the conclusions from the implementation of these agreements thus far, especially in the area of security.

B. At this stage, the closure will continue for an additional week.

C. The removal of the closure on laborers from the Gaza Strip will be examined in accordance with the ability of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority to fulfill their obligations, as set forth in the agreements signed with them.

D. For now, the suspension involving treatment of a prisoner release and of the "safe passage" issue will continue.

E. Approval is given for the bringing of 6,000 foreign laborers to work in construction and agriculture, in accordance with the details and conditions to be determined by the Labor and Social Affairs Minister and the Agriculture Minister.

F. The Prime Minister has asked the Attorney-General to prepare an opinion on the possibility of arresting Israeli employers who hire laborers from the territories without permission.

G. The Prime Minister seeks to act toward accelerating legislation to increase fines against those employers referred to in Section F.

H. The Finance Minister, in conjunction with the other involved ministries and offices, will present the Cabinet with solutions for assistance on the matter of employment within Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.

I. With the goal of bringing about a separation between the populations of sovereign Israel and of the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, the Prime Minister has asked the Finance and Police Ministers to create teams that will examine ways and processes to bring about such a separation, as well as its meaning and implications for the areas of economics and internal security.

The Finance Minister has been asked to form a team that will examine the economic sphere. The Police Minister has been asked to form a team that will examine the area of internal security.

The Ministers will coordinate their proposals with the ministers and various government bodies involved in the matter, and bring them to the Government or Cabinet within one month.

EGYPT, JORDAN, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY,
CONCLUDING STATEMENT OF THE CAIRO SUMMIT, CAIRO, 2 FEBRUARY 1995

1. The leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, meeting in Cairo on February 2, 1995 reaffirmed their determination to continue the Middle East peace process towards the fulfillment of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the region.

2. The parties are committed to fully honor and implement, in letter and spirit, the historic accords reached between them. They reaffirmed their commitment to implement all the outstanding parts of those agreements and their intention to pursue their efforts towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The parties also reaffirmed the necessity of moving promptly to conclude the negotiations on the Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians Authority in all its aspects. The parties emphasized the urgency of taking the necessary measures to enhance the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and to improve the climate and build confidence between the parties.

3. The parties expressed their appreciation for the swift implementation of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. They expressed the hope that the near future would witness the achievement of peace accords between Israel and Syria and Lebanon.

4. The leaders reiterated their appreciation for Egypt's leading role for peace in the Middle East which is essential for the success of the peace process.

5. The peace process in the Middle East is an historic necessity serving the interest of all its peoples and individuals. Therefore it will prevail against all the forces that attempt to undermine it. The four parties condemned all the outbreaks of bloodshed, terror and violence in the region, and reaffirmed their intention to stand staunchly against and put an end to all such acts.
6. Within the framework of peace and reconciliation in the region, with enhanced security, economic prosperity and a higher standard of living for their peoples, the leaders reaffirmed their intention to:

- Achieve equal security and mutual confidence at lower levels of armaments, appreciating President Mubarak's disarmament proposal on weapons of mass destruction. The parties shall pursue a mutually verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.
- Enhance economic cooperation and encourage joint projects, and attract the international private sector, particularly in preparation for the Amman summit (October 30, 1995). As part of this process, the parties are committed to support the establishment of a regional development bank.
- Give special attention to strengthening the educational capabilities of the region, with special emphasis on science, technology and computerization. In this regard, the parties will seriously consider and explore with the European Union the convening of a special education conference devoted to this aim.

In pursuit of the implementation of this declaration, the representatives of the four parties, at Foreign Ministers level, will conduct consultations to facilitate their cooperation. The first meeting at this level will take place next week in Washington.

Following the Cairo Meeting Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin have agreed to meet next Thursday in Erez to continue negotiations on the bilateral issues.

President Mubarak, King Hussein, Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat, will meet again if necessary to pursue their joint efforts aimed at reinforcing the process of comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

UNITED STATES, EGYPT, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, BLAIR HOUSE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, WASHINGTON, DC, 12 FEBRUARY 1995

On February 12, 1995, the United States hosted a follow-up meeting in Washington of the February 2, 1995 Cairo Summit of representatives from Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. President Clinton, accompanied by Vice-President Gore, addressed the gathering which was attended by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amre Moussa, Jordanian Foreign Minister Abd al-Karim Kabariti, Palestinian Authority Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Nabil Sha'ath, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Posuvalyuk who participated as an observer.

The five participants acknowledged the leadership of Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak in hosting the Cairo Summit. Building on that historic meeting, the five participants reaffirmed their determination to consolidate the breakthroughs achieved in the Arab-Israeli peace process, to overcome obstacles and disputes, and to push forward toward a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the region based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, thus leading to a lasting reconciliation among the peoples of the Middle East cemented by bonds of mutual respect and dignity, tolerance, cooperation, security, and peaceful relations.

Toward this end, the five parties represented in Washington have joined together to act to further cooperation in support of peace. Because peace requires concerted action, the parties agreed to explore practical steps in the political, economic, security, and human dimension areas of education and culture. They also agreed to meet as necessary to consult and to coordinate action in these areas. Experts will follow up in each of these areas as appropriate.
In the political area, the parties reaffirmed their strong commitment to honoring those agreements already concluded, in letter and spirit, and to accelerate negotiations on all tracks. The Secretary of State reported on the conclusions reached between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations today. Those conclusions are attached and constitute an integral part of this communiqué. The participants in today’s meeting welcomed the results achieved by Israel and the Palestinian Authority and pledged to do all they could to support the conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The parties also expressed appreciation for the continuation of the implementation of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in all its aspects. They further expressed the hope that a peace agreement between Israel and both Syria and Lebanon could be reached soon, leading to comprehensive peace.

With respect to security, the parties agreed that there can be no real peace in the region without security and stability. The parties declared that they are committed to combat all acts that aim to destroy the peace process, particularly acts of terrorism and violence, and to stand staunchly against and put an end to all such acts. The parties reaffirmed the intention expressed at the Cairo Summit that within the framework of peace and reconciliation in the region, with enhanced security, economic prosperity and a higher standard of living for their people, they intend to achieve equal security and mutual confidence at lower levels of armaments, appreciating President Mubarak’s disarmament proposal on weapons of mass destruction. The parties shall pursue a mutually verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.

In the economic area, they reaffirmed the importance of fostering economic development and investment in the region. The parties agreed to support assistance to Palestinians and the development and strengthening of the creation of industrial zones in the West Bank and Gaza. The parties are committed to explore the removal of barriers to trade. They will also explore ways to promote liberalized trade between the parties and the United States. In this regard, the parties expressed appreciation to the United States for its proposal to extend duty free treatment to products from industrial zones to be created in the West Bank and Gaza and free trade zones that may be established in Taba, Eilat, and Aqaba. The United States will consult further with the parties and the US Congress on this matter. At the same time, the parties took note of progress and agreed to continue their efforts towards the establishment of a Middle East Development Bank. Such an institution would serve to fund development projects and the promotion of private sector investment.

To underscore the public-private partnership as embodied in the Casablanca Declaration, the four parties agreed to the promotion of private sector projects. The parties will work together with the private sector for the success of the Amman Economic Summit in October.

In the human dimension, the parties also agreed on the need to build bridges between peoples, to overcome barriers to understanding, and to share knowledge and expertise to deal with common problems. The parties also agreed to explore the possibilities of new and more creative forms of cooperation in these areas.

Finally, the parties pledged to work to ensure that there can be no turning back in the Arab-Israeli peace process. They agreed to do all in their power to work toward the achievement of a comprehensive peace and to create a Middle East with peace, security and economic prosperity for all the people of the region. In this regard, they pledged their continued support for the efforts and contributions of the multilateral track of the peace process.

In light of our commitment to pursue a comprehensive peace, the United States will be consulting with its Russian co-sponsor, the European Union as well as with Norway, Japan and other regional participants in the peace process on ways to promote progress and reach our common goals.

* * *
ISRAEL, PLO, JORDAN AND EGYPT, STATEMENT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE
COMMITTEE MEETING ON PERSONS DISPLACED IN 1967, AMMAN, 7 MARCH 1995

1. Delegations from Israel, PLO, Jordan and Egypt met in Amman on March 7th, 1995, as the Continuing Committee for the purpose of deciding by agreement the modalities of admission of Palestinians displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder and other matters of common concern.

2. The Ministerial meeting based its frame of reference on the DOP and its Annexes, and Agreed Minutes, and on parallel clauses pertaining to displaced persons in the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, and in the Camp David Accords.

3. The four Parties agreed on the structure of the Continuing Committee for the displaced persons, and other matters of common concern, which would meet at Ministerial and technical levels. With regard to the technical level, it was agreed that each delegation is to be composed of three permanent members at senior level, joined by experts as needed. The venue of the meetings of the technical committee would be by rotation. The first meeting will be convened within a month from today. Thereafter, meetings will be held normally every three weeks. Meetings at the Ministerial level will be held by rotation every two/three months. The technical level will report to the Ministerial level.

4. Relevant confidence building measures shall be discussed in the Continuing Committee.

5. The Ministerial Committee reaffirms its commitment to the speedy solution of this question to enhance the Peace Process.

JOINT STATEMENT BY KING HASSAN II OF MOROCCO, ISRAELI
FOREIGN MINISTER SHIMON PERES AND PLO CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT,
RABAT, MOROCCO, 28 MAY 1995

The Israelis and the Palestinians, recognizing the important role of His Majesty King Hassan II in the peace process in general and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in particular, considered it appropriate, at this stage of the process, for Mr. Yasser Arafat and Mr. Shimon Peres to consult with H.M. the King of Morocco. A meeting was held under his patronage to seek ways to bolster and accelerate the peace process with the aim of implementing as rapidly as possible the obligations contained in the Oslo, Washington and Cairo agreements.

The following points were also discussed:

1. The drawing of conclusions from the recent difficulties and the search for effective and reliable means to arrive at lasting peace, while ensuring that no situation will be allowed again to endanger the peace process.

2. The development of economic cooperation between Israel, the Palestinians and the neighboring states, in an effort to bring about freer movement of goods and people between Gaza, the West Bank, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the other countries, while guaranteeing appropriate means to assure the security of all parties.

3. The need to afford the Palestinians the means to enable their economy to take part in the cooperation projects of the Mediterranean countries.

His Majesty King Hassan II, Mr. Arafat and Mr. Peres believe that the Economic Conference which convened in Casablanca in October 1994 marks the opening of a new and promising economic era for the peoples of the region, and for the Palestinians in particular.

They are convinced that this momentum must be continued by implementing the decisions contained in the Casablanca Declaration and assuring the success of the Amman Conference to be held at the end of October 1995 as well as the Euro-Mediterranean Conference to be held in Barcelona in November of this year.
Israel and the Palestinians reiterated their real desire to reach an agreement no later than July 1, 1995 on the second stage of the interim agreement, including redeployment, security arrangements, elections, transfer of powers, and other points contained in the Oslo, Washington and Cairo agreements.

Mr. Shimon Peres and Mr. Yasser Arafat wish to thank His Majesty King Hassan II for the opportunity to meet with him in Morocco, for his warm and cordial hospitality, and for his untiring efforts throughout the years in the cause of peace.

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ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHIMON PERES AND PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING, 4 JUNE 1995

The Rais of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres announced today that, after months of public and discreet negotiations and meetings between Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres and Al Rais, understandings have been reached on main aspects of the Interim Agreement - free and democratic elections for the Palestinian Council and the Rais, redeployment of the Israeli military forces in the West Bank, and the transfer of civilian authorities.

Both sides agreed that the Interim Agreement would by fully based on the DOP - Israel, on the eve of the elections, will redeploy from populated areas of the West Bank. Elections will be held for the establishment of the Palestinian Council and Al Rais.

The two sides have agreed that the Interim Agreement will enable Palestinians and Israelis to live in peace and security.

Al Rais Arafat and Foreign Minister Peres instructed their delegations headed by Abu Alla and Uri Savir to enter into intense negotiations in order to finalize the Interim Agreement by July 25th. Mr. Arafat and Mr. Peres covered, among other issues, the release of the Palestinian prisoners held and detained in Israeli jails. The parties agreed that the prisoners' gradual release will be arranged under the auspices of the ministerial committee formed for this purpose and will be included in the Interim Agreement.

Both sides reaffirmed their desire to achieve a just, lasting comprehensive and durable peace settlement and a historic reconciliation, and that the Interim Agreement is an integral part of the whole peace process.

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JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, 28TH ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING, BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, 29-30 JULY 1995 [EXCERPTS]

1. The 28th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held in Bandar Begawan from 29 to 30 July 1995. […]

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES

[…]

12. The Foreign Ministers welcomed the progress made in the Middle East peace process, in particular the implementation of the PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements of 1993. The Ministers stressed importance of continuing the discussions between the Palestinians and Israelis to reach an agreement on the details of the withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from the West Bank. They also welcomed the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel and the ongoing discussions between Syria and Israel and believed that these would contribute to a comprehensive settlement to the Middle East problem. […]

† † †
PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATION DELEGATIONS,
JOINT STATEMENT ON REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES, TABA, 11 AUGUST 1995

[In the following statement - issued by FM Peres and Chairman Arafat - the letter 'P' signifies the Palestinian position and the letter 'I' the Israeli position.]

The Palestinian delegation, headed by Rais Yasser Arafat and the Israeli delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, met in Taba, Egypt between 7-11 August, 1995 and agreed on some of the principles, to be elaborated in the Interim Agreement, as follows:

1. **Area B**
   In Area B there will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces. The Palestinian Police shall assume responsibility for public order for Palestinians and shall establish [I: 25] [P: 30] police stations and posts in towns, villages and other places, as agreed. In Area B, Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism. While the [I: activities] [P: movement] of uniformed Palestinian Policemen in Area B, outside places where there is a Palestinian police station will be carried out after coordination and confirmation, three months after the completion of redeployment from Area B, the DCOs may decide that movement of Palestinian policemen from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian towns and villages in Area B on roads that are used only by Palestinian traffic will take place after notifying the DCO. These procedures will be reviewed within six months.

2. **Further Redeployments**
   The further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will be gradually implemented in accordance with the DOP in three intervals, every six months, after the inauguration of the Council, to be completed by [P: February] [I: July] 1997. In Area C, while Israel will transfer civil powers and responsibilities not relating to territory in the first phase of redeployment, powers and responsibilities relating to territory will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed by [P: February] [I: July] 1997.

3. **Hebron**
   With regard to Hebron, both sides exchanged ideas and decided to continue the negotiations on this issue.

4. **Prisoners**
   In addition to the two stages of prisoner release agreed in the context of the Ministerial Committee (one upon the signing of the interim agreement and the other - before the Palestinian elections), there will be a third stage of prisoner release. The Ministerial Committee will work out the details of this third stage.

5. **Revenues**
   The Israeli side will transfer tax revenues to the Palestinian side upon the signing of the interim agreement.

6. **Joint Committee**
   A joint Israeli-Palestinian-American committee will be formed to deal with:
   1. economic issues;
   2. water production; and
   3. political coordination.
   4. the Palestinian Covenant
   Two months after the inauguration of the Palestinian Council, the Palestinian Covenant will be amended in accordance with the letter of Chairman Arafat to Prime Minister Rabin, dated September 9, 1993.
PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATION DELEGATIONS, JOINT STATEMENT ON THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, 25 AUGUST 1995

The two heads of delegations - Mr. Abu Ala and Mr. Savir - issued a joint statement today, 25.08.95, at the conclusion of this week’s round of negotiations on the Palestinian-Israeli interim agreement. The two delegations have reached a merged version of the full interim agreement and its various annexes - which deal with redeployment and security, elections and civil affairs - while also progressing towards the finalization of the legal and cooperation annexes (altogether approximately 260 pages).

In all these issues, various working groups have made substantial progress towards a detailed and balanced agreement, as well as towards the creation of effective implementation and cooperation mechanisms in forty civilian spheres, the various working groups have reached merged versions and agreed on approximately 25 spheres. Important progress was made in the spheres of telecommunications and water. In the redeployment and the security annex, substantial progress has been made, although on the important issue of Hebron, no progress has been reached. In next week’s agenda, the two delegations will discuss the annexes on Hebron and the release of the Palestinian prisoners, as well as issues in the security and civilian spheres. The two delegations will reconvene next week in small working groups, in order to overcome the outstanding issues. Over the weekend, the two delegations will report to their respective leaders, in order to receive instructions that may help in overcoming the obstacles.

GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, PROTOCOL ON THE FURTHER TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, 27 AUGUST 1995

It is hereby agreed between the Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter “the PLO), the representative of the Palestinian people as follows:

Article I - Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities
Israel shall transfer and the Palestinian Authority shall assume the authorities, powers and responsibilities in the West Bank from the Israeli government and its Civil Administration in the following spheres: Labor, Commerce and Industry, Gas and Petroleum, Insurance, Postal Services, Local Government and Agriculture, as specified in this Protocol (hereinafter referred to as “the Eight Spheres”).

Article II - Framework and Scope
1. The Annexes to this Protocol regarding each of the Eight Spheres hereinafter “the Annexes”) shall be incorporated in the Protocol concerning Civil Affairs to the Interim Agreement to be concluded between the Parties (hereinafter “the Interim Agreement”).
2. Pending the implementation of the Interim Agreement with regard to the Eight Spheres, the provisions of the Annexes shall be subject to the provisions of this Protocol and to the Appendices attached to the Annexes (hereinafter “the Appendices”).
3. The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority under this Protocol shall not apply to issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations in accordance with the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government arrangements signed at Washington DC on September 13, 1993 and the Agreed Minutes thereto.

Article III - Legislative Powers of the Palestinian Authority
Legislative powers related to, or within, each of the Eight Spheres shall be transferred to the Palestinian Authority upon the implementation of the Interim Agreement with regard to the Eight Spheres. Notwithstanding the above, the Palestinian side shall have the right to issue administrative internal procedures regarding the Eight Spheres.
Article IV - Rights, Liabilities and Obligations
1. The provisions of Article XXII of the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area as signed at Cairo on May 4, 1994, (hereinafter "the Gaza-Jericho Agreement") shall apply to the Eight Spheres.
2. In accordance with paragraph 1 above, Israel shall provide the Palestinian Authority with the information it has regarding pending and anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against the Israeli side with regard to the Eight Spheres.
3. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 above, the Palestinian Authority shall review Civil Administration contracts in the Eight Spheres which extend beyond the date of the transfer, with a view to deciding which contracts will remain in force and which will be terminated. A list of all such contracts is attached to this Protocol as Schedule 1.

Article V - Law Enforcement
1. Arrangements regarding the operation of civilian inspectors to monitor compliance with laws and regulations in each of the Eight Spheres, shall be agreed upon within the Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee established in accordance with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (hereinafter, "the CAC"). Such inspectors may conduct internal inquiries in the Eight Spheres. In any event, such inspectors shall not wear uniforms of a police or military nature or carry arms.
2. All powers and responsibilities regarding law enforcement, including investigation, judicial proceedings and imprisonment, will continue to be under the responsibility of the existing authorities in the West Bank.

Article VI - Modalities of Transfer
1. The transfer of powers and responsibilities in the Eight Spheres pursuant to this Protocol will be implemented on the 1st day of October, 1995.
2. The transfer of powers and responsibilities shall be coordinated through the CAC and shall be implemented in accordance with the arrangements set out in this Protocol in a smooth, peaceful and orderly manner.
3. The Palestinian Authority will continue to employ the Palestinian employees of the Civil Administration who are currently employed in the offices included in each of the Eight Spheres, without derogating from the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority to deal with all employee related matters in the Eight Spheres. The Palestinian Authority shall maintain the rights, including pension rights, of present and former employees.
4. The main office of each of the Eight Spheres will be situated in the Jericho Area or in the Gaza Strip. The two sides agree on the operation of the existing subordinate offices and on the establishment of additional subordinate offices in the West Bank, if necessary, in such locations as mutually agreed.
5. With the transfer of powers and responsibilities, the Civil Administration shall transfer all its movable and immovable property which is necessary for the continued operation of the powers and responsibilities transferred therein. This property includes, inter alia, equipment, registers, files, computer programs and reports.

Article VII - Relations Between the Two Sides
1. With regard to each of the Eight Spheres, the Palestinian Authority shall coordinate with the Civil Administration on issues relating to other spheres, and to powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Palestinian Authority.
2. Each side will assist and support the other side in promoting the effective exercise of its powers and responsibilities.
3. The Palestinian Authority will notify the military government and its Civil Administration regarding any planned large-scale events or mass gatherings in respect of the Eight Spheres.
4. The Palestinian Authority shall prevent any activities with a military or police orientation within each of the Eight Spheres.
5. Nothing in this Protocol shall affect the continued authority of the military government and its Civil Administration to exercise their powers and responsibilities with regard to security and public order, as well as with regard to other powers and responsibilities not transferred.
6. Provisions in the Annexes referring to the Interim Agreement (such as references to the sections on the Environment or Transportation or to the Security Annex) shall be read as relating to the continued authority of the military government and its Civil Administration.

**Article VIII - Budgetary and Revenue Issues**

All budgetary and revenue issues regarding the Eight Spheres will be discussed separately between the two sides.

**Article IX - Final Clauses**

1. This protocol shall enter into force on the date of its signing.
2. The arrangements established by this Protocol shall remain in force pending their replacement or cancellation by the Interim Agreement or by any other agreement between the Parties.
3. The Annexes, Appendices and Schedule attached to this Protocol shall constitute and integral part hereof.

Done at Cairo this 27th day of August 1995.

Signed: Oren Shachor     Jamil Tarifi
For the Government of the State of Israel   For the PLO

**ANNEX CONCERNING THE SPHERE OF LABOR**

1. The sphere of Labor includes, *inter alia*, rights of workers, labor relation, labor conciliation, safety and hygiene in work places, labor accidents and compensation, vocational and professional training courses, cooperative associations, professional work associations and trade unions, heavy machinery equipment.
2. The two sides shall establish agreed procedures for mutual recognition of professional certificates and diplomas.
3. The Palestinian side shall ensure the completion of vocational and professional training courses currently being conducted by the Civil Administration. In this regard, the Civil Administration will transfer to the Palestinian side a proportionate amount of fees received on account of such courses, relating to the period following the date of transfer.
4. The Palestinian side shall continue to hold vocational training courses, at least to the same extent as has been undertaken by the Civil Administration, *inter alia*, in the following professions: heavy-vehicle and public transport drivers, garage managers, vehicle technicians, vehicles testers, driving teachers and driving school managers.
5. Cooperative Associations, Professional Work Associations and Trade Unions should act in a manner that does not violate the Cooperative Associations laws, the Professional Work Associations laws and the Trade Union laws.
6. The Palestinian side shall inform the Israeli side of any work related accident resulting in the injury of an Israeli. The Israeli side may conduct an investigation of such an accident coordination with the Palestinian side.
7. All matters regarding the production and use of explosives and gunpowder shall be dealt with in the Security Annex.

**ANNEX CONCERNING THE SPHERE OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY**

1. This sphere includes, *inter alia*, import and export, the planning and formulation and implementation of policies, as well as the licensing and supervision of all industrial and commercial activities, including commodities, services, weights and measures and the regulation of commerce.
2. In authorizing the establishment and operation of industrial plants, factories or concerns in the West Bank, both sides shall ensure that there is no detrimental impact on the environment, and on the safety of the other side. Matters regarding the environment are dealt with in Section (Environmental Protection).
3. The production and use of weapons, ammunition or explosives are dealt with in the Security Annex.
4. The economic aspects of this sphere are dealt with in Annex (Economic Protocol).
ANNEX CONCERNING THE SPHERE OF GAS, FUEL AND PETROLEUM

1. This sphere includes, inter alia, the planning, formulation and implementation of policies, as well as the licensing and supervision of gas, fuel and petroleum facilities. For the purposes of this paragraph, ‘gas, fuel and petroleum facilities’ shall include, inter alia, all gas and petrol stations, installations, terminals and infrastructure, as well as agencies for the marketing, distribution, transportation, storage, sale or supply of gas, fuel or petroleum products. This sphere also includes the licensing and supervision of the import, export, and transportation in addition to the exploration, production and distribution of gas, fuel and petroleum.

2. In authorizing the establishment and operation of gas, fuel and petroleum facilities as defined in paragraph 1, the Palestinian side shall ensure that there is no detrimental impact on the environment or on the safety of Israel, the settlements and military installations and that a safety distance from Israel, the settlements and military installations is observed. Accordingly, the Palestinian side shall apply the American, British, and/or Israeli safety and environmental standards.

3. The color of all gas cylinders in use by Palestinians in the West Bank shall be different than that in use in Israel and by Israelis.

4. a. The Palestinian side will notify the Israeli side of any exploration and production of oil and gas carried out by the Palestinian side or with its permission.

   b. Israel and the Palestinian side agree to cooperate concerning production of oil and gas in cases of joint geological structures.

5. a. All transportation of gas or fuel products, in Israel and in the West Bank, shall be in accordance with the respective laws applying which, in any event shall not fall short of the international requirements and standards concerning safety and environmental protection as applied by Israel. The transportation of gas and fuel products into Israel, the settlements and military installations shall further be subject to the requirements and modalities regarding entry into Israel.

   b. In order to facilitate the movement of transportation of gas or fuel products in the West Bank:

      (1) The Palestinian side will issue permits to Palestinian owners, drivers and exports of vehicles transporting gas or fuel products. The issue of such permits shall be governed by the criteria regarding the recruitment to the Palestinian police according to this Agreement. The issue of such permits is not contingent upon the approval of the Israeli side. The Palestinian side shall notify the Israeli side of the permits issued by it.

      (2) The Palestinian side shall ensure that vehicles transporting gas or fuel products, as well as their parking lots, shall be guarded against any theft or unauthorized use. The Palestinian side shall inform the Israeli side, at the earliest opportunity, of any suspected theft or unauthorized use of such vehicles.

6. The Israeli side shall cooperate with the Palestinian side with regard to the establishment by the Palestinian side of 3-4 storage facilities for gas and petroleum, including in facilitating, inter alia, location, land a technical assistance in order to secure the purchasing needs of the Palestinians for the Israeli market.

7. Matter regarding the environment and transportation are dealt with Section I (Environmental Protection) and Section (Transportation), respectively.

Appendix Regarding the Sphere of Gas and Petroleum

Powers and responsibilities regarding exploration and production of oil and gas shall be transferred upon the transfer of the Sphere of Gas and Petroleum in accordance with the Interim Agreement.

ANNEX CONCERNING THE SPHERE OF INSURANCE

1. This sphere includes, inter alia, the licensing of insurers and insurance agents, and the supervision of their activities, including supervision of insurer’s deposits and funds and the road safety fund.


3. a. The Existing Fund, as defined in Article XI, shall be transferred to the Palestinian side. This transfer will include all the Existing Fund’s assets and liabilities.
b. The Palestinian side shall be responsible for all liabilities of the Existing Fund whether arising from accidents occurring prior or subsequent to the date of transfer.

c. Accordingly, Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility in this respect. If Israel is sued with regard to the aforesaid liabilities, the Palestinian side will reimburse Israel for the full amount awarded by any court against it in this respect and shall enable the Palestinian side to participate in defending the claim.

4. With a view to assisting the Palestinian side to deal with claims against the Existing Fund, the following provision shall apply:

a. A joint experts committee shall be established to examine claims against the Existing Fund (hereinafter "the Joint Committee").

b. Without prejudice to paragraph 3(c) above, the Joint Committee shall examine and estimate whether the assets of the Existing Fund are sufficient to meet its liabilities as they stand on the day of the transfer. In the event that the Joint Committee concludes that the Existing Fund's assets are not sufficient to meet its liabilities, the Israeli side shall cover the agreed deficit, including claims incurred but not reported (IBNR). If the Joint Committee is unable to agree on the above amount, the matter shall be referred to the JEC (Joint Economic Committee).

c. The Joint Committee shall submit recommendations to the Palestinian side concerning administrative or legal changes with a view to expediting settlement of the claims.

d. The Joint Committee shall conclude its work within three months. The two sides may agree on a one-time extension for another three months.

5. Additionally, the Israeli side will provide to the Palestinian side all the necessary assistance with regard to the Existing Fund, and advice and consultation when requested.

6. All claims, including pending claims, against the Existing Fund should not be brought before or heard by any Israeli court or tribunal and should only be brought before the Palestinian Courts. To this end, the two sides may take all necessary measures, including if possible, the enactment of legislation.

ANNEX CONCERNING THE SPHERE OF POSTAL SERVICES

1. This sphere includes, inter alia, the planning, formulation and implementation of policies, as well as the management and supervision of post offices, postal services and all monetary transactions and activities in postal units (publicly known as "the Postal Bank").

2. The Palestinian side shall issue postage stamps and postal stationary (hereinafter "stamps"), date stamps and all other related materials, subject to the following provisions.

   (1) Stamps shall include only the terms "the Palestinian Council" or "the Palestinian Authority", the face value and the subject. Should date stamps include the name of the issuing authority, only the above-mentioned terms may be used.

   (2) The face value shall be stated only in one of the agreed legal currencies circulating in the West Bank as detailed in Annex (Economic Protocol).

   (3) The design, symbols, wording and subjects of stamps and date stamps issued by the Palestinian side will be in the spirit of the peace.

3. In setting postal rates for international postal services, both sides shall coordinate in such a way as to prevent mutual economic harm.

4. Both sides shall ensure the efficient transmission and delivery of postal items, including parcels, destined for or originating from the other side. Similarly, they shall ensure the efficient transmission and delivery of such postal items arriving from, or destined for, foreign countries.

5. The modalities and arrangements for sending and receiving all postal items, including parcels, between the two sides will be arranged by means of a commercial agreement between the Israel Postal Authority and the Palestinian Authority.

6. a. The modalities and arrangements for sending and receiving postal items, including parcels, between the Palestinian Authority and foreign countries will be arranged by means of commercial agreements between the PLO, for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority, and the Postal Authorities of Jordan and Egypt, and a commercial agreement between the Palestinian Authority and the Israel Postal Authority.

   b. Without derogating from the generality of Article of this Agreement (foreign relations), the status of the Palestinian side to this Agreement in the Universal Postal Union will remain as it is at present, and the Palestinian side will not be party to any action to alter or change its status.
7. The relevant customs principles detailed in Annex (Economic Protocol) shall also apply to postal items, including parcels, transmitted to the West Bank.

Appendix Regarding the Sphere of Postal Services

1. The powers and responsibilities regarding the "Postal Bank" (monetary transactions and activities in postal units) shall be transferred upon the transfer of the Sphere of Postal Services in accordance with the Interim Agreement. Pending the Interim Agreement, the Civil Administration will continue to provide "Postal Bank" services.

2. In the event that the Civil Administration makes use of the services of the postal units managed by the Palestinian Authority for the purpose of granting "Postal Bank" services, it shall transfer to the Palestinian Authority a proportional amount from the amounts transferred to it by the Israel Postal Authority, which relates to the services provided by the Palestinian Authority.

Annex Concerning the Sphere of Statistics

1. This sphere includes, inter alia, all phases of planning, producing and disseminating and archiving statistics from census and surveys in all areas of statistics including, but not limited to, demographic, social, economic, area, and environmental matters.

2. Israel shall transfer from the Civil Administration to the Palestinian side all the necessary material for maintaining and running the statistical system, such as:
   a. The estimation procedures, forms of questionnaires, manuals, coding annuals, procedures for and results of quality control measures and analysis of surveys.
   b. The statistical maps.
   c. The sampling frames, including the household listings.
   d. The basket of consumer goods and all related material, including the weights used for the CPI.
   e. Any other professional statistical materials whenever requested.

Any other professional statistical means and methods used by the military government, Civil Administration, or on their behalf, shall also be transferred to the Palestinian side.

3. a. The Israeli side shall, through a Joint Committee to be established, transfer to the Palestinian side, if requested, any primary data from censuses and surveys, carried out by the military government, Civil Administration, or on their behalf, and archived administrative records used by the military government, Civil Administration, or on their behalf.
   b. The Joint Committee shall decide upon the modalities and arrangements concerning the transfer of the above-mentioned materials.

4. Issues relating to the right to be included in the Population Registry will be dealt with in the Population Registry section of this Agreement.

5. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics will maintain good working relations and will cooperate in statistical matters.

Appendix Regarding the Sphere of Statistics

The Palestinian side may conduct censuses or canvasses subject to the agreement determined in the Israeli-Palestinian Elections negotiations.

Annex Concerning the Sphere of Local Government

1. This sphere includes, inter alia, formulation and implementation of Local Government policies, appointment of Local Government officials, approval of Local Government budgets, tenders, acquisitions, fees and tariffs, alteration of Local Government boundaries, creation and dissolution of Local Government, Local Government election processes, Local Government inspections and the creation of joint service councils, city councils, in their capacity as local planning committees, and the operation and maintenance of the municipal water and electricity distribution systems and pricing of these services. The term "Local Government" in this Annex includes municipal councils, village councils and all other communities which lack municipal status.
2. The Palestinian side has the right to make any and all alterations to the Local Government boundaries in the West Bank, within areas A and B as defined in the Security Annex.
3. Issues relating to the provision of Local Government services to settlements and to installations serving the Israeli military forces, are dealt with in the relevant sections.
4. The Palestinian side shall give notice to the Israeli side of any Local Government elections. With a view to avoid friction in the context of such elections, special security arrangements will be agreed in the security liaison mechanism.
5. In addition to the existing powers and responsibilities of a city council, in its capacity as local planning committee, it shall also be authorized to issue building permits for various purposes, including factories, hospitals and schools, in accordance and subject to existing detailed planning schemes in force.
6. Municipal authorities shall continue to supply water and electricity from existing systems in accordance with existing quantities and practices.
7. Matters regarding planning and zoning, water and electricity are dealt with in Section (Planning and Zoning), Section (Water) and Section (Electricity), respectively.

Appendix Regarding the Sphere of Local Government

Pending the transfer of powers and responsibilities in the Sphere of Local Government in accordance with the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian Authority shall have the powers and responsibilities transferred in accordance with the Annex on this Sphere, subject to the following provisions:

1. a. Any alterations made to boundaries of existing local authorities shall be subject to the approval of the Civil Administration.
   b. The declaration of new local authorities, or of alterations made to the status of existing local authorities, will not involve any change in the powers and responsibilities and privileges of such local authorities unless otherwise agreed between the two sides.
2. The enactment or amendment of municipal by-laws shall only take effect upon the approval of both sides.

ANNEX CONCERNING THE SPHERE OF AGRICULTURE

1. This sphere includes, *inter alia*, veterinary services, animal husbandry, all existing experimental stations, irrigation water which has been allocated for this purpose, scientific data, forestry, pasture and grazing, licensing and supervision of agriculture, the farming and marketing (including export and import) of crops, fruit and vegetables, nurseries, forestry products, and animal produce.
2. Irrigation water, as well as facilities, water resources, installations and networks used in agriculture shall be dealt with in Section (Water).
3. Relations in the agricultural sphere between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side, including the movement of agricultural produce, are dealt with in Annex (Economic Protocol).
4. The two sides will cooperate in training and research, and shall undertake joint studies on the development of all aspects of agriculture, irrigation and veterinary services.
5. Forestry is part of the Agriculture sphere and will be dealt with separately in the Interim Agreement.

Appendix Regarding the Sphere of Agriculture

1. Powers and responsibilities regarding forestry shall be transferred upon the transfer of the Sphere of Agriculture in accordance with the Interim Agreement.
2. Pending the signing of the Interim Agreement, the Israeli side shall maintain the existing quantities of irrigation water in the West Bank, in accordance with existing practices.
PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP (“OSLO II”), WASHINGTON, DC, 28 SEPTEMBER 1995

[See also Map 1 in the annex.]

The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter "the PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people;

PREAMBLE

Within the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991;

Reaffirming their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and to live in peaceful co-existence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights;

Reaffirming their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process;

Recognizing that the peace process and the new era that it has created, as well as the new relationship established between the two Parties as described above, are irreversible, and the determination of the two Parties to maintain, sustain and continue the peace process;

Recognizing that the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, i.e. the elected Council (hereinafter "the Council" or "the Palestinian Council"), and the elected Ra’ees of the Executive Authority, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the date of signing the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (hereinafter "the Gaza-Jericho Agreement") on May 4, 1994, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

Reaffirming their understanding that the interim self-government arrangements contained in this Agreement are an integral part of the whole peace process, that the negotiations on the permanent status, that will start as soon as possible but not later than May 4, 1996, will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and that the Interim Agreement shall settle all the issues of the interim period and that no such issues will be deferred to the agenda of the permanent status negotiations;

Reaffirming their adherence to the mutual recognition and commitments expressed in the letters dated September 9, 1993, signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO;

Desirous of putting into effect the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed at Washington, DC on September 13, 1993, and the Agreed Minutes thereto (hereinafter "the DOP") and in particular Article III and Annex I concerning the holding of direct, free and general political elections for the Council and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority in order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip may democratically elect accountable representatives;

Recognizing that these elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will provide a democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions;

Reaffirming their mutual commitment to act, in accordance with this Agreement, immediately, efficiently and effectively against acts or threats of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis;

Following the Gaza-Jericho Agreement; the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed at Erez on August 29, 1994 (hereinafter "the Preparatory Transfer Agreement"); and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed at Cairo on August 27, 1995 (hereinafter "the Further Transfer Protocol"); which three agreements will be superseded by this Agreement;

Hereby agree as follows:

CHAPTER 1 - THE COUNCIL

Article 1: Transfer of Authority

1. Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council in accordance with this Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred.
2. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the powers and responsibilities transferred to the Council shall be exercised by the Palestinian Authority established in accordance with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which shall also have all the rights, liabilities and obligations to be assumed by the Council in this regard. Accordingly, the term "Council" throughout this Agreement shall, pending the inauguration of the Council, be construed as meaning the Palestinian Authority.
3. The transfer of powers and responsibilities to the police force established by the Palestinian Council in accordance with Article XIV below (hereinafter "the Palestinian Police") shall be accomplished in a phased manner, as detailed in this Agreement and in the Protocol concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements attached as Annex I to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex I").
4. As regards the transfer and assumption of authority in civil spheres, powers and responsibilities shall be transferred and assumed as set out in the Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs attached as Annex III to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex III").
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration in the West Bank will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government shall be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the military government shall not prevent it from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
6. A Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereinafter "the CAC"), Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees, one for the Gaza Strip and the other for the West Bank, and District Civil Liaison Offices in the West Bank shall be established in order to provide for coordination and cooperation in civil affairs between the Council and Israel, as detailed in Annex III.
7. The offices of the Council, and the offices of its Ra'eess and its Executive Authority and other committees, shall be located in areas under Palestinian territorial jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Article II: Elections
1. I order that the Palestinian people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council and the Ra'eess of the Executive Authority of the Council in accordance with the provisions set out in the Protocol concerning Elections attached as Annex II to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex II").
2. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will provide a democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions.
3. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there may participate in the election process in accordance with the provisions contained in this Article and in Article VI of Annex II (Election Arrangements concerning Jerusalem).
4. The elections shall be called by the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority immediately following the signing of this Agreement to take place at the earliest practicable date following the redeployment of Israeli forces in accordance with Annex I, and consistent with the requirements of the election timetable as provided in Annex II, the Election Law and the Election Regulations, as defined in Article I of Annex II.

Article III: Structure of the Palestinian Council
1. The Palestinian Council and the Ra'eess of the Executive Authority of the Council constitute the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which will be elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip for the transitional period agreed in Article I of the DOP.
2. The Council shall possess both legislative power and executive power, in accordance with Articles VII and IX of the DOP. The Council shall carry out and be responsible for all the legislative and executive powers and responsibilities transferred to it under this Agreement. The exercise of legislative powers shall be in accordance with Article XVIII of this Agreement (Legislative Powers of the Council).
3. The Council and the Ra'eess of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Election Law and Regulations, which shall not be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement.
5. Immediately upon its inauguration, the Council will elect from among its members a Speaker. The Speaker will preside over the meetings of the Council, administer the Council and its committees, decide on the agenda of each meeting, and lay before the Council proposals for voting and declare their results.

6. The jurisdiction of the Council shall be as determined in Article XVII of this Agreement (Jurisdiction).

7. The organization, structure and functioning of the Council shall be in accordance with this Agreement and the Basic Law for the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which Law shall be adopted by the Council. The Basic Law and any regulations made under it shall not be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement.

8. The Council shall be responsible under its executive powers for the offices, services and departments transferred to it and may establish, within its jurisdiction, ministries and subordinate bodies, as necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.

9. The Speaker will present for the Council’s approval proposed internal procedures that will regulate, among other things, the decision-making processes of the Council.

Article IV: Size of the Council
The Palestinian Council shall be composed of 82 representatives and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority, who will be directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

Article V: The Executive Authority of the Council
1. The Council will have a committee that will exercise the executive authority of the Council, formed in accordance with paragraph 4 below (hereinafter "the Executive Authority").

2. The Executive Authority shall be bestowed with the executive authority of the Council and will exercise it on behalf of the Council. It shall determine its own internal procedures and decision making processes.

3. The Council will publish the names of the members of the Executive Authority immediately upon their initial appointment and subsequent to any changes.
   a) The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority shall be an ex officio member of the Executive Authority.
   b) All of the other members of the Executive Authority, except as provided in subparagraph c. below, shall be members of the Council, chosen and proposed to the Council by the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority and approved by the Council.
   c) The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some persons, in number not exceeding twenty percent of the total membership of the Executive Authority, who are not members of the Council, to exercise executive authority and participate in government tasks. Such appointed members may not vote in meetings of the Council.
   d) Non-elected members of the Executive Authority must have a valid address in an area under the jurisdiction of the Council.

Article VI: Other Committees of the Council
1. The Council may form small committees to simplify the proceedings of the Council and to assist in controlling the activity of its Executive Authority.

2. Each committee shall establish its own decision-making processes within the general framework of the organization and structure of the Council.

Article VII: Open Government
1. All meetings of the Council and of its committees, other than the Executive Authority, shall be open to the public, except upon a resolution of the Council or the relevant committee on the grounds of security, or commercial or personal confidentiality.

2. Participation in the deliberations of the Council, its committees and the Executive Authority shall be limited to their respective members only. Experts may be invited to such meetings to address specific issues on an ad hoc basis.
Article VIII: Judicial Review
Any person or organization affected by any act or decision of the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council or of any member of the Executive Authority, who believes that such act or decision exceeds the authority of the Ra'ees or of such member, or is otherwise incorrect in law or procedure, may apply to the relevant Palestinian Court of Justice for a review of such activity or decision.

Article IX: Powers and Responsibilities of the Council
1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council will, within its jurisdiction, have legislative powers as set out in Article XVIII of this Agreement, as well as executive powers.
2. The executive power of the Palestinian Council shall extend to all matters within its jurisdiction under this Agreement or any future agreement that may be reached between the two Parties during the interim period. It shall include the power to formulate and conduct Palestinian policies and to supervise their implementation, to issue any rule or regulation under powers given in approved legislation and administrative decisions necessary for the realization of Palestinian self-government, the power to employ staff, sue and be sued and conclude contracts, and the power to keep and administer registers and records of the population, and issue certificates, licenses and documents.
3. The Palestinian Council's executive decisions and acts shall be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
4. The Palestinian Council may adopt all necessary measures in order to enforce the law and any of its decisions, and bring proceedings before the Palestinian courts and tribunals.
5. a. In accordance with the DOP, the Council will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, the establishment of diplomatic and consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions.
   b. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the PLO may conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states or international organizations for the benefit of the Council in the following cases only:
      (1) economic agreements, as specifically provided in Annex V of this Agreement;
      (2) agreements with donor countries for the purpose of implementing arrangements for the provision of assistance to the Council;
      (3) agreements for the purpose of implementing the regional development plans detailed in Annex IV of the DOP or in agreements entered into in the framework of the multilateral negotiations; and
      4) cultural, scientific and educational agreements.
   c. Dealings between the Council and representatives of foreign states and international organizations, as well as the establishment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of representative offices other than those described in subparagraph 5.a above, for the purpose of implementing the agreements referred to in subparagraph 5.b above, shall not be considered foreign relations.
6. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council shall, within its jurisdiction, have an independent judicial system composed of independent Palestinian courts and tribunals.

CHAPTER 2 - REDEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Article X: Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces
1. The first phase of the Israeli military forces redeployment will cover populated areas in the West Bank - cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and hamlets - as set out in Annex I, and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e., 22 days before the day of the elections.
2. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence after the inauguration of the Council and will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian Police, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council as detailed in Articles XI (Land) and XIII (Security), below and in Annex I.
3. The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public order and internal security for Palestinians in a phased manner in accordance with Article XIII (Security) below and Annex I.

4. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for external security, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "Israeli military forces" includes Israel Police and other Israeli security forces.

**Article XI: Land**

1. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.

2. The two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, as specified below:
   a. Land in populated areas (Areas A and B), including government and Al Waqf land, will come under the jurisdiction of the Council during the first phase of redeployment.
   b. All civil powers and responsibilities, including planning and zoning, in Areas A and B, set out in Annex III, will be transferred to and assumed by the Council during the first phase of redeployment.
   c. In Area C, during the first phase of redeployment Israel will transfer to the Council civil powers and responsibilities not relating to territory, as set out in Annex III.
   d. The further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will be gradually implemented in accordance with the DOP in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, after the inauguration of the Council, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.
   e. During the further redeployment phases to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, powers and responsibilities relating to territory will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
   f. The specified military locations referred to in Article X, paragraph 2 above will be determined in the further redeployment phases, within the specified time-frame ending not later than 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, and will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.

3. For the purpose of this Agreement and until the completion of the first phase of the further redeployments:
   a. "Area A" means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in brown on attached map No. 1;
   b. "Area B" means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in yellow on attached map No. 1, and the built-up area of the hamlets listed in Appendix 6 to Annex I; and
   c. "Area C" means areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and B, which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in accordance with this Agreement.

**Article XII: Arrangements for Security and Public Order**

1. In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council shall establish a strong police force as set out in Article XIV below. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against external threats, including the responsibility for protecting the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, and for defense against external threats from the sea and from the air, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and Settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.

2. Agreed security arrangements and coordination mechanisms are specified in Annex I.

3. A Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes (hereinafter "the JSC"), as well as Joint Regional Security Committees (hereinafter "RSCs") and Joint District Coordination Offices (hereinafter "DCOs"), are hereby established as provided for in Annex I.
4. The security arrangements provided for in this Agreement and in Annex I may be reviewed at the request of either Party and may be amended by mutual agreement of the Parties. Specific review arrangements are included in Annex I.

5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "the Settlements" means, in the West Bank - the settlements in Area C; and in the Gaza Strip - the Gush Katif and Erez settlement areas, as well as the other settlements in the Gaza Strip, as shown on attached map No. 2.

Article XIII: Security

1. The Council will, upon completion of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in each district, as set out in Appendix 1 to Annex I, assume the powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area A in that district.

a. There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces from Area B. Israel will transfer to the Council and the Council will assume responsibility for public order for Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.

b. In Area B the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public order for Palestinians and shall be deployed in order to accommodate the Palestinian needs and requirements in the following manner:

   (1) The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 police stations and posts in towns, villages, and other places listed in Appendix 2 to Annex I and as delineated on map No. 3. The West Bank RSC may agree on the establishment of additional police stations and posts, if required.

   (2) The Palestinian Police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents in which only Palestinians are involved.

   (3) The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in populated places where police stations and posts are located, as set out in paragraph b(1) above.

   (4) While the movement of uniformed Palestinian policemen in Area B outside places where there is a Palestinian police station or post will be carried out after coordination and confirmation through the relevant DCO, three months after the completion of redeployment from Area B, the DCOs may decide that movement of Palestinian policemen from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian towns and villages in Area B on roads that are used only by Palestinian traffic will take place after notifying the DCO.

   (5) The coordination of such planned movement prior to confirmation through the relevant DCO shall include a scheduled plan, including the number of policemen, as well as the type and number of weapons and vehicles intended to take part. It shall also include details of arrangements for ensuring continued coordination through appropriate communication links, the exact schedule of movement to the area of the planned operation, including the destination and routes thereto, its proposed duration and the schedule for returning to the police station or post. The Israeli side of the DCO will provide the Palestinian side with its response, following a request for movement of policemen in accordance with this paragraph, in normal or routine cases within one day and in emergency cases no later than 2 hours.

   (6) The Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces will conduct joint security activities on the main roads as set out in Annex I.

   (7) The Palestinian Police will notify the West Bank RSC of the names of the policemen, number plates of police vehicles and serial numbers of weapons, with respect to each police station and post in Area B.

   (8) Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security responsibility to the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be carried out in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Council, except for the issues of permanent status negotiations and of Israel's overall responsibility for Israelis and borders.

The procedures detailed in this paragraph will be reviewed within six months of the completion of the first phase of redeployment.
Article XIV: The Palestinian Police
1. The Council shall establish a strong police force. The duties, functions, structure, deployment and composition of the Palestinian Police, together with provisions regarding its equipment and operation, as well as rules of conduct, are set out in Annex I.
2. The Palestinian police force established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement will be fully integrated into the Palestinian Police and will be subject to the provisions of this Agreement.
3. Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
4. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian Police described in Annex I, and those of the Israeli military forces, no organization, group or individual in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the West Bank or the Gaza Strip any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment, unless otherwise provided for in Annex I.

Article XV: Prevention of Hostile Acts
1. Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and against their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders.
2. Specific provisions for the implementation of this Article are set out in Annex I.

Article XVI: Confidence Building Measures
With a view to fostering a positive and supportive public atmosphere to accompany the implementation of this Agreement, to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and good faith, and in order to facilitate the anticipated cooperation and new relations between the two peoples, both Parties agree to carry out confidence building measures as detailed herewith:

1. Israel will release or turn over to the Palestinian side, Palestinian detainees and prisoners, residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The first stage of release of these prisoners and detainees will take place on the signing of this Agreement and the second stage will take place prior to the date of the elections. There will be a third stage of release of detainees and prisoners. Detainees and prisoners will be released from among categories detailed in Annex VII (Release of Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees). Those released will be free to return to their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
2. Palestinians who have maintained contact with the Israeli authorities will not be subjected to acts of harassment, violence, retribution or prosecution. Appropriate ongoing measures will be taken, in coordination with Israel, in order to ensure their protection.
3. Palestinians from abroad whose entry into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is approved pursuant to this Agreement, and to whom the provisions of this Article are applicable, will not be prosecuted for offenses committed prior to September 13, 1993.

CHAPTER 3 - LEGAL AFFAIRS

Article XVII: Jurisdiction
1. In accordance with the DOP, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory as a single territorial unit, except for:
   a. issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis; and
   b. powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
2. Accordingly, the authority of the Council encompasses all matters that fall within its territorial, functional and personal jurisdiction, as follows:
   a. The territorial jurisdiction of the Council shall encompass Gaza Strip territory, except for the Settlements and the Military Installation Area shown on map No. 2, and West Bank territory, except for Area C which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of
the Council. At this time, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. Territorial jurisdiction includes land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

b. The functional jurisdiction of the Council extends to all powers and responsibilities transferred to the Council, as specified in this Agreement or in any future agreements that may be reached between the Parties during the interim period.

c. The territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council will apply to all persons, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.

d. Notwithstanding subparagraph a. above, the Council shall have functional jurisdiction in Area C, as detailed in Article IV of Annex III.

3. The Council has, within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial powers and responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement.

4. a. Israel, through its military government, has the authority over areas that are not under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council and Israelis.

b. To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam.

5. The exercise of authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and air space shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

6. Without derogating from the provisions of this Article, legal arrangements detailed in the Protocol Concerning Legal Matters attached as Annex IV to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex IV") shall be observed. Israel and the Council may negotiate further legal arrangements.

7. Israel and the Council shall cooperate on matters of legal assistance in criminal and civil matters through a legal committee (hereinafter "the Legal Committee"), hereby established.

8. The Council's jurisdiction will extend gradually to cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues to be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, through a series of redeployments of the Israeli military forces. The first phase of the redeployment of Israeli military forces will cover populated areas in the West Bank - cities, towns, refugee camps and hamlets, as set out in Annex I - and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e. 22 days before the day of the elections. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence immediately upon the inauguration of the Council and will be effected in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be concluded no later than eighteen months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

**Article XVIII: Legislative Powers of the Council**

1. For the purposes of this Article, legislation shall mean any primary and secondary legislation, including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts.

2. The Council has the power, within its jurisdiction as defined in Article XVII of this Agreement, to adopt legislation.

3. While the primary legislative power shall lie in the hands of the Council as a whole, the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall have the following legislative powers:
   a. the power to initiate legislation or to present proposed legislation to the Council;
   b. the power to promulgate legislation adopted by the Council; and
   c. the power to issue secondary legislation, including regulations, relating to any matters specified and within the scope laid down in any primary legislation adopted by the Council.

4. a. Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or military orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the Council or which is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the DOP, this Agreement, or of any other agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period, shall have no effect and shall be void ab initio.

b. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall not promulgate legislation adopted by the Council if such legislation falls under the provisions of this paragraph.

5. All legislation shall be communicated to the Israeli side of the Legal Committee.
6. Without derogating from the provisions of paragraph 4 above, the Israeli side of the Legal Committee may refer for the attention of the Committee any legislation regarding which Israel considers the provisions of paragraph 4 apply, in order to discuss issues arising from such legislation. The Legal Committee will consider the legislation referred to it at the earliest opportunity.

Article XIX: Human Rights and the Rule of Law
Israel and the Council shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law.

Article XX: Rights, Liabilities and Obligations
1. a. The transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its civil administration to the Council, as detailed in Annex III, includes all related rights, liabilities and obligations arising with regard to acts or omissions which occurred prior to such transfer. Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding such acts or omissions and the Council will bear all financial responsibility for these and for its own functioning.
   b. Any financial claim made in this regard against Israel will be referred to the Council.
   c. Israel shall provide the Council with the information it has regarding pending and anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against Israel in this regard.
   d. Where legal proceedings are brought in respect of such a claim, Israel will notify the Council and enable it to participate in defending the claim and raise any arguments on its behalf.
   e. In the event that an award is made against Israel by any court or tribunal in respect of such a claim, the Council shall immediately reimburse Israel the full amount of the award.
   f. Without prejudice to the above, where a court or tribunal hearing such a claim finds that liability rests solely with an employee or agent who acted beyond the scope of the powers assigned to him or her, unlawfully or with willful malfeasance, the Council shall not bear financial responsibility.
2. a. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1.d through 1.f above, each side may take the necessary measures, including promulgation of legislation, in order to ensure that such claims by Palestinians, including pending claims in which the hearing of evidence has not yet begun, are brought only before Palestinian courts or tribunals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and are not brought before or heard by Israeli courts or tribunals.
   b. Where a new claim has been brought before a Palestinian court or tribunal subsequent to the dismissal of the claim pursuant to subparagraph a. above, the Council shall defend it and, in accordance with subparagraph 1.a above, in the event that an award is made for the plaintiff, shall pay the amount of the award.
   c. The Legal Committee shall agree on arrangements for the transfer of all materials and information needed to enable the Palestinian courts or tribunals to hear such claims as referred to in subparagraph b. above, and, when necessary, for the provision of legal assistance by Israel to the Council in defending such claims.
3. The transfer of authority in itself shall not affect rights, liabilities and obligations of any person or legal entity, in existence at the date of signing of this Agreement.
4. The Council, upon its inauguration, will assume all the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Palestinian Authority.
5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "Israelis" also includes Israeli statutory agencies and corporations registered in Israel.

Article XXI: Settlement of Differences and Disputes
Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. The provisions of Article XV of the DOP shall apply to any such difference which is not settled through the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism, namely:
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any related agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be settled through the Liaison Committee.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between the Parties.

3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties, the Parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

CHAPTER 4 - COOPERATION

Article XXII: Relations between Israel and the Council
1. Israel and the Council shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.

2. Israel and the Council will ensure that their respective educational systems contribute to the peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and to peace in the entire region, and will refrain from the introduction of any motifs that could adversely affect the process of reconciliation.

3. Without derogating from the other provisions of this Agreement, Israel and the Council shall cooperate in combating criminal activity which may affect both sides, including offenses related to trafficking in illegal drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling, and offenses against property, including offenses related to vehicles.

Article XXIII: Cooperation with Regard to Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities

In order to ensure a smooth, peaceful and orderly transfer of powers and responsibilities, the two sides will cooperate with regard to the transfer of security powers and responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of Annex I, and the transfer of civil powers and responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of Annex III.

Article XXIV: Economic Relations

The economic relations between the two sides are set out in the Protocol on Economic Relations, signed in Paris on April 29, 1994, and the Appendices thereto, and the Supplement to the Protocol on Economic Relations, all attached as Annex V, and will be governed by the relevant provisions of this Agreement and its Annexes.

Article XXV: Cooperation Programs

1. The Parties agree to establish a mechanism to develop programs of cooperation between them. Details of such cooperation are set out in Annex VI.

2. A Standing Cooperation Committee to deal with issues arising in the context of this cooperation is hereby established as provided for in Annex VI.

Article XXVI: The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee

1. The Liaison Committee established pursuant to Article X of the DOP shall ensure the smooth implementation of this Agreement. It shall deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes.

2. The Liaison Committee shall be composed of an equal number of members from each Party. It may add other technicians and experts as necessary.

3. The Liaison Committee shall adopt its rules of procedures, including the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

4. The Liaison Committee shall reach its decisions by agreement.

5. The Liaison Committee shall establish a subcommittee that will monitor and steer the implementation of this Agreement (hereinafter "the Monitoring and Steering Committee"). It will function as follows:
   a. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will, on an ongoing basis, monitor the implementation of this Agreement, with a view to enhancing the cooperation and fostering the peaceful relations between the two sides.
b. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will steer the activities of the various joint committees established in this Agreement (the JSC, the CAC, the Legal Committee, the Joint Economic Committee and the Standing Cooperation Committee) concerning the ongoing implementation of the Agreement, and will report to the Liaison Committee.

c. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will be composed of the heads of the various committees mentioned above.

d. The two heads of the Monitoring and Steering Committee will establish its rules of procedures, including the frequency and places of its meetings.

Article XXVII: Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt

1. Pursuant to Article XII of the DOP, the two Parties have invited the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. As part of these arrangements a Continuing Committee has been constituted and has commenced its deliberations.

2. The Continuing Committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

3. The Continuing Committee shall also deal with other matters of common concern.

Article XXVIII: Missing Persons

1. Israel and the Council shall cooperate by providing each other with all necessary assistance in the conduct of searches for missing persons and bodies of persons which have not been recovered, as well as by providing information about missing persons.

2. The PLO undertakes to cooperate with Israel and to assist it in its efforts to locate and to return to Israel Israeli soldiers who are missing in action and the bodies of soldiers which have not been recovered.

CHAPTER 5 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article XXIX: Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are set out in Annex I.

Article XXX: Passages

Arrangements for coordination between Israel and the Council regarding passage to and from Egypt and Jordan, as well as any other agreed international crossings, are set out in Annex I.

Article XXXI: Final Clauses

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing.

2. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement, except for Article XX (Confidence-Building Measures), the Preparatory Transfer Agreement and the Further Transfer Protocol will be superseded by this Agreement.

3. The Council, upon its inauguration, shall replace the Palestinian Authority and shall assume all the undertakings and obligations of the Palestinian Authority under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Preparatory Transfer Agreement, and the Further Transfer Protocol.

4. The two sides shall pass all necessary legislation to implement this Agreement.

5. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than May 4, 1996, between the Parties. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

6. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the DOP. Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions.
7. Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.

8. The two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.

9. The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the inauguration of the Council, the Palestinian National Council will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the letters signed by the Chairman of the PLO and addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994.

10. Pursuant to Annex I Article VII of this Agreement, Israel confirms that the permanent checkpoints on the roads leading to and from the Jericho Area (except those related to the access road leading from Mousa Alami to the Allenby Bridge) will be removed upon the completion of the first phase of redeployment.

11. Prisoners who, pursuant to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, were turned over to the Palestinian Authority on the condition that they remain in the Jericho Area for the remainder of their sentence, will be free to return to their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip upon the completion of the first phase of redeployment.

12. As regards relations between Israel and the PLO, and without derogating from the commitments contained in the letters signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994, the two sides will apply between them the provisions contained in Article XXII, paragraph 1, with the necessary changes.

13. a. The Preamble to this Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps attached hereto, shall constitute an integral part hereof.

b. The parties agree that the maps attached to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement as:
   a) map No. 1 (The Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 2 (in this Agreement "map No. 2");
   b) map No. 3 (Deployment of Palestinian Police in the Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 5 (in this Agreement "map No. 5"); and
   c) map No. 6 (Maritime Activity Zones), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 8 (in this Agreement "map No. 8"); are an integral part hereof and will remain in effect for the duration of this Agreement.

14. While the Jeflik area will come under the functional and personal jurisdiction of the Council in the first phase of redeployment, the area’s transfer to the territorial jurisdiction of the Council will be considered by the Israeli side in the first phase of the further redeployment phases.

Done at Washington DC, this 28th day of September, 1995.

Signed: For the Government of the State of Israel
        For the PLO

Witnessed by: The United States of America, The Russian Federation,
The Arab Republic of Egypt, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
The Kingdom of Norway, The European Union

ANNEX I:
PROTOCOL CONCERNING REDEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Article I: Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces and Transfer of Responsibility

First Phase of Redeployment:
1. The first phase of Israeli military forces redeployment will cover populated areas in the West Bank - cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and hamlets, as shown on map No. 1. This redeployment will be effected in stages, as set out in the schedule attached to this Annex as Appendix 1, and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e., 22 days before the day of elections.

2. In order to maintain the territorial integrity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, and to promote their economic growth and the demographic and geographical links be-
between them, both sides shall implement the provisions of this Annex, while respecting and preserving without obstacles, normal and smooth movement of people, vehicles, and goods within the West Bank, and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

3. Any security arrangements and measures which become effective commensurate with the redeployment of the Israeli military forces will not undermine the importance of, nor will they prejudice, the Palestinian development programs and projects for reconstruction and development of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as the moral and physical dignity of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

4. After the inauguration of the Palestinian Council, the unity and integrity of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be maintained and respected. All Palestinian people residing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be accountable to the Palestinian Council only, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.

5. After the inauguration of the Palestinian Council, the Israeli Civil Administration will be dissolved and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

6. The Council will assume powers and responsibilities for civil affairs, as well as for public order and internal security, according to this Agreement.

7. Nothing in this Article shall derogate from Israel's security powers and responsibilities in accordance with this Agreement.

8. There will be a period of 10 days prior to each stage of redeployment according to paragraph 1 of this Article, during which the commanders of the Israeli military forces will acquaint the respective commanders of the different echelons of the Palestinian Police with the respective area and its specific problems. Further Redeployments After the Inauguration of the Palestinian Council.

9. The further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will be gradually implemented in accordance with the DOP in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, after the inauguration of the Council, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

10. The specified military locations referred to in Article X, paragraph 2 of this Agreement will be determined in the further redeployment phases within the specified time-frame ending not later than 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, and will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.

Article II: Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence

1. The Palestinian security policy as defined by the Palestinian Authority on March 9, 1995, for the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area will also be implemented in the rest of the West Bank in areas which come under Palestinian security responsibility as follows:
   a. The Palestinian Police is the only Palestinian security authority.
   b. The Palestinian Police will act systematically against all expressions of violence and terror.
   c. The Council will issue permits in order to legalize the possession and carrying of arms by civilians. Any illegal arms will be confiscated by the Palestinian Police.
   d. The Palestinian Police will arrest and prosecute individuals who are suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror.

2. Both sides will, in accordance with this Agreement, act to ensure the immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end, they will cooperate in the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities. Each side shall immediately and effectively respond to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence.

3. With a view to implementing the above, each side shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, carry out the following functions in the areas under its security responsibility:
   a. protect all residents of, and all other persons present in, these areas;
   b. actively prevent incitement to violence, including violence against the other side or persons under the authority of the other side;
   c. apprehend, investigate and prosecute perpetrators and all other persons directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism, violence and incitement; and
d. prevent and deal with any attempt to cause damage or harm to infrastructure serving the other side, including, inter alia, roads, water, electricity, telecommunications and sewage infrastructure.

4. Both sides undertake to deal with the issue of persons who are present in the areas in violation of this Agreement, and to take further measures in accordance with procedures to be determined by the JSC.

Article III: Coordination and Cooperation In Mutual Security Matters

1. Joint Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee

a. A Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes is hereby established (hereinafter "the JSC"). It will deal with all security matters of mutual concern regarding this Agreement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

b. The JSC shall:
   (1) recommend security policy guidelines for the approval of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee and implement such approved guidelines;
   (2) deal with security issues raised by either side;
   (3) provide the proper channel for exchanging information between the two sides, needed to solve security problems;
   (4) provide directives for the Joint Regional Security Committees (hereinafter "the RSCs") and for the Joint District Coordination Offices (hereinafter "the DCOs"); and
   (5) subject to the provisions of Article XXVI (the Joint Israeli Palestinian Liaison Committee), and Article XXI (Settlement of Differences and Disputes) of this Agreement, deal with alleged violations, as well as differences relating to the application or implementation of the security arrangements set out in this Agreement.

c. The JSC shall comprise between five and seven members from each side. Decisions of the JSC will be reached by agreement between the two sides.

d. The JSC shall determine its rules of procedure. Meetings of the JSC shall be held every two weeks. In the event that either side requests a special meeting, it shall be convened within forty-eight (48) hours.

e. Unless otherwise agreed by the two sides, JSC meetings will be hosted by each of the sides alternately.

f. The JSC shall develop a comprehensive plan to ensure full coordination between the Israeli military forces and the Palestinian Police during the interim period, starting from the date of signing of his Agreement.

g. This coordination will be implemented through the RSCs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the DCOs, as mentioned hereafter in this Article.

h. The comprehensive plan will include a plan for the West Bank, consisting of arrangements for the entry of the Palestinian Police and the introduction of police arms, ammunition and equipment, as well as arrangements intended to facilitate the smooth transfer of authority and assumption by the Palestinian Police of its security responsibilities according to this Agreement.

i. The above mentioned comprehensive plan will also include two regional plans that will include arrangements for coordination and cooperation in security matters after the redeployment is effected.

j. These regional plans will be reviewed every six months, or whenever needed, by the JSC and the relevant RSC.

2. Regional Security Committees

a. Two RSCs are hereby established, one in the West Bank and one in the Gaza Strip.

b. Each RSC shall:
   (1) guide the relevant DCOs with security policy guidelines;
   (2) deal with security issues referred to it by the DCOs;
   (3) ensure proper transfer of information and guidelines to the relevant DCOs; and
   (4) propose to the JSC security policy guidelines, and forward issues to the JSC for determination.

c. The Israeli side and the Palestinian side in the RSCs will maintain contact with each other as follows:
   (1) regular as well as special meetings shall be held between the commander of the Israeli military forces and the commander of the Palestinian Police in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip, as appropriate; and
   (2) each side will operate a regional security coordination office 24 hours a day, with direct and constant communication links between the two sides.
d. The RSCs shall commence operations immediately upon the signing of this Agreement and shall determine by agreement their mode of procedure.

3. District Coordination Offices
   a. DCOs are hereby established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as set out below.
   b. The location of the DCOs is as detailed on attached map Nos. 2 and 4.
   c. Each DCO shall:
      (1) monitor and manage matters requiring coordination as determined by the JSC and/or the relevant RSC, according to the policy and guidelines established by either of them;
      (2) monitor and manage all matters of a joint nature within the respective district of the DCO, including the coordination of activities by one side which may affect the other side;
      (3) review, investigate and report to the relevant RSC on the overall situation within the DCO’s respective district, with special regard to specific events, incidents and activities occurring in the district; and
      (4) direct the Joint Patrols and the Joint Mobile Units set up in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article and Article V, paragraph 2.c below, operating within the DCO’s respective district.
   d. The DCOs shall commence operations immediately upon the signing of this Agreement.
   e. Each DCO will be continuously staffed by a team of up to six officers from each side, comprising one commander and five duty officers.
   f. The DCOs will be operated jointly by both sides, 24 hours a day. At least one duty officer from each side, as well as the necessary number of assistants, will be present during each eight-hour shift.
   g. With a view to preventing friction and to enabling the two sides to deal with possible incidents, both sides shall ensure that the relevant DCO shall immediately be notified of any of the following events:
      (1) routine, scheduled or unscheduled activity or deployment by the Israeli military forces or the Palestinian Police that directly affects the security responsibility of the other side. This includes activity or deployment in the proximity of Settlements or Palestinian populated localities, as the case may be;
      (2) events that pose a threat to public order;
      (3) activities that disturb the regular flow of traffic on the main roads, including roadblocks and roadworks;
      (4) incidents involving both Israelis and Palestinians, such as road accidents, rescue of casualties or persons in mortal danger, engagement steps or any incident in which a weapon is used;
      (5) a terrorist action of any kind and from any source;
      (6) infiltrations between the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel; and
      (7) all cases in which Israelis are hospitalized in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, or in which Palestinians of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip are hospitalized in Israel.
   h. Each DCO shall notify the relevant Israeli and Palestinian headquarters, as well as the Joint Patrols operating in the relevant district, of the occurrence of any of the events listed in subparagraph g. above.
   i. The JSC may modify the content of the list of events included in subparagraph g. Above.
   j. Any event involving injury to Israelis, at any location within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, shall be immediately reported to Israel through the relevant DCO. Israel may employ any means necessary for the evacuation and treatment of such injured persons, and will coordinate such activity through the relevant DCO.
   k. The DCOs shall be equipped with the necessary means of communication to enable direct and immediate contact both with the Joint Patrols and the relevant RSC, as well as with each side’s respective police or military district headquarters.

4. Joint Patrols
   a. The mission of the Joint Patrols shall be to assist in ensuring free, unimpeded and secure movement along the roads designated in Articles V and VI below.
   b. Unless the JSC decides otherwise, the Joint Patrols shall each be composed of two 4-wheel drive vehicles, one Palestinian and one Israeli, equipped with adequate communications systems. The vehicles shall be marked so as to be easily distinguishable from all other vehicles in the area. In each vehicle there will be an officer and three uniformed and armed guards.
c. The Joint Patrols will patrol 24 hours a day, in vehicles along their routes of activity, or as directed by the relevant DCO. Joint Patrols on the Lateral Roads in the Gaza Strip will also patrol on foot along their routes of activity, and on the adjacent sides of the roads upon which the security of the traffic along these roads is dependent.
d. On roads under Israeli security responsibility, the Israeli vehicle will be the leading vehicle. On roads under Palestinian security responsibility, the Palestinian vehicle will be the leading vehicle. The Joint Patrols will be under the direction of the relevant DCO.
e. The Joint Patrols shall continuously monitor movement within their area of operation and shall act to prevent and deal with incidents that may threaten or endanger persons using the roads. They shall report any such incident or threat thereof, as well as any action taken, to the relevant DCO, and to the respective Israeli military and Palestinian police district headquarters.
f. On reaching the scene of an incident, the Joint Patrol will take all measures necessary to deal with the incident, and provide assistance as necessary. The Joint Patrol shall verify that the appropriate measures have been taken and report to the relevant DCO accordingly.

5. Joint Mobile Units
a. The mission of the Joint Mobile Units (hereinafter "JMUs") is to provide rapid response in the event of incidents and emergency situations, in order to ensure free, unimpeded and secure movement along their designated routes of activity, or in their areas of activity.
b. The composition of the JMUs will be similar to that of the Joint Patrols.
c. In areas under Israeli security responsibility, the Israeli vehicle will be the leading vehicle. In areas under Palestinian security responsibility, the Palestinian vehicle will be the leading vehicle. The Joint Mobile Units will be under the direction of the relevant DCO.
d. The functions of the JMUs are:
   (1) to monitor movement along their designated routes of activity from their stationary locations, from where they may patrol on agreed roads as directed by the relevant DCO, in which case their duties will be the same as those of the Joint Patrols;
   (2) in the event of an incident involving both Israelis and Palestinians, to reach the site of the incident in order to provide assistance and to investigate; and
   (3) any other function determined by the relevant DCO.

6. Joint Liaison Bureaus
Joint Liaison Bureaus established by the two sides shall operate at crossing points and at terminals as described in Articles V, VI and VIII of this Annex.

7. Other joint activities may be agreed upon in the JSC and/or the RSC.

Article IV: The Palestinian Police
1. Duties and Functions
As detailed in the Palestinian law, the Palestinian Police shall carry out its duties and functions in accordance with this Agreement as follows:
a. maintaining internal security and public order;
b. protecting the public and all other persons present in the areas, as well as protecting their property, and acting to provide a feeling of security, safety and stability;
c. adopting all measures necessary for preventing crime in accordance with the law;
d. protecting public installations, infrastructure and places of special importance;
e. preventing acts of harassment and retribution;
f. combating terrorism and violence, and preventing incitement to violence; and
ɡ. performing any other normal police functions.

2. Structure and Composition
a. The Palestinian Police shall consist of one integral unit under the control of the Council. It shall be composed of six branches:
   (1) Civil Police (Al Shurta);
(2) Public Security;
(3) Preventive Security;
(4) Amn Al Ri‘asah;
(5) Intelligence; and
(6) Emergency Services and Rescue (Al Difa‘a Al Madani).
In each district, all members of the six Police branches shall be subordinate to one central command.
b. The Palestinian Police shall have a Palestinian Coastal Police unit in accordance with Article XIV of this Annex.

3. Deployment
a. During the interim period, the total number of policemen of the Palestinian Police in all its branches in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be no more than 30,000 out of which up to 12,000 policemen may be deployed in the West Bank and up to 18,000 policemen in the Gaza Strip. These numbers may be changed by agreement, if necessary. The Palestinian side will notify Israel of the names of the policemen recruited to the Palestinian Police in the Gaza Strip.
b. In accordance with the stages of the first phase of redeployment of Israeli forces in the West Bank, up to 6,000 of the above-mentioned 12,000 Palestinian policemen may be deployed in the West Bank in Area A and, as set out in paragraph 3 of Article V, in Area B, as detailed in Appendix 2.
c. The remaining 6,000 Palestinian policemen will be deployed in the West Bank according to the phases of the further redeployments or as needed, as agreed upon by the two Parties.
d. The Palestinian Police shall be deployed as shown on attached map Nos. 3 and 5.

4. Recruitment
a. The Palestinian Police shall consist of policemen recruited locally, and from abroad (from among individuals holding Jordanian passports or Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). The number of Palestinian recruits from abroad shall not exceed 5,000 in the West Bank and 7,000 in the Gaza Strip.
b. Palestinian policemen coming from abroad may be accompanied by their spouse and sons and daughters.
c. The Palestinian policemen to be recruited pursuant to this Agreement shall be West Bank or Gaza Strip residents who will be duly trained to perform police functions.
d. The Palestinian side will notify Israel of any candidate for recruitment to the Palestinian Police. Should Israel object to the recruitment of any such candidate, that person shall not be recruited.
e. In accordance with Palestinian law, the employment of policemen who have been convicted of serious crimes, or have been found to be actively involved in terrorist activities subsequent to their recruitment, will be immediately terminated, and their weapons and police identification documentation will be confiscated.

5. Arms, Ammunition and Equipment
a. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, uniformed policemen may carry arms, and plainclothes policemen on duty who hold special accreditation may carry personal light arms concealed in their clothing, in accordance with this Agreement.
b. In the West Bank, the Palestinian Police will possess the following arms and equipment:
   (1) up to 4,000 rifles;
   (2) up to 4,000 pistols;
   (3) up to 120 machine guns of 0.3” or 0.5” caliber; and
   (4) up to 15 light, unarmed riot vehicles of a type to be agreed on between the two sides in the JSC.
c. In the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Police will possess the following arms and equipment:
   (1) 7,000 light personal weapons;
   (2) up to 120 machine guns of 0.3” or 0.5” caliber; and
   (3) up to 45 wheeled armored vehicles of a type to be agreed on between the two sides, and of which 22 will be deployed in protecting Council installations. The use of wheeled armored vehicles in the Security Perimeter, on the Lateral Roads and on their adjacent sides, or in the vicinity of the Settlements shall be approved through the relevant DCO. Movement of such vehi-
cles along the central North-South road (Road No. 4) in the Gaza Strip may take place only after providing notification to the relevant DCO.

d. The number of arms or items of equipment specified in subparagraphs b. and c. above may be increased subject to the agreement of both sides.

e. The Palestinian Police will maintain an updated register of all weapons held by its personnel.

f. The Palestinian Police may possess communication systems, subject to Article 36 of Annex III, and distinctive uniforms, identification badges and vehicle markings.

g. In this Annex, the term "weapons" includes firearms, ammunition and explosives of all kinds.

6. Introduction of Arms, Equipment and Foreign Assistance

a. All foreign contributions and other forms of assistance to the Palestinian Police must comply with the provisions of this Agreement.

b. The introduction of arms, ammunition or equipment intended for the Palestinian Police shall be coordinated through the JSC, in accordance with its established practices.

7. Movement

Movement of Palestinian policemen between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be conducted in accordance with Article X of this Annex.

Article V: Security Arrangements in the West Bank

1. Coordination and Cooperation in the West Bank

As shown on map No. 4, eight DCOs will function in the West Bank, as follows:

a. a DCO for the Jenin District, located at the Quabatiya junction or in its vicinity;

b. a DCO for the Nablus District, located at the Hawara Junction;

c. a DCO for the Tulkarm District, located at the Kaddouri Junction;

d. a DCO for the Qalqilya District located at Tsufin Junction;

e. a DCO for the Ramallah District, located at the Beth El junction or in its vicinity;

f. a DCO for the Bethlehem District, located at the Panorama Hills in Beit Jala;

g. a DCO for the Hebron District, located at Har Manoakh (Jabal Manoah); and

h. a DCO for the Jericho District, located at Vered Yericho, that will maintain a subordinate Joint Liaison Bureau in the Allenby Terminal.

2. Area A

a. The Council will, upon completion of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in each district, as set out in Appendix 1 to this Annex, assume the powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area A in that district.

b. Jewish Holy Sites

(1) The following provisions will apply with respect to the security arrangements in Jewish holy sites in Area A which are listed in Appendix 4 to this Annex:

(a) While the protection of these sites, as well as of persons visiting them, will be under the responsibility of the Palestinian Police, a JMU shall function in the vicinity of, and on the access routes to, each such site, as directed by the relevant DCO.

(b) The functions of each such JMU shall be as follows:

(i) to ensure free, unimpeded and secure access to the relevant Jewish holy site; and

(ii) to ensure the peaceful use of such site, to prevent any potential instances of disorder and to respond to any incident.

(c) Given the Jewish religious nature of such sites, Israeli plainclothes guards may be present inside such sites.

(2) The present situation and the existing religious practices shall be preserved.

c. Clarifications Concerning the Jericho Area:

With regard to the definition of the Jericho Area, as delineated on attached map No. 1, it is hereby clarified that Route No. 90 crossing Auja from South to North and the East-West road connecting Route No. 90 with Yitav, and their adjacent sides, shall remain under Israeli authority.
For the purpose of this Article, the width of each such road and its adjacent sides, as shown on attached map No. 1, shall extend at least 12 meters on each side measured from its center.

3. Areas B and C

a. There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces from Area B. Israel will transfer to the Council and the Council will assume responsibility for public order for Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.

b. In Area B the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public order for Palestinians and shall be deployed in order to accommodate the Palestinian needs and requirements in the following manner:

1. The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 police stations and posts in towns, villages, and other places listed in Appendix 3 to this Annex and as delineated on map No. 3. The West Bank RSC may agree on the establishment of additional police stations and posts, if required.

2. The Palestinian Police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents in which only Palestinians are involved.

3. The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in populated places where police stations and posts are located, as set out in paragraph b.1 above.

4. While the movement of uniformed Palestinian policemen in Area B outside places where there is a Palestinian police station or post will be carried out after coordination and confirmation through the relevant DCO, three months after the completion of redeployment from Area B, the DCOs may decide that movement of Palestinian policemen from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian towns and villages in Area B on roads that are used only by Palestinian traffic will take place after notifying the DCO.

5. The coordination of such planned movement prior to confirmation through the relevant DCO shall include a scheduled plan, including the number of policemen, as well as the type and number of weapons and vehicles intended to take part. It shall also include details of arrangements for ensuring continued coordination through appropriate communication links, the exact schedule of movement to the area of the planned operation, including the destination and routes thereto, its proposed duration and the schedule for returning to the police station or post. The Israeli side of the DCO will provide the Palestinian side with its response, following a request for movement of policemen in accordance with this paragraph, in normal or routine cases within one day and in emergency cases no later than 2 hours.

6. The Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces will conduct joint security activities on the main roads as set out in this Annex.

7. The Palestinian Police will notify the West Bank RSC of the names of the policemen, number plates of police vehicles and serial numbers of weapons, with respect to each police station and post in Area B.

8. Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security responsibility to the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be carried out in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Council, except for the issues of permanent status negotiations and of Israel's overriding responsibility for Israelis and borders.

9. The procedures detailed in this paragraph will be reviewed within six months of the completion of the first phase of redeployment.

4. Joint Patrols

a. Joint Patrols led by a Palestinian vehicle will operate on each of the following roads, as indicated on map No. 4:

1. the main north-south road (Route No. 60) crossing Jenin;
2. the main north-south road (Route No. 60) crossing Nablus;
3. the main east-west road (Route Nos. 57 and 60) crossing Nablus;
4. the main east-west road (Route No. 57) crossing Tulkarm;
5. the main east-west road (Route No. 55) crossing Qalqilya;
6. the main north-south road (Route No. 60) crossing Ramallah;
(7) the main east-west road (Route No. 3) crossing Ramallah;
(8) the main north-south road (Route No. 60) crossing Bethlehem;
(9) the main east-west road crossing Beit Jala;
(10) the main north-south road (Route No. 90) crossing Jericho; and
(11) the road crossing Hebron, as set out in Article VII (Hebron) below.

The operation of the Joint Patrols in each district will commence after the completion of redeployment in the respective district.

b. Each DCO will be allowed, within 3 months after the completion of the redeployment in its respective district, to decide that Joint Patrols will function on roads crossing areas A, B and C.

5. Joint Mobile Units
a. Joint Mobile Units will operate in Area B and will be led by the Israeli vehicle. Three such Joint Mobile Units shall be located at each DCO. One will be on alert 24 hours a day. The two others will perform missions as directed by the DCO during daylight hours.

b. A Joint Mobile Unit shall be located at the Auja junction being the intersection of Route No. 90 and the road to Yitav. This unit shall be led by the Israeli vehicle, and may be directed by the DCO to deal with certain incidents occurring on the road between Auja and Jericho in which Palestinians are involved.

c. A Joint Mobile Unit shall be located at the Nahal Elisha junction on the road from Jericho to the Mousa Allami project.

6. Movement of Palestinian Policemen
Movement of uniformed policemen, whether armed or unarmed, as well as armed on-duty plain-clothes policemen, in Area C, will be confirmed and coordinated by the relevant DCO. Movement of such policemen between Area A and Area B will be approved by the relevant DCO.

7. Rachel's Tomb
a. Without derogating from Palestinian security responsibility in the City of Bethlehem, the two sides hereby agree on the following security arrangements regarding Rachel’s Tomb which will be considered a special case during the Interim Period:

   (1) While the Tomb, as well as the main road leading from Jerusalem to the Tomb, as indicated on map No.1, will be under the security responsibility of Israel, the free movement of Palestinians on the main road will continue.

   (2) For the purpose of protecting the Tomb, three Israeli guard posts may be located in the Tomb, the roof of the Waqf building, and the parking lot.

b. The present situation and existing practices in the Tomb shall be preserved.

Article VI: Security Arrangements in the Gaza Strip

1. The Delimiting Line
a. For the purpose of the present Agreement only, and without prejudice to the permanent status negotiations on borders, the line delimiting the northern and eastern edge of the Gaza Strip follows the fence on the ground, as delineated on attached map No. 2 by an unbroken green line (hereinafter "the Delimiting Line") and shall have no other effect.

b. The Parties reaffirm that, as long as this Agreement is in force, the security fence between the Gaza Strip and Israel shall remain in place, and that the line demarcated by the fence shall be authoritative only for the purpose of this Agreement.

2. Security Perimeter
a. There will be a security perimeter along the Delimiting Line inside the Gaza Strip as delineated on attached map No. 2 by a broken green line (hereinafter "the Security Perimeter").

b. In accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, the Palestinian Police will be responsible for security in the Security Perimeter.

c. The Palestinian Police will enforce special security measures aimed at preventing infiltrations across the Delimiting Line or the introduction into the Security Perimeter of any arms, ammunition or related equipment, except for the arms, ammunition or equipment of the Palestinian Police, authorized through the relevant DCO.
Activities of the Palestinian Police inside the Security Perimeter will be coordinated through the relevant DCO. Security activities in Israel in the vicinity of the Delimiting Line that directly affect the other side will be coordinated with the Palestinian Police through the relevant DCO.

3. The Israeli Settlements
a. In accordance with the DOP, during the interim period, the Gush Katif and Erez settlement areas, as well as the other settlements in the Gaza Strip, as delineated on attached map No. 2 by a blue line, will be under Israeli authority.
b. Palestinians will be free to move along the coast road and along the road from the Netzarim Junction to the seashore.

4. The Yellow Area
a. In the areas delineated by a broken red line and shaded in yellow in attached map No. 2 (hereinafter “the Yellow Area”), and without derogating from Palestinian authority, responsibility will be shared as follows: the Israeli authorities will have the overriding responsibility and powers for security, and the Council will have the responsibility and powers for civil affairs, subject to this Agreement. In addition, with regard to the Yellow Area, cooperation and coordination in security matters, including Joint Patrols, as agreed, will be implemented.
b. Entry of Palestinian policemen into the Yellow Area and their activity therein may take place as agreed upon through the relevant DCO.
c. Without derogating from the above, while the Palestinian side shall have responsibility and powers for public order for Palestinians in the Mawasi Area, Israel shall retain the responsibility and powers for internal security. Accordingly, the area shall be treated as Area B throughout the interim period in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article V above. For the purpose of exercising Palestinian public order responsibility and powers, Palestinian uniformed Civil Police (Al Shurta) policemen may enter the Mawasi Area after coordination and confirmation of their movement and activity through the relevant DCO.

c. The Mawasi Area
a. As shown on map No. 2, two Joint Patrols will operate in the Mawasi area, the fishermen's wharves of Rafah and Khan Yunis and along the coast road, led by the Israeli vehicle.
b. Access of Palestinians to the Mawasi area, as delineated on attached map No. 2, will be by the following roads:
   (1) Rafah - Tel Sultan - Mawasi;
   (2) Khan Yunis - El Bahr Village; and
   (3) Deir El Ballah - along the beach to the Mawasi.
c. The Mawasi Beach
   (1) Notwithstanding Israeli authority over the Gush Katif settlement area, the Council may operate sections of the Mawasi beach extending to the east up to the coast road, totaling, together with the Rafah and Khan Yunis wharves, five (5) kilometers. Israel has notified the Palestinian Authority of the locations of these sections.
   (2) These sections may be used for the following purposes:
      (a) sport and recreation, including boat hire facilities;
      (b) operating food establishments;
      (c) enlarging the wharves;
      (d) expanding the facilities for fishermen, such as offices, warehouses and cold storage facilities; and
      (e) an hotel.
   (3) In these sections, the Council, in exercising its civil authority, will be able to grant licenses for businesses, collect fees and taxes, set and enforce public health standards and develop and manage the tourist sector.
   (4) In each of the fishermen's wharves, the Council may have an office building which shall be protected.
   (5) There will not be any construction by Israelis of new sites along the beach.
   (6) During a period of three months from the signing of this Agreement, Israel may consider, in light of the security situation, the use by the Council of additional beach sections
6. The Egyptian Border
The Military Installation Area along the Egyptian border in the Gaza Strip, as delineated on attached map No. 2 by a blue line and shaded in pink, will be under Israeli authority. The village of Dahaniya will remain part of the Military Installation Area pending a declaration of a general amnesty for the residents of the village, and provision having been made for their protection. Upon realization of the above amnesty and protection, the village of Dahaniya will become part of the Yellow Area.

7. Lateral Roads to the Settlements
a. Without derogating from Palestinian authority and in accordance with the Declaration of Principles:
   1. On the three lateral roads connecting the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip to Israel, namely: the Kissufim-Gush Katif road; the Sufa-Gush Katif road; and the Karni-Netzarim road, as indicated by a light blue line on attached map No. 2, including the adjacent sides upon which the security of traffic along these roads is dependent (hereinafter "the Lateral Roads"), the Israeli authorities will have all necessary responsibilities and powers in order to conduct independent security activity, including Israeli patrols.
   2. Joint Patrols will operate along the Lateral Roads. Such joint patrols will be led by the Israeli vehicle.
   3. Where the Israeli authorities carry out engagement steps, they will do so with a view to transferring, at the earliest opportunity, the continued handling of the incidents falling within the Palestinian responsibility, to the Palestinian Police.
   4. Overpasses will be constructed on intersections between the Lateral Roads and the central North-South road (Road No. 4).

b. Where the Lateral Roads overlap the Security Perimeter, the two sides, in the exercise of their respective powers and responsibilities, will fully coordinate their activity in order to prevent friction.

8. The Central North-South Road (Road No. 4)
A Joint Patrol led by the Palestinian vehicle will be operated along the central North-South road (Road No. 4) in the Gaza Strip between Kfar Darom and Wadi Gaza.

9. Joint Mobile Units
a. Joint Mobile Units will be located at the following junctions:
   1. the Nissanit junction;
   2. the Netzarim junction;
   3. the Deir el-Ballah junction; and
   4. the Sufa-Morag junction.

b. At the Netzarim junction, the Israeli side of this Joint Mobile Unit will check Israeli vehicles, which will then be able to continue their journey without interference. This Joint Mobile Unit will also operate as a Joint Patrol between the Netzarim junction and Wadi Gaza under the direction of the relevant DCO.

10. Coordination and Cooperation in the Gaza Strip
Two DCOs will function in the Gaza Strip as follows:
   a. A DCO for the Gaza district, located at the Erez crossing point with subordinate Joint Liaison Bureaus at the Erez and Nahal Oz crossing points.
   b. A DCO for the Khan Yunis district, located at the Nuriya Camp with subordinate Joint Liaison Bureaus at the Sufa crossing points and at the Rafah Terminal.

Article VII - Guidelines for Hebron
1. a. There will be a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the city of Hebron except for places and roads where arrangements are necessary for the security and protection of Israelis and their movements. The areas of such redeployment are delineated by red and blue lines and shaded in orange stripes on a yellow background on attached map No. 9 (hereinafter "Area H-1").
   b. This redeployment will be completed not later than six months after the signing of this Agreement.
2. a. The Palestinian Police will assume responsibilities in Area H-1 similar to those in other cities in the West Bank.
   b. All civil powers and responsibilities, set out in Annex III of this Agreement, will be transferred to the Council in the City of Hebron as in the other cities in the West Bank.
   c. Palestinian police stations or posts will be established in Area H-1, manned by a total of up to 400 policemen, equipped with 20 vehicles and armed with 200 pistols, and 100 rifles for the protection of those stations.
d. The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in Area H-1. Any activity or movement by it outside this area will be carried out after coordination and confirmation through the DCO established in paragraph 6 of this Article.

e. The Imara will be turned over to the Palestinian side upon the completion of the redeployment, and will become the headquarters of the Palestinian Police in the city of Hebron.

3. According to the DOP, Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

4. a. In the area of the city of Hebron from which Israel military forces will not redeploy, as delineated by red and blue lines on attached map No. 9 (hereinafter "Area H-2"), Israel will retain all powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order.

b. In Area H-2, the civil powers and responsibilities will be transferred to the Council, except for those relating to Israelis and their property which shall continue to be exercised by Israeli Military Government.

c. In Area H-2, plainclothes unarmed municipal inspectors will monitor and enforce vis-a-vis Palestinians, compliance with the laws and regulations, within the civil powers and responsibilities transferred to the Council in Hebron.

5. The municipality of Hebron will continue to provide all municipal services to all parts of the city of Hebron.

6. a. A DCO will be located at Har Manoakh (Jabal Manoah).

b. Upon completion of the redeployment of Israeli military forces, a JMU will operate throughout the city of Hebron, including in the Old City, if required to do so by the abovementioned DCO.

c. A Joint Patrol will function in Hebron on the road from Ras e-Jura to the north of the Dura junction via E-Salaam road and on Route No. 35.

d. Three months after the completion of the redeployment, the DCO will consider the reassignment of the Joint Patrol to other parts of Hebron.

7. Measures and procedures for normalizing life in the Old City and on the roads of Hebron will be taken immediately after the signing of this Agreement, as follows:

a. opening of the wholesale market- Hasbahe, as a retail market;

b. removal of the barrier on the road leading from Abu Sneineh to Shuhada Road in order to facilitate the movement on these roads;

c. reopening of the main entrance to the Islamic College;

d. replacement of the closed roadblock at the Ras e-Jura junction by a normally open traffic supervision system;

e. replacement of the roadblock at the Harsina junction by a regular position;

f. opening of the route from the Sa’air Shiukh road to Hebron;

g. opening of the Tnuva Road; and

h. removal of the two barriers in the vicinity of the Raranta School near the North Dura junction.

8. A high level Joint Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with the security situation in Hebron after completion of the redeployment.

9. a. Since the two sides are unable to reach agreement regarding the Tomb of the Patriarchs / Al Haram Al Ibrahimi, they have agreed to keep the present situation as is.

b. Three months after the redeployment the high level Joint Liaison Committee will review the situation.

10. There will be a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). Both sides will agree on the modalities of the TIPH, including the number of its members and its area of operation.

11. Immediately after the completion of the redeployment, measures must be taken to ensure a stable and secure situation throughout the Hebron area, free from efforts to undermine this Agreement or the peace process.

12. Hebron will continue to be one city, and the division of security responsibility will not divide the city.

Article VIII: Passages

I. General

a. While Israel remains responsible during the interim period for external security, including along the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, border crossing shall take place according to the arrangements included in this Article. These arrangements aim at creating a mechanism that facilitates
the entry and exit of people and goods, reflecting the new reality created by the DOP, while providing full security for both sides.

b. The arrangements included in this Article shall apply to the following border crossings:
   (1) the Allenby Bridge crossing; and
   (2) the Rafah crossing.

c. A joint Israeli-Palestinian committee will decide on applying the arrangements included in this Article to the Damya Bridge crossing and, in parallel, on alternatives.

d. The provisions of the Protocol Regarding Arrangements with Respect to Passages, signed on October 31, 1994 in Casablanca, as amended and attached to this Annex as Appendix 5 (hereinafter “Appendix 5”), will continue to be applicable for the duration of this Agreement, unless otherwise agreed upon. Immediately upon the signing of this Agreement, the CAC shall review the amended Protocol and, in this context, consider the Palestinian request that with regard to the administration of the passages, the Israel Airport Authority be replaced by the Israeli military government.

e. The same arrangements will be applied by the Parties, with the necessary adjustments, to agreed seaports, airports or other international crossings, such as the Abdullah bridge.

f. The two sides are determined to do their utmost to maintain the dignity of persons passing through the border crossings. To this end, the mechanism created will rely heavily on brief and modern procedures.

g. In each border crossing there will be one terminal, consisting of two wings. The first wing will serve Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and visitors to these areas (hereinafter "the Palestinian Wing"). The second wing will serve Israelis and others (hereinafter "the Israeli Wing"). There will be a closed Israeli checking area and a closed Palestinian checking area, as set out below.

h. Special arrangements applicable to VIPs crossing through the Palestinian Wing, are set out in Appendix 5.

2. Control and Management of the Passages

a. For the purpose of this Article, "passage" is defined to mean the area from the crossing barrier at the Egyptian border or the Allenby Bridge, passing through and including the terminal and:
   (1) with regard to the Allenby Bridge crossing, from the terminal up to the Jericho Area; and
   (2) with regard to the Rafah crossing, from the terminal up to the outer limit of the Israel military location along the Egyptian border.

b. (1) Israel will have the responsibility for security throughout the passage, including for the terminal.
   (2) An Israeli director-general will have the responsibility for the management and security of the terminal.
   (3) The director-general will have two deputies who will report to him:
      a) an Israeli deputy who will be the manager of the Israeli Wing. Israel will have exclusive responsibility for the management of the Israeli Wing; and
      b) a Palestinian deputy, appointed by the Council, who will be the manager of the Palestinian Wing.
   (4) Each deputy will have an assistant for security and an assistant for administration. The assignments of the Palestinian deputies for security and administration are set out in Appendix 5.
   (5) The Palestinian deputy director-general at the Allenby Bridge terminal will be able to travel between this terminal and the Jordanian terminal for the purpose of exercising his functions.
   (6) There will be maximum coordination between the two sides. Both sides will maintain cooperation and coordination on matters of mutual concern.
   (7) The director-general will continue to use Palestinian contractors to provide bus services and other administrative and logistical services.
   (8) Palestinian policemen present at the terminal will be armed with handguns. Their deployment is set out in Appendix 5. Other Palestinian officials present at the terminal will be unarmed.
   (9) The details of management and security including those relating to the Liaison Bureau referred to in subparagraph 5 below, are set out in Appendix 5.
   (10) The two sides will work together in order to seek ways for additional arrangements in the Rafah terminal.
c. Except for all the arrangements included in this Article, the current procedures and arrangements applicable outside the terminal shall continue to apply throughout the passage.

d. (1) Once incoming passengers have crossed the terminal, they will proceed to the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, as appropriate, without any interference from Israeli authorities (safe passage).

(2) Outgoing passengers may proceed to the terminal without any interference from Israeli authorities after joint verification that such passengers hold the necessary documentation for exiting the area to Jordan or Egypt, as set out in this Agreement.

3. Arrangements for Entry from Egypt and Jordan Through the Palestinian Wing

a. At the entrance to the Palestinian Wing there will be a Palestinian policeman and a raised Palestinian flag.

b. Before entering the Palestinian Wing, passengers will identify their personal luggage and it will be placed on a conveyor belt. Each side will be able to inspect such luggage inside its own checking area, using its own personnel and, if necessary, may open the luggage for inspection in the presence of the owner and a Palestinian policeman.

c. Persons entering the Palestinian Wing will pass through a magnetic gate. An Israeli policeman and a Palestinian policeman will be posted on each side of this gate. In the event of suspicion, each side will be entitled to require a physical inspection to be conducted in inspection booths to be located adjacent to the gate. Passengers will be inspected by a Palestinian policeman in the presence of an Israeli policeman. Accompanying personal belongings may also be inspected at this point.

d. Having completed the above phase, persons entering the Palestinian Wing will pass through one of two lanes for the purpose of identification and document control, as follows:

(1) The first lane will be used by Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These passengers will pass via a Palestinian counter, where their documents and identity will be checked. Their documents will be checked by an Israeli officer who will also check their identity indirectly in an invisible manner.

(2) The second lane will serve visitors to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These passengers will first pass via an Israeli counter, where their documents and identity will be checked. Then they will continue via Palestinian counter, where their documents and identity will be checked. The two counters will be separated by tinted glass and a revolving door.

e. In the event of suspicion regarding a passenger in any of the two lanes described in subparagraph d. above, each side may question such passengers in its closed checking area. Suspicion justifying questioning in the closed checking area may be one of the following:

(1) the passenger was involved, directly or indirectly, in criminal or planned criminal activity, or in terrorist or planned terrorist activity, and is not a beneficiary of the amnesty provisions of this Agreement;

(2) the passenger conceals arms, explosives or related equipment;

(3) the passenger holds forged or non-valid documentation or the details included in the documentation are inconsistent with those included in the population registry (in case of a resident) or in the data base (in case of a visitor), except that questions relating to such inconsistency will initially be raised at the counter and the passenger will be questioned in the closed checking area only if the suspicion has not been removed; or

(4) the passenger acts in an obviously suspicious behavior during the passage via the terminal.

If, at the conclusion of this questioning, the suspicion has not been removed, such passenger may be apprehended, after the other side has been notified. In case of a Palestinian suspect being apprehended by the Israeli side, a Palestinian policeman will be asked to meet with the suspect. Following notification to the Liaison Bureau, any further treatment of the apprehended person will be in accordance with Annex IV.

f. In the Palestinian Wing, each side will have the authority to deny the entry of persons who are not residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For the purpose of this Agreement, "residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip" means persons who, on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, are registered as residents of these areas in the population registry maintained by the military government of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and by the Council, as
well as persons who have subsequently obtained permanent residency in these areas with the approval of Israel, as set out in this Agreement.

g. Following the above procedure, the passengers will collect their luggage and proceed to the customs area as described in Annex V, and as set out in Appendix 5.
h. The Palestinian side will provide passengers whose entry is approved with an entry permit stamped by the Palestinian side and attached to their documents. At the conclusion of the direct and indirect checking of the documents and identity of passengers passing via the first lane and stamping their entry permits, the Palestinian officer will provide the passenger with a white card issued by the Israeli officer. A Palestinian official posted at the exit if the Palestinian Wing will verify that the passenger holds such white card and will collect the cards with indirect and invisible Israeli checking. For passengers going through the second lane, the Israeli officer will provide the passengers with a blue card, after checking their documents and identity, and verifying their entry permits. An Israeli and a Palestinian official posted at the exit of the Palestinian Wing will verify and collect the cards. White and blue cards collected will be checked by Israeli and Palestinian officials. In cases where either side denies the entry of a non-resident passenger, that passenger will be escorted out of the terminal and sent back to Jordan or Egypt, as appropriate, after notifying the other side.

4. Arrangements for Exit to Egypt and Jordan Through the Palestinian Wing
Passengers exiting to Egypt or Jordan through the Palestinian Wing will enter the terminal without their luggage. Thereafter, the same procedures described in paragraph 3 above will apply to them, except that the order of passing via the Israeli and Palestinian counters will be reversed.

5. Joint Liaison Bureau
a. There will be a Joint Liaison Bureau at each crossing point in order to deal with matters arising regarding passengers passing through the Palestinian Wing, issues regarding coordination, and differences regarding the implementation of these arrangements. Without derogating from Israel’s responsibility for security, the bureau will also deal with incidents.
b. This bureau will be comprised of an equal number of representatives from each side and will be located at a specified location inside each terminal.
c. This bureau will be subordinate to the relevant subcommittee of the CAC.

6. Miscellaneous
a. Special arrangements will be agreed upon by the two sides regarding the passage of goods, buses, trucks and privately-owned vehicles. Pending this Agreement, the current arrangements will continue to apply. The above-mentioned arrangements will be agreed upon within six months from the date of signing this Agreement.
b. In order to cross through the border crossings into and out of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, residents of these areas will use documents as detailed in Annex III.
c. The Allenby Bridge terminal will operate from Sunday through Thursday, between the hours of 08:00 and 24:00, and on Fridays and Saturdays, between the hours of 08:00 and 15:00, except on Yom Kippur.

Article IX: Movement Into, Within and Outside the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

1. General
a. Israel declares that work to relocate the Erez crossing point currently within the Gaza Strip to a location within Israel adjacent to the Delimiting Line, is underway. Israel will make every effort to complete this work as soon as possible. A joint Israeli-Palestinian committee will decide, within one month from the signing of this Agreement, the timeframe for completing this work and all related issues. Pending the completion of this work, Israel shall retain control over this crossing point and operate it in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
b. Israelis entering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall carry Israeli documentation (if they are above the age of 16) and, if driving a vehicle, a driving license and vehicle registration documentation recognized in Israel. Tourists to Israel entering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be subject to Palestinian laws in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, shall carry their passports and other relevant documentation, and may be required by the Palestinian Police to identify themselves by presenting their passport or documentation, unless otherwise provided in this Article.
c. Entry of persons from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel shall be subject to Israeli laws and procedures regulating entry into Israel, and residents of these areas shall be required to carry the identity card as agreed upon in this Agreement, as well as documentation specified by Israel and notified through the CAC to the Council.

d. The provisions of this Agreement shall not prejudice Israel’s right, for security and safety considerations, to close the crossing points to Israel and to prohibit or limit the entry into Israel of persons and of vehicles from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In addition, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prejudice the use of safe passage.

e. Tourists to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from countries having diplomatic relations with Israel, who have passed through an international crossing, will not be required to pass any additional entry control before entry into Israel.

2. Passage within the West Bank and between the West Bank and Israel

a. Without derogating from Israel’s security powers and responsibilities in accordance with this Agreement, movement of people, vehicles and goods in the West Bank, between cities, towns, villages and refugee camps, will be free and normal, and shall not need to be effected through checkpoints or roadblocks.

b. Movement between the West Bank and Israel shall be governed by the applicable laws, regulations and rules regulating the movement of persons and vehicles between the West Bank and Israel, while respecting the importance of the economic and social life, development programs and projects, and emergency health care services of the Palestinian population.

c. The Palestinian Police shall set up checkpoints in areas under its security responsibility on roads connecting the West Bank and Israel, for the purpose of inspection and identification of Palestinian vehicles and passengers, in order to prevent illegal introduction of weapons into or from Israel.

3. Passage between the Gaza Strip and Israel

a. Passage between the Gaza Strip and Israel will be via one or more of the following crossing points:
   (1) the Erez crossing point;
   (2) the Nahal Oz crossing point;
   (3) the Sufa crossing point; and
   (4) the Karni (commercial) crossing point (for goods only).

b. The Council may set up a checkpoint, within the Gaza Strip, on the road leading to the Erez crossing point and on the road leading to the Nahal Oz crossing point, at locations to be coordinated between the two sides, for the purpose of inspection and identification of passengers and vehicles. Israelis and tourists to Israel passing through these checkpoints may be only required to identify themselves by presenting Israeli documentation or a passport, as set out in subparagraph 1.b above. The above requirements shall not apply to uniformed members of the Israeli military forces.

c. The Council may set up a checkpoint, within the Gaza Strip, on the road leading to the Sufa crossing point, at a location acceptable to both sides, for the purpose of inspection and identification of Palestinian passengers and vehicles. Israeli vehicles may bypass this checkpoint unimpeded.

d. The Council will allow passage of Israeli and tourists to Israel between the Gaza Strip and Israel, in addition, via the following crossing points:
   (1) the Karni (non-commercial) crossing point;
   (2) the Kisufim crossing point;
   (3) the Kerem Shalom crossing point; and
   (4) the Elei Sinai crossing point.

e. Israelis, and tourists to Israel, who have passed through any of the above crossing points into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall not be required to undergo inspection, identification or other requirements in addition to the stated provisions for entry into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip outlined in this Article.

f. Arrangements for the movement of goods between the Gaza Strip and Israel through the crossing points are set out in Annex V.

g. A Palestinian liaison officer will be present at each of the crossing points on the Lateral Roads.
Article X: Safe Passage

1. General
   a. There shall be a safe passage connecting the West Bank with the Gaza Strip for movement of persons, vehicles and goods, as detailed in this Article.
   b. Israel will ensure safe passage for persons and transportation during daylight hours (from sunrise to sunset) or as otherwise agreed by the JSC, but in any event not less than 10 hours a day.
   c. Safe passage through Israel between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be effected via the following designated crossing points:
      (1) the Erez crossing point (for persons and vehicles only);
      (2) the Karni (commercial) crossing point (for goods only);
      (3) the Tarkumya crossing point; and
      (4) an additional crossing point around Mevo Horon.
   d. Israel will make such passage available through the routes indicated on attached map No. 6.
   e. Consistent with Article XXXI, paragraph 6 of the Agreement, the arrangements included in this Article are without prejudice to the permanent status negotiations.

2. Use of Safe Passage
   a. As detailed below, persons using the safe passage shall carry, in addition to personal and vehicle documentation, the following documents:
      (1) a safe passage card; and
      (2) (for drivers only) a vehicle safe passage permit.
      Arrangements for the implementation of the safe passage usage, as well as modalities for the issuance by Israel of safe passage cards and vehicle safe passage permits, shall be discussed and agreed in the JSC, in consultation with the CAC.
   b. Residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in possession of a permit enabling them to enter Israel will be able to use this permit as a safe passage card.
   c. Safe passage cards and vehicle safe passage permits shall be stamped by the Israeli authorities at the crossing point, with the time of departure from the crossing point and the estimated time of arrival.
   d. Israel may deny the use of its territory for safe passage by persons who have seriously or repeatedly violated the safe passage provisions detailed in this Article.
   e. Persons who are denied entry into Israel will use safe passage by means of shuttle buses which will be escorted by the Israel Police and which will operate from 7:00 AM to 2:00 PM on two days of every week. The exact date and times of such operation will be coordinated through the JSC. Applications by persons denied entry to Israel to use safe passage must be submitted to, and agreed upon in, the relevant DCO at least five days prior to the planned journey.
   f. Special arrangements will apply with respect to the passage of Palestinian leaders, senior Council officials, distinguished personalities and guests of the Ra'ees of the Council. The CAC will define the scope and nature of the special arrangements, in consultation with the JSC.
   g. The movement of Palestinian policemen on duty through the safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be coordinated through the JSC.
   h. Any additional matters relating to the usage of safe passage will be coordinated through the JSC.

3. Mode of Use of Safe Passage
   a. Persons and vehicles using safe passage under these arrangements shall neither break their journey nor depart from the designated routes, and shall complete the passage within the designated time stamped on their safe passage cards and permits, unless a delay is caused by a medical emergency or a technical breakdown.
   b. Persons using the safe passage through Israel shall be subject to Israeli law.
   c. Persons and vehicles using the safe passage shall not carry explosives, firearms or other weapons or ammunition, except for special cases that may be agreed in the JSC.

4. General Provisions Regarding the Safe Passage Routes
   a. The above arrangements shall in no way affect the status of the safe passage and its routes.
   b. The safe passage arrangements will not be available on Yom Kippur, Israel's Memorial Day and Israel's Independence Day.
c. Israel may, for security or safety reasons, temporarily halt the operation of a safe passage route or modify the passage arrangements while ensuring that one of the routes is open for safe passage. Notice of such temporary closure or modification shall be given to the JSC.

d. Israel shall notify the Council of incidents involving persons using safe passage routes, through the JSC.

Article XI: Rules of Conduct in Mutual Security Matters

1. Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms of human rights and the rule of law, and shall be guided by the need to protect the public, respect human dignity and avoid harassment.

2. Weapons

a. Each side shall enforce upon civilians, Palestinians or Israelis, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in accordance with their security responsibility, a prohibition on possession or carrying of weapons without a license.

b. The Palestinian Police may grant licenses to possess or carry pistols for civilian use. The modalities for granting such licenses, as well as categories of persons who may be granted such licenses, will be agreed upon in the JSC.

c. Upon the assumption of security responsibility, and in accordance with the Palestinian law, the Palestinian Police shall declare a period of grace of one month, during which period holders of unlicensed weapons will be required to declare that they hold such weapons and to apply for licenses. The Palestinian Police may grant such licenses in accordance with subparagraph b. above, and will enforce the Palestinian security policy set out in Article II, paragraph 1 of this Annex, against persons who hold unlicensed weapons.

d. Israelis may carry weapons licensed in accordance with subparagraph a. Above.

e. The Palestinian Police will maintain an updated register of all weapons licensed by it.

f. The Palestinian Police will prevent the manufacture of weapons as well as the transfer of weapons to persons not licensed to possess them.

g. The use of explosives in quarries and for other civilian purposes will be only in accordance with modalities and procedures agreed upon in the JSC.

3. Engagement Steps

a. For the purpose of this Article, “engagement” shall mean an immediate response to an act or an incident constituting a danger to life or property that is aimed at preventing or terminating such an act or incident, or at apprehending its perpetrators.

b. Within the territory under the security responsibility of the Council, in places where Israeli authorities exercise their security functions in accordance with this Annex and in their immediate vicinities, the Israeli authorities may carry out engagement steps in cases where an act or incident requires such action. In such cases, the Israeli authorities will take any measures necessary to bring to an end such an act or incident with a view to transferring, at the earliest opportunity, the continued handling of the incident falling within the Palestinian responsibility to the Palestinian Police. The Palestinian Police will immediately be notified, through the relevant DCO, of such engagement steps.

c. Engagement with the use of firearms in responding to such acts or incidents shall not be allowed, except as a last resort after all attempts at controlling the act or the incident, such as warning the perpetrator or shooting in the air, have failed, or are ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result in the circumstances. Use of firearms should be aimed at deterring or apprehending, and not at killing, the perpetrator. The use of firearms shall cease once the danger is past.

d. Any activity involving the use of firearms other than for immediate operational purposes shall be subject to prior notification to the relevant DCO.

e. If a person is injured or otherwise in need of assistance, such assistance will be provided by the side that first reaches the site. If such a person is under the security responsibility of the other side, the assisting side shall notify the relevant DCO and appropriate arrangements shall be made, pursuant to this Agreement, for treatment and hospitalization.
4. Rules of Conduct on Roads for Israelis
   a. Israeli military forces and Israeli civilians may continue to use roads freely within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
   b. On the main roads that are jointly patrolled, vehicles bearing Israeli license plates shall not be stopped except for identification, which shall be conducted by a Joint Patrol, pursuant to the provisions of Article III of this Annex. The Israeli side of such a patrol may carry out identity and vehicle documentation checks. In the event that a vehicle bearing a license plate issued by either the Council or the Civil Administration is stopped, the Palestinian side of the Joint Patrol may carry out identity and vehicle documentation checks.
   c. On other roads, vehicles bearing Israeli license plates shall not be stopped by the Palestinian Police, except that such vehicles may be stopped in the Gaza Strip, in Area A or in places in Area B where there is a police station or post, for the purpose of identification checks of the above-mentioned documentation.
   d. Israelis shall under no circumstances be apprehended or placed in custody or prison by Palestinian authorities. However, where an Israeli is suspected of having committed an offense, he or she may be detained in place by the Palestinian Police while ensuring his or her protection, in accordance with the provisions of Annex IV, until the arrival of a Joint Patrol, called immediately by the Palestinian Police, or of other Israeli representatives dispatched by the relevant DCO.
   e. Israeli pedestrians may be required to produce identity documentation (if above the age of sixteen). Thereafter, they shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
   f. Uniformed members of the Israeli military forces, as well as vehicles of the Israeli military forces, shall not be stopped by the Palestinian Police in any circumstances, and shall not be subject to any identification requirements. Without derogating from the above, in the event of suspicion regarding such a person or vehicle, the Palestinian Police may notify the Israeli authorities through the relevant DCO, in order to request appropriate assistance.
   g. Verification, pursuant to this Article, of the identity of persons who claim to be Israelis but cannot present appropriate identification documentation, will be confirmed by the Israeli side of a Joint Patrol, called by the Palestinian Police, or by other Israeli representatives dispatched by the relevant DCO.

Article XII: Security Arrangements Concerning Planning, Building and Zoning

   a. Notwithstanding the provisions relating to planning, building and zoning set out elsewhere in this Agreement, the provisions of this Article shall apply with respect to the areas specified below.
   b. These arrangements will be reviewed within a period of six months from the signing of this Agreement, and, thereafter, every six months, with a view to modifying them, with due consideration to Palestinian plans for establishing economic projects, and to the security concerns of both sides.
   c. The limitations set out below on the construction of buildings and installations in specific areas shall not require the demolition or removal of existing buildings or installations.

2. Provisions regarding the West Bank
   a. Buildings or installations shall not be constructed or erected and natural and artificial culture shall not be altered, on either side of the roads delineated in blue on map No. 7 up to a distance of 50 meters from the center of these roads.
   b. Bridges or other structures will not be built which may prevent the movement on roads of vehicles of a height of up to 5.25 meters.
   c. In the areas shaded in purple on map No. 7, construction will be limited to a height of 15 meters.
   d. Any buildings or installations constructed or erected contrary to this paragraph shall be dismantled.

3. Provisions regarding the Gaza Strip
   a. The existing buildings, installations and natural and artificial culture in the Gaza Strip within a distance of 100 meters from the Delimiting Line shall remain as they are at present.
   b. Within the next 500 meters of the Security Perimeter, and within the Yellow Area, buildings or installations may be constructed, provided that:
   c. one building or installation may be constructed on each plot, the size of which shall not be less than 25 dunams; and
d. such building or installation shall not exceed two floors, of a size not exceeding 180 sq. meters per floor. The Council shall maintain the predominantly agricultural character of the remaining areas of the Security Perimeter.

e. Buildings or installations shall not be constructed on either side of the Lateral Roads up to a distance of 75 meters from the center of these Roads.

f. For the purpose of enforcing this Article, the United States has provided both sides with satellite photographs of the Gaza Strip depicting the buildings, installations and natural and artificial culture existing at the time of the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement.

Article XIII: Security of the Airspace

1. Operation of aircraft for the use of the Council in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be initially as follows:
   a) Two (2) transport helicopters for VIP transportation within and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
   b) Up to 3 helicopters for the purpose of transport missions to approved landing pads.
   c) 3 fixed-wing transport aircraft with up to 35 persons capacity, for transporting persons between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

2. Changes in the number, type and capacity of aircraft may be discussed and agreed upon in a Joint Aviation Subcommittee of the JSC (hereinafter “the JAC”).

3. The Council may immediately establish and operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip provisional airstrips for the helicopters and fixed wing aircraft referred to in paragraph 1 above, in accordance with arrangements and modalities to be discussed and agreed upon in the JAC.

4. All aviation activity or use of the airspace by any aerial vehicle in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall require prior approval of Israel. It shall be subject to Israeli air traffic control including, inter alia, monitoring and regulation of air routes as well as relevant regulations and requirements to be implemented in accordance with the Israel Aeronautical Information Publication, the relevant parts of which will be issued after consultation with the Council.

5. Aircraft taking off from, and landing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be registered and licensed in Israel or in other states members of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Air crews of such aircraft shall be licensed in Israel or in such other states, provided that such licenses have been approved and recommended by the Council and validated by Israel.

6. Palestinian Civil Aviation and airline staff may be recruited locally and from abroad. The number of Palestinians recruited from abroad shall not exceed 400. This number may be changed by agreement, if necessary.

7. Aircraft referred to in this Article shall not carry firearms, ammunition, explosives or weapons systems, unless otherwise approved by both sides. Special arrangements for armed guards escorting high ranking officials, will be agreed upon in the JAC.

8. The location of navigational aids and other aviation equipment will be approved by Israel through the JAC.

9. a. The Council shall ensure that only the aviation activity in accordance with this Agreement will take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
   b. Further powers and responsibilities may be transferred to the Council through the JAC.
   c. The Council may establish a Palestinian Civil Aviation Department to act on its behalf in accordance with the provisions in this Article and of this Agreement.

10. a. Aviation activity by Israel will continue to be operated above the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with the same limitations applicable in Israel regarding civil and military flights over densely-populated areas.
    b. Israel will notify the Council of emergency rescue operations, searches and investigation of aerial accidents in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Searches and investigations of civilian aircraft accidents in which Palestinians or their property are involved, will be conducted by Israel with the participation of the Council.

11. Guided by the principle that the two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, as set out in Article IV of the DOP, and in order to enable the smooth operation of flights between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip:
a. The JAC will agree on special arrangements to facilitate flights of the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Ra'ees and his spouse, and family members of the Ra'ees, his body guards and VIPs when accompanying the Ra'ees will fly without prior inspection of their person, personal belongings, and luggage.
b. The minimum time of notification of VIPs, flights will be four hours. The notification will include the list of passengers.
c. Flights of other persons will be handled in accordance with the procedures agreed in the JAC.

12. Flights between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may be operated through the Gaza-Tel Aviv (sea shore) corridor. Monitoring and regulations of this air route will be discussed in the JAC.

13. Commercial, domestic and international air services to, from and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may be operated by Palestinian, Israeli or foreign operators approved by both sides, certified and licensed in Israel or in ICAO member states maintaining bilateral aviation relations with Israel. Arrangements for such air services, beginning with a service between Gaza and Cairo using two (2) fixed-wing aircraft with capacity up to fifty passengers each, as well as arrangements regarding the establishment and operation of airports and air terminals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, will be discussed and agreed upon by the two sides in the JAC. Any such international commercial air services will be carried out in accordance with Israel's bilateral aviation agreements. The implementation phase will be discussed and agreed on in the JAC.

Article XIV: Security along the Coastline to the Sea of Gaza

1. Maritime Activity Zones

a. Extent of Maritime Activity Zones: The sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip will be divided into three Maritime Activity Zones, K, L, and M as shown on map No. 8 attached to this Agreement, and as detailed below:

(1) Zones K and M

(a) Zone K extends to 20 nautical miles in the sea from the coast in the northern part of the sea of Gaza and 1.5 nautical miles wide southwards.
(b) Zone M extends to 20 nautical miles in the sea from the coast, and one (1) nautical mile wide from the Egyptian waters.
(c) Subject to the provisions of this paragraph, Zones K and M will be closed areas, in which navigation will be restricted to activity of the Israel Navy.

(2) Zone L

(a) Zone L bounded to the south by Zone M and to the north by Zone K extends 20 nautical miles into the sea from the coast.
(b) Zone L will be open for fishing, recreation and economic activities, in accordance with the following provisions:

i. Fishing boats will not exit Zone L into the open sea and may have engines of up to a limit of 25 HP for outboard motors and up to a maximum speed of 18 knots for inboard motors. Four months after the signing of this Agreement the Maritime Coordination and Cooperation Center (hereinafter “the MC”), as referred to in paragraph 3 below, will consider raising the limit for outboard motors up to 40 hp. in accordance with the types of the boats. The boats will neither carry weapons nor ammunition nor will they fish with the use of explosives.

ii. Recreational boats will be permitted to sail up to a distance of 6 nautical miles from the coast unless, in special cases, otherwise agreed within the Maritime Coordination and Cooperation Center as referred to in paragraph 3 below. Recreational boats may have engines up to a limit of 10 horsepower. Marine motor bikes and water jets will neither be introduced into Zone L nor be operated therein.

iii. Yachts may sail up to a distance of 6 nautical miles from the coast at a maximum speed of 15 knots.

iv. Foreign vessels entering Zone L will not approach closer than 12 nautical miles from the coast except as regards activities covered in paragraph 4 below.

b. General Rules of the Maritime Activity Zones

(1) The aforementioned fishing boats and recreational boats and their skippers sailing in Zone L shall carry licenses issued by the Council, the format and standards of which will be coordinated through the JSC.
(2) The boats shall have identification markings determined by the Council. The Israeli authorities will be notified through the JSC of these identification markings.

(3) Residents of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip fishing in Zone L will carry Israeli licenses and vessel permits.

(4) As part of Israel's responsibilities for safety and security within the three Maritime Activity Zones, Israel Navy vessels may sail throughout these zones, as necessary and without limitations, and may take any measures necessary against vessels suspected of being used for terrorist activities or for smuggling arms, ammunition, drugs, goods, or for any other illegal activity. The Palestinian Police will be notified of such actions, and the ensuing procedures will be coordinated through the MC.

2. The Palestinian Coastal Police
   a. The Palestinian Coastal police (hereinafter the "PCP") may function in Zone L, up to a distance of 6 nautical miles from the coast. In special cases, it may also exercise control over Palestinian fishing boats fishing in Zone L in an additional area of 6 nautical miles, up to the limit of 12 nautical miles from the coastline, after clearance and coordination through the MC.
   b. The PCP shall have up to 10 boats, with a displacement of up to 50 tons and maximum speed of up to 25 knots.
   c. The boats shall carry weapons of up to a 7.62 mm caliber.
   d. Boats of the PCP shall fly a Palestinian flag, have police identification markings and shall operate identification lights.
   e. The two sides shall cooperate on all sea matters, including mutual help at sea, and pollution and environmental issues.
   f. The boats of the Palestinian Coastal Police will initially use the Gaza Wharf.
   g. Boats belonging to Israelis are solely subject to the control, authority and jurisdiction of Israel and the Israel Navy.

3. Maritime Coordination and Cooperation Center
   a. The MC shall function as part of the JSC, to coordinate civil maritime activities and coastal police affairs off the coast of the Gaza Strip.
   b. The MC shall function within the relevant DCO, and will determine its own rules of procedure.
   c. The MC shall function 24 hours a day.
   d. The MC shall be staffed by members of the Israel Navy and the PCP, each providing a liaison officer and an assistant liaison officer.
   e. A direct radio telephone link (hot line) shall be set up between the Israel Navy vessels and the PCP vessels.
   f. The role of the MC is to coordinate:
      (1) assistance between the PCP and the Israel Navy as may be necessary to deal with incidents arising at sea;
      (2) PCP training involving the use of firearms;
      (3) joint activities between the PCP and the Israel Navy when pre-planning is operationally necessary;
      (4) radio contact between PCP and Israel Navy vessels in the event that "hot line" communication between vessels of the two sides has not been established;
      (5) search and rescue operations; and
      (6) maritime activities related to an agreed port, when established in the Gaza Strip.

4. Gaza Strip Port
   a. Plans for the establishment of a port in the Gaza Strip in accordance with the DOP, its location, and related matters of mutual interest and concern, as well as licenses for vessels and crews sailing on international voyages will be discussed and agreed upon between Israel and the Council taking into consideration the provisions of Article XXX (Passages) of this Agreement. To this end a special committee will be established by the two sides.
   b. The Gaza Sea Port Authority referred to in the DOP shall act on behalf of the Council in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
   c. Pending construction of a port, arrangements for entry and exit of vessels, passengers and goods by sea, as well as licenses for vessels and crews sailing on international voyages in transit to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, shall be through Israeli ports in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations applicable in Israel and in accordance with the provisions of Annex V.
Appendix 1: Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces

A. Stages of the First Phase of Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces Pursuant to Article I paragraph 1 of this Annex:

The first phase of Israeli military forces redeployment will commence 10 days after the signing of this Agreement. The Israeli Government intends to complete the first phase of redeployment in all areas but the area of Hebron by the end of December 1995, in which redeployment will be completed by six months after the signing of this Agreement. Within two weeks of the signing of this Agreement, the two sides will decide on a precise redeployment schedule on a district-by-district basis.

B. Phases of the Further Redeployments of Israeli Military Forces Pursuant to Article I.8 of this Annex, the further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will take place in phases as follows:

Phase 1 - Six months after the inauguration of the Council.
Phase 2 - Twelve months after the inauguration of the Council.
Phase 3 - Eighteen months after the inauguration of the Council.

Appendix 2: Deployment of Palestinian Policemen

1. Pursuant to paragraph 3.b of Article IV of this Annex, the details of the deployment of the 6,000 Palestinian policemen in Areas A and B will be as follows:

   (1) in the Jenin District: 1,000 policemen;
   (2) in the Tulkarm District: 400 policemen;
   (3) in the Qalqilia District: 400 policemen;
   (4) in the Nablus District: 1,200 policemen;
   (5) in the Ramallah District: 1,200 policemen;
   (6) in the Bethlehem District: 850 policemen;
   (7) in the Hebron District: 950 policemen including 400 policemen in the City of Hebron; and
   (8) in the Jericho District: 600 policemen that will be considered part of the number of policemen allocated to the Gaza Strip in accordance with Article IV of this Annex.

2. Changes in the numbers of policemen in each district during the further redeployment phases, when the number of policemen in the West Bank will increase to 12,000, will be agreed upon in the West Bank RSC.

Appendix 3: Police Stations and Posts in Area B

1. The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 Civil Police (Al Shurta) police stations and posts in the towns, villages and other places listed below and shown on map No. 3, with personnel and equipment as follows:

   a. Jenin District
      (1) El-Yamun: 50 policemen, 2 vehicles, 9 rifles, 17 pistols;
      (2) Mezithalun: 50 policemen, 2 vehicles, 9 rifles, 17 pistols;
      (3) Kaf Rai: 45 policemen, 2 vehicles, 8 rifles, 15 pistols;
      (4) Jalqamus: 45 policemen, 2 vehicles, 8 rifles, 15 pistols; and
      (5) Burqin: 45 policemen, 2 vehicles, 8 rifles, 15 pistols.

   b. Nablus District
      (1) Asirat A-Shumaliyya: 50 policemen, 2 vehicles, 9 rifles, 17 pistols;
      (2) Talouza: 45 policemen, 2 vehicles, 8 rifles, 15 pistols;
      (3) Tell: 30 policemen, 2 vehicles, 5 rifles, 10 pistols;
      (4) Talfit: 60 policemen, 2 vehicles, 12 rifles, 20 pistols;
      (5) Tamun: 50 policemen, 2 vehicles, 9 rifles, 17 pistols; and
      (6) Aqraba: 50 policemen, 2 vehicles, 9 rifles, 17 pistols.
c. Tulkarm and Qalqilya District
   (1) Shuweika: 45 policemen, 2 vehicles, 8 rifles, 15 pistols;
   (2) Kafr Zibad: 50 policemen, 2 vehicles, 9 rifles, 17 pistols;
   (3) Anabta: 50 policemen, 2 vehicles, 9 rifles, 17 pistols; and
   (4) Illar: 45 policemen, 2 vehicles, 8 rifles, 15 pistols.

d. Ramallah District
   (1) Arura: 50 policemen, 2 vehicles, 9 rifles, 17 pistols;
   (2) Deir Ghassana: 45 policemen, 2 vehicles, 8 rifles, 15 pistols;
   (3) Khirbat Abu Falah: 45 policemen, 2 vehicles, 8 rifles, 15 pistols; and
   (4) Bir Zeit: 70 policemen, 3 vehicles, 14 rifles, 23 pistols;

e. Bethlehem District Tuqua: 50 policemen, 3 vehicles, 9 rifles, 17 pistols.

f. Hebron District
   (1) Yata: 80 policemen, 3 vehicles, 15 rifles, 27 pistols;
   (2) Dhahiriyah: 70 policemen, 3 vehicles, 14 rifles, 23 pistols;
   (3) Nuba: 45 policemen, 2 vehicles, 8 rifles, 15 pistols;
   (4) Dura: 70 policemen, 3 vehicles, 14 rifles, 23 pistols; and
   (5) Bani-Naim: 45 policemen, 3 vehicles, 8 rifles, 17 pistols.

2. The rifles in each of these police stations will be used only for the purpose of guarding the police station. In special cases, where the use of rifles outside the police station is required for the exercise of public order responsibility, prior notification shall be given to the DCO.

Appendix 4 - Jewish Holy Sites
Pursuant to Article V of this Annex, the Jewish Holy Sites are as follows:
1. Joseph's Tomb (Nablus)
2. Shalom Al Israel synagogue (Jericho)

Appendix 5 - Protocol Regarding Arrangements with Respect to Passages (as amended)
Pursuant to paragraph 1.d of Article VIII to this Annex:

Section A – Definitions
For the purpose of this Protocol: a. "The Agreement" means the Interim Agreement;
   b. "Annex I" means Annex I to the Interim Agreement;
   c. All other terms will have the same meaning as in the Agreement.

Section B - Entry and Exit through the Palestinian Wing
Pursuant to Article VIII of Annex I to the Agreement, the following arrangements will apply with respect to the terminals at the Rafah and Allenby Bridge crossings:
1. Entry from Egypt and Jordan
   a. At the entrance to the Palestinian wing there will be a Palestinian policeman and a raised Palestinian flag.
   b. Before entering the Palestinian wing, passengers will identify their personal luggage and it will be placed on a conveyor belt. Each side will be able to inspect such luggage inside its own checking area, using its own personnel and, if necessary, may open the luggage for inspection in the presence of the owner and a Palestinian policeman.
   c. Persons entering the Palestinian Wing will pass through a magnetic gate. An Israeli policeman and a Palestinian policeman will be posted on each side of this gate. In the event of suspicion, each side will be entitled to require a physical inspection to be conducted in inspection booths to be located adjacent to the gate. Passengers will be inspected by a Palestinian policeman in the presence of an Israeli policeman. Accompanying personal belongings may also be inspected at this point.
Having completed the above phase, persons entering the Palestinian wing will pass through one of two lanes for the purpose of identification and document control, as follows:

1. the first lane will be used by Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These passengers will pass via a Palestinian counter, where their documents and identity will be checked. Their documents will be checked by an Israeli officer who will also check their identity indirectly in an invisible manner;

2. the second lane will serve visitors to the Gaza Strip and West Bank. These passengers will first pass via the Israeli counter, where their documents and identity will be checked. Then they will continue via the Palestinian counter, where their documents and identity will be checked. The two counters will be separated by tinted glass and a revolving door.

e. In the event of suspicion regarding a passenger in any of the two lanes described in subparagraph 1.d above, each side may question such passenger in its closed checking area. Suspicion justifying questioning in the closed checking area may be one of the following:

1. the passenger was involved, directly or indirectly, in criminal or planned criminal activity, in terrorist or planned terrorist activity and is not a beneficiary of the amnesty provisions of the Agreement;

2. the passenger conceals arms, explosives or related equipment;

3. the passenger holds forged or non-valid documentation or the details included in the documentation are inconsistent with those included in the population registry (in the case of a resident) or in the data base (in case of a visitor), except that questions relating to such inconsistency will initially be raised at the counter and the passenger will be questioned in the closed checking area only if the suspicion has not been removed; or

4. the passenger acts in an obviously suspicious behavior during the passage via the terminal.

If, at the conclusion of this questioning, the suspicion has not been removed, such passenger may be apprehended, after the other side has been notified. In case of a Palestinian suspect being apprehended by the Israeli side, a Palestinian policeman will be asked to meet with the suspect. Following notification to the Liaison Bureau, any further treatment of the apprehended person will be in accordance with Annex IV to the Agreement.

f. In the Palestinian wing, each side will have the authority to deny the entry of persons who are not residents of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. For the purpose of the Agreement and this Protocol, “residents of the Gaza Strip and West Bank” means persons who, on the date of entry into force of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, were registered as residents of these areas in the population registry maintained by the military government of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, as well as persons who have subsequently obtained permanent residency in these areas with the approval of Israel, as set out in the Agreement.

g. Following the above procedure, the passengers will collect their luggage and proceed to the customs area where they will be dealt with as set out in Section H of this Protocol.

h. The Palestinian side will provide passengers whose entry is approved with an entry permit stamped by the Palestinian side and attached to their documents. At the conclusion of the direct and indirect checking of the documents and identity of passengers passing via the first lane and stamping their entry permits, the Palestinian officer will provide the passenger with a white card issued by the Israeli officer. A Palestinian official posted at the exit of the Palestinian wing will verify that they passenger holds such a white card and will collect the cards with indirect and invisible Israeli checking. For passengers going through the second lane, the Israeli officer will provide the passengers with a blue card, after checking their documents and identity, and verifying their entry permits. An Israeli and a Palestinian official posted at the exit of the Palestinian wing will verify and collect the cards. White and blue cards collected will be checked by Israeli and Palestinian officials. In cases where either side denies the entry of a non-resident passenger, that passenger will be escorted out of the terminal and sent back to Jordan or Egypt, as appropriate, after notifying the other side.

2. Exit to Egypt and Jordan

Passengers exiting to Egypt or Jordan through the Palestinian wing will enter the terminal without their luggage. Thereafter, the same procedures described in paragraph 1 above will apply to them, except that the order of passing via the Israeli and Palestinian counters will be reversed.
Section C - Control and Management of the Passages

1. General
   a. Israel will have the responsibility for security throughout the passage, including for the terminal.
   b. An Israeli Director-General will have the responsibility for the management and security of the terminal (hereinafter - "the Director-General").
   c. Israel will have exclusive responsibility for the management of the Israeli wing.
   d. The Director-General will have two deputies who will report to him:
      (1) A Palestinian deputy, appointed by the Council, who will be the manager of the Palestinian wing (hereinafter - "the Manager of the Palestinian wing"); and
      (2) An Israeli deputy who will be the manager of the Israeli wing (hereinafter - "the Manager of the Israeli wing").
   e. The Israeli Director-General will be assisted by a professional team appointed at his discretion. Such team shall include:
      (1) an officer who will assist the Director-General with respect to the general security of the terminal (hereinafter - "the security officer");
      (2) an expert who will advise the Director-General and the wing managers with respect to the general administration of the terminal (hereinafter - "the administration expert"); and
      (3) an expert who will be responsible for the performance of those duties which the Director-General shall require him to perform when the need arises (hereinafter - "the duty officer").
   f. The Director-General may appoint any of the persons set out in paragraphs 1.d.(2) and 1.e above or another specialized Israeli official employed in the terminal to fulfill the role of the Director-General in his absence (hereinafter - "the substitute officer").
   g. Each wing Manager will have an assistant for security and an assistant for administration.
   h. All assignments and functions of the Manager of the Palestinian wing, the Assistant for administration of the Manager of the Palestinian wing and the Assistant for security of the Manager of the Palestinian wing and any other Palestinian employee shall be exercised in a manner consistent with the Agreement and with this Protocol.

2. Assignments of the Manager of the Palestinian wing
   The assignments of the Manager of the Palestinian wing shall be the following:
   a. Employment of Palestinian staff in the Palestinian wing. The list of Palestinian candidates for employment in the Palestinian wing shall be passed by the Manager of the Palestinian wing to the Director-General for security clearance, which shall be a pre-requisite to their engagement.
   b. All personnel matters of the Palestinians employed in the Palestinian wing including, inter alia, their salary, their social insurance and claims by such employees with respect to their employment;
   c. The Council shall have, through the Manager of the Palestinian wing, full responsibility for all personnel matters of the Palestinians employed in the Palestinian wing;
   d. Other non-security related grounds for the release of Palestinian employees from employment in the Palestinian wing shall be specified in a procedure to be promulgated by the Director-General upon consultation with the Manager of the Palestinian wing and his two Assistants.
   e. Employment of Palestinian staff in the Palestinian wing, whilst informing the Director-General. Upon consultation with the Manager of the Palestinian wing, the Director-General may also decide to release a Palestinian from employment in the Palestinian wing due to security reasons of substantial nature. The Manager of the Palestinian wing shall inform the employee of his release.
   f. For the purpose of this Protocol, "Palestinians employed in the Palestinian wing" means all Palestinians employed in the Palestinian wing, except the Manager of the Palestinian wing;
   g. General training and briefing of Palestinian employees in the Palestinian wing and handling of their work related problems;
   h. Declaration of an emergency situation in the Palestinian wing. This assignment is without prejudice to the power of the Director-General, the substitute officer and/or the security officer to declare a state of emergency in the Palestinian wing and to act forthwith as deemed fit within their complete discretion, in full cooperation with the Manager of the Palestinian wing.
   i. Other powers and responsibilities assigned to him under paragraph 3 of Article VIII of Annex I;
g. professional guidance of the Palestinian document control officials with respect to the performance of their assignments;

h. appointment of a person as his substitute and appointment of a duty officer for the Palestinian wing;

i. with respect to the Rafah crossing, the Manager of the Palestinian wing shall also have the following assignments:

(1) responsibility for the efficient movement of passengers traveling abroad, from the entrance to the terminal, through the Palestinian wing and up to their embarkation on the bus or other vehicle leaving the terminal in the direction of Egypt;

(2) responsibility for the efficient movement of passengers arriving from abroad from the sheltered waiting area located near the entrance to the Palestinian wing, through the Palestinian wing and up to their embarkation on the bus or other vehicle leaving the terminal in the direction of the Gaza Strip;

(3) responsibility for the orderly functioning of the service car defined in Section F of this Protocol with respect to the transportation of VIPs traveling abroad, from the entrance to the terminal to the entrance to the Palestinian wing;

(4) responsibility for the canteen serving passengers traveling abroad through the Palestinian and the Israeli wing;

(5) responsibility to allocate tasks to specific Palestinian service personnel employed and assigned by the Director-General to work in the Palestinian wing;

(6) responsibility to contact Palestinian contractors and to pass to the Director-General their offers regarding tenders with respect to administrative and logistical services in the terminal; and

(7) responsibility for the orderly functioning of the emergency clinic to be established in the Palestinian wing. This clinic will be staffed by a Palestinian physician and a nurse. These assignments shall also apply, at a later stage, with respect to the Allenby Bridge crossing, with the necessary adjustments; and

j. within the framework of the functions assigned to him pursuant to this paragraph, the promulgation of procedures for the Palestinian employees in the Palestinian wing.

3. Assignments of the Palestinian Assistant for Security

The Palestinian Assistant for Security shall be appointed from the ranks of the Palestinian Police, shall be subordinate to the Manager of the Palestinian wing and his assignments shall be within the Palestinian wing, as follows:

a. implementation of standard security procedures promulgated by the Director-General pursuant to Paragraph 5 of this Section;

b. implementation of other security related measures pursuant to the instructions of the Director-General, the substitute officer and in emergencies or exceptional cases, the security officer;

c. in conjunction with the Manager of the Palestinian wing and after duly informing the Director-General and the security officer, training and briefing of each Palestinian employee in the Palestinian wing as to the performance of his specific security related task;

d. supervision, maintenance and storage of all handguns in the possession of Palestinian policemen present in the Palestinian wing;

e. responsibility for ensuring the due and proper execution of the procedures set out in paragraph 3 of Article VIII of Annex I;

f. ensuring the immediate arrival of a Palestinian policeman pursuant to an Israeli demand for his presence, made pursuant to paragraphs 3.b, 3.c, and/or 3.e of Article VIII of Annex I;

g. ensuring maintenance of secrecy amongst the Palestinian employees with respect to the nature of their employment, the layout of the terminal, security procedures, and all other information, the revelation of which could compromise the general security of the terminal;

h. ensuring decorum and good public order in a routine working context;

i. declaration of an emergency situation in the Palestinian wing, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2.e of this Section; and

j. upon discovery of a suspicious object, immediately to notify the security officer and the Manager of the Palestinian wing. The security officer will then have complete discretion to act as he deems fit in the circumstances.
4. Assignments of the Palestinian Assistant for Administration
The Palestinian Assistant for Administration shall be subordinate to the Manager of the Palestinian wing and shall deal with matters relating to manpower, organization and logistics within the Palestinian wing, as follows:

a. ensuring the efficient movement of passengers in the Palestinian wing;

b. implementation of standard administration procedures promulgated by the Director-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section;

c. implementation of other non-security related matters pursuant to the instructions of the Manager of the Palestinian wing given upon consultation with the Director-General;

d. escorting the elderly, the ill, children and disabled;

e. ensuring orderly behavior and presentable appearance of Palestinian employees;

f. ensuring cleanliness, the presence efficient functioning of fire fighting facilities and the supply of provisions;

g. training and briefing of each Palestinian employee in the Palestinian wing, engaged in non-security related matters with respect to the specific nature of his employment; and

h. uninterrupted functioning of the section of the conveyor belt under Palestinian supervision as set out in paragraph 3 of Article VIII of Annex I.

5. Standard Security and Administration Procedures
The Director-General, upon consultation with the Israeli and Palestinian wing Managers, shall determine and shall furnish to the persons set out in Paragraphs 1.d, 1.e and 1.g above and to the Liaison Bureau a compendium detailing standard procedures with respect to security and administration of the terminal. Such procedures shall include:

a. procedures in a state of emergency;

b. procedures with respect to inspection of persons, personal belongings and/or luggage pursuant to paragraphs 3.b, 3.c and/or 3.e of Article VIII of Annex I;

c. procedures with respect to road-markings, signs, plaques and flags in the terminal;

d. procedures with respect to handling of luggage and the loading of the conveyor belt;

e. procedures with respect to operation of the conveyor belt;

f. procedures with respect to media and public relations;

g. procedures with respect to public transportation and taxis passing through the terminal, as will be agreed upon between the two sides;

h. procedures with respect to maintenance and upkeep of the terminal;

i. procedures with respect to supply of provisions and services;

j. procedures with respect to general conduct and behavior of employees within the terminal and changing of work shifts;

k. procedures with respect to escorting the elderly, the ill, children and disabled;

l. procedures with respect to escorting VIPs;

m. procedures with respect to people denied exit or entry through the Palestinian wing; and

n. procedures with respect to comportment, personal appearance and identification tags of employees in the terminal. The Director-General may promulgate, upon consultation with the Israeli and the Palestinian wing Managers, additional procedures not provided for in this paragraph. All of the abovementioned procedures will be consistent with the Agreement and with this Protocol, and will be reviewed at a later date by the two sides if the circumstances so necessitate.

Section D – Weapons in the Passages

1. General

a. Pursuant to paragraph 2.b(8) of Article VIII of Annex I, the Palestinian policemen present in the terminals will be armed with handguns.

b. The Palestinian officials entitled to carry handguns in the terminals shall be those Palestinian policemen explicitly provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section and other Palestinian officials explicitly provided for in Section F below.
2. Functions of Armed Palestinian Policemen in the Terminals

Palestinian policeman present in the terminals will be entitled to carry a handgun. In the initial stage, only the Palestinian policemen deployed as detailed below will carry a handgun:

a. In the Palestinian wing of the terminals serving passengers arriving from Egypt or Jordan;
   (1) one policeman posted at the entrance to the Palestinian wing as provided for in paragraph 3.a of Article VIII of Annex I;
   (2) one policeman who may be called for from the Palestinian checking area when an Israeli official requires the opening of luggage for inspection within the Israeli checking area, as provided for in paragraph 3.b of Article VIII of Annex I;
   (3) one policeman posted at the side of the magnetic gate serving all persons entering the Palestinian wing, as provided for in paragraph 3.c of Article VIII of Annex I; and
   (4) one policeman who may be requested by an Israeli official, when necessary, to carry out a physical inspection in an inspection booth in the presence of an Israeli policeman as provided for in paragraph 3.c of Article VIII of Annex I;

b. In the Palestinian wing of the terminals serving passengers leaving for Egypt or Jordan;
   (1) one policeman posted at the entrance to the Palestinian wing;
   (2) one policeman posted at the side of the magnetic gate serving all persons leaving for Egypt and Jordan; and
   (3) one policeman who may be requested by an Israeli official, when necessary, to carry out a physical inspection in an inspection booth in the presence of an Israeli policeman;

c. The Palestinian Assistant for Security; and

d. The Palestinian Liaison Bureau coordinating officer defined in paragraph 2.c of Section E below.

The number of armed Palestinian policemen may be increased in cases in which both sides agree that the circumstances so necessitate. Such agreement will also include the deployment of the additional Palestinian policemen.

3. Licensing of Weapons

Palestinian policemen entitled to carry handguns within the Palestinian wing in the course of their duty pursuant to Paragraph 2 above, shall be required to obtain a written license from all of the following:

a. The Council;

b. The Manager of the Palestinian wing; and

c. The Director-General.

4. Handguns and Ammunition

The Palestinian policemen entitled to carry handguns in the Palestinian wing pursuant to paragraph 2 above, shall:

a. carry handguns which shall be:
   (1) of 0.22 inch, 7.65 mm or 9 mm caliber; and
   (2) secured and tied safely to their body;

b. carry one magazine with regular ammunition; and

c. carry their handguns in a uniform and visible manner, as fixed in procedures promulgated by the Director-General pursuant to Section C of this Protocol.

5. Registration and Storage

a. Handguns carried by the Palestinian policemen:
   (1) shall be passed to the Director-General for the purpose of examination before they are brought into the terminal;
   (2) their registration numbers shall be noted by the Director-General;
   (3) shall be allocated to one user only and not exchanged between Palestinian policemen working in the terminal unless coordinated through the Director-General or whoever was appointed by him for that purpose, and registrated by him;
   (4) shall be substituted with other handguns only after the new handgun has been passed to the Director-General for the purpose of examination;
   (5) shall not be taken out of the Palestinian wing; and
6. Use of Handguns
   a. A Palestinian policeman shall be authorized to use his handgun in the following cases:
      (1) where there is a substantial and immediate danger to his life, in which case the handgun may
           only be used in a reasonable manner in the circumstances;
      (2) pursuant to the instructions of the Director-General, the substitute officer or the Security officer; or
      (3) pursuant to a security procedure to be agreed with respect to this matter.
   b. The Director-General shall promulgate procedures with respect to the use of handguns, in accordance
      with Section C of this Protocol.

7. Weapons Outside the Terminals
   In accordance with the provisions of the Agreement:
   a. with respect to the Rafah crossing, all outgoing passengers destined for the Palestinian wing shall
      not enter the Military Installation Area armed with a weapon; and
   b. with respect to the Allenby Bridge crossing, all outgoing passengers destined for the Palestinian
      wing shall not leave the Jericho Area towards the terminal armed with a weapon. The Council
      shall do its utmost to ensure compliance with paragraphs 7.a and 7.b above.

8. Weapons in the Terminals
   a. Persons destined for the Palestinian wing and who are not subject to paragraph 7 above shall de-
      posit their weapon with the Joint Verification Team established by Section E below.
   b. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 8.a above, VIPs and bodyguards who are entitled to en-
      ter the terminals with a handgun pursuant to Section F below, shall carry the handgun in accordance
      with procedures to be promulgated by the Director-General in accordance with Section C of this Pro-
      tocol.

9. The Palestinian Policemen
   Palestinian policemen present in the Palestinian wing as set out in paragraph 2 above shall wear a
   Palestinian police uniform.

Section E - Liaison Bureau

1. General
   A Joint Liaison Bureau (hereinafter "Liaison Bureau") shall be set up at the Rafah crossing and at the
   Allenby Bridge crossing, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article VIII of Annex I.

2. Structure of the Liaison Bureau
   Each Liaison Bureau will be composed of 6 persons, 3 from each side, as follows:
   a. an Israeli coordinating officer and a Palestinian coordinating officer who shall both be members of
      the relevant JRCAC and whose assignments shall be:
         (1) to coordinate the routine activity of the Palestinian wing in conjunction with the relevant Joint
             Regional CAC (hereinafter - "the JRCAC");
         (2) to coordinate the passage of VIPs through the Palestinian wing, pursuant to Section F below;
   b. an Israeli official and a Palestinian official, who shall both be members of the relevant JRCAC,
      and who shall deal with:
         (1) complaints with respect to passage through the Palestinian wing; and
         (2) other problems relating to such passage; and
   c. an Israeli coordinating officer and a Palestinian coordinating officer who shall both be members of
      the relevant DCO and whose assignments shall be to coordinate the passage of members of the Pal-
      estinian police and their equipment.
3. Functions of the Liaison Bureau
   a. The functions of each Liaison Bureau shall be to coordinate and to facilitate the following activities with respect to the Palestinian wing:
      (1) verification of the status of VIPs and the implementation of the special arrangements provided for them by virtue of Section F below;
      (2) passage of members of the Palestinian police;
      (3) passage of the elderly, the ill and the disabled;
      (4) transfer of the deceased;
      (5) resolution of problems with respect to documentation, luggage and passenger delay;
      (6) resolution of differences regarding the implementation of procedures with respect to passage; and
      (7) provision of guidance to the JVT with respect to its assignments.
   b. The Liaison Bureau shall be notified of the apprehension of persons in the Palestinian wing pursuant to paragraph 3.e of Article VIII of Annex I.
   c. Without derogating from Israel's responsibility for security, the Liaison Bureau will also deal with incidents.
   d. The execution of each Liaison Bureau's functions shall not prejudice the powers and responsibilities set out in Section C of this Protocol.
   e. The Liaison Bureau shall carry out its functions in full cooperation and coordination with the Director-General, the Palestinian and the Israeli wing managers and shall seek to promote coordination between the Director-General and the two wing managers.
   f. The Liaison Bureau shall be subordinate to the relevant JRCAC.

4. Joint Verification Team
   a. A Joint Verification Team (hereinafter - the “JVT”) shall be established, in order to verify that outgoing passengers destined for the Palestinian wing hold the necessary documentation for exiting the area to Jordan or Egypt, as set out in the Agreement.
   b. The JVT will be composed of one officer and one official from each side, and shall be subordinate to the Liaison Bureau.
   c. (1) With respect to the Rafah crossing, the JVT shall be based at the outer limit of the northern entrance gate to the terminal.
      (2) With respect to the Allenby Bridge crossing, the JVT shall be based at the entrance to the Mousa Allami project.
      (3) Once incoming passengers have crossed the terminal, they will proceed to the Jericho Area or the Gaza Strip, as appropriate, without any interference from Israeli authorities.
      (4) Outgoing passengers may proceed to the terminal without any interference from Israeli authorities once the JVT has verified that such passengers hold the necessary documentation for exiting the area to Jordan or Egypt, as set out in the Agreement.
   d. The JVT shall inform the Liaison Bureau of the imminent arrival of a VIP pursuant to Section F below.
   e. The JVT shall also regulate the traffic coming from the Jericho Area or the Gaza Strip towards the terminals in order to prevent congestion.

Section F - Passage of VIPs
1. General
   a. Whilst representing the special status of certain persons and at the same time without prejudicing the dignity of other persons, the two sides have agreed upon a standard procedure for the treatment of VIPs passing through the Palestinian wing of the terminals, as detailed below.
   b. VIPs may include the following:
      (1) holders of the most senior positions within the Council and officers of the Palestinian Police of the rank of Major-General (hereinafter - category 1”);
      (2) director-generals of departments in the Council, officials of the Council of equivalent rank to such persons and officers of the Palestinian Police of the rank of Brigadier-General (hereinafter - “category 2”); and
(3) heads of units in departments in the Council, officials of the Council of equivalent rank to such persons and officers of the Palestinian Police of the rank of Commander ('Aqid) (hereinafter - "category 3").

The extent of the categories 1-3 above shall be determined by the CAC. Any exceptions to categories 1-3 may be dealt with by the CAC.

2. Procedures for the Granting of VIP Status
a. Only the CAC may grant or withdraw VIP status.
b. The Council may present the CAC with a list of persons eligible for VIP status and shall specify the registration-plates number of the vehicles to be used by individuals entitled to enter or pass through the terminal with a vehicle.
c. Upon approving VIP status, the CAC will issue to the person concerned a certificate confirming such status. The duration of such status shall be for one year or until the completion of the term of duty of the person in his VIP capacity, whichever be the sooner.
d. Prior to the expiration of the duration of the VIP certificate, the Council may request that the CAC renew the VIP status.
e. The Palestinian representatives to the CAC shall, every six months or whenever the need shall arise, whichever be the sooner:
   (1) review the list of VIPs in order to ensure that every recipient of VIP status retains a valid entitlement to such status; and
   (2) inform the Israeli representatives to the CAC of the results of such review.
f. Categories 1 and 2 VIPs may submit to the CAC a list of persons who shall also be granted VIP status. Such persons shall only be:
   (1) the spouse, children and parents;
   (2) one chauffeur; and
   (3) one bodyguard; of the VIP (hereinafter - "Secondary VIPs").

3. Arrangements With Respect to Passage of VIPs
a. Category 1 VIPs shall give prior notification of their arrival to the Liaison Bureau and upon arrival at the terminal, shall be accommodated in a VIP lounge pending:
   (1) a brief visual inspection of their vehicle by an Israeli official;
   (2) transfer of their documentation by an employee of the Palestinian wing for the purpose of the immediate performance of all the necessary procedures with respect to the documentation, as set out in Article VIII of Annex I; and
   (3) transfer of their vehicle through the terminal by their chauffeur, whereupon those VIPs shall continue their journey.
b. For the purpose of clarification:
   (1) cargo and freight other than personal luggage brought by category 1 VIPs shall be subject to the same procedures and customs arrangements which apply to all passengers passing through the Palestinian wing; and
   (2) only category 1 VIPs and one bodyguard accompanying them shall be entitled to enter the terminal with a handgun, once the registration number of the handgun has been noted by the JVT.
c. Category 2 VIPs who arrive at the terminal with a vehicle shall, after their vehicle has been subjected to a brief visual inspection at the entrance to the terminal:
   (1) be accommodated in the VIP lounge whilst an employee of the Palestinian wing shall take that VIP's luggage and documentation for the purpose of the immediate and full performance of all the necessary procedures with respect to the luggage and documentation, as set out in Article VIII of Annex I; and
   (2) pass through the terminal in a service car which shall be provided for them or in a taxi, unless otherwise agreed pursuant to paragraph 4.c of Section H of this Protocol.
d. Category 3 VIPs shall:
   (1) be transported from the entrance to the terminal to the Palestinian wing in a service car which shall be provided for them or in a taxi;
(2) be subject to the inspection procedures set out in paragraph 3 of Article VIII of Annex I, which shall be performed immediately with an employee of the Palestinian wing accompanying them throughout this process; and
(3) pass through the terminal in a service car which shall be provided for them or in a taxi, unless otherwise agreed pursuant to paragraph 4.c of Section H of this Protocol.

e. Secondary VIPs:
(1) when traveling with the VIP in whose name they are registered, shall be accorded the same treatment as is accorded to that VIP;
(2) when traveling without the VIP in whose name they are registered:
   (a) if they are the spouse, parents and/or children of that VIP, shall be accorded equal treatment to that VIP;
   (b) if they are the chauffeur or bodyguard of that VIP, shall receive the treatment accorded to category 3 VIPs.

f. In the event of a duly substantiated suspicion within the course of the aforementioned inspection procedures, the Director-General, after consulting his superiors and after informing the Manager of the Palestinian wing of the suspicion, shall be entitled, upon consultation with the Manager of the Palestinian wing, temporarily to withdraw the preferential treatment accorded to a VIP until the matter has been dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. Category 1 and Category 2 VIPs will be transferred to the Council if the suspicion is proved to be well founded, and their VIP privileges will be canceled by the CAC.

4. Foreign VIPs visiting the Gaza Strip or the West Bank
a. The Liaison Bureau established pursuant to Section E of this Protocol shall have the power to grant VIP status to a visitor to the Gaza Strip or the West Bank passing through the Palestinian wing, and to specify the treatment that that person shall receive according to one of the categories set out in paragraph 1 above.

b. Thereafter, the arrangements set out in paragraph 3 above shall apply.

5. Miscellaneous
a. With respect to persons destined for the Palestinian wing, the Liaison Bureau established pursuant to Section E of this Protocol shall have the power to make arrangements, in conjunction with the Director-General, regarding access to the terminals and to other areas of the passages of persons greeting incoming VIPs or escorting and parting from exiting VIPs, and to coordinate the implementation of these arrangements.

b. The following procedure will apply with respect to the passage of category 1 VIPs, family members of the Chairman of the Council except the spouse of the Chairman of the Council, bodyguards of the Chairman of the Council and other persons approved by the CAC, when any of these persons are accompanying the Chairman of the Council in his vehicles:
(1) notification of their arrival at the terminal shall be given to the Liaison Bureau as soon as possible and not later than 4 hours prior to such arrival. The Liaison Bureau shall, on receipt thereof, coordinate:
   (a) passage of these persons without delay;
   (b) passage of these persons without inspection of their person, personal belongings, luggage or vehicle; and
   (c) completion of all necessary documentary procedures prior to these persons’ arrival.

The above will be coordinated in a conference to be attended to by a Palestinian and an Israeli representative and the members of the Liaison Bureau, in the duty officer’s office, not less than one hour prior to such passage. During this conference, the documents of persons subject to this paragraph shall be presented. The two officers defined in paragraph 2.a of Section E of this Protocol shall hand over to these persons their documentation, upon their arrival at the terminal; and

(2) the abovementioned prior notification will also mention the number of bodyguards accompanying the Chairman of the Council. These bodyguards shall be entitled to enter the terminal with a handgun, once the registration number of the handgun has been noted by the JVT.
c. Passage of the Chairman of the Council and the spouse of the Chairman of the Council will be performed pursuant to paragraph 5.b above, except that paragraph 3.f of this Section will not apply. No prior notification will be required with respect to such passage.

Section G - Passenger Fee

1. General
a. Passengers exiting through the Rafah passage to Egypt and through the Allenby Bridge passage to Jordan shall pay a passenger fee equivalent to 26 USA dollars.
b. This passenger fee will be collected by Israel. The Council may sell passenger fee vouchers to passengers passing through the Palestinian wing of the terminals, after having purchased them from Israel by means of a letter of guarantee given by an Israeli bank for each quota of vouchers transferred to the Council, or any other method of payment to be agreed upon. The design and content of the vouchers or stamps used will be agreed.
c. Diplomats and children under two years of age will be exempt from the passenger fee.

2. Use of Passenger Fee
a. Passenger fee income from up to a total of 750,000 paying passengers each year will be equally divided between the two sides. With respect to these 750,000 passengers, the Council will pay Israel the equivalent of 1 USA dollar for services, maintenance and development of the terminals.
b. As from the first paying passenger thereafter during the same year, Israel will receive the equivalent of 10 USA dollars of the passenger fee and the Council will receive the equivalent of 16 USA dollars thereof.

3. Miscellaneous
a. The Council will be responsible for the 90 Palestinian personnel employed in the Allenby Bridge crossing by the Director-General and the 20 Palestinian personnel employed at the Rafah crossing by the Director-General, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.a of Section C of this Protocol.
b. Israel will be responsible for maintenance and development costs with respect to the terminals.
c. With respect to the Rafah crossing:
   (1) taxis arriving from the Gaza Strip in the direction of the terminal will be permitted entry to the terminal, in accordance with procedures to be promulgated by the Director-General pursuant to Section C of this Protocol; and
   (2) upon request by the Council, the present bus service transporting passengers destined for the Palestinian wing from the entrance to the terminal to the entrance to the Palestinian wing will be replaced by a bus service to be chosen by the Council. Such replacement will be effected not less than one month after the date of signing of this Protocol, and will be fully coordinated with the Director-General.
d. Arrangements will be agreed upon by the two sides with respect to the passage of buses, trucks and privately owned vehicles. Until such arrangements are established, the current arrangements will continue to apply.
e. Israel will transfer to the Council the agreed share of the collected fees pursuant to paragraph 2 above, at the end of each calendar month following the month in which those fees were collected.

Section H - Passenger Customs Lane

1. General
In the Palestinian wing there will be one passenger customs hall consisting of a passenger customs lane administered by customs officials of the Council and serving residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and visitors thereto.

2. Procedures with regard to the Customs Lane
a. Israeli customs officials shall be present in this lane and shall be entitled to request the Palestinian customs officials to conduct an inspection of goods and the collection of taxes when due.
b. The inspection of goods and the collection of taxes will be conducted by a Palestinian customs official in a separate room in the presence of an Israeli customs official.
c. Inspection of goods and the collection of taxes shall be carried out in accordance with Annex V to this Agreement.

d. With respect to veterinary matters, plant protection, medicines and goods, all of the procedures referred to above shall apply, except that the customs officials shall be replaced by Palestinian and Israeli Agriculture Service and Health Service officials.

3. Miscellaneous

a. Any other matters regarding the abovementioned passenger customs lane shall be dealt pursuant to the provisions of Annex V to the Agreement.

b. Arrangements will be agreed upon by the two sides with respect to goods and freight shipment. Until such arrangements are established, the current arrangements will continue to apply.

c. (1) A branch of a Palestinian bank may be opened in the Palestinian wing.
(2) Commercial aspects of the terminals, including the number of commercial projects, will be agreed between the two sides.

Section I - Document Control in the Palestinian Wing

I. General

a. Pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article VIII of Annex I, Palestinian and Israeli officials shall check the documents and the identity of passengers in the Palestinian wing.

b. This Section sets out the agreed-upon document control procedures with respect to the Palestinian wing with due respect to the distinction between the following categories of persons mentioned in Article VIII of Annex I:
(1) residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and
(2) visitors to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank passing through the Palestinian wing.

c. In the Palestinian wing, there will be a Palestinian and an Israeli document control manager. There will also be, in every working shift, a Palestinian and an Israeli document control duty officer.

d. Any required coordination between the Israeli and the Palestinian document control officials shall be done through the document control duty officers.

2. Passengers Exiting to Egypt or Jordan

In the Palestinian exit wing, the following procedures shall apply:

a. with respect to a resident of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip:
(1) the passenger will pass via a Palestinian counter, where his documents and identity will be checked by a Palestinian official according to a procedure promulgated by the Manager of the Palestinian wing;
(2) having completed examining the documents of the passenger, the Palestinian official shall compare the passenger's identity card number with the population registry records of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip residents, and then pass the documents to the Israeli official via a drawer installed for that purpose;
(3) the documents to be passed by the Palestinian official shall be a valid passport/travel document, or Palestinian passports/travel documents. Residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip accompanying a passenger shall be subject to the procedures detailed in subparagraph a(1) - (3) above, unless their personal details, including their identity card number, are detailed in the passenger's documents, in which case they will be processed together with the passenger;
(4) thereafter:
(a) the passenger and the persons accompanying him shall wait in front of the Palestinian counter;
(b) the documents shall be checked by an Israeli official without unjustified delay. The Israeli official shall also check the passenger's identity indirectly;
(c) in case of a delay with respect to the checking of a passenger's documents or identity, the passenger shall wait in a special waiting area pending resolution of the matter;
(5) the Israeli official will return the documents to the Palestinian official after having identified the passenger and checked and approved the documents, together with the white card referred to in paragraph 3.1 of Article VIII of Annex I;
(6) the Palestinian official will return the stamped documents and the abovementioned white card to the passenger;  
(7) the passenger will be directed to the exit of the Palestinian wing, where he will then hand over the white card to a Palestinian official; and 
(8) the Palestinian official will pass the white card to the Israeli official, and will allow the passenger to pass if the card is valid; 
b. with respect to a visitor to the Gaza Strip or the West Bank passing through the Palestinian wing: 
(1) the passenger will pass via an Israeli counter where his documents and identity will be checked by an Israeli official. The Israeli official shall then return the documents to the passenger, together with the abovementioned blue card; 
(2) the passenger will continue via a Palestinian counter, where his documents and identity will be checked by a Palestinian official according to a procedure promulgated by the Manager of the Palestinian wing; and 
(3) the passenger will be directed to the exit of the Palestinian wing, where he will then hand over the abovementioned blue card to the Israeli and Palestinian officials posted there.

3. Passengers Entering from Egypt or Jordan 
a. The procedure set out in paragraph 2.a above will also apply with respect to the entry of residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
b. The procedure set out in paragraph 2.b above will also apply with respect to the entry of visitors to the Gaza Strip and West Bank passing through the Palestinian wing, with the following adjustments: 
(1) without prejudice to each side's authority to deny the entry of visitors passing through the Palestinian wing pursuant to Article VIII of Annex I, only visitors holding a passport or travel document valid for at least six months shall be permitted entry; 
(2) in exceptional cases, visitors holding a passport or a travel document valid for less than six months shall be permitted entry for a stay of 30 days. Such passengers, visitor's permits will not be extended by the Council unless the validity of their passport or their travel document has been extended for at least six months; and 
(3) the extension of the abovementioned visitor's permit shall be carried out in accordance with Appendix I to Annex III of the Agreement.

4. Miscellaneous 
a. Should a passenger in the Palestinian wing be apprehended by either side pursuant to paragraph 3.e of Article VIII of Annex I: 
(1) the document control duty officer of the apprehending side shall notify the document control duty officer of the other side of the apprehension; 
(2) if the passenger is apprehended by an Israeli official, the Palestinian document control duty officer will ensure the immediate arrival of a Palestinian policeman to meet with the apprehended passenger; and 
(3) following notification to the Liaison Bureau, any further treatment of the apprehended passenger will be in accordance with Annex IV to the Agreement. 
b. A passenger shall be denied exit abroad in the following circumstances: 
(1) if the passenger has been duly apprehended in accordance with the Agreement; 
(2) if the passenger is not in possession of the required documents to travel abroad pursuant to Appendix I to Annex III of the Agreement; or 
(3) if a restraining order has been issued with respect to the passenger pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article II of Annex IV to the Agreement. 
c. Special document control arrangements will apply to certain categories of passengers, as follows: 
(1) with respect to VIPs, the arrangements are set out in Section F of this Protocol; 
(2) passengers will be considered disabled if they are connected to medical equipment separation from which could endanger their lives, or if they cannot pass through the magnetic gate. Such passengers will wait in an ambulance whilst their documents, luggage and personal belongings undergo a full inspection as set out in Article VIII of Annex I.
The Director-General shall specify, in procedures to be promulgated pursuant to Section C, any other matters regarding treatment to be accorded to the disabled;

(3) residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between the ages of 12 and 16 who have not been issued with a passport/travel document and do not have an identity card, may travel abroad alone only if they possess an exit permit issued by the CAC. A recent photograph shall be stamped and attached to the exit permit;

(4) residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between the ages 5 and 12 may travel abroad as set out above, only when accompanied by a person over the age of 16;

(5) Palestinian policemen and other employees of the Council who have not been issued with passports/travel documents and do not have identity cards, shall only be allowed to travel abroad if they possess the documents that enabled them to enter the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and an exit permit issued by the CAC, and have a copy of a request form for an identity card;

(6) upon the arrival of a Palestinian policeman or another employee of the Council for the first time to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a request for an identity card will be filled out in triplicate at the terminal. This request shall be registered once the name of the person has been cleared by the relevant Israeli official and after he has presented a valid travel document and a computerized number has been issued. A stamp indicating that the passenger is a Palestinian policeman or an employee of the Council shall then be placed on the request form. After the document control procedures have been carried out, the form will be stamped with an entry stamp;

(7) arrangements for the entry of spouse and children of Palestinian policemen and of other employees of the Council will be established by the CAC. The present procedures will continue to apply until such arrangements are established; and

(8) residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip who have lost their documentation abroad may apply to the Council from abroad, through their relatives. In such circumstances, they will be issued with documents of temporary nature by the same side which issued the original lost documents.

d. Palestinian document control officials will stamp the documents of residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and of visitors to the Gaza Strip and to the West Bank.

e. The CAC may alter the arrangements set out in this section when the circumstances so necessitate.

Appendix 6: List of Hamlets included in Area B

Pursuant to Article XI, paragraph 3b of the Agreement, the list of hamlets included in Area B is as follows:

C. Salfit District: Khirbat Qays
D. Jericho District: Al-Zubeidet
ANNEX II: PROTOCOL CONCERNING ELECTIONS, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

Article I: Basis of Elections

General Provisions

1. Pursuant to Article III of the Declaration of Principles, and in accordance with the provisions of this Annex, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council and, simultaneously, for the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority.

2. The holding of elections for the position of Ra'ees and for the Palestinian Council shall be governed by this Annex, and the Law on the Election of the Ra'ees and the Palestinian Council (hereinafter "the Election Law") and the regulations made under this law (hereinafter "the Election Regulations"). The Election Law shall be adopted by the Palestinian Authority. The Election Law and the Election Regulations shall be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. Unless otherwise specifically provided in this Annex, all persons voting or standing as candidates in the elections shall be uniformly subject to the provisions of the Election Law and the Election Regulations.

The Central Election Commission

3. The Palestinian Central Election Commission (hereinafter "the CEC"), which will be appointed by the Palestinian Authority, will be responsible for the administration of the elections. The CEC will be responsible for the preparation and conduct of the elections and shall have the powers and competences necessary to fulfill these functions, as defined in the Election Law. All matters related to the elections which are not subject to specific provision in this Agreement shall be subject to determination by the Palestinian Authority or the CEC in accordance with the Election Law, the Election Regulations and any relevant procedures set out in this Agreement. The CEC and its subordinate bodies shall be independent.

4. a. All of the offices of the CEC and of its subordinate bodies, including the offices of the District Election Commissions (hereinafter "the DECs") and the District Election Offices (hereinafter "the DEOs"), shall be situated in constituencies set out in the Palestinian Election Law in areas under the jurisdiction of the Council.

b. All aspects of the electoral administration (such as publication of lists of electors or candidates, and other information concerning the conduct of the elections, appeals, counting votes, and publication of results) shall take place only in the offices of the relevant DEO.

Article II: Right to Vote and the Electoral Register

1. Right to Vote

a. The right to vote will be universal, regardless of sex, race, religion, opinion, social origin, education, or property status. Every Palestinian who meets the qualification to vote shall have the right to be registered to vote.

b. Only a person whose name appears on the Electoral Register, as defined in paragraph 2 below, and who is 18 years old or older on the day of the elections, will have the right to vote.

c. No person may be registered as an elector in more than one polling district, as defined in paragraph 2 below.

d. The qualification to vote will be the same for the election for the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council and the election for the Council.

e. Israeli citizens shall not be entered on the Electoral Register.

f. To be qualified to be entered on the Electoral Register, a person must:

(1) be Palestinian;

(2) be 17 years old or older;

(3) have his or her abode in the polling district where he or she is registered to vote;

(4) not be disqualified under subparagraph k. below; and

(5) be entered in the population register maintained by the Palestinian Authority or the Israeli authorities (hereinafter together "the Population Register"), and thus be the holder of an identity card issued by the Palestinian Authority or the Israeli authorities.

g. Any person who:
(1) will be at least 40 years old on January 1, 1996 and can provide satisfactory evidence that he or she has actually lived in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip continuously, except for short absences, for at least 3 years immediately prior to the date of the signing of this Agreement; or
(2) will be less than 40 years old on January 1, 1996 and can provide satisfactory evidence that he or she has actually lived in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip continuously, except for short absences, for at least 4 years immediately prior to the date of the signing of this Agreement, shall be entitled, notwithstanding the fact that he or she was not previously entered in the Population Register, to be entered in the Population Register and to receive the appropriate identity card. The Palestinian Authority and Israel, through the CAC, shall together invite applications to be so entered in the Population Register. Such applications shall be submitted prior to the date of the elections to the Civil Administration or the relevant joint Israeli-Palestinian liaison body as appropriate and shall be dealt with by the Civil Administration or by both sides of such joint liaison body on an expedited basis to assist the process of registration.

h. The inclusion of any person on the Electoral Register at any address shall be without prejudice to the question of that person’s legal abode at that address.

i. In this Agreement, the word “abode” denotes the main permanent fixed address within any polling district at which, at the time of the initial registration canvass, a person actually lives.

j. In this Agreement, the word "address" denotes the community, house, street, neighborhood or other description identifying the specific abode in which a person actually lives, where such information exists.

k. The following persons will be disqualified from being entered on the Electoral Register:
(1) any person deprived of the right to vote by judicial sentence, while that sentence is in force;
(2) any person declared incapable by judicial decision; and
(3) any person detained in a psychiatric institution by judicial decision, during the period of that detention. "Judicial sentence" means a judicial verdict or sentence made by a Palestinian court.

2. The Electoral Register

a. In accordance with the provisions of this Article, the Election Law and the Election Regulations, the CEC shall compile and maintain the list of all persons registered as qualified to vote (hereinafter “the Electoral Register”). A separate section of the Electoral Register (hereinafter "an electoral register") shall be kept for each defined geographical area possessing its own polling station (hereinafter "polling district").

b. In accordance with the arrangements agreed between the two sides, the CEC will compile the initial draft register. The compilation of the register in each polling district will be the responsibility of the Polling Station Commission (hereinafter “PSC”) for that district.

c. The PSC must enter on the initial draft register the name of any person who is 18 or over, is qualified to be registered in the particular polling district, is the holder of an identity card issued by the Israeli authorities or the Palestinian Authority, and provides all the required information as long as the PSC believes the information to be correct.

d. The PSC will also enter on the initial draft register the name of any person who is 17 and otherwise meets all the criteria to be entered thereon. Such a person may vote if he or she has reached his or her 18th birthday on or before polling day.

e. The initial draft register will be displayed within each polling district at the site of the PSC. It shall bear upon each sheet the following text:

"This is the initial draft of the register of the persons entitled, if they are 18 years old or more on the day of the election, to vote in this polling district in the election for the Palestinian Council and the Ra'ees of its Executive Authority. The entry on this draft register of any individual is subject to confirmation that he or she is entered in the population register maintained by the Palestinian Authority or the Israeli authorities and thus the holder of an identity card issued by the Palestinian Authority or the Israeli authorities. Any person who believes that he or she has been wrongly omitted, and any person who believes that the information published about him or her is wrong, may submit a claim to the Polling Station Commission. Any person who believes that any other person entered on the draft register is not qualified to appear on this register may submit an objection to the Polling Station Commission. The deadline for receipt of claims and objections is YYMMDD".

f. A subcommittee established by the Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee shall consider questions of registration defined in this Agreement and coordinate the implementation of the registration arrangements (hereinafter in this Article "the CAC subcommittee").
g. Within 6 weeks of the compilation of the initial draft register, and following adjudication of all claims and objections, the Palestinian side of the CAC subcommittee will provide the Israeli side with a copy of this register as amended in the computer format agreed between the two sides and set out in Appendix 1 to this Annex. Upon receipt of this information, the Israeli side in the CAC subcommittee will confirm the information contained in the initial draft register with that contained in the Population Register. Subject to compliance with the provisions of Appendix 1, and with any agreed amendments following the experimental input or otherwise, this confirmation will take place within 7 days. Persons whose details do not appear, or whose details are significantly different from those in the Population Register, shall be removed from the initial draft register, unless the Palestinian side can provide satisfactory evidence within 7 days that the person is entered in the Population Register.

h. The publication of the Electoral Register and the display of the relevant electoral register in each polling district shall follow the confirmation provided for in subparagraph g. above. Each electoral register shall bear the following text: “This is the register of the persons entitled, if they are 18 years old or more on the day of the election, to vote in this polling district in the election of the Palestinian Council and the Ra'ees of its Executive Authority.”

i. At least three days prior to its publication, the final Electoral Register shall be forwarded by the CEC to the Israeli side in the CAC subcommittee in the form, and containing the information, described in Appendix 1.

Article III: Qualification and Nomination of Candidates

1. Qualification to be a candidate

   a. Every candidate for the Council and every candidate for the position of Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be a registered elector.

   b. Every candidate for the Council from the various constituencies set out in the Palestinian Election Law must have a valid address in an area under the jurisdiction of the Council in the constituency for which he or she is a candidate. Every candidate for the position of the Ra'ees must have a valid address in an area under the jurisdiction of the Council. A valid address shall be that of a residential property which is owned or rented or otherwise legitimately occupied by the candidate. This valid address shall be entered in the candidate's nomination paper. Where a candidate has more than one valid address, he may enter all such addresses on his nomination paper.

   c. Israeli citizens may not be candidates for election to be a member of the Council or to be the Ra'ees.

2. Nominations

   The nomination of any candidates, parties or coalitions will be refused, and such nomination or registration once made will be canceled, if such candidates, parties or coalitions:

   (1) commit or advocate racism; or
   (2) pursue the implementation of their aims by unlawful or non-democratic means.

3. Nomination procedures - The Council

   a. Nominations shall be submitted to the DEC on the official nomination papers, as specified in the Palestinian Election Law.

   b. Following the close of nominations, the DEC for each constituency will immediately publish the provisional Statement of Persons Nominated for its constituency in accordance with the Palestinian Election Law.

   c. Upon publication of the provisional Statement of Persons Nominated, any person may, within 7 days, submit an objection to the CEC that a provisionally nominated candidate does not satisfy the criteria set out in paragraphs 1.b. 1.c and 2 above.

   d. Following the resolution of all appeals, and not later than 22 days before polling day, the DEC will publish the final Statement of Persons Nominated.

4. Nomination procedures - The position of the Ra'ees

   a. The nomination of any candidate shall be submitted to the CEC on the official nomination paper, as specified in the Palestinian Election Law.

   b. The CEC will publish the provisional Statement of Persons Nominated 3 days after the close of nominations.
c. Upon publication of the provisional Statement of Persons Nominated, any person may, within 2 days, submit an objection to the CEC that a provisionally nominated candidate does not satisfy the criteria set out in paragraphs 1.b, 1.c and 2 above.

d. Following the resolution of all appeals (and therefore not later than 22 days before polling day) the CEC will publish the final Statement of Persons Nominated.

**Article IV: The Election Campaign**

1. **General campaign provisions**
   a. All activities carried out by nominated candidates, or by political parties, coalitions, or groupings of electors who have nominated candidates, or for their benefit, that are directly addressed to obtain the electorate’s vote, shall constitute campaign activities. Candidates and their supporters may promote their campaign by any legal means.
   
b. The official campaign period of the election, during which the provisions relating to the election campaign will apply, will start 22 days before polling day and close 24 hours before the polls open. Campaigning on the day before polling day, or on polling day itself, will not be permitted.

2. **Rallies and meetings**
   a. The CEC will publish a list of venues and facilities available for election rallies and meetings, which shall include all recognized public open air meeting places and all public buildings with a recognized public meeting hall. The CEC will also publish a list of routes available for marches. These lists will be posted in each constituency in the respective DEO. Such campaign activities shall be conducted at venues and facilities included in the lists published by the CEC.
   
b. Without derogating from the principle that the Palestinian Police will ensure public order during the Palestinian elections, and in order to enable the elections to proceed smoothly, without any interference, obstacle or friction, the two sides agree to deal with, and coordinate with regard to, security issues that may arise in relation to the electoral process in the relevant DCO in each constituency.
   
c. Security issues relating to the international observers will also be dealt with in the relevant DCO, within the framework of the trilateral Palestinian- Israeli-European Union forum, as set out in Article V, paragraph 7 below.
   
d. Each side shall take all necessary measures with regard to persons under its authority to prevent public disorder during campaign activities, to ensure that such activities do not interfere with the free flow of traffic, and to protect the electoral process from any violence, incitement, hostile propaganda or other undemocratic interference.
   
e. (1) The representative of a candidate or candidates wanting to hold a rally, meeting or march must submit an application to the relevant DEO giving details of the proposed time and venue.
   
(2) With regard to applications to hold such a campaign activity in areas in which the Palestinian Police exercises responsibility for public order, but there is no Palestinian police station or post, the DEO shall give prior notification of the activity to the relevant DCO.

(3) With regard to applications to hold such a campaign activity outside the areas in which the Palestinian Police exercises responsibility for public order, the activity shall only take place after coordination and confirmation through the relevant DCO.

**Article V: International Observation of Elections**

1. **International Standards**
   The election process will be open to international observation. Observation will be conducted according to accepted international standards.

2. **Scope of observation**
   a. All stages of the electoral process will be open to observation. This includes registration of electors, the campaign, the operation of polling stations during polling, the operation of the count in each polling station, and the totaling and scrutiny (including the determination of claims made by candidates or their representatives) at district and central level.
   
b. The observers will be asked to assess whether all stages of the electoral process are free and fair. The activity of the observers will be limited to observation, reporting and dialogue with the relevant authorities.
c. Observer delegations may wish at any point to make comments or representations about the con-
duct of the elections to the CEC, which shall consider them and reply appropriately.
d. In order to facilitate the independence of the observation, the mandate and operating instructions of
each international observer delegation shall be determined by that delegation in consultation with
the international observer coordinating body under the common terms of reference attached as Ap-
pendix 2 to this Annex.

3. Source of observers
It is envisaged that observers will be present from all parts of the world.
a. Observer delegations will, in particular, be present from the European Union, the United Nations,
the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Canada, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, Norway,
South Africa, the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the
Islamic Conference Organization. Observer delegations from other governments or intergovern-
mental organizations may be added to this list upon consultation.
b. Other observers, including those representing non-governmental organizations, will also be present.

4. Coordinating body
The European Union will act as the coordinator for the activity of observer delegations.

5. Accreditation of observers
a. All observers, both international and domestic, shall be accredited through machinery established
by the CEC. Accreditation will be issued by the CEC on request and will be conditional on accep-
tance of the common terms of reference. The accreditation card will contain a trilingual text (Ara-
ic, English and Hebrew).
b. The accreditation card of members of observer delegations and members of the Coordinating
Body shall contain the following details:
   (1) full name;
   (2) country of origin;
   (3) the following text: "The bearer of this card is an International Observer and is entitled to Privi-
leges and Immunities in accordance with the Interim Agreement"; and
   (4) a photograph.
c. The accreditation card of other observers shall not be the same color as the card for members of
observer delegations in subparagraph b. above, and shall contain the following details:
   (1) name;
   (2) organization;
   (3) the words "Election Observer";
   (4) the following text: "The bearer of this card is an Election Observer entitled to all possible assis-
tance in the conduct of his or her tasks in accordance with the Interim Agreement."; and
   (5) a photograph.

6. Privileges and immunities
a. Observer delegations and members of the coordinating body (hereinafter "delegation members")
shall be granted, according to international standards, the privileges and immunities necessary for
the fulfillment of their activities in accordance with Appendix 3 to this Annex.
b. The names of delegation members will be supplied in advance by the CEC to Israel, following
which privileges and immunities will be granted in accordance with Appendix 3.

7. Trilateral coordination forum for logistics and security
The CEC, Israel and the European Union shall establish a trilateral forum for the purpose of dealing
with issues (for example: security of observers, communications, visas, identification, and other ques-
tions of logistics) which are raised by observer delegations as requiring assistance, or which other-
wise require coordination between the members of the trilateral forum. Other matters relating to the
conduct of the elections may be dealt with between the CEC and the European Union bilaterally. The
operational modalities of the trilateral forum will be agreed by the parties at its first meeting.
8. Freedom of movement
   a. For the purposes of election observation, all measures necessary will be taken to ensure freedom of
      movement in all areas of operation.
   b. Observers will not be accompanied by official representatives of the CEC or of Israel unless they
      so request.

9. Equipment of observers
   a. Members of observer delegations will be identifiable by a distinctive outfit (cap, shirt, jacket etc.)
      and an overjacket carrying the words “INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER” in Arabic and English.
      Other observers will be otherwise identified.
   b. Observers will not carry arms.

10. Reporting by observer delegations
    During and following the election, the coordinating body, each individual observer delegation, and
    other observers may issue statements and hold press conferences as to their findings.

11. Domestic observers and parallel vote tabulations
    Domestic observer organizations will be required to be independent of parties, coalitions and group-
    ings of electors with nominated candidate(s) and will be accredited by the CEC on request. Domestic
    observer organizations will operate under the common terms of reference for domestic observers
    attached in Appendix 2. Any parallel vote tabulation organization will also be accredited as a domes-
    tic observer organization.

12. Provisions for journalists
    Domestic and international journalists will be accredited by the CEC upon production of valid press
    documentation. Journalists shall enjoy freedom of the press and of movement in all areas in order to
    cover the electoral process. Journalists shall have access to all electoral facilities during all stages of
    the electoral process. The electoral authorities may request the presentation of the issued accredita-
    tion in order to facilitate this access.

Article VI: Election Arrangements Concerning Jerusalem

1. Election Campaigning
   A subcommittee of the CAC shall be established comprising representatives of the CEC and Israel, to
   coordinate issues relating to election campaigning in Jerusalem. Candidates conducting campaign
   activities in Jerusalem shall apply for the necessary permits through the CEC. The CEC shall obtain
   the necessary permits from the Israeli side in the CAC subcommittee. In addition, the CEC may dis-
   qualify candidates whose election campaigning in Jerusalem fails to comply with the provisions of
   the Palestinian Election Law and this Agreement.

2. Polling Arrangements
   a. Location A number of Palestinians of Jerusalem will vote in the elections through services ren-
      dered in post offices in Jerusalem, in accordance with the capacity of such post offices.
      The relevant post offices for the purposes of these arrangements shall be:
         (1) Salah-a-din post office;
         (2) Jaffa Gate post office;
         (3) Shuafat post office;
         (4) Beit Hamina post office; and
         (5) Mount of Olives post office.
   b. International Observation
      International observers will be present in the above post offices on the day of the elections.
      (1) Those Palestinians of Jerusalem who will vote in the elections through post offices in Jerusalem
      shall be notified of the relevant post office by Electoral Registration card provided by the CEC
      (hereinafter "the electors").
(2) On arrival at the post office, electors shall identify themselves to the relevant postal personnel (hereinafter "the personnel") and present their Electoral Registration card.

(3) The personnel shall provide the electors with the following:
   (a) two ballot papers, one for the election of the Ra'ees, and one for the election to the Council; and
   (b) two envelopes addressed to the DEO.

(4) The electors shall mark the ballot papers at the post office counter, then place them in the envelopes to be inserted in receptacles, the size and shape of which shall be agreed between the two sides.

(5) At the end of the day, the receptacles shall be promptly delivered to the office of the relevant DEO. Such delivery shall be open to international observers. These receptacles shall be sealed prior to delivery.

(6) The DEO shall be responsible for the counting and totaling of votes cast through the arrangements set out above as part of the total election count.

APPENDIX 1: AGREED FORMAT FOR CANVASS INFORMATION

1. Computer specifications
   a. The data will be provided on a DAT (2GB) tape. If possible, the data will be transferred by means of the TAR program.
   b. The data will be provided in a file which accords with Microsoft Windows Arabic Standard.
   c. The data will be provided in a flat file and not an export file.

2. General points
   a. A table indicating the relationship between the PSC codes and the names of their respective localities will be provided.
   b. An experimental input of 100 entries will be tried, not later than two weeks after the start of the canvass.

3. Format of the data
   a. The file to be transferred shall be in the following format:
      Content Type Length
      -------------------------------------------
      ID Number NUMBER 9
      ID Type NUMBER 1
      Date of birth DATE 6-YYMMDD
      Sex NUMBER 1
      PSC code NUMBER 5
   b. The ID Number may have a length of 8 where there is no check digit. In this case, the final space should be left blank.
   c. The ID Type field may contain one of three values:
      1 Israeli ID (West Bank)
      2 Palestinian Authority ID
      3 Israeli ID (Jerusalem).
   d. The Sex field may contain one of two values:
      1 Male
      2 Female.
   e. When not fully known, dates of birth will be entered as follows:
      i. When the day of the month is not known, 00 will be entered.
      ii. When the month is not known, 00 will be entered.
      iii. Where the entire date of birth is unknown, it will be entered as 000000.

APPENDIX 2: COMMON TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR OBSERVERS

A. International Observers
1. Observers are invited to observe the full Palestinian election process, from the announcement through registration, campaign, polling, counting, compiling of results and complaints procedures.
2. All bodies sending observers will be free in their choice of observers. All observers will be issued on arrival with accreditation by the CEC.
3. Any accredited observer is free to have contact with any person at any time and anywhere and to attend all election related events.
4. Israel will allow accredited observers to travel through and to get accommodation in Israel.
5. The premises, equipment and property, including papers, documents (including computerized documents), communications, correspondence and databases of observer organizations shall be respected by each side according to its applicable laws. This provision shall apply also to the property of observers created, maintained or used for the purposes of their work or duties.
6. Members of observer delegations will wear their distinctive outfit (caps, shirts, jackets etc., including the words “INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER” in Arabic and English) whenever and wherever they go on duty. Observers who are not members of observer delegations in accordance with Article V, paragraph 3.a of this Annex (hereinafter “other observers”) will be otherwise identified.
7. All observers will be responsible for the arrangement of their own accommodation, equipment, means of transport, and medical and other insurance.
8. The CEC and Israel will bear no financial liability in respect of expenditure undertaken by observers, or of injury, damage or loss incurred by observers in the course of their duties or otherwise. The European Union will only bear such liability in relation to members of the coordinating body and to the European Union observers and only to the extent that it explicitly agrees so to do.
9. No restriction shall be placed on introducing foreign currency to fund the activities of observers nor on the repatriation of such funds to any country abroad nor on the free exchange of foreign currency through an authorized dealer in exchange at the market rate of exchange.
10. All necessary measures shall be taken to ensure the security of observers. Enhanced security will be provided as necessary on request.
11. All observers have the right to emergency medical assistance, including emergency evacuation as necessary. The appropriate Israeli and Palestinian authorities undertake to provide such emergency assistance and evacuation.

B. Domestic Observers
1. Domestic observers are invited to observe the full Palestinian election process, from the announcement through registration, campaign, polling, counting, compiling of results and complaints procedures.
2. All domestic observer bodies will be free in their choice of observers. Domestic observers will be issued with accreditation by the CEC.
3. Any accredited domestic observer is free to move and to have contact with any person at any time and anywhere and to attend all election related events.
4. Freedom of speech for domestic observers in regard of words spoken or written in their official capacity shall be guaranteed.
5. The premises, equipment and property, including papers, documents (including computerized documents), communications, correspondence and databases of domestic observer organizations shall be respected by each side, according to its applicable laws. This provision shall apply also to the property of domestic observers created, maintained or used for the purposes of their work or duties.
6. Israel will allow accredited domestic observers from the list provided by the CEC to travel through Israel in the course of their duties.
7. All observers will be responsible for the arrangement of their own equipment, means of transport, and medical and other insurance.
8. The CEC and Israel will bear no financial liability in respect of expenditure undertaken by observers, or of injury, damage or loss incurred by observers in the course of their duties or otherwise.

APPENDIX 3: PRIVILEGES & IMMUNITIES OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATIONS
For the purpose of this Appendix, privileges and immunities shall be granted to all accredited members of international observer delegations, and members of the coordinating body and personnel appointed by observer delegations to perform activities related to the election observation (hereinafter “delegation members”).
1. Delegation members shall:
   a. be immune from personal arrest or detention, and from seizure of any personal belongings;
b. be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written or acts done by them in the
course of the performance of their mission;
c. enjoy inviolability for all papers and documents, including computerized documentation; and
d. be permitted, for the purposes of their official communications, to use codes and to receive pa-
pers and correspondence by courier or sealed bags.
2. The inviolability and freedom of communications and correspondence to and from delegation
members shall be assured.
3. The premises, including all archives and databases, property, funds and assets of delegation mem-
bers shall:
a. be protected and inviolable; and
b. be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interfer-
ence, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.
4. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying these
privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations in force in the areas under each side's
jurisdiction.
5. The coordinating body and each observer delegation will be able to acquire and use freely and
efficiently, from the beginning to the end of its operation, the means of communication necessary
for it to fulfill its duty. Within the framework of the trilateral forum as defined in Article V, para-
graph 7 of this Annex (hereinafter "the trilateral forum"), the Israeli and Palestinian authorities will
ensure access to all necessary communication lines and frequencies.
6. The coordinating body and each observer delegation will have access to either or both of:
a. special license plates and necessary permits, agreed in the trilateral forum, for cars bought or
hired locally; and
b. special license plates for cars imported and re-exported.
Comprehensive motor insurance shall be acquired for each such car.
7. Any equipment, materials, articles or goods imported by the coordinating body or any observer de-
egregation in connection with their activities shall be exempt from all custom and import taxes and duties.
It is understood, however, that such exemption does not include charges for services provided at Israeli
points of entry. In the event of a request to pay storage charges resulting from an undue delay caused
by Israeli authorities as certified by the trilateral forum, storage charges shall be reimbursed.
Questions relating to such imports regarding prohibitions or restrictions, in accordance with the law,
shall be raised in the trilateral forum and dealt with under expedited procedures.
Each observer delegation will be allowed to import and re-export all necessary equipment, including
cars, which it considers necessary to fulfill its duties. Within the framework of the trilateral forum, Is-
raeli and/or Palestinian customs authorities will perform appropriate customs clearances through a spe-
cial expedited procedure under the supervision of senior customs officials. All imported equipment,
materials, articles or goods exempted from import taxes and duties will be re-exported or donated ac-
cording to applicable customs procedures agreed upon between the two sides at the conclusion of the
mission of the observer delegations.
8. a. Palestinians recruited locally to perform services for the coordinating body or for an observer
degregation (hereinafter "local personnel") shall, subject to the provisions of this paragraph, enjoy
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip:
(1) freedom of movement in the exercise of their duties; and
(2) immunity from prosecution in respect of words spoken or written and any act performed by
them in the exercise of their duties.
b. Observer delegations and the coordinating body shall provide lists of local personnel to the CEC,
which will accredit such local personnel following prior coordination with Israel. Accredited local
personnel shall be issued with a certificate in Arabic, English and Hebrew, possession of which shall
be necessary to enjoy the freedom of movement and immunity in subparagraph a. above.
c. The certificate will include the following text:
"The bearer of this certificate is officially attached to an international observer delegation. He
or she is entitled to drive or travel in a vehicle bearing special observer delegation license plates
in the course of his or her legitimate duties. He or she is entitled to limited immunity in the
course of such duties, in accordance with the Interim Agreement."
d. Such local personnel shall not enjoy immunity from any legal process related to traffic offenses, or damage caused by such offenses.

e. Matters regarding arrangements for entry by local personnel into Israel and for movement by local personnel between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including the issuance of entry certificates, will be handled within the trilateral forum by the Israeli representative to that forum, who shall, to that end, maintain ongoing contacts with the appropriate Israeli authorities with a view to expediting all related matters.

f. Local personnel shall not carry arms.

9. The coordinating body, and observer delegations, may display their flag and/or emblem on their office premises and vehicles.

10. Within the framework of the trilateral forum, the Palestinian and Israeli authorities will appoint liaison officers as appropriate to ensure that all arrangements relating to requests concerning logistics and security are implemented.

ANNEX III: PROTOCOL CONCERNING CIVIL AFFAIRS, 28 SEPTEMBER 1995

Article I: Liaison and Coordination in Civil Affairs

1. Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee

a. A Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereinafter "the CAC") is hereby established.

b. The CAC will function with regard to policy matters under the direction of the Joint Liaison Committee, with ongoing coordination being provided by the Monitoring and Steering Committee.

c. The CAC will deal with the following matters:

   (1) Civil affairs, including issues concerning the transfer of civil powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council.

   (2) Matters arising with regard to infrastructures, such as roads, water and sewage systems, power lines and telecommunication infra-structure, which require coordination according to this Agreement.

   (3) Questions regarding passage to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including crossing points and international crossings.

   (4) The relations between the two sides in civil matters, in issues such as granting of permits.

   (5) Matters dealt with by the various professional subcommittees established in accordance with this Annex, which require further discussion or overall coordination.

   (6) Other matters of mutual interest.

d. The CAC shall convene at least once a month, unless otherwise agreed.

e. Each side may initiate the convening of a special meeting on short notice.

f. The CAC shall determine by agreement its mode of procedure.

2. Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees

a. Two Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees will operate under the CAC, one for the West Bank and one for the Gaza Strip (hereinafter "the RCACs").

b. The RCACs in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip shall deal with the regional civil affairs matters in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip respectively, detailed in paragraph 1.c above, and with civil matters referred to them by the District Civil Liaison Offices.

c. Each RCAC may establish ad hoc working groups if and when the need arises.

d. Each RCAC shall convene no less than once every two weeks.

2. Matters of principle and policy not settled within the RCACs shall be passed on to the CAC.

3. District Civil Liaison Offices

a. Each side will establish and operate District Civil Liaison Offices in the West Bank (hereinafter "DCLs"). Such DCLs will be established in the following areas: Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron and Jericho.

b. In the Gaza Strip DCLs may be established to operate in the districts assigned for the DCOs, as specified in Annex I.
c. The DCLs shall deal with the day to day civil affairs, detailed in paragraph 1.c above, in their respective areas of operation.
d. The DCLs shall operate on a daily basis, representatives of the respective DCLs shall meet daily and the heads of the respective DCLs shall convene official meetings at least once a week.

4. General
a. Means of communication shall be set up with a view to ensuring efficient and direct contact 24 hours a day, in order to deal with any urgent matter arising in the civil affairs field.
b. The CAC and the RCACs shall be comprised of an equal number of representatives from Israel and from the Council.
c. Each side shall inform the other of its representatives to the CAC and the RCACs prior to meetings. Meetings of the CAC and the RCACs shall be organized and hosted by the two sides alternately, unless otherwise agreed.
d. The provisions of this Article shall not impede daily contacts between representatives of Israel and of the Council in all matters of mutual concern.

Article II: Transfer of Civil Powers and Responsibilities
Powers and responsibilities of the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration shall be transferred to and assumed by the Council in accordance with the provisions of this Annex and of Appendix 1.

Article III: Modalities of Transfer
1. In the first phase of redeployment, the transfer of civil powers and responsibilities will be effected concurrently with the stages of this redeployment, as detailed in Annex I, Article I.1 and Appendix 1 thereto.
2. The transfer of civil powers and responsibilities shall be coordinated through the CAC and implemented in accordance with the arrangements set out in this Annex, in a smooth, peaceful and orderly manner.
3. Preparations for the implementation of this Annex shall commence immediately upon the signing of this Agreement.
4. The Israeli authorities shall provide all necessary assistance to the Council including access to offices, registers, records, systems and equipment and all necessary information, data and statistics, required for the transfer of powers and responsibilities.
5. In accordance with the stages of transfer of powers and responsibilities, Israel will transfer from the possession of the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council, offices located in areas under Palestinian territorial jurisdiction, equipment, registers, files, computer programs, reports, archives, records, maps, scientific data, relevant licenses, installations, registrations (including registrations regarding land situated in the areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council) and other movable and immovable property necessary for its functioning.
6. Arrangements regarding the transfer of funds, assets, and contracts, are set out in Article 39 of Appendix 1 (Treasury).

Article IV: Special Provisions concerning Area C
1. In Area C, in the first phase of redeployment, powers and responsibilities not related to territory, as set out in Appendix 1, will be transferred to and assumed by the Council in accordance with the provisions of that Appendix.
2. During the further redeployment phases, powers and responsibilities relating to territory, as set out in Appendix 1, will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
3. In accordance with the DOP, in Area C, the Council will have functional jurisdiction with regard to the powers and responsibilities transferred pursuant to this Annex. This jurisdiction shall not apply to issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, as set out in Article XVII, paragraph 1 of this Agreement.
4. The transfer of powers and responsibilities in Area C shall not affect Israel’s continued authority to exercise its powers and responsibilities with regard to internal security and public order, as well as with regard to other powers and responsibilities not transferred.

5. The closure of areas or the imposing of other restrictions on the movement of persons or goods in Area C, required for the implementation of the powers and responsibilities transferred to the Council in accordance with this Annex (such as for the prevention of the spreading of diseases), shall require prior Israeli consent.

6. a. The Council may appoint civilian inspectors to monitor compliance with laws and regulations within the powers and responsibilities transferred to it in Area C, in a number necessary for the fulfillment of its functions as agreed in the CAC.
   b. Arrangements regarding the operation of such inspectors, including agreed identification documentation, shall be as agreed within the CAC.
   c. The civilian inspectors shall not conduct activity which involves arrests or detention of persons, seizure of property or any other activity involving the use of force.
   d. These inspectors shall neither wear uniforms of a police or military nature nor carry arms.

APPENDIX 1: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

In accordance with Article II of this Annex, powers and responsibilities of the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration shall be transferred to and assumed by the Council in accordance with this Annex and the following provisions:

**Article 1: Agriculture**

1. This sphere includes, inter alia, veterinary services, animal husbandry, all existing experimental stations, irrigation water (i.e., usage of irrigation water which has been allocated for this purpose), scientific data, forestry, pasture and grazing, licensing and supervision of agriculture, the farming and marketing (including export and import) of crops, fruit and vegetables, nurseries, forestry products, and animal produce.

2. Irrigation water, as well as facilities, water resources, installations and networks used in agriculture are dealt with in Article 40 (Water and Sewage).

3. Relations in the agricultural sphere between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side, including the movement of agricultural produce, are dealt with in Annex V (Protocol on Economic Relations).

4. The two sides will cooperate in training and research, and shall undertake joint studies on the development of all aspects of agriculture, irrigation and veterinary services.

5. Forestry is part of the Agriculture sphere and is dealt with in Article 14 (Forests).

**Article 2: Archaeology**

1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of archaeology in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side. This sphere includes, inter alia, the protection and preservation of archaeological sites, management, supervision, licensing and all other archaeological activities.

2. In Area C, powers and responsibilities related to the sphere of Archaeology will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

3. The Palestinian side shall protect and safeguard all archaeological sites, take all measures necessary to protect such sites and to prevent damage to them and take all precautions when carrying out activities, including maintenance and construction activities, which may affect such sites.

4. A Joint Committee of experts from both sides shall be established by the CAC to deal with archaeological issues of common interest.

5. The Palestinian side shall respect academic freedom and rights in this sphere.

6. Subject to academic considerations, and in accordance with the law, when the Palestinian side grants excavation licenses to archaeologists, researchers and academics, it shall do so without discrimination.

7. The Palestinian side shall ensure free access to archaeological sites, open to the public without discrimination.
8. Both sides shall inform each other, through the Joint Committee, of the discovery of new archaeological sites in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

9. Each side undertakes upon itself to respect sites in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which are regarded as holy, or which hold archaeological value. Each side shall have the right to raise issues relating to those sites before the Joint Committee which will consider the issue raised and reach an agreement upon such issue. The sites listed in Schedule 1 are of archaeological and historical importance to the Israeli side. The Israeli side may notify the Palestinian side of other sites which shall be added to this list. The Palestinian side will take into consideration that actions which may affect these sites shall be referred to the Joint Committee for full cooperation.

10. In areas transferred to the territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian side, the Israeli side shall provide the Palestinian side with all archaeological records, including, inter alia, a list of all excavated sites and a detailed list and description of archaeological artifacts found since 1967. With due consideration to the Palestinian demand that Israel shall return all archaeological artifacts found in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 1967, this issue shall be dealt with in the negotiations on the final status.

11. a. Both sides shall take all necessary steps to prevent the theft of archaeological artifacts.
   b. Both sides shall enforce the prohibitions on illegal trading in archaeological artifacts and shall, in this context, prevent any transfer of such artifacts to Israel or abroad.
   c. In this regard, and with a view to safeguarding their common interests, Israel and the Palestinian side shall cooperate, exchange information and take necessary measures to combat the theft of, and illegal trade and transport of archaeological artifacts, including between areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the two sides, coordinating such activity through the Joint Committee.

Article 3: Assessments
Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Assessments in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side. This sphere includes, inter alia, the licensing of assessors.

Article 4: Banking and Monetary Issues
1. This sphere includes, inter alia, issues relating to foreign currency services, regulation, licensing, supervision and inspection of banking activities, and the regulation and supervision of capital activities, and powers and responsibilities relating to monetary policies, all as formulated in Annex V (Protocol on Economic Relations).
2. The Bank of Israel (BOI) shall furnish the Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA) with the relevant information and reports relating to the activities of the banks operating in the West Bank prior to the transfer of powers and responsibilities in this sphere.
3. The BOI and the PMA will continue to have ongoing discussions and exchange of information on matters of mutual interest, including, in particular, banking and monetary issues.
4. The BOI and PMA will cooperate in order to facilitate the movement of “notes” between commercial banks and other financial institutions and between them and the PMA in, within and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Article 5: Civil Administration Employees
1. The Palestinian side will continue to employ the Palestinian employees of the Civil Administration who are currently employed, without derogating from the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian side to deal with all employee related matters. The Palestinian side shall maintain the rights, including pension rights, of present and former employees.
2. In accordance with Article XX of the Agreement (Rights, Liabilities and Obligations):
   a. The Palestinian side shall assume the Civil Administration’s statutory and contractual obligations towards Palestinian employees and pensioners, regarding their rights and the payment of their pensions, and Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility in this regard.
   b. If Israel is sued with regard to the aforesaid rights, the Palestinian side will reimburse Israel for the full amount awarded by any court or tribunal. The Israeli side shall notify the Palestinian side about any claim against it in this respect and shall enable the Palestinian side to participate in defending the claim.
3. a. The Palestinian side will deduct from the salaries and pensions paid in accordance with para-
graph 1 above, those sums owing in respect of loan repayments to Yahav Bank for Government
Employees Ltd., and will transfer these to Yahav bank through the Israeli side.
b. The Israeli side will provide the Palestinian side with a list detailing the monthly loan repay-
ments to be deducted and transferred in respect of each employee or pension receiver under
subparagraph 3.a above.

Article 6: Commerce and Industry
1. This sphere includes, inter alia, import and export, the planning, formulation and implementation
of policies, as well as the licensing and supervision of all industrial and commercial activities, in-
cluding commodities, services, weights and measures and the regulation of commerce.
2. In authorizing the establishment and operation of industrial plants, factories or concerns in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, both sides shall ensure that there is no detrimental impact on the en-
vironment, and on the safety of the other side. Matters regarding the environment are dealt with in
Article 12 (Environmental Protection).
3. The production and use of weapons, ammunition or explosives are dealt with in Article XIV of the
Agreement and in Annex I.
4. The economic aspects of this sphere are dealt with in Annex V (Protocol on Economic Relations).

Article 7: Control
Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Control in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be
transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side. This
sphere includes, inter alia, the institution of controls and proper supervision over the activities of all
offices of the Palestinian side, and the licensing of auditors.

Article 8: Direct Taxation
1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Direct Taxation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
will be transferred from the Israeli side to the Palestinian side. This sphere includes, inter alia, in-
come tax on individuals and corporations, property taxes, municipal taxes and fees, in accordance
with Article V of the Protocol on Economic Relations as replaced by Appendix I of the Supple-
ment to the Protocol (hereinafter - "Article V").
2. a. In Area C, the powers and responsibilities regarding property tax will be transferred gradually to
Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory except for the issues
that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment
phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council. How-
ever, the property tax will be collected by the Israeli side, in cooperation and coordination with
the Palestinian side, and the income will be transferred to the Council.
b. The powers and responsibilities of the Israeli side for levying and collection of income tax and
deduction at source, with regard to Israelis (including corporations in which the majority of
shares which grant rights to distribution of profits are held by Israelis) in respect of income ac-
crued or derived in Area C outside the Settlements and military locations, will be exercised ac-
cording to the Palestinian tax code and the tax collected will be remitted to the Palestinian side.
3. Tax enforcement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be in accordance with applicable laws
and in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
4. The provisions of this Article and of Article V shall be implemented on 1.1.96. The provisions set
forth in paragraphs 5-8 of Article V shall be in force until 31.12.96, and will continue for an addi-
tional period upon the mutual agreement of the two tax authorities.

Article 9: Education and Culture
Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Education and Culture in the West Bank and in the Gaza
Strip will be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian
side. This sphere includes, inter alia, responsibility over schools, teachers, higher education, special
education and private, public, non- governmental and other cultural and educational activities, institu-
tions and programs and all movable and immovable education property.
**Article 10: Electricity**

Both sides have agreed to continue the negotiations concerning the sphere of Electricity after the signing of this Agreement, with a view to reaching an agreement within three months, based on the following merged version, pending which the existing status quo in the sphere of electricity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall remain unchanged. IEC personnel and equipment shall be guaranteed free, unrestricted and secure access to the electricity grid.

(Merged Version)

1. The Israeli side shall transfer to the Palestinian side, and the Palestinian side shall assume, all powers and responsibilities in this sphere [I: in Areas A and B] [P: in the West Bank] that are presently held by the military government and its Civil Administration, including the power to set tariffs and issue licenses [P, as well as all existing property related to this sphere and the grid, as defined in paragraph 4]. [I: In Area C, powers and responsibilities relating to this sphere will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.]

2. The Palestinian Energy Authority (PEA) will have the authority to issue licenses and to set rules, tariffs and regulations in order to develop electricity systems [I: under the responsibility of the Palestinian side] in the West Bank. In addition, the PEA shall have the right to construct transmission lines, distribution lines, power stations and the [I: Palestinian part of the] inter-regional electricity connection [I: scheme], in the West Bank. [I: Such construction which is intended to be connected or related to the IEC grid, or which is in Area C, shall be subject to prior Israeli consent.]

3. Pending the establishment of an independent Palestinian electricity supply system or of other supply sources, the Israel Electric Company (IEC) shall continue to supply the electricity in order to meet existing and future expected demand in the West Bank. All aspects of supply of electricity to the Palestinian side by IEC shall be dealt with in a commercial agreement, similar to commercial agreements and prices agreed upon for major bulk Israeli consumers.

4. For the purpose of this Article the term "grid" shall include lines, cables, transformers, substations, circuit-breakers, switches, protection devices and metering equipment, of all different voltage levels. [P: The grid in the West Bank shall be transferred to the Palestinian side] [I: IEC will retain full responsibility for the operation, maintenance and development of the IEC grid. For this purpose IEC personnel, vehicles and equipment shall be entitled to free, unrestricted and secure access to this grid.]

5. The Israeli side shall retain full responsibility for the [I: supply of electricity to the Israeli settlements and the military locations through the IEC grid.][P: operation and maintenance of the electricity supply systems within the Israeli settlements and the military locations.]

6. [I: Subject to the terms of the commercial agreement referred to in paragraph 3 above, which shall include, inter alia, provisions concerning safety and technical standards, dedicated feeders and segments of lines branching from feeders supplying Palestinian consumers, will be transferred to the Palestinian side.] [P: The Israeli side shall transfer to the Palestinian side all existing property related to this sphere and the grid, as defined in paragraph 4, in the West Bank.]

7. The PEA will be authorized to implement, in the grid [I: under the responsibility of the Palestinian side] [P: in the West Bank], the outcome of the technical studies currently being undertaken concerning the following:
   a. The rehabilitation of existing distribution systems.
   b. Upgrading of protection systems.
   c. Construction of control systems.
   d. Implementation of transmission and distribution schemes.

8. Both sides shall establish a Joint Electricity Subcommittee. The functions of the committee shall be to deal with the issues of mutual interest concerning electricity and to implement the provisions of this Article including, inter alia: finalization of the commercial agreement, cooperation in technical issues and arrangements concerning the transfer of agreed systems.

[P: 9. In light of the proposal that was submitted by President Arafat in the last round of negotiations which was later reassured by Mr. Perez, Israeli Foreign Minister, both sides shall agree on an international arbitration company to deal with the transfer of the electrical grid in the West Bank.]
**Article 11: Employment**
1. Powers and responsibilities of the Civil Administration in the sphere of Employment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred to the Palestinian side.
2. This sphere includes, inter alia, organizing and planning, from the Palestinian side, the employment of the Palestinians who work or intend to work in Israel and in the Settlements, as well as collecting information and building a database.
3. The Palestinian side will provide the Israeli side with details of Palestinian workers seeking jobs in Israel and in the Settlements. When Israel makes positive decisions, Israel will issue the necessary permits.
4. The Israeli side will continue to provide the assistance currently granted to Palestinian workers who work in Israel or in the Settlements, regarding their social rights according to the prevailing laws.
5. A joint committee will be established after the signature of this Agreement to set the procedures and arrangements relating to this sphere and their implementation, including the matters of employment injuries.
6. Israel will provide the Palestinian side with lists of all Palestinian employees from whose wages Israel deducts health fees ("health stamp") and lists of retired Palestinian employees receiving pensions paid through the Payment Section of the Israeli Employment Service.
7. Israel will notify the Palestinian side of amendments made in the laws and regulations that relate to Palestinians employed in Israel or in the Settlements.
8. Issues relating to the placement and rights of the Palestinians employed in Israel are dealt with in Article VII of Annex V (Protocol on Economic Relations).

**Article 12: Environmental Protection**

**A. Transfer of Authority**
The Palestinian side and Israel, recognizing the need to protect the environment and to utilize natural resources on a sustainable basis, agreed upon the following:
1. This sphere includes, inter alia, licensing for crafts and industry, and environmental aspects of the following: sewage, solid waste, water, pest control (including anti-malaria activities), pesticides and hazardous substances, planning and zoning, noise control, air pollution, public health, mining and quarrying, landscape preservation and food production.
2. The Israeli side shall transfer to the Palestinian side, and the Palestinian side shall assume, powers and responsibilities in this sphere, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that are presently held by the Israeli side, including powers and responsibilities in Area C which are not related to territory.

In Area C, powers and responsibilities in this sphere related to territory (which only include environmental aspects of sewage, solid waste, pesticides and hazardous substances, planning and zoning, air pollution, mining and quarrying, and landscape preservation) will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

**B. Cooperation and Understandings**
3. Both sides will strive to utilize and exploit the natural resources, pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, in a manner which shall prevent damage to the environment, and shall take all necessary measures to ensure that activities in their respective areas do not cause damage to the environment of the other side.
4. Each side shall act for the protection of the environment and the prevention of environmental risks, hazards and nuisances including all kinds of soil, water and air pollution.
5. Both sides shall respectively adopt, apply and ensure compliance with internationally recognized standards concerning the following: levels of pollutants discharged through emissions and effluents; acceptable levels of treatment of solid and liquid wastes, and agreed ways and means for disposal of such wastes; the use, handling and transportation (in accordance with the provisions of Article 38 (Transportation)) and storage of hazardous substances and wastes (including pesticides, insecticides and herbicides); and standards for the prevention and abatement of noise, odor, pests and other nuisances, which may affect the other side.
6. Each side shall take the necessary and appropriate measures to prevent the uncontrolled discharge of wastewater and/or effluents to water sources, water systems and water bodies, including groundwater, surface water and rivers, which may affect the other side, and to promote the proper treatment of domestic and industrial wastewater, as well as solid and hazardous wastes.

7. Both sides shall ensure that a comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) shall be conducted for major development programs, including those related to industrial parks and other programs detailed in Schedule 2.

8. Both sides recognize the importance of establishing new industrial plants in their respective areas within planned and approved industrial zones, subject to the preparation of comprehensive EIAs, and shall endeavor to ensure compliance with the above.

9. Both sides recognize the importance of taking all necessary precautions to prevent water and soil pollution, as well as other safety hazards in their respective areas, as a result of the storage and use of gas and petroleum products, and shall endeavor to ensure compliance with the above.

10. Pending the establishment of appropriate alternative sites by the Palestinian side, disposal of chemical and radioactive wastes will be only to the authorized sites in Israel, in compliance with existing procedures in these sites. The construction, operation and maintenance of the alternative facilities will follow internationally accepted guidelines, and will be implemented pursuant to the preparation of EIAs.

11. Both sides shall cooperate in implementing the ways and means required to prevent noise, dust and other nuisances from quarries, which may affect the other side. To this end the Palestinian side shall take all necessary and appropriate measures, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, against any quarry that does not meet the relevant environmental standards.

12. Both sides recognize the importance of taking all necessary and appropriate measures in their respective areas for the monitoring and control of insect-transmitted diseases including sand flies, anophelines and all other mosquito species, and shall endeavor to ensure compliance with the above.

13. Both sides shall cooperate in implementing internationally accepted principles and standards relating to environmental issues of global concern, such as the protection of the ozone layer.

14. Israel and the Palestinian side shall cooperate in implementing principles and standards, which shall conform with internationally accepted principles and standards, concerning the protection of endangered species and of wild fauna and flora, including restriction of trade, conservation of migratory species of wildlife and preservation of existing forests and nature reserves.

15. Israel and the Palestinian side shall respectively operate an emergency warning system in order to respond to events or accidents which may generate environmental pollution, damage or hazards. A mechanism for mutual notification and coordination in cases of such events or accidents will be established.

16. Recognizing the unsatisfactory situation of the environment in the West Bank, and further recognizing the mutual interest in improving this situation, Israel shall actively assist the Palestinian side, on an ongoing basis, in attaining this goal.

17. Each side shall promote public awareness on environmental issues.

18. Both sides shall work on appropriate measures to combat desertification.

19. Each side shall control and monitor the transfer of pesticides and any internationally banned and restricted chemicals in their respective areas.

20. Each side shall reimburse the other for environmental services granted in the framework of mutually agreed programs.

21. Both sides shall cooperate in the carrying out of environmental studies, including a profile, in the West Bank.

22. For the mutual benefit of both sides, the relevant Israeli authorities and the Palestinian Environmental Protection Authority and/or other relevant Palestinian authorities shall cooperate in different fields in the future. Both sides will establish an Environmental Experts Committee for environmental cooperation and understandings.

Article 13: Fisheries

1. This sphere includes, inter alia, licensing of fishermen, marine agriculture and vessels, permits, in the Gaza Strip.
2. Security restrictions are dealt with in Article XIV (Security along the Coastline to the Sea of Gaza) of Annex I.

A**rticle 14: Forests.**

1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Forests in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side. This sphere includes, inter alia, the establishment, administration, supervision, protection, and preservation of all forests (planted and unplanted).

2. In Area C, powers and responsibilities related to the sphere of Forests will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

3. The Palestinian side shall safeguard, protect and preserve all forests in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian side shall take all necessary measures to ensure the protection and prevention of damage to said forests.

4. The Palestinian side shall have the right to plant new forests for, inter alia, protection of soil from erosion and desertification, and landscaping purposes, bearing in mind safety and security considerations concerning main roads and infrastructure.

5. Both sides shall cooperate in matters regarding the protection and preservation of forests, including fire extinguishing and pest control, and shall exchange information on issues relating to pests, diseases and scientific research.

6. The Israeli side shall coordinate with the Palestinian side activities in Area C, outside Settlements and military locations, which may change the existing status of this sphere.

A**rticle 15: Gas, Fuel and Petroleum.**

1. a. This sphere includes, inter alia, the planning, formulation and implementation of policies, as well as the licensing and supervision of gas, fuel and petroleum facilities. For the purposes of this paragraph, “gas, fuel and petroleum facilities” shall include, inter alia, all gas and petrol stations, installations, terminals and infrastructure, as well as agencies for the marketing, distribution, transportation, storage, sale or supply of gas, fuel or petroleum products. This sphere also includes the licensing and supervision of the import, export, and transportation in addition to the exploration, production and distribution of gas, fuel and petroleum.

b. In Area C, powers and responsibilities regarding exploration and production of oil and gas shall be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

2. In authorizing the establishment and operation of gas, fuel and petroleum facilities as defined in paragraph 1, the Palestinian side shall ensure that there is no detrimental impact on the environment or on the safety of Israel, the Settlements and military installations and that a safety distance from Israel, the Settlements and military installations is observed. Accordingly, the Palestinian side shall apply the American, British and/or Israeli safety and environmental standards.

3. The color of all gas cylinders in use by Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be different than that in use in Israel and by Israelis.

4. a. The Palestinian side will notify the Israeli side of any exploration and production of oil and gas carried out by the Palestinian side or with its permission.

b. Israel and the Palestinian side agree to cooperate concerning production of oil and gas in cases of joint geological structures.

5. a. All transportation of gas or fuel products, in Israel and in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, shall be in accordance with the respective laws applying which, in any event, shall not fall short of the international requirements and standards concerning safety and environmental protection as applied by Israel. The transportation of gas and fuel products into Israel, the Settlements and military installations shall further be subject to the requirements and modalities regarding entry into Israel.

b. In order to facilitate the movement of transportation of gas or fuel products in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip –
(1) The Palestinian side will issue permits to Palestinian owners, drivers and escorts of vehicles transporting gas or fuel products. The issue of such permits shall be governed by the criteria regarding recruitment to the Palestinian police according to this Agreement. The issue of such permits is not contingent upon the approval of the Israeli side. The Palestinian side shall notify the Israeli side of the permits issued by it.

(2) The Palestinian side shall ensure that vehicles transporting gas or fuel products, as well as their parking lots, shall be guarded against any theft or unauthorized use. The Palestinian side shall inform the Israeli side, at the earliest opportunity, of any suspected theft or unauthorized use of such vehicles.

6. The Israeli side shall cooperate with the Palestinian side with regard to the establishment by the Palestinian side of 3-4 storage facilities for gas and petroleum, including in facilitating, inter alia, location, land and technical assistance in order to secure the purchasing needs of the Palestinians from the Israeli market.

7. Matters regarding the environment and transportation are dealt with in Article 12 (Environmental Protection) and Article 38 (Transportation), respectively.

Article 16: Government and Absentee Land and Immovables

1. Powers and responsibilities of the Custodian of Government and Absentee Property (hereinafter "the Custodian") in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with regard to Government and Absentee Land and immovables, shall be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side.

2. In Area C, powers and responsibilities relating to this sphere will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

3. The Palestinian side shall respect the legal rights of Israelis (including corporations owned by Israelis) related to Government and Absentee land located in the areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council.

4. a. The Palestinian courts shall be empowered to deal with disputes regarding rights relating to land.
   b. Notwithstanding the above, when an Israeli or a Palestinian considers that his or her rights may be affected by any enforcement, confirmation or registration proceedings, he or she may request, within 30 days from the receipt of the information by the CAC in accordance with subparagraph c. below, that the issue be brought before a Professional Joint Committee established by the two sides (hereinafter - "the Joint Committee"), prior to the carrying out of such proceedings. The Joint Committee shall convene within 14 days from the submission of the objection to deal with all the relevant aspects pertaining to the issue and decide whether to approve the carrying out of the proceedings regarding which the objection has been submitted. Pending an approval by the Joint Committee, no enforcement, confirmation or registration, regarding which the objection has been put forward, may be carried out or registered in the Land Registry or in any other relevant registry.
   c. For the purpose of this paragraph, the Palestinian side shall, at the earliest opportunity, provide the CAC with the information regarding any judgment or any request for enforcement, confirmation or registration (including First Registration of land), which may affect the rights of Israelis.

Article 17: Health

1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Health in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred to the Palestinian side, including the health insurance system.

2. The Palestinian side shall continue to apply the present standards of vaccination of Palestinians and shall improve them according to internationally accepted standards in the field, taking into account WHO recommendations. In this regard, the Palestinian side shall continue the vaccination of the population with the vaccines listed in Schedule 3.

3. The Palestinian side shall inform Israel of any Israeli hospitalized in a Palestinian medical institution upon his or her admission. Arrangements for moving such hospitalized Israelis shall be agreed upon in the joint committee.
4. The Palestinian side, on the one hand, and the Israeli Ministry of Health or other Israeli health institutions, on the other, shall agree on arrangements regarding treatment and hospitalization of Palestinians in Israeli hospitals.

5. The Israeli authorities shall endeavor to facilitate the passage of Palestinian ambulances within and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Israel, subject to the provisions of Annex I.

6. Israel and the Palestinian side shall exchange information regarding epidemics and contagious diseases, shall cooperate in combating them and shall develop methods for exchange of medical files and documents.

7. The health systems of Israel and of the Palestinian side will maintain good working relations in all matters, including mutual assistance in providing first aid in cases of emergency, medical instruction, professional training and exchange of information.

8. a. The Palestinian side shall act as guarantor for all payments for Palestinian patients admitted to Israeli medical institutions, on condition that they receive prior approval from the Palestinian health authorities.

b. Notwithstanding the above, in all cases of the emergency hospitalization in Israel of a sick or injured Palestinian not arranged in advance via the Ministry of Health of the Council, the Israeli hospital shall report to the Palestinian side directly and immediately, and in any case not more than 48 hours after the admission, the fact of the admission and the patient’s condition and diagnosis. The report shall be made by telephone and fax and the Israeli Ministry of Health shall be informed at the same time. Within 24 hours of the receipt of the said report, the Palestinian side must either give an undertaking to cover all the costs of the hospitalization or remove the patient, by its own means, to a Palestinian hospital. Should the Palestinian side have done neither of these in the given time, the Israeli hospital shall remove the patient in an Israeli vehicle and charge all costs to the Palestinian side at the accepted Israeli rate. In all cases, the Palestinian side shall cover all hospitalization costs from admission to discharge to the territory of the Palestinian side. Should the Israeli hospital not report as required to the Palestinian side, the hospital itself shall bear all costs.

9. A committee established through the CAC shall facilitate coordination and cooperation on health and medical issues between the Palestinian side and Israel.

10. Imports of pharmaceutical products to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be in accordance with general arrangements concerning imports and donations, as dealt with in Annex V (Protocol on Economic Relations).

Article 18: Indirect Taxation

1. This sphere includes, inter alia, VAT, purchase taxes on local production and import taxes, as well as any other indirect taxes, as formulated in Annex V (the Protocol on Economic Relations).

2. In order to foster regional trade between the Palestinian territories and external markets, various storage facilities can be established at the entry points at the Rafah and Allenby Bridge terminals, for temporary storage purposes (by Palestinian companies and the Palestinian Customs Department) before the customs clearance of goods. The specific locations and arrangements for the above will be agreed upon by the Joint Economic Committee. The administration of these storage facilities will be according to the provisions relating to freight shipments detailed in Article III of Annex V (the Protocol on Economic Relations). Detailed arrangements and procedures will be agreed upon between the two sides.

3. If there will be additional entry points in which paragraph 14.a of Article III of Annex V will be implemented, additional storage facilities as those detailed in paragraph 2 above can be established there too.

4. While ongoing permanent Israeli businesses situated in Area C outside the Settlements and military locations will be registered for VAT purposes with the Israeli side, the rules of Palestinian VAT legislation will apply to these businesses and the Israeli side will transfer to the Palestinian side the net VAT collected from these businesses after deduction of their refunds. The above will be coordinated with the Palestinian side. For this purpose, an Israeli includes a corporation in which the majority of shares which grant rights to distribution of profits are held by Israelis.

5. Tax enforcement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be in accordance with applicable laws and in accordance with this Agreement.
Article 19: Insurance
1. This sphere includes, inter alia, the licensing of insurers and insurance agents, and the supervision of their activities, including supervision of insurers' deposits and funds and the road safety fund.
3. a. The Existing Fund, as defined in Article XI, shall be transferred to the Palestinian side. This transfer will include all the Existing Fund’s assets and liabilities.
b. The Palestinian side shall be responsible for all liabilities of the Existing Fund whether arising from accidents occurring prior or subsequent to the date of transfer.
c. Accordingly, Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility in this respect. If Israel is sued with regard to the aforesaid liabilities, the Palestinian side will reimburse Israel for the full amount awarded by any court or tribunal. The Israeli side shall notify the Palestinian side about any claim against it in this respect and shall enable the Palestinian side to participate in defending the claim.
4. With a view to assisting the Palestinian side to deal with claims against the Existing Fund, the following provisions shall apply:
a. A joint experts committee shall be established to examine claims against the Existing Fund (hereinafter "the Joint Committee").
b. Without prejudice to paragraph 3.c above, the Joint Committee shall examine and estimate whether the assets of the Existing Fund are sufficient to meet its liabilities as they stand on the day of the transfer (in the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area - the 4th of May 1994; in the West Bank - the 10th of September 1995). In the event that the Joint Committee concludes that the Existing Fund's assets are not sufficient to meet its liabilities, the Israeli side shall cover the agreed deficit, including claims incurred but not reported (IBNR).
If the Joint Committee is unable to agree on the above amount, the matter shall be referred to the JEC (Joint Economic Committee).
c. The Joint Committee shall submit recommendations to the Palestinian side concerning administrative or legal changes with a view to expediting settlement of the claims.
d. The Joint Committee shall conclude its work within three months. The two sides may agree on a one time extension for another three months.
5. Additionally, the Israeli side will provide to the Palestinian side all the necessary assistance with regard to the Existing Fund, and advice and consultation when requested.
6. All claims, including pending claims, against the Existing Fund should not be brought before or heard by any Israeli court or tribunal and should only be brought before the Palestinian Courts. To this end, the two sides may take all necessary measures, including, if possible, the enactment of legislation.

Article 20: Interior Affairs
1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Interior Affairs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side. This sphere includes, inter alia, licensing of newspapers and publications and censorship of films and plays.
2. Municipal affairs are dealt with in Article 24 (Local Government).

Article 21: Labor
1. The sphere of Labor includes, inter alia, rights of workers, labor relations, labor conciliation, safety and hygiene in work places, labor accidents and compensation, vocational and professional training courses, cooperative associations, professional work associations and trade unions, heavy machinery equipment.
2. The two sides shall establish agreed procedures for mutual recognition of professional certificates and diplomas.
3. The Palestinian side shall ensure the completion of vocational and professional training courses currently being conducted by the Civil Administration. In this regard, the Civil Administration shall transfer to the Palestinian side a proportionate amount of fees received on account of such courses, relating to the period following the date of transfer.
4. The Palestinian side shall continue to hold vocational training courses, at least to the same extent as has been undertaken by the Civil Administration, inter alia, in the following professions: heavy-vehicle and public transport drivers, garage managers, vehicle technicians, vehicle testers, driving teachers and driving school managers.

5. Cooperative Associations, Professional Work Associations and Trade Unions should act in a manner that does not violate the Cooperative Associations laws, the Professional Work Associations laws and the Trade Unions laws.

6. The Palestinian side shall inform the Israeli side of any work related accident resulting in the injury of an Israeli. The Israeli side may conduct an investigation of such an accident in coordination with the Palestinian side.

7. All matters regarding the production and use of explosives and gunpowder shall be dealt with in Article XIV of this Agreement and Annex I.

Article 22: Land Registration

1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Land Registration in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side. This sphere includes, inter alia, registration in the Land Registry of real estate transactions, First Registrations of land, registration of courts, decisions, registration of parcelations pursuant to the Towns, Villages and Buildings Planning Law, No. 79, of 1966, and the administration of Land Registry offices and processes.

2. In Area C, powers and responsibilities relating to this sphere will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

3. The Palestinian side shall respect the legal rights of Israelis (including corporations owned by Israelis) related to lands located in the areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council.

4. a. The Palestinian courts shall be empowered to deal with disputes regarding ownership of or rights relating to land.

b. Notwithstanding the above, when an Israeli or a Palestinian considers that his or her rights may be affected by any enforcement, confirmation or registration proceedings, he or she may request, within 30 days from the receipt of the information by the CAC in accordance with subparagraph c. below, that the issue be brought before a Professional Joint Committee established by the two sides (hereinafter - “the Joint Committee”), prior to the carrying out of such proceedings. The Joint Committee shall convene within 14 days from the submission of the objection to deal with all the relevant aspects pertaining to the issue and decide whether to approve the carrying out of the proceedings regarding which the objection has been submitted. Pending an approval by the Joint Committee, no enforcement, confirmation or registration, regarding which the objection has been put forward, may be carried out or registered in the Land Registry or in any other relevant registry.

c. For the purpose of this paragraph, the Palestinian side shall, at the earliest opportunity, provide the CAC with the information regarding any judgment or any request for enforcement, confirmation or registration (including First Registration of land), which may affect the rights of Israelis.

Article 23: Legal Administration

1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of legal administration shall be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian Side.

2. This sphere includes, inter alia:

   a. administration, planning and management of the Palestinian Judicial system and its different organs;
   b. appointment of judges;
   c. licensing and supervision of lawyers;
   d. licensing and supervision of public notaries; and
   e. registration of companies and intellectual property rights, including, but not limited to, patents and trademarks.

3. Registration of Companies:
a. The Israeli side shall transfer to the Palestinian side the Register of Companies in the West Bank.
b. Each side shall allow persons or legal entities of the other side to register companies in its register.
c. Each side shall ensure that its Register of Companies is open to the public for information.
d. Each side will provide the other side, upon request, and on a case-by-case basis, with updated information regarding the registration of companies, share ownership, charges and other relevant information held by their respective registrars of companies.

The two sides shall agree on arrangements for the exchange of updated information regarding the registration of companies.

4. Intellectual Property Rights:
   a. Intellectual property rights include, inter alia, patents, industrial designs, trademarks, copyright and related rights, geographical indications and undisclosed information.
   b. (1) Each side shall use its best efforts to adopt in its legislation standards of protection of intellectual property compatible with those in the GATT Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (hereinafter “GATT-TRIPS”).
      (2) Each side will strive to establish an adequate system for the examination of applications for registration of intellectual property rights compatible with those in GATT-TRIPS.
   c. Each side will recognize the copyright and related rights in original “literary and artistic works”, including in particular, musical works, computer programs and audio and visual recordings, legally originating in the areas under the jurisdiction of the other side.
   d. Each side will recognize the undisclosed information rights originating in the areas under the jurisdiction of the other side.
   e. (1) In view of the free movement of industrial goods between Israel on the one hand and the West Bank and Gaza Strip on the other, each side when processing applications submitted by any resident or legal entity of the other side for the registration of patents, industrial designs, trademarks and geographic indications (hereinafter “Registered Rights”), shall expedite the examination process including publication for objections, for Registered Rights existing and in force in both areas, on the date of the transfer of powers and responsibilities in the sphere of legal administration.
      (2) In the event of a dispute between the registration of Registered Rights in Israel and their registration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip the registration of each side will apply in the areas under its jurisdiction.
   f. In the interest of promoting investment in the region, and in order to facilitate the protection by registration of intellectual property rights, the Palestinian side will, when processing applications for registration, take account of the fact that a particular right has been examined elsewhere.
   g. Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Annex IV (Protocol concerning Legal Affairs), each side will extend its administrative and judicial protection to intellectual property right-holders of the other side. The purpose of this protection is to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights under this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements, and remedies which constitute a deterrent to future infringements.
   h. The two sides will provide each other on a case-by-case basis with information regarding the registration of Registered Rights held by their respective Registrars of intellectual property rights.
   i. Both sides shall ensure that their Registers are open to the public.

5. Legal issues regarding criminal and civil jurisdiction of the Palestinian courts are dealt with in Annex IV (Protocol concerning Legal Matters).

**Article 24: Local Government**

1. This sphere includes, inter alia, formulation and implementation of Local Government policies, appointment of Local Government officials, approval of Local Government budgets, tenders, acquisitions, fees and tariffs, alteration of Local Government boundaries, creation and dissolution of Local Government, Local Government election processes, Local Government inspections and the creation of joint service councils, city councils, in their capacity as local planning committees, and the operation and maintenance of the municipal water and electricity distribution systems and pricing of these services.

The term “Local Government” in this Article includes municipal councils, village councils and all other communities which lack municipal status.
2. The Palestinian side has the right to make any and all alterations to the Local Government boundaries in the West Bank, within areas A and B as defined in this Agreement.
3. Issues relating to the provision of Local Government services to Settlements and to installations serving the Israeli military forces, are dealt with in the relevant Articles of this Appendix.
4. The Palestinian side shall give notice to the Israeli side of any Local Government elections. With a view to avoiding friction in the context of such elections, special security arrangements will be agreed in the security liaison mechanism.
5. In addition to the existing powers and responsibilities of a city council, in its capacity as local planning committee, it shall also be authorized to issue building permits for various purposes, including factories, hospitals and schools, in accordance and subject to existing detailed planning schemes in force.
6. Municipal authorities shall continue to supply water and electricity from existing systems in accordance with existing quantities and practices.
7. Matters regarding planning and zoning, water and electricity are dealt with in Article 27 (Planning and Zoning), Article 40 (Water and Sewage) and Article 10 (Electricity), respectively.

Article 25: Nature Reserves
1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Nature Reserves in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side and shall be assumed by it, including, inter alia, the establishment, declaration, administration, supervision, protection and preservation of Nature Reserves and of animal species, natural assets and plants.
2. In Area C, powers and responsibilities related to the sphere of Nature Reserves will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.
3. The Palestinian side shall safeguard and preserve the Nature Reserves in accordance with established scientific standards.
4. The two sides shall agree on methods of cooperation regarding the protection and preservation of Nature Reserves, through a Joint Committee of Experts from the two sides. This cooperation shall include exchange of information and data regarding issues such as animal and plant diseases, pests, and scientific research.
5. The two sides shall each take appropriate measures in order to protect Nature Reserves, Protected Natural Assets and species of animals, plants and flowers of special breeds, as well as to implement rules of behavior in Nature Reserves.
6. Each side shall enforce, within the areas under its responsibility, the regulations pertaining to hunting, and in particular the prohibition on hunting of protected and endangered species.
7. The Israeli side shall coordinate with the Palestinian side activities in Area C, outside Settlements and military locations, which may change the existing status of this sphere.

Article 26: Parks
1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Parks in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side including, inter alia, the establishment, administration, supervision, protection, and development of Parks.
2. In Area C, powers and responsibilities relating to this sphere will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.
3. Each side, within the area under its responsibility, shall implement rules of behavior in Parks, and shall take necessary measures to avoid detrimental impacts on the scenery, and natural and cultural attractions.
4. The two sides shall make arrangements, including in matters relating to finance, for the mutual recognition of multi-site tickets issued by either side.
5. The above is without prejudice to the provisions of Article 32 (Religious Sites) and Article 2 (Archaeology).
6. The Israeli side shall coordinate with the Palestinian side activities in Area C, outside Settlements and military locations, which may change the existing status of this sphere.
Article 27: Planning and Zoning

1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Planning and Zoning in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side. This includes initiating, preparing, amending and abrogating Planning Schemes, and other legislation pertaining to issues regulated by Planning Schemes (hereinafter: "Planning Schemes") issuing building permits and supervising and monitoring building activities.

2. In Area C, powers and responsibilities related to the sphere of Planning and Zoning will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

3. a. The Palestinian side shall ensure that no construction close to the Settlements and military locations will harm, damage or adversely affect them or the infrastructure serving them.

   b. Accordingly, when the Palestinian side considers that a proposed Planning Scheme pertains to construction which may fall within subparagraph a. above (in particular: waste disposal sites; electric power stations and projects regarding sewage, hazardous materials or which may have a polluting impact), it shall provide the CAC with a copy of such a Planning Scheme prior to its entry into force.

   A sub-committee established by the CAC shall, upon request by the Israeli side, discuss such Planning Scheme. Pending the decision of the committee, planning procedures shall not be concluded and no building activity shall be carried out pursuant to the said Planning Scheme.

Article 28: Population Registry and Documentation

1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of population registry and documentation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side.

2. The Palestinian side shall maintain and administer a population registry and issue certificates and documents of all types, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this Agreement. To this end, the Palestinian side shall receive from Israel the population registry for the residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in addition to files and records concerning them, as follows:

   - Notices of births.
   - Old handwritten records of births and deaths and the indexes from 1918 till 1981.
   - Photographs file with all its equipment.
   - All computer devices and equipment with all accessories (screens, printers and communications equipment).

3. A Joint Committee will be established to solve the reissuance of identity cards to those residents who have lost their identity cards.

4. The existing identity card of the present residents, as well as of new residents, shall be substituted by a new identity card with a new I.D. number. Such substituted identity cards shall be issued by the Palestinian side and shall bear its symbols. New identification numbers may be issued by the Palestinian side a year after the signing of this Agreement. The new identification numbers and the numbering system will be transferred to the Israeli side. All titles and values in such identity cards will be in Arabic and Hebrew, and the number of such identity cards will be in Arabic numerals (i.e. 0-9).

5. Possession of the aforementioned identity card, whether it was issued by the military government and its Civil Administration or substituted or issued by the Palestinian side, and any other necessary documents, notification of which will be given to the Palestinian side through the CAC, shall be required for entry into Israel by residents.

6. Safe passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as provided for in Annex I, shall require the possession of the aforementioned identity card, whether it was issued by the military government and its Civil Administration or substituted or issued by the Palestinian side, and any other necessary documents, notification of which will be given to the Palestinian side through the CAC.

7. Israel recognizes the validity of the Palestinian passports/travel documents issued by the Palestinian side to Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and this Agreement. Such passports/travel documents shall entitle their holders to exit abroad through the passages or through Israeli points of exit.

8. The holder of a VIP Palestinian passport/travel document will pass the international passages free of the fees and will enjoy VIP treatment in the Israeli international exit points.
9. Special VIP certificates may be issued as concluded in the Protocol regarding Arrangements with respect to Passages of October 31, 1994, and in this Agreement.

10. In order to ensure efficient passage procedures and to avoid discrepancies and with a view to enabling Israel to maintain an updated and current registry, the Palestinian side shall provide Israel, on a regular basis through the CAC, with the following information regarding passports/travel documents and identity cards:
   a. With respect to passports/travel documents: full name, mother's name, ID number, date of birth, place of birth, sex, profession, passport/travel document number and date of issue and a current photograph of the person concerned.
   b. With respect to identity cards: identity card number, full name, mother's name, date of birth, sex and religion and a current photograph of the person concerned.

The Palestinian side shall inform Israel of every change in its population registry, including, inter alia, any change in the place of residence of any resident.

11. To reflect the spirit of the peace process, the Palestinian side has the right, with the prior approval of Israel, to grant permanent residency in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to:
   a. investors, for the purpose of encouraging investment;
   b. spouses and children of Palestinian residents; and
   c. other persons, for humanitarian reasons, in order to promote and upgrade family reunification.

12. The Palestinian side shall have the right to register in the population registry all persons who were born abroad or in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, if under the age of sixteen years and either of their parents is a resident of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

13. a. Persons from countries not having diplomatic relations with Israel who visit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank shall be required to obtain a special visitor's permit to be issued by the Palestinian side and cleared by Israel. Requests for such permits shall be filed by any relative or acquaintance of the visitor, who is a resident, through the Palestinian side, or by the Palestinian side itself. All titles and values in such permits will be in English.
   b. Visitors to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank shall be permitted to remain in these areas for a period of up to three months granted by the Palestinian side and cleared by Israel. Such visitors can enter Israel during the validity of their visit permit, without any need for another permit. The Palestinian side may extend this three months period for an additional period of up to four months. The Palestinian side will notify Israel of this extension. Any further extensions require the approval of Israel. The Palestinian side may, upon clearance by Israel, issue visitors, permits for the purpose of study or work, for a period of one year which may be extended by agreement with Israel. In any event, the duration of such visitors, permits shall not exceed the period of validity of the said visitors, passports or travel documents. The Palestinian side may grant permanent residency to the employees upon agreement with Israel.

14. Persons from countries having diplomatic relations with Israel who visit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank shall either be required to obtain the aforementioned visitor's permit or to hold a valid passport and an Israeli visa, when required. Such visitors can enter Israel during the validity of their visit permit, without any need for another permit.

15. The Palestinian side shall ensure that visitors referred to above shall not overstay the duration of their entry permit and authorized extensions.

16. The Palestinian side shall use, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Palestinian revenue stamps and shall determine their required fees.

17. The CAC will establish a subcommittee to supervise the implementation of this Article.

**Article 29: Postal Services**

1. This sphere includes, inter alia, the planning, formulation and implementation of policies, as well as the management and supervision of post offices, postal services and all monetary transactions and activities in postal units (publicly known as "the Postal Bank").

2. The Palestinian side shall issue postage stamps and postal stationery (hereinafter "stamps"), date stamps and all other related materials, subject to the following provisions:
a. Stamps shall include only the terms "the Palestinian Council" or "the Palestinian Authority", the face value and the subject. Should date stamps include the name of the issuing authority, only the above-mentioned terms may be used.

b. The face value shall be stated only in one of the agreed legal currencies circulating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as detailed in Annex V (Protocol on Economic Relations). c. The design, symbols, wording and subjects of stamps and date stamps issued by the Palestinian side will be in the spirit of the peace.

3. In setting postal rates for international postal services, both sides shall coordinate in such a way as to prevent mutual economic harm.

4. Both sides shall ensure the efficient transmission and delivery of postal items, including parcels, destined for or originating from the other side. Similarly, they shall ensure the efficient transmission and delivery of such postal items arriving from, or destined for, foreign countries.

5. The modalities and arrangements for sending and receiving all postal items, including parcels, between the two sides will be arranged by means of a commercial agreement between the Israel Postal Authority and the Palestinian side.

6. a. The modalities and arrangements for sending and receiving postal items, including parcels, between the Palestinian side and foreign countries, will be arranged by means of commercial agreements between the PLO, for the benefit of the Palestinian side, and the Postal Authorities of Jordan and Egypt, and a commercial agreement between the Palestinian side and the Israel Postal Authority.

b. Without derogating from the generality of paragraph 5 of Article IX of this Agreement (Foreign Relations), the status of the Palestinian side to this Agreement in the Universal Postal Union will remain as it is at present, and the Palestinian side will not be party to any action to alter or change its status.

7. The relevant customs principles detailed in Annex V (Protocol on Economic Relations) shall also apply to postal items, including parcels, transmitted to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

**Article 30: Public Works and Housing**

1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Public Works and Housing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side. This sphere includes, inter alia, the maintenance and repair of roads and Housing Department affairs.

2. a. In Area C, powers and responsibilities related to the sphere of Public Works and Housing will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

b. In exercising its powers and responsibilities in Area C, the Israeli side shall, as far as possible, employ Palestinians in carrying out road works.

3. a. The Palestinian side shall maintain the roads and be guided by international standards for road maintenance and construction, and shall ensure compatibility in said standards with neighboring countries. Additionally, the Palestinian side shall carry out any necessary works in order to ensure the proper condition of road infrastructure, including the cleaning of culverts and ditches, and shall keep the roads clear and free of all physical obstacles.

b. Upon the request of the Israeli side, any necessary work stipulated in sub-paragraph a above may be carried out by either one side or the two sides together, after full coordination between them.

4. a. The Palestinian side shall notify the Israeli side and road users, in a reasonable time and prior to having significant activities which may disturb the regular flow of traffic on roads or which may affect infrastructure located in proximity to roads.

b. Whenever both sides consider that the above activities affect the movement on roads or the infrastructure located in proximity to such roads, these activities shall be carried out in coordination between the Israeli and Palestinian sides.

5. A professional joint committee shall be established by the CAC to deal with issues requiring coordination and cooperation in this sphere, including the coordination of road works on roads in the West Bank serving both Palestinians and Israelis.

**Article 31: Quarries and Mines**

1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Quarries and Mines in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestin-
ian side including, inter alia, the licensing and supervision of the establishment, enlargement, and operation of quarries, crushing facilities and mines (hereinafter “quarries”).

2. In Area C, powers and responsibilities relating to this sphere will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

3. a. Rights of Israelis (including corporations owned by Israelis) regarding quarries situated within the areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian side, which are not operative, may be purchased by the Palestinian side, with the consent of the Israeli concerned, through a joint committee which shall be established by the CAC for this purpose. The sum to be paid to each Israeli with regard to his rights in the said quarries shall be based upon the investments made by him in the site. The Israeli side shall freeze licenses to such quarries. Pursuant to the date of the signing of this Agreement, such quarries shall not become operative.

b. The above joint committee shall also discuss the issue of quarries operated or used by Israelis. The two sides shall respect the recommendations of this committee. Until the decision of the Committee, the Palestinian side shall not take any measures which may adversely affect these quarries.

c. The provisions of subparagraphs a. and b. will apply to quarries presently situated in Area C, as they come under the territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian side, commensurate with the gradual transfer of powers and responsibilities in accordance with paragraph 2 above.

4. The Israeli side shall consider any request by Palestinian entrepreneurs to operate quarries in Area C on its merits.

Article 32: Religious Sites

1. Responsibility over sites of religious significance in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (hereinafter - “Holy Sites”) will be transferred to the Palestinian side. In Area C, this responsibility will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

2. Both sides shall respect and protect the listed below religious rights of Jews, Christians, Moslems and Samaritans:
   a. protection of the Holy Sites;
   b. free access to the Holy Sites; and
   c. freedom of worship and practice.

3. a. The Palestinian side shall ensure free access to, respect the ways of worship in and not make any changes to, the Jewish Holy Sites listed in List No. 1 of Schedule 4.
   b. The Palestinian side shall ensure free access to, and respect the ways of worship in, the Jewish Holy Sites listed in List No. 2 of Schedule 4.
   c. Schedule 4 shall be updated commensurate with the gradual transfer of responsibility in accordance with paragraph 1.

4. The holy site of Nebi Musa shall be under the auspices of the Palestinian side for religious purposes.

5. During religious events that take place three times a year and other special occasions that shall be coordinated with the Israeli authorities, Palestinians shall have the right to religious pilgrimage to the Al-Maghtas under the Palestinian flag. Safe passage will be provided from the Jericho Area to Al-Maghtas for this purpose.

Article 33: Social Welfare

1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Social Welfare in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side. This sphere includes, inter alia, all social services and the registration and supervision of local and international charitable societies.

2. Charitable, voluntary and non-profit organizations and institutions, whether local or international, should act in a manner that does not violate the laws in force.

3. Israeli and Palestinian social welfare systems shall cooperate with regard to the following:
   a. Probation officers and preparation of briefs in connection with juvenile offenses.
b. Exchanging social reports needed for juvenile offenders upon request.
c. Arrangements to protect confidentiality and individual privacy in the exchange of information.
4. Both sides will maintain a positive working relationship in the field of professional training.

**Article 34: Statistics**
1. This sphere includes, inter alia, all phases of planning, producing and disseminating and archiving statistics from censuses and surveys in all areas of statistics including, but not limited to, demographic, social, economic, area, and environmental matters.
2. Israel shall transfer from the Civil Administration to the Palestinian side all the necessary material for maintaining and running the statistical system, such as:
   a. The estimation procedures, forms of questionnaires, manuals, coding manuals, procedures for and results of quality control measures and analysis of surveys.
   b. The statistical maps.
   c. The sampling frames, including the household listings.
   d. The basket of consumer goods and all related material, including the weights used for the CPI.
   e. Any other professional statistical materials whenever requested.
   Any other professional statistical means and methods used by the military government, Civil Administration, or on their behalf, shall also be transferred to the Palestinian side.
3. a. The Israeli side shall, through a Joint Committee to be established, transfer to the Palestinian side, if requested, any primary data from censuses and surveys, carried out by the military government, Civil Administration, or on their behalf, and archived administrative records used by the military government, Civil Administration, or on their behalf.
   b. The Joint Committee shall decide upon the modalities and arrangements concerning the transfer of the above-mentioned materials.
4. Issues relating to the right to be included in the Population Registry are dealt with in Article 28 (Population Registry and Documentation).
5. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics will maintain good working relations and will cooperate in statistical matters.

**Article 35: Surveying**
1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of surveying in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip shall be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side. This sphere includes, inter alia, licensing of surveyors, carrying out of surveys and confirmation of survey maps.
2. In Area C, powers and responsibilities relating to the sphere of surveying will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.
3. Each side shall preserve and ensure the location and adequate condition of triangulation points, traverse points and bench marks, located in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli side shall provide the Palestinian side with all the necessary information regarding these points and marks.
4. The two sides shall establish a Joint Committee of Experts to deal with any needs that may arise.

**Article 36: Telecommunications**
A. General
1. This sphere includes, inter alia, the management and monitoring of the use of the radio frequency spectrum, the use of the geostationary satellite orbit, the planning, formulation and implementation of telecommunications policies, regulations and legal frameworks. The above shall be in accordance with, and subject to, the following provisions:
2. a. In Area C, although powers and responsibilities are transferred to the Palestinian side, any digging or building regarding telecommunications and any installation of telecommunication equipment, will be subject to prior confirmation of the Israeli side, through the CAC.
   b. Notwithstanding paragraph a. above, the supply of telecommunications services in Area C to the Settlements and military locations, and the activities regarding the supply of such services, shall be under the powers and responsibilities of the Israeli side.
B. Principles
1. Israel recognizes that the Palestinian side has the right to build and operate separate and independent communication systems and infrastructures including telecommunication networks, a television network and a radio network.
2. Without prejudice to subparagraph D.5.c of this section, the Palestinian side has the right to establish satellite networks for various services, excluding international services.
3. The Palestinian side has the right to establish its own telecommunications policies, systems and infrastructures. The Palestinian side also has the right to choose any and all kinds of communication systems (including broadcasting systems) and technologies, suitable for its future in, inter alia, basic and value added services (including cellular telephony).
4. Operators and providers of services, presently and in the future, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be required to obtain the necessary approvals from the Palestinian side. In addition, all those operating and/or providing services, presently and in the future, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip who wish to operate and/or provide services in Israel, are required to obtain the necessary approvals from the Israeli Ministry of Communications.
5. Both sides shall refrain from any action that interferes with the communication and broadcasting systems and infrastructures of the other side. Specifically, the Palestinian side shall ensure that only those frequencies and channels specified in Schedule 5: List of Approved Frequencies (herein - "Schedule 5") and Schedule 6: List of Approved TV Channels and the Location of Transmitters (herein - "Schedule 6") shall be used and that it shall not disturb or interfere with Israeli radio communication activity, and Israel shall ensure that there shall be no disturbance of or interference with the said frequencies and channels.
6. A joint committee of technical experts representing both sides shall be established to address any issue arising out of this section including the growing future needs of the Palestinian side (hereinafter referred to as "the Joint Technical Committee" or "JTC"). The JTC shall meet on a regular basis for the purpose of solving all relevant problems, and as necessary in order to solve urgent problems.

C. The Electromagnetic Sphere
1. The Palestinian side has the right to use the radio frequency spectrum, in accordance with principles acceptable to both sides, for present and future needs, and frequencies assigned or reassigned within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip covering all its required services within the bands L.F., M.F., H.F., V.H.F., U.H.F., S.H.F. and E.H.F. In order to satisfy the present needs of the Palestinian side, the frequencies detailed in Schedule 5 are assigned for the use of the Palestinian side in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
2. Future needs for frequencies shall be agreed upon by the two sides. To that end, the Palestinian side shall present its requirements through the JTC which must fulfill these requirements within a period not exceeding one month. Frequencies or sections of frequencies shall be assigned, or an alternative thereto providing the required service within the same band, or the best alternative thereto acceptable by the Palestinian side, and agreed upon by Israel in the JTC.
3. a. The frequencies specified in Schedule 5 shall serve, inter alia, for the transmission of a television network and a radio network.
   b. The television channels and locations of transmitters to be used by the Palestinian side are specified in Schedule 6. The production studios and related broadcasting equipment shall be located in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
   c. The radio transmitter shall be located in the area of Ramallah and Al-Bireh Cities, at the presently agreed site.
   d. The Palestinian side has the right to change the location(s) of radio transmitters according to an agreement between the two sides through the JTC, to serve the Palestinian plans in achieving the best coverage.

D. Telecommunications
1. Pending the establishment of an independent Palestinian telephone network, the Palestinian side shall enter into a commercial agreement with Bezeq - The Israel Telecommunications Corp. Ltd. (herein, "Bezeq"), regarding supply of certain services in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the
area of international telephony, commercial agreement(s) shall be concluded with Bezeq or other duly-licensed Israeli companies. The above shall be without prejudice to subparagraph 5.c below.

2. As long as the Palestinian network is integrated with the Israeli network, the Palestinian side shall use such telephonic equipment as is compatible with the standards adopted and applied in Israel by the Ministry of Communications, and will coordinate with the Israeli side any changes to the structure and form of telephone exchanges and transmission equipment. The Palestinian side shall be permitted to import and use any and all kinds of telephones, fax machines, answering machines, modems and data terminals, without having to comply with the above-mentioned standards (accordingly, lists A1 and A2 of Annex V (Protocol on Economic Relations) will be updated). Israel recognizes and understands that for the purpose of building a separate network, the Palestinian side has the right to adopt its own standards and to import equipment which meets these standards (accordingly, lists A1 and A2 of Annex V (Protocol on Economic Relations) will be updated). The equipment will be used only when the independent Palestinian network is operational.

3. a. The Palestinian side shall enable the supply of telecommunications services to the Settlements and the military installations by Bezeq, as well as the maintenance by Bezeq of the telecommunications infrastructure serving them and the infrastructure crossing the areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian side.

b. The Israeli side shall enable the supply of telecommunications services to the geographically-dispersed areas within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This shall include provision, subject to the approval of the proper Israeli authorities, free of charge, of rights of way or sites in the West Bank for microwave repeater stations and cables to interlink the West Bank and to connect the West Bank with the Gaza Strip.

c. Israel recognizes the right of the Palestinian side to establish telecommunications links (microwave and physical) to connect the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through Israel. The modalities of establishing such telecommunications connections, and their maintenance, shall be agreed upon by the two sides. The protection of the said connections shall be under the responsibility of Israel.

4. Without prejudice to paragraph 3 above:

a. The Palestinian side shall take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of the telecommunications infrastructures serving Israel, the Settlements and the military installations, which are located in the areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian side.

b. The Israeli side shall take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of the telecommunications infrastructures serving the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and which are located in areas under Israel's responsibility.

5. a. The Palestinian side has the right to collect revenue for all internal and international telecommunications services originating and terminating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (except Settlements and military locations).

b. Details regarding payment by the Palestinian side to Bezeq or other duly-licensed Israeli companies, and compensation by Bezeq or the said companies to the Palestinian side, referred to in subparagraph a. above, shall be agreed upon in the commercial agreement(s) between them.

c. The provisions of subparagraphs a. and b. above will be applied between the sides until such time as the two sides agree upon installation and operation of an "international gateway", as well as the international code, for the Palestinian side and the actual commencement of operation of the said gateway.

d. The Palestinian side shall enter into a discussion with Bezeq for the purpose of coming to an agreement for the use of a separate area code and numbering plan, pending the establishment of a separate Palestinian network.

6. The Palestinian side has the right to collect taxes on all telecommunications services billed in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, subject to the provisions of Annex V (Protocol on Economic Relations).

7. a. The Israeli side shall provide the Palestinian side with all operating, maintenance and system manuals, information regarding billing systems and all operating and computer programming protocols of all the equipment that will be transferred to the Palestinian side, subject to protection of rights of commercial confidentiality.

b. The Israeli side shall also supply the Palestinian side with all contractual agreements between the Civil Administration and all domestic and international entities in the area of telecommunications. The timing of the provision of the above mentioned materials will be as provided for in this Annex.
c. Bezeq, in accordance with the commercial agreement, will supply the Palestinian side with all legal verification of its purported ownership of any and all movable or immovable assets in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, that are not part of the Civil Administration's present network.

Article 37: Tourism
1. Powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Tourism in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian side. This sphere includes, inter alia, regulating, licensing, classifying, and supervising tourist services, sites and industries. It also includes promoting foreign and domestic tourism and developing the Palestinian tourist sources and sites. It includes, as well, supervising the marketing, promotion and information activities related to foreign and domestic tourism.

2. In Area C, while powers and responsibilities regarding the development of visitors, interest in tourist sites and the encouragement of the development of tourist services around them, in coordination with the Israeli side, will be transferred during the first phase of redeployment, other powers and responsibilities regarding those sites will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, during the further redeployment phases, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.


4. Without derogating from the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article X of Annex V (Protocol on Economic Relations), a Joint Committee, established through the CAC, shall facilitate coordination and cooperation on day to day tourism issues.

Article 38: Transportation
General
Powers and responsibilities relating to transportation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be transferred from the Israeli military government and its Civil administration to the Palestinian side subject to the following:

1. This sphere includes, inter alia, the licensing and supervision of drivers and vehicles, freight transportation, public transportation, traffic supervision, setting appropriate standards for transportation, meteorology, and others.

2. High and appropriate transportation safety standards and environmental quality shall serve as the basis for cooperation and agreement in this sphere.

3. The Palestinian side in this sphere shall follow international standards such as the European Standard, as applied in the area. Such standards and regulations shall be continuously adapted to reflect technological developments and advances as well as safety and environmental considerations.

4. The arrangements regarding the transfer of powers and responsibilities concerning maritime activity and aviation are dealt with according to the provisions of this Agreement.

Drivers' and Vehicle Licensing
5. Instruction, training and licensing in all fields relating to transportation, including drivers' testing, training and licensing will be conducted at a minimum, in accordance with existing standards.

6. The Palestinian side shall issue drivers' and vehicle licenses as well as license plates according to the format and standards currently in use and as set out in Schedule 7 to be attached to this Appendix as agreed upon between the sides.

7. To facilitate the entry of vehicles registered by the Palestinian side into Israel, the Palestinian side will periodically forward to the Israeli side through the CAC, updated information regarding drivers and vehicles registered by it.

Traffic Supervision
8. Signalization and Traffic Arrangements
a. The Palestinian side shall have powers and responsibilities regarding traffic signalization and traffic arrangements in the areas under its territorial jurisdiction and shall cooperate with the Israeli side concerning related activities that may disturb traffic arrangements.

b. All traffic signalization, including the posting of road signs, markings and traffic arrangements, shall be in accordance with international standards as applied in the area and where a written
warning or message on a sign is required, such a warning or message shall be written in the Arabic, Hebrew and English languages.

9. Public Transportation Permits
   a. Powers and responsibilities regarding Israeli public transportation to and between Israel and the Settlements and military locations shall be exercised by Israel.
   b. Powers and responsibilities regarding Palestinian public transportation to, between and within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be exercised by the Palestinian side. Arrangements for the use of safe passage for this purpose are set out in Annex I.

10. Public Transportation Routes
    a. Palestinian public transportation routes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except into Settlements and military locations, shall be determined by the Palestinian side.
    b. Israeli public transportation routes from Israel to and between Settlements and military locations, and/or to other places in Israel, shall be determined by Israel.
    c. Public transportation routes will be as short and safe as possible.

11. Bus Stops
    a. Bus stops designated for the boarding and alighting of passengers in the areas under Palestinian territorial jurisdiction shall be determined by the Palestinian side.
    b. Bus stops at the main junctions leading to Settlements and military locations or Palestinian villages in the West Bank will be determined in cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian traffic controllers.
    c. Existing bus stops will be kept at Jewish Holy Sites.

Vehicles and Vehicle Maintenance
12. Israel and the Palestinian side shall cooperate for the purpose of maintaining safety standards, technical know how and professional training, and shall exchange information regarding the maintenance, repair and servicing of vehicles, based on international standards as applied in the area.
13. Without derogating from other provisions of this Agreement, any vehicle prototype imported by the Palestinian side which has not been tested and approved by Israel, will be permitted to enter Israel and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip provided that such vehicle prototype is tested and approved by an authorized laboratory facility recognized by both sides, applying standards used in the European Union as applied in the area.
14. All types of vehicles and automotive products manufactured by the Palestinian side shall be tested and approved for use by an authorized laboratory recognized by both sides, prior to their entry into Israel and the West Bank or the Gaza Strip.
15. The import of vehicles by the Palestinian side shall be according to Annex V, Article III, paragraphs 10 and 11.
16. The issue of the transfer of car ownership will be discussed between the Ministries of Transportation of the two sides immediately after the signing of this Agreement.

Freight Transportation
17. Vehicles for transporting freight that are registered by the Palestinian side shall be permitted to enter Israel subject to the provisions regarding entry into Israel, the applicable Israeli laws and regulations governing the transportation of freight by motor vehicle, and the provisions set out in Schedule 7.

Transportation of Dangerous Substances
18. a. The provisions of Article 15, paragraph 5.a. and b. on transportation of gas, fuel and petroleum shall be applicable to the transportation of all dangerous substances.
    b. The above provisions shall be applicable with respect to the transportation of dangerous substances, except household gas and fuel and petroleum products for vehicles, on roads in the West Bank and Gaza Strip directly leading to Settlements and military locations.
    c. In addition to the provisions of sub-paragraph a. above, the transportation within Israel and on roads in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, of dangerous substances classified as "most dangerous substances" as listed in current UN publications, will require a permit signed by both traffic controllers.
Public Transportation from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to and from Jordan and Egypt
19. Both sides agree in principle to the operation of public transportation from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to and from Jordan and Egypt. Procedures and arrangements, including lines, will be detailed in Schedule 7.

Meteorology
20. Both sides agree on a wide range of cooperation in the sphere of meteorology and, in particular, regarding the updating of weather forecasts, data processing, and the transfer of information. The Israeli side shall provide meteorological services to the Palestinian side in the following fields: aviation, maritime, synoptic stations, weather forecasting, vocational training, etc.

Subcommittee for Transportation
21. Details regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Section, as well as all other matters regarding transportation between the two sides shall be formulated by the Subcommittee of the CAC for Transportation.

Article 39: Treasury
1. The transfer of the powers and responsibilities from the Civil Administration to the Council in this sphere shall include providing the available details concerning the Civil Administration's budgets, revenues, expenses and accounts. Israel will provide the Council with all the necessary information, manuals, forms, operating procedures, etc., of the Civil Administration's financial system, which are relevant for the smooth and orderly transfer of powers and responsibilities in this sphere and for their operation by the Council.
2. The Israeli side shall transfer to the Council, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the date of the transfer of the powers and responsibilities, the remaining surplus of the Civil Administration's budget.
3. a. Israel shall provide the Council with a list of the Civil Administration departments and their immovable offices, storerooms, warehouses, etc., located in the areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council.
b. Where such immovables are situated on private property, including property owned by absentees, Israel shall provide the Council with the contracts made between the Civil Administration and the owners of such property.
4. a. The Civil Administration shall bring to an end all its services and development contracts, and will bear the liability directly arising from such termination.
b. Civil Administration lease or rental contracts with the Waqf, the Custodian of Absentee Property or private property owners in the areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, will be transferred to the Council.
c. All land and property lease and rental contracts entered into by the Custodian of Absentee and Governmental Property relating to the areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council will be transferred to the Council. Israel shall give notice of such transfer to the tenants and lessees.
5. Without derogating from the above provisions, upon the transfer of powers and responsibilities, Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding contracts of the Civil Administration and the Council will bear all financial responsibility for them, in accordance with Article XX of the Agreement (Rights, Liabilities and Obligations).

Article 40: Water and Sewage
On the basis of good-will, both sides have reached the following agreement in the sphere of Water and Sewage:
Principles
1. Israel recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. These will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various water resources.
2. Both sides recognize the necessity to develop additional water for various uses.
3. While respecting each side's powers and responsibilities in the sphere of water and sewage in their respective areas, both sides agree to coordinate the management of water and sewage resources and systems in the West Bank during the interim period, in accordance with the following principles:
   a. Maintaining existing quantities of utilization from the resources, taking into consideration the quantities of additional water for the Palestinians from the Eastern Aquifer and other agreed sources in the West Bank as detailed in this Article.
   b. Preventing the deterioration of water quality in water resources.
   c. Using the water resources in a manner which will ensure sustainable use in the future, in quantity and quality.
   d. Adjusting the utilization of the resources according to variable climatological and hydrological conditions.
   e. Taking all necessary measures to prevent any harm to water resources, including those utilized by the other side.
   f. Treating, reusing or properly disposing of all domestic, urban, industrial, and agricultural sewage.
   g. Existing water and sewage systems shall be operated, maintained and developed in a coordinated manner, as set out in this Article.
   h. Each side shall take all necessary measures to prevent any harm to the water and sewage systems in their respective areas.
   i. Each side shall ensure that the provisions of this Article are applied to all resources and systems, including those privately owned or operated, in their respective areas.

Transfer of Authority
4. The Israeli side shall transfer to the Palestinian side, and the Palestinian side shall assume, powers and responsibilities in the sphere of water and sewage in the West Bank related solely to Palestinians, that are currently held by the military government and its Civil Administration, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
5. The issue of ownership of water and sewage related infrastructure in the West Bank will be addressed in the permanent status negotiations.

Additional Water
6. Both sides have agreed that the future needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank are estimated to be between 70 - 80 mcm/year.
7. In this framework, and in order to meet the immediate needs of the Palestinians in fresh water for domestic use, both sides recognize the necessity to make available to the Palestinians during the interim period a total quantity of 28.6 mcm/year, as detailed below:
   a. Israeli Commitment:
      (1) Additional supply to Hebron and the Bethlehem area, including the construction of the required pipeline - 1 mcm/year.
      (2) Additional supply to Ramallah area - 0.5 mcm/year.
      (3) Additional supply to an agreed take-off point in the Salfit area - 0.6 mcm/year.
      (4) Additional supply to the Nablus area - 1 mcm/year.
      (5) The drilling of an additional well in the Jenin area - 1.4 mcm/year.
      (6) Additional supply to the Gaza Strip - 5 mcm/year.
      (7) The capital cost of items (1) and (5) above shall be borne by Israel.
   b. Palestinian Responsibility:
      (1) An additional well in the Nablus area - 2.1 mcm/year.
      (2) Additional supply to the Hebron, Bethlehem and Ramallah areas from the Eastern Aquifer or other agreed sources in the West Bank - 17 mcm/year.
      (3) A new pipeline to convey the 5 mcm/year from the existing Israeli water system to the Gaza Strip. In the future, this quantity will come from desalination in Israel.
      (4) The connecting pipeline from the Salfit take-off point to Salfit.
      (5) The connection of the additional well in the Jenin area to the consumers.
(6) The remainder of the estimated quantity of the Palestinian needs mentioned in paragraph 6 above, over the quantities mentioned in this paragraph (41.4 - 51.4 mcm/year), shall be developed by the Palestinians from the Eastern Aquifer and other agreed sources in the West Bank. The Palestinians will have the right to utilize this amount for their needs (domestic and agricultural).

8. The provisions of paragraphs 6-7 above shall not prejudice the provisions of paragraph 1 to this Article.

9. Israel shall assist the Council in the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 7 above, including the following:
   a. Making available all relevant data.
   b. Determining the appropriate occasions for drilling of wells.

10. In order to enable the implementation of paragraph 7 above, both sides shall negotiate and finalize as soon as possible a Protocol concerning the above projects, in accordance with paragraphs 18-19 below.

The Joint Water Committee

11. In order to implement their undertakings under this Article, the two sides will establish, upon the signing of this Agreement, a permanent Joint Water Committee (JWC) for the interim period, under the auspices of the CAC.

12. The function of the JWC shall be to deal with all water and sewage related issues in the West Bank including, inter alia:
   a. Coordinated management of water resources.
   b. Coordinated management of water and sewage systems.
   c. Protection of water resources and water and sewage systems.
   d. Exchange of information relating to water and sewage laws and regulations.
   e. Overseeing the operation of the joint supervision and enforcement mechanism.
   f. Resolution of water and sewage related disputes.
   g. Cooperation in the field of water and sewage, as detailed in this Article.
   h. Arrangements for water supply from one side to the other.
   i. Monitoring systems. The existing regulations concerning measurement and monitoring shall remain in force until the JWC decides otherwise.
   j. Other issues of mutual interest in the sphere of water and sewage.

13. The JWC shall be comprised of an equal number of representatives from each side.

14. All decisions of the JWC shall be reached by consensus, including the agenda, its procedures and other matters.

15. Detailed responsibilities and obligations of the JWC for the implementation of its functions are set out in Schedule 8.

Supervision and Enforcement Mechanism

16. Both sides recognize the necessity to establish a joint mechanism for supervision over and enforcement of their agreements in the field of water and sewage, in the West Bank.

17. For this purpose, both sides shall establish, upon the signing of this Agreement, Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSET), whose structure, role, and mode of operation is detailed in Schedule 9.

Water Purchases

18. Both sides have agreed that in the case of purchase of water by one side from the other, the purchaser shall pay the full real cost incurred by the supplier, including the cost of production at the source and the conveyance all the way to the point of delivery. Relevant provisions will be included in the Protocol referred to in paragraph 19 below.

19. The JWC will develop a Protocol relating to all aspects of the supply of water from one side to the other, including, inter alia, reliability of supply, quality of supplied water, schedule of delivery and off-set of debts.

Mutual Cooperation

20. Both sides will cooperate in the field of water and sewage, including, inter alia:
b. Cooperation concerning regional development programs, in accordance with the provisions of Article XI and Annex IV of the Declaration of Principles.
c. Cooperation, within the framework of the joint Israeli-Palestinian-American Committee, on water production and development related projects agreed upon by the JWC.
d. Cooperation in the promotion and development of other agreed water-related and sewage-related joint projects, in existing or future multi-lateral forums.
e. Cooperation in water-related technology transfer, research and development, training, and setting of standards.
f. Cooperation in the development of mechanisms for dealing with water-related and sewage-related natural and man-made emergencies and extreme conditions.
g. Cooperation in the exchange of available relevant water and sewage data, including:
   (1) Measurements and maps related to water resources and uses.
   (2) Reports, plans, studies, researches and project documents related to water and sewage.
   (3) Data concerning the existing extractions, utilization and estimated potential of the Eastern, North-Eastern and Western Aquifers (attached as Schedule 10).

Protection of Water Resources and Water and Sewage Systems
21. Each side shall take all necessary measures to prevent any harm, pollution, or deterioration of water quality of the water resources.
22. Each side shall take all necessary measures for the physical protection of the water and sewage systems in their respective areas.
23. Each side shall take all necessary measures to prevent any pollution or contamination of the water and sewage systems, including those of the other side.
24. Each side shall reimburse the other for any unauthorized use of or sabotage to water and sewage systems situated in the areas under its responsibility which serve the other side.

The Gaza Strip
25. The existing agreements and arrangements between the sides concerning water resources and water and sewage systems in the Gaza Strip shall remain unchanged, as detailed in Schedule 11.

SCHEDULE 1: Archaeological Sites of Importance to the Israeli Side Pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 9 of this Appendix:
1. The Samoa Synagogue/Ashtamaa
2. The Maon Synagogue/Ma’in
3. The Synagogue in Yata
4. Tel Rumeida (Tomb of Yishai and Ruth in Biblical Hebron)
5. Betar/Batir
6. The Hasmonean Palaces
7. Sebastia/Samaria
8. Elonei Mamre/Haram Er-Rameh
9. The Naaran Synagogue - Ein Diuk
10. The Jewish Cemetery in Tel Sammarat
11. The "Shalom Al Israel" Synagogue in Jericho
12. The Jewish Synagogue in Gaza City.

SCHEDULE 2: Pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 7 of this Appendix:
1. Power plants (including gas turbines, substations and super tension lines).
2. Quarries and mines (including expansion of existing quarries and mines).
3. Waste water treatment plants including main sewers.
4. Solid waste disposal sites.
5. Hazardous waste disposal sites.
6. Plants producing, storing, or using hazardous substances.
7. Airports and landing strips.
8. Seaports, jetties and harbors.
9. Refineries.
10. Industrial parks.
11. Major dams and reservoirs.
12. Major roads.

SCHEDULE 3: Pursuant to Article 17, paragraph 2 of this Appendix:

Vaccinations

The routine vaccination system carried out in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip including:

A) Vaccinations for infants:
1. Vaccination against Hepatitis B:
   I. To an infant born in a hospital or in a maternity home: at the ages of 0, 1, 6, months.
   II. To an infant born at home: at the ages of 1, 2, 6 months.
2. Triple vaccination against Diptheria, Pertussis and Tetanus (DPT): Given at the ages of 2, 4, 6, 12 months.
3. Vaccination against Polio (Polio):
   Sabin vaccine (OPV) given at the ages of 4, 6, 12 months.
   Salk vaccine (IPV) given at the ages of 2, 4, 12 months.
   Note: If, in the future, we will revert to the quadruplex vaccination method which combines DPT with the Salk vaccine against Polio, the method will be: Quadruplex (IPV + DPT): at the ages of 2, 4, 12 months. DPT: at the age of 6 months.
4. Triple vaccination against Measles, Mumps, Rubella (MMR): Given at the age of 15 months.
   (Note: It is necessary to point out that UNRWA gives an additional dose of the Measles vaccine, at the age of 9 months - within the boundaries of the refugee camps).

B) Vaccinations for children and youth:
1. Against Polio (OPV = SABIN) at the age of 6 years.
2. Against Measles - at the age of 6 years.
3. Against Tuberculosis - given BCG (after a Tuberculin test = Mantoux test) at the age of 6 years.
   (Note: It is necessary to note that UNRWA gives an additional dose of the BCG vaccine immediately after birth).
4. Vaccination against Diptheria and Tetanus - DT (at special concentration suitable for children) is given as a booster vaccination at the age of 6 years. An additional booster vaccination - dT (at a special concentration suitable for adults) is given at the age of 15 years.
5. Against Rubella, for girls only, at the age of 12 years.

C) Vaccination against Tetanus for pregnant women:
   Tetanus Toxoid vaccination is given in order to avoid Tetanus Neonatorum.
   First dose is given at the beginning of the second third of the pregnancy (in the fourth or fifth month) and a second dose before the birth (during the eighth month of pregnancy).

D) Vaccination against Hepatitis B for specific members of the population:
1. A newborn whose mother was found to be suffering with Hepatitis B during her pregnancy or is a carrier of the disease (discovered after a routine test for this disease in pregnant women) - receives vaccination against Hepatitis B. The vaccination is given a number of days after the birth and includes an active and passive vaccine: HBV and HBIG.
2. The husband of a pregnant woman who is sick or is a carrier of the disease (who was checked for Hepatitis B and found healthy) - receives an active vaccination - HBV.
3. Hospital workers, including nurses, technicians and others, who come into contact with blood intensively: in laboratories, haemodialysis units, intensive care units, operating theaters, delivery rooms and emergency rooms, as well as dentists - receive the active vaccination HBV.

E) Vaccination against Meningococcal Meningitis type A:
   Given to pilgrims to Saudi Arabia, 10 days before their departure via the Jordan River bridges.

SCHEDULE 4: Pursuant to Article 32, paragraph 3 of this Appendix:

List No. 1
1. Elazar's Tomb, Ittamar's Tomb and the Tomb of the 70 Elders in Awarta
2. Joshua's Tomb in Kifel-Hares
3. The Cave of Othniel ben Knaz in Hebron
4. The Eshtamoa Synagogue in Samoa
5. The Yata Synagogue
6. Batir
7. Sebastia/Samaria

List No. 2
1. Nun’s Tomb and Caleb’s Tomb in Kifel-Hares
2. The Tombs of Natan the Prophet and Gad the Seer in Halhul
3. The Naran Synagogue - Ein Diuk
4. The Jewish Cemetery in Sammerat
5. The Synagogue in Gaza City

SCHEDULE 5: List of Approved Frequencies - Pursuant to Article 36, paragraph B.5 of this Appendix:
[...]
Notice:
(1) The frequencies marked with (*) are assigned for exclusive use by the Palestinian side and can serve for multi-areas networks and for trunking systems.
(2) All other frequencies are for use only at the specific area since some of the frequencies are duplicated at various areas in Israel.
(3) All frequencies are assigned to be used with BW=2.5KHz and Power=up to 25 watts; all values are in MHz. The frequencies marked with (*) can be used with unlimited power.
[...]
7. Satellite Services: Frequencies will be assigned upon specific requests, for each station, through the JTC.
8. GSM: Mutual participation will be agreed in the JTC according to the planning of each side, and the division of this section of frequencies will take into account the users ratio of each side.

SCHEDULE 6: List of Approved TV Channels and the Locations of Transmitters - Pursuant to Article 36, paragraph B.5 of this Appendix:
Jericho Channel 24
Nablus (Mt.Gerizim) Channel 5
Jenin Channel 31
Ramallah Channel 25
Hebron Channel 30
Gaza Channel 31

SCHEDULE 7: Transportation Arrangements - Pursuant to Article 38, paragraphs 6, 17 and 19 of this Appendix: Note: To be attached.

SCHEDULE 8: Joint Water Committee - Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 15 of this Appendix, the obligations and responsibilities of the JWC shall include:
1. Coordinated management of the water resources as detailed hereunder, while maintaining the existing utilization from the aquifers as detailed in Schedule 10, and taking into consideration the quantities of additional water for the Palestinians as detailed in Article 40. It is understood that the above-mentioned Schedule 10 contains average annual quantities, which shall constitute the basis and guidelines for the operation and decisions of the JWC:
   a. All licensing and drilling of new wells and the increase of extraction from any water source, by either side, shall require the prior approval of the JWC,
   b. All development of water resources and systems, by either side, shall require the prior approval of the JWC.
   c. Notwithstanding the provisions of a. and b. above, it is understood that the projects for additional water detailed in paragraph 7 of Article 40, are agreed in principle between the two sides.
Accordingly, only the geo-hydrological and technical details and specifications of these projects shall be brought before the JWC for approval prior to the commencement of the final design and implementation process.

d. When conditions, such as climatological or hydrological variability, dictate a reduction or enable an increase in the extraction from a resource, the JWC shall determine the changes in the extractions and in the resultant supply. These changes will be allocated between the two sides by the JWC in accordance with methods and procedures determined by it.

e. The JWC shall prepare, within three months of the signing of this Agreement, a Schedule to be attached to this Agreement, of extraction quotas from the water resources, based on the existing licenses and permits. The JWC shall update this Schedule on a yearly basis and as otherwise required.

2. Coordinated management of water and sewage systems in the West Bank, as follows:

a. Existing water and sewage systems, which serve the Palestinian population solely, shall be operated and maintained by the Palestinian side solely, without interference or obstructions, in accordance with the provisions of Article 40.

b. Existing water and sewage systems serving Israelis, shall continue to be operated and maintained by the Israeli side solely, without interference or obstructions, in accordance with the provisions of Article 40.

c. The systems referred to in a and b above shall be defined on Maps to be agreed upon by the JWC within three months from the signing of this Agreement.

d. Plans for construction of new water and sewage systems or modification of existing systems require the prior approval of the JWC.

SCHEDULE 9: Supervision and Enforcement Mechanism - Pursuant to Article 40, Paragraph 17 of this Appendix:

1. Both sides shall establish, upon the signing of this Agreement, no less than five Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSETs) for the West Bank, under the control and supervision of the JWC, which shall commence operation immediately.

2. Each JSET shall be comprised of no less than two representatives from each side, each side in its own vehicle, unless otherwise agreed. The JWC may agree on changes in the number of JSETs and their structure.

3. Each side will pay its own costs, as required to carry out all tasks detailed in this Schedule. Common costs will be shared equally.

4. The JSETs shall operate, in the field, to monitor, supervise and enforce the implementation of Article 40 and this Schedule, and to rectify the situation whenever an infringement has been detected, concerning the following:

a. Extraction from water resources in accordance with the decisions of the JWC, and the Schedule to be prepared by it in accordance with sub-paragraph 1.e of Schedule 8.

b. Unauthorized connections to the supply systems and unauthorized water uses;

c. Drilling of wells and development of new projects for water supply from all sources;

d. Prevention of contamination and pollution of water resources and systems;

e. Ensuring the execution of the instructions of the JWC on the operation of monitoring and measurement systems;

f. Operation and maintenance of systems for collection, treatment, disposal and reuse, of domestic and industrial sewage, of urban and agricultural runoff, and of urban and agricultural drainage systems;

g. The electric and energy systems which provide power to all the above systems;

h. The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for all the above systems;

i. Water and sewage quality analyses carried out in approved laboratories, to ascertain that these laboratories operate according to accepted standards and practices, as agreed by the JWC. A list of the approved laboratories will be developed by the JWC;

j. Any other task, as instructed by the JWC.

5. Activities of the JSETs shall be in accordance with the following:

a. The JSETs shall be entitled, upon coordination with the relevant DCO, to free, unrestricted and secure access to all water and sewage facilities and systems, including those privately owned or operated, as required for the fulfillment of their function.
b. All members of the JSET shall be issued identification cards, in Arabic, Hebrew and English containing their full names and a photograph.

c. Each JSET will operate in accordance with a regular schedule of site visits, to wells, springs and other water sources, water works, and sewage systems, as developed by the JWC.

d. In addition, either side may require that a JSET visit a particular water or sewage facility or system, in order to ensure that no infringements have occurred. When such a requirement has been issued, the JSET shall visit the site in question as soon as possible, and no later than within 24 hours.

e. Upon arrival at a water or sewage facility or system, the JSET shall collect and record all relevant data, including photographs as required, and ascertain whether an infringement has occurred. In such cases, the JSET shall take all necessary measures to rectify it, and reinstate the status quo ante, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. If the JSET cannot agree on the actions to be taken, the matter will be referred immediately to the two Chairmen of the JWC for decision.

f. The JSET shall be assisted by the DCOs and other security mechanisms established under this Agreement, to enable the JSET to implement its functions.

g. The JSET shall report its findings and operations to the JWC, using forms which will be developed by the JWC.

SCHEDULE 10: Data Concerning Aquifers - Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 20 and Schedule 8 paragraph 1 of this Appendix:
The existing extractions, utilization and estimated potential of the Eastern, North-Eastern, and Western Aquifers are as follows:

Eastern Aquifer:
- In the Jordan Valley, 40 mcm to Israeli users, from wells;
- 24 mcm to Palestinians, from wells;
- 30 mcm to Palestinians, from springs;
- 78 mcm remaining quantities to be developed from the Eastern Aquifer;
- Total = 172 mcm.

North-Eastern Aquifer:
- 103 mcm to Israeli users, from the Gilboa and Beisan springs, including from wells;
- 25 mcm to Palestinian users around Jenin;
- 17 mcm to Palestinian users from East Nablus springs;
- Total = 145 mcm.

Western Aquifer:
- 340 mcm used within Israel;
- 20 mcm to Palestinians;
- 2 mcm to Palestinians, from springs near Nablus;
- Total = 362 mcm.

All figures are average annual estimates. The total annual recharge is 679 mcm.

SCHEDULE 11: The Gaza Strip - Pursuant to Article 40, Paragraph 25:
1. All water and sewage (hereinafter referred to as "water") systems and resources in the Gaza Strip shall be operated, managed and developed (including drilling) by the Council, in a manner that shall prevent any harm to the water resources.

2. As an exception to paragraph 1, the existing water systems supplying water to the Settlements and the Military Installation Area, and the water systems and resources inside them shall continue to be operated and managed by Mekoroth Water Co.

3. All pumping from water resources in the Settlements and the Military Installation Area shall be in accordance with existing quantities of drinking water and agricultural water. Without derogating from the powers and responsibilities of the Council, the Council shall not adversely affect these quantities. Israel shall provide the Council with all data concerning the number of wells in the Settlements and the quantities and quality of the water pumped from each well, on a monthly basis.
4. Without derogating from the powers and responsibilities of the Council, the Council shall enable the supply of water to the Gush Katif settlement area and Kfar Darom settlement by Mekoroth, as well as the maintenance by Mekoroth of the water systems supplying these locations.
5. The Council shall pay Mekoroth for the cost of water supplied from Israel and for the real expenses incurred in supplying water to the Council.
6. All relations between the Council and Mekoroth shall be dealt with in a commercial agreement.
7. The Council shall take the necessary measures to ensure the protection of all water systems in the Gaza Strip.
8. The two sides shall establish a subcommittee to deal with all issues of mutual interest including the exchange of all relevant data to the management and operation of the water resources and systems and mutual prevention of harm to water resources.
9. The subcommittee shall agree upon its agenda and upon the procedures and manner of its meetings, and may invite experts or advisers as it sees fit.

ANNEX IV: PROTOCOL CONCERNING LEGAL MATTERS, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

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Article I: Criminal Jurisdiction
1. a. The criminal jurisdiction of the Council covers all offenses committed by Palestinians and/or non-Israelis in the Territory, subject to the provisions of this Article. For the purposes of this Annex, "Territory" means West Bank territory except for Area C which, except for the Settlements and the military locations, will be gradually transferred to the Palestinian side in accordance with this Agreement, and Gaza Strip territory except for the Settlements and the Military Installation Area.
b. In addition, the Council has criminal jurisdiction over Palestinians and their visitors who have committed offenses against Palestinians or their visitors in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in areas outside the Territory, provided that the offense is not related to Israel's security interests.
c. Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph a. above, the criminal jurisdiction of each side over offenses committed in Area B shall be in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.a of Article XIII of this Agreement.
d. Individuals arrested by the Palestinian Police in Area B for public order and other reasons shall be tried before the Palestinian courts, provided that these courts have criminal jurisdiction.
2. Israel has sole criminal jurisdiction over the following offenses:
a. offenses committed outside the Territory, except for the offenses detailed in subparagraph 1. b above; and
b. offenses committed in the Territory by Israelis.
3. a. In exercising the criminal jurisdiction of their courts, each side shall have the power, inter alia, to investigate, arrest, bring to trial and punish offenders.
b. Activities of the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces for the implementation of subparagraph a. above shall be as set out in the Agreement and Annex I thereto.
4. In addition, and without derogating from the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, Israel has the power to arrest and to keep in custody individuals suspected of having committed offenses which fall within Israeli criminal jurisdiction as noted in paragraphs 1.c, 2 and 7 of this Article, who are present in the areas under the security responsibility of the Council, where:
a. The individual is an Israeli, in accordance with Article II of this Annex; or
b. (1) The individual is a non-Israeli suspected of having just committed an offense in a place where Israeli authorities exercise their security functions in accordance with Annex I, and is arrested in the vicinity in which the offense was committed. The arrest shall be with a view to transferring the suspect, together with all evidence, to the Palestinian Police at the earliest opportunity.
2. In the event that such an individual is suspected of having committed an offense against Israel or Israelis, and there is a need for further legal proceedings with respect to that individual, Israel may retain him or her in custody, and the question of the appropriate forum for prosecuting such a suspect shall be dealt with by the Legal Committee on a case by case basis.

5. In the case of an offense committed in the areas under the security responsibility of the Council by a non-Israeli against Israel or an Israeli, the Council shall take measures to investigate and prosecute the case, and shall notify Israel of the result of the investigation and any legal proceedings.

6. When a suspicion arises against a tourist in transit to or from Israel through the Territory in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, that the tourist has committed an offense in the Territory and that tourist is present on roads or in Jewish holy sites specified in Article V, paragraph 8, Article VII, paragraph 9 and Appendix 4 of Annex I, the Palestinian Police may detain him in place and immediately notify the Israeli military forces which shall be authorized to arrest and question him. Where an offense has been committed by a tourist in violation of the prevailing law and further legal proceeding in respect of the tourists are required, such proceedings shall be taken by the Council. Where such a tourist present outside these areas is detained or arrested by the Council, it shall notify the Israeli authorities within a reasonable time, not exceeding 24 hours, and shall enable them at the earliest opportunity to meet the detainee and to provide any necessary assistance, including consular notification, requested by the detainee.

7. a. Without prejudice to the criminal jurisdiction of the Council, and with due regard to the principle that no person can be tried twice for the same offense, Israel has, in addition to the above provisions of this Article, criminal jurisdiction in accordance with its domestic laws over offenses committed in the Territory against Israel or an Israeli.

   b. In exercising its criminal jurisdiction in accordance with subparagraph a. above, activities of the Israeli military forces related to subparagraph a. above shall be as set out in the Agreement and Annex I thereto.

**Article II: Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters**

1. General
   a. Israel and the Council shall cooperate and provide each other with legal assistance in criminal matters. Such cooperation shall include the arrangements detailed in this Article.
   b. Documents served by one side in the territory under the responsibility of the other, shall be accompanied by a translation into the official language of the other side.

2. Cooperation in Criminal Matters
   a. The Israeli Police and the Palestinian Police shall cooperate in the conduct of investigations. Subject to detailed arrangements to be agreed upon, such cooperation shall include the exchange of information, records and fingerprints of criminal suspects, vehicle ownership registration records, etc.
   b. Where an offense is committed in the Territory by an Israeli acting jointly with an individual under Palestinian personal jurisdiction, the Israeli military forces and the Palestinian Police will cooperate in conducting an investigation.
   c. The Palestinian authorities shall not arrest Israelis or place them in custody. Israelis can identify themselves by presenting Israeli documentation. However, when an Israeli commits a crime against a person or property in the Territory, the Palestinian Police, upon arrival at the scene of the offense shall, if necessary, until the arrival of the Israeli military forces, detain the suspect in place while ensuring his protection and the protection of those involved, prevent interference with the scene of the offense, collect the necessary evidence and conduct preliminary questioning, and in any case shall immediately notify the Israeli authorities through the relevant DCO.
   d. Without derogating from the jurisdiction of the Council over property located or transported within the Territory, where the property is being transported or carried by an Israeli, the following procedure shall apply: The Palestinian authorities have the power to take any measures necessary in relation to Israeli vehicles or property where such vehicle or property has been used in the commission of a crime and present an immediate danger to public safety or health. When such measures are taken, the Palestinian authorities shall immediately notify the Israeli authorities through the relevant DCO, and shall continue to take the necessary measures until their arrival.

3. When an Israeli is suspected of committing an offense and is present in the Territory, the Israeli military forces shall be able to arrest, search and detain the suspect as required; in areas where the Palestin-
1. Palestinian Police exercise powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order, such activities shall take place in coordination with the Palestinian Police, in its presence and with its assistance.

4. Israel shall hand over to the Palestinian Police the Palestinian offenders to whom Article I, paragraph 1.b applies, together with any collected evidence.

5. Restraining Orders
   Each side shall execute orders issued by the competent organs of the other side restraining a person under the jurisdiction of that side from traveling abroad.

6. Summons and Questioning of Witnesses
   a. Where the statement of a witness who is an Israeli or other person present in Israel is required for a Palestinian investigation, the statement shall be taken by the Israeli Police in the presence of a Palestinian Police officer in an Israeli facility at an agreed location.
   b. Where the statement of a non-Israeli witness present in the Territory is required for an Israeli investigation, the statement shall be taken by the Palestinian Police in the presence of an Israeli Police officer in a Palestinian facility at an agreed location.
   c. In exceptional cases, each side may take a statement requested by the other side itself, without the presence of the requesting side.

7. Transfer of Suspects and Defendants
   a. Where a non-Israeli suspected of, charged with, or convicted of, an offense that falls within Palestinian criminal jurisdiction is present in Israel, the Council may request Israel to arrest and transfer the individual to the Council.
   b. Where an individual suspected of, charged with, or convicted of, an offense that falls within Israeli criminal jurisdiction, is present in the Territory, Israel may request the Council to arrest and transfer the individual to Israel.
   c. Requests under subparagraph a. and b. above shall specify the grounds for the request and shall be supported by an arrest warrant issued by a competent court.
   d. Where the request is for the transfer of a suspect who is not a Palestinian requested by the Council:
      (1) the arrest warrant shall only be issued pursuant to an application made by or on behalf of the Attorney-General, confirming that there is a reasonable evidentiary basis that the offense was committed by the suspect;
      (2) the offense must be punishable by not less than 7 years imprisonment under the law of the requesting side.
   e. (1) Individuals suspected of offenses punishable by less than 7 years, imprisonment shall be interrogated by the investigating side in a facility of the other side or at an agreed location.
      (2) Interrogation shall take place in the presence of a police officer of the other side.
      (3) Upon the request of the investigating side the other side may detain the suspect in custody pending and during questioning.
      (4) Where the presence of the suspect is required for an objective reason, such as confronting witnesses and identification of site, the suspect shall be transferred for that purpose only.
   f. (1) Both sides, upon receipt of a request in accordance with this Article, shall effect the arrest and transfer requested.
      (2) If the individual requested is detained in custody or is serving a prison sentence, the side receiving the request may delay the transfer to the requesting side for the duration of the detention or imprisonment.
   g. No person shall be transferred in respect of an offense punishable by capital punishment unless the requesting side undertakes that capital punishment shall not be imposed in the case.
   h. (1) Both sides shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the treatment of the individuals transferred under this article complies with the applicable legal arrangements in Israel and in the Territory and with internationally-accepted norms of human rights regarding criminal investigations.
      (2) suspects transferred under this paragraph shall have the right to be assisted during the investigation period by an advocate of their own choice.
   i. Each side may, upon the request of the other side, detain, for no more than seven days, an individual in respect of whom a request for arrest and transfer is to be made, pending the submission of such a request.
j. The transfer of foreigners by Israel to the Council under this Article shall be subject to the applicable conventions to which Israel is a party and in coordination with the foreigner's state of origin.

k. Both sides may agree that an individual convicted in the courts of one side shall serve his sentence in a prison of the other side, subject to arrangements and conditions to be agreed between the sides.

8. Assistance in the Execution of Court Orders for the Purposes of Investigations

a. Israel and the Council shall execute orders issued by each other’s courts for the purposes of investigations (e.g., search warrants, orders for the production of documents and seizure orders), subject to the provisions of local law.

b. Where, for the purposes of an investigation, Israel or the Council requires that tests or examinations (such as fingerprinting or blood analysis) be effected in relation to an item situated in territory under the responsibility of the other side, that side shall effect the tests or examinations required and transfer the results to the side conducting the investigation, where feasible. Where these results are not sufficient for the purposes of the investigation, arrangements shall be made for the transfer of the item to the side conducting the investigation.

9. Legal Assistance in the Conduct of Judicial Proceedings

a. (1) Summons and subpoenas issued by an Israeli court in respect of defendants and witnesses present in the Territory, shall be effected through the Council, which shall be responsible for the service of summons, and the execution of subpoenas by the Palestinian Police.

(2) Subpoenas issued in respect of an Israeli defendant or witness present in the Territory shall be executed by the Israeli military forces. In areas where the Palestinian Police exercise powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order, such activities shall take place in the presence and with the assistance of the Palestinian Police.

b. Summons and subpoenas issued by a Palestinian court in respect of defendants and witnesses in Israel shall be executed through the Israeli Police who shall be responsible for the service of summons and the execution of subpoenas.

c. Where the evidence of an Israeli witness is required in connection with proceedings conducted by a Palestinian court, the witness shall testify at a Palestinian court sitting at an agreed venue, and the witness shall be accompanied by representatives of the Israeli military forces together with the Palestinian Police.

d. Where the evidence of a witness is required in connection with proceedings conducted by a court of one side, a notice of such a request will be given to the authorities of the other side to summon the witness.

10. Nothing in this Annex shall derogate from each side’s powers and responsibilities as detailed in Annex I.

Article III: Civil Jurisdiction

1. The Palestinian courts and judicial authorities have jurisdiction in all civil matters, subject to this Agreement.

2. In cases where an Israeli is a party, the Palestinian courts and judicial authorities have jurisdiction over civil actions in the following cases:

a. the subject matter of the action is an ongoing Israeli business situated in the Territory (the registration of an Israeli company as a foreign company in the Territory being evidence of the fact that it has an ongoing business situated in the Territory);

b. the subject matter of the action is real property located in the Territory;

c. the Israeli party is a defendant in an action and has consented to such jurisdiction by notice in writing to the Palestinian court or judicial authority; d. the Israeli party is a defendant in an action, the subject matter of the action is a written agreement, and the Israeli party has consented to such jurisdiction by a specific provision in that agreement;

e. the Israeli party is a plaintiff who has filed an action in a Palestinian court. If the defendant in the action is an Israeli, his consent to such jurisdiction in accordance with subparagraphs c. or d. above shall be required; or

f. actions concerning other matters as agreed between the sides.

3. The jurisdiction of the Palestinian courts and judicial authorities does not cover actions against the State of Israel including its statutory entities, organs and agents.
4. Israelis, including registered companies of Israelis, conducting commercial activity in the Territory are subject to the prevailing civil law in the Territory relating to that activity. Enforcement of judicial and administrative judgments and orders issued against Israelis and their property shall be effected by Israel, within a reasonable time, in coordination and cooperation with the Council.

Article IV: Legal Assistance in Civil Matters

1. Service of Documents
   a. Israel and the Council will be responsible for the service of legal documents, including subpoenas, issued by the judicial organs under the responsibility of the other side.
   b. Documents served by one side in the territory under the responsibility of the other, shall be accompanied by a translation into the official language of the other side.

2. Taking of Evidence
   Israel and the Council will make arrangements for taking evidence from witnesses, when necessary, when such evidence is sought in connection with proceedings conducted by the judicial organs under the responsibility of the other side.

3. Enforcement of Judgments
   a. Israel and the Council will enforce judgments rendered by the judicial organs under the responsibility of the other side, provided that the judicial organ concerned has the jurisdiction to render the judgment and further provided that the enforcement is not contrary to public policy. The execution offices under the responsibility of each side shall execute such judgments as if rendered by their own judicial organs.
   b. In executing any judgment against Israelis, the Palestinian execution offices may issue orders (e.g., attachments, receivership, eviction) against Israeli property within the Territory. The Palestinian Police shall effect the execution of such orders jointly with the Israeli Police, which undertakes to respect the said orders. This subparagraph does not relate to attachments effected by the service of documents without requiring any physical actions, such as attachments of bank accounts.
   c. Without derogating from the civil jurisdiction of the Palestinian courts and judicial authorities in accordance with Article III, imprisonment orders against Israelis, and orders restraining Israelis from traveling abroad (excluding interim orders before a judgment was given), shall only be issued by Israeli execution offices and effected by the Israeli police.

ANNEX V: PROTOCOL ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

for the text see Protocol on Economic Relations, 29 April 1994

SUPPLEMENT TO THE PROTOCOL ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS

1. The clearance of revenues from all import taxes and levies and from excise on fuel products between Israel and the Council, according to this Agreement, will come into full force on the date of completion of the first phase of the redeployment of the Israeli military forces prior to the elections, i.e., 22 days before the day of elections (hereinafter “the said date”). However, in view of the special needs of the Palestinian Authority and in order to assist it in covering current expenses, Israel has agreed to transfer to the Palestinian Authority:
   a. One month after the signing of this Agreement - 50% of the revenues collected during this month from import taxes on goods, the final destination of which is the West Bank, and from excise on petroleum purchased by the Palestinian side for the West Bank.
   b. Two months after the signing of this Agreement - 50% of the revenues collected during the previous month from import taxes and petroleum excise as aforesaid.
   c. On the said date - 100% of the revenues collected during the period since the previous payment according to subparagraph b. above, from import taxes and petroleum excise as aforesaid.

2. In addition, on the said date Israel will transfer to the Palestinian Authority 15 million NIS as an advance payment in respect of the remaining surplus of the Civil Administrations budget as mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 39 (Treasury) of Annex III.

3. Israel will transfer immediately 12 million NIS to cover the recurrent costs of the eight spheres transferred to the Palestinian Authority starting from September 1, 1995.
4. For the purposes of the implementation of the Protocol on Economic Relations, Israel will deduct 3% from each transfer to the Palestinian side of import taxes and other indirect taxes, in order to cover Israeli administrative costs in collecting these taxes and in handling matters related to them.

5. The two sides will continue discussion through the Joint Economic Committee on the procedures for the set-off of financial obligations between the two sides, including legal entities under their control or management.

6. a. Cigarettes, alcohol, iron and cement will be added to list A2 attached to the Protocol on Economic Relations in accordance with subparagraphs 2.a.(2) and 2.b of Article III of the Protocol, in quantities according to the Palestinian market needs, taking into account the quantities of these goods included in list A1. However, with regard to these goods, the Israeli rates of customs, purchase tax, levies, excises and other charges, prevailing at the date of signing of the Agreement, as changed from time to time, shall serve as the minimum basis for the Council.

   b. The quantities of electrical equipment in lists A1 and A2 will be revised and increased by the JEC to cover all the needs of the Palestinian market.

7. Articles V (Direct Taxation) and VI (Indirect Taxes on Local Production) of the Protocol on Economic Relations shall be replaced by the Articles attached as Appendices 1 and 2 to this Supplement.

APPENDIX 1 (Replacing Article V of the Protocol on Economic Relations)

Article V: Direct Taxation

1. Israel and the Palestinian side will each determine and regulate independently its own tax policy in matters of direct taxation, including income tax on individuals and corporations, property taxes, municipal taxes and fees.

2. Each tax administration will have the right to levy the direct taxes generated by economic activities within the area under its tax responsibility.

3. Each tax administration may impose additional taxes on its residents (individuals and corporations) who conduct economic activities in areas under the tax responsibility of the other side.

4. Israel will transfer to the Palestinian side a sum equal to:
   a. 75% of the income taxes collected from Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip employed in Israel.
   b. The full amount of the income taxes collected from Palestinians from the West Bank and the Settlements.

5. When a Palestinian remits payment to an Israeli the following rules regarding deduction at source shall apply:
   a. No tax shall be deducted at source on income from the sales of goods from the areas under Israeli tax responsibility, which are not supplied by means of a permanent establishment in the areas under Palestinian tax responsibility. Where income from the sales of goods is attributable to a permanent establishment in the areas under Palestinian tax responsibility, tax may be deducted at source, but only on such income as is attributable to such permanent establishment.
   b. No tax shall be deducted at source on income derived by an Israeli from transportation activities, if the point of departure or the point of final destination is in the areas under Israeli tax responsibility.

6. When an Israeli remits payment to a Palestinian which is income accruing in or deriving in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the following rules regarding deduction at source shall apply:
   a. No tax shall be deducted at source on income from the sales of goods from the areas under Palestinian tax responsibility which are not supplied by means of a permanent establishment in the areas under Israeli tax responsibility. Where income from the sales of goods is attributable to a permanent establishment in the areas under Israeli tax responsibility, tax may be deducted at source, but only on such income as is attributable to such permanent establishment.
   b. No tax shall be deducted at source on income derived by a Palestinian from transportation activities, if the point of departure or the point of final destination is in the areas under Palestinian tax responsibility.

7. Non-deduction at source in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 above, shall be carried out through the use of certificates in the form set out in Schedule 1. Such certificates shall be issued on special paper in order to assure that the certificates are authentic. The certificates will
be worded in both Hebrew and Arabic and will be filled out in the language of the other side or in English, and the figures will be written in "Arabic" (not Hindi) numerals.

8. a. In any case, where the appropriate certificate referred to in paragraph 7 has not been presented to the payer prior to the payment of income referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 above, tax will be deducted at source by the payer according to the applicable law.

b. With regard to income not referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 above, tax may be imposed by the tax administration responsible for the areas in which the income was accrued or derived.

9. Each side will grant its residents a tax relief for income tax paid by them on income accrued in or derived in the areas under the tax responsibility of the other side.

10. Both sides agree that a special subcommittee will be established to finalize the arrangements and procedures regarding taxation issues (including issues concerning double taxation).

APPENDIX 2 (Replacing Article VI of the Protocol on Economic Relations)

Article VI: Indirect Taxes on Local Production

1. The Israel and the Palestinian tax administrations will levy and collect VAT and purchase taxes on local production, as well as any other indirect taxes, in their respective areas.

2. The purchase tax rates within the jurisdiction of each tax administration will be identical as regards locally produced and imported goods.

3. While the prevailing concepts and principles of VAT will continue to be applied by both sides in a compatible way, the Palestinian VAT rate shall not be lower than 2% below the Israeli VAT rate (the present Israeli VAT rate is 17%).

4. The Palestinian side will decide on the maximum annual turnover for businesses under its jurisdiction to be exempt from VAT, within an upper limit of 12,000 US $.

5. a. Ongoing permanent businesses will register for VAT purposes with the VAT administration of the side exercising responsibility in the place in which they are situated.

b. When subparagraph a. does not apply, dealers will register for VAT purposes with the VAT administration of the side of their residence, notwithstanding the place of their activity. A corporation will register for VAT purposes according to the residency of the individual holding the majority of its shares which grant rights to distribution of profits.

c. Special cases of dealers having ongoing operations in the other side without having a permanent place of business there, will be dealt with by the joint committee established according to paragraph 11 below, upon a request of either side.

d. Each side will provide the other side, upon request, information concerning sales of specific dealers from one side to specific dealers from the other side. Israel will provide the Palestinian tax administration assistance in collecting information concerning the activities in Israel of Palestinian dealers registered for VAT purpose with the Palestinian VAT administration having ongoing operations in Israel, and will enable Palestinian inspectors to follow their activities in Israel, as necessary for tax enforcement purposes and allowed by law.

6. The VAT on purchases by dealers registered for VAT purposes will accrue to the VAT administration with which the dealer is registered.

7. The principles set out in paragraphs 1-6 of this Article shall also apply to wage- and-profit tax on financial institutions.

8. There will be clearance of VAT revenues between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side according to the following conditions:

a. The VAT clearance will apply to VAT on transactions between dealers registered with different VAT administrations.

b. The following procedures will apply to clearance of VAT revenues accruing from transactions by dealers registered for VAT purposes:

   (1) For transactions between dealers registered with the different VAT administrations special invoices, clearly marked for this purpose, must be used, and they will be accepted for clearance purposes.

   (2) These invoices will be worded in both Hebrew and Arabic and will be filled out in any of these two languages or in English, provided that the figures are written in "Arabic" (not Hindi) numer-
als and that the amounts filled out in the invoice are stated also in NIS. The amount of VAT will be specified both numerically and in words.

(3) For the purposes of tax rebates, such invoices will be valid for six months from their date of issue.

(4) Representatives of the two sides will meet once a month, on the twenty-fifth day of the month, to present each other with a list of invoices submitted to them for tax rebate, for VAT clearance. This list will include the following details regarding each invoice:
   (a) the number of the registered dealer issuing it;
   (b) the name of the registered dealer issuing it;
   (c) the number of the invoice;
   (d) the date of issue;
   (e) the amount of the invoice - with a separate reference to the amount of VAT; and
   (f) the name and the registration number of the recipient of the invoice.

(5) The clearance claims will be settled within six days from the meeting, through a payment by the side with the net balance of claims against it, to the other side.

(6) Each side will provide the other side, upon request, with invoices for verification purposes. Each tax administration will be responsible for providing invoices for verification purposes for two years after receiving them.

(7) Each side will take the necessary measures to verify the authenticity of the invoices presented to it for clearance by the other side.

(8) Claims for VAT clearance which will not be found valid will be deducted from the next clearance payment.

(9) Once an interconnected computer system for tax rebates to dealers and for VAT clearance between the two sides is operational, it will replace the clearance procedures specified in sub-paragraph (4) above.

(10) The two tax administrations will exchange lists of the dealers registered with them and will provide each other with the necessary documentation, if requested, for the verification of transactions.

(11) The joint subcommittee established under paragraph 11 will deal with the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph.

9. VAT paid on transactions made with dealers registered with the Israeli side by not-for-profit Palestinian organizations and institutions, or by financial institutions, which are registered with the Palestinian side, or by the Palestinian local authorities, or by the Palestinian side itself, will be remitted to the Palestinian side in accordance with the clearance system set out in paragraph 8 above.

10. VAT paid on transactions made with dealers registered with the Palestinian side by not-for-profit Israeli organizations and institutions, or by financial institutions, which are registered with the Israeli side, or by the Israeli local authorities, or by the Israeli side itself, will be remitted to the Israeli side in accordance with the clearance system set out in paragraph 8 above.

11. The two sides will establish a joint committee composed of representatives of both VAT administrations. This committee will deal with all issues requiring coordination and cooperation with regard to this Article.

SCHEDULE 1

Pursuant to Article V (Direct Taxation):
Serial No.
Certificate of Non-Deduction of Income Tax at Source by the Palestinian Tax Administration
To: (name of payer)
1. We hereby certify that: (name of recipient)
   I.D. Number and/or dealer number
   home address      business address
   is entitled to receive the full amount of NIS ___ for the sale of goods/ transportation activities without deduction of tax at source.

2. This certification shall apply only to income accruing in or deriving in the West Bank or Gaza Strip, and shall be valid from ____ until ____ and/or for invoice(s) No. ____.

3. This certification is valid only on presentation of the original certificate. This certificate was issued Date of issue by ______ Serial No. _________.

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Certificate of Non-Deduction of Income Tax at Source by the Israeli Tax Administration
To: (name of payer)
1. We hereby certify that: (name of recipient)
   I.D. Number and/or dealer number
   home address    business address
   is entitled to receive the full amount of NIS ___ for the sale of goods/transportation activities without deduction of tax at source.
2. This certification shall apply only to income accruing in or deriving in Israel, the Settlements and military locations, and shall be valid from ____ until _____ and/or for invoice(s) No. ____.
3. This certification is valid only on presentation of the original certificate. This certificate was issued Date of issue by ________.

ANNEX VI: PROTOCOL CONCERNING ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION PROGRAMS, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

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Article I: Objectives
1. The two sides are determined to establish dialogue and cooperation on the bases of equality, fairness and reciprocity within the context of the interim period, and to act together in order to ensure that peace, stability and cooperation between them are reinforced and sustained. In striving to live in peaceful coexistence, the two sides will seek to design and implement various programs which will facilitate the efforts leading to full reconciliation based on the agreed political process, and make it possible for smooth implementation of a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
2. To that end, the two sides agree to establish and maintain between them an extensive program of cooperation in fields of human activity including in economic, scientific, social and cultural fields, involving officials, institutions, and the private sector.
3. The two sides will act to meet common challenges which require a coordinated overall approach and, taking into account their respective distinguishing features, they will act with respect for the values and human dignity of the other side.
4. The two sides are committed to strengthening regional cooperation which takes into account the interests of each side, in particular within the framework of the multilateral Middle East peace talks.

Article II: Scope
The scope of cooperation between the two sides, as detailed in this Annex, will include, inter alia, the following main aspects:
   a. cooperation with regard to environmental protection;
   b. economic cooperation;
   c. scientific and technological cooperation;
   d. cultural and educational cooperation; and
   e. cooperation in enhancing the dialogue and relations between the two peoples through a people-to-people program.
Article III: Standing Cooperation Committee

1. A Standing Cooperation Committee is hereby established (hereinafter "the SCC").
2. a. The SCC shall be composed of an equal number of members from each side and may be assisted in its meetings by experts and technicians as necessary.
   b. The SCC shall adopt its rules of procedure. It shall meet once a month. Meetings may be held more frequently at the request of either side.
   c. The SCC shall reach its decisions by agreement.
   d. The SCC may set up working groups or bodies for the implementation of this Annex.
3. The SCC shall deal with the matters covered in this Annex. It shall consider and decide on the methods and modalities for the implementation of the various fields of cooperation as detailed in Article IX. It may decide to add new fields of cooperation.

Article IV: Principles of Economic Cooperation

1. The two sides recognize the importance of economic growth, especially on the Palestinian side and cooperation based on the principles of equity, fairness, and reciprocity as a key factor in the context of building peace and reconciliation.
2. To this end, the two sides shall promote economic cooperation, including the promotion of joint ventures for their mutual benefit, in accordance with the overall objectives and principles set out in this Annex. This endeavor shall be pursued without derogating from the provisions of Annex III of the Declaration of Principles, Annex V of this Agreement (Protocol on Economic Matters), and any subsequent agreement or understanding reached between them during the interim period.
3. In implementing the various economic cooperation programs, the two sides will ensure that aspects of environmental protection including air, water, marine and land resources, and prevention of environmental risks, hazards and nuisances will be taken into consideration.
4. Without derogating from the existing agreements between them, economic cooperation between the two sides shall focus principally on sectors producing balanced economic, social, and human development and growth. The cooperation aims, among other things, at:
   a. developing the infrastructure and a strong base for the Palestinian economy;
   b. strengthening the bases for independent and institutional economic decision making processes within the Palestinian side;
   c. supporting the establishment of the Palestinian Standards and Specifications Institute, export institute, etc.;
   d. working together to promote social development and foster the rise of Palestinian standards of living; and
   e. aspiring towards reducing the disparity in the level of the respective economic development of the two sides.
5. Economic cooperation between the two sides shall include exchange of information and ideas on economic issues, matters, and transactions involving the two sides.
6. Economic cooperation between the two sides shall take into account changes in economic policies in various economic spheres.

Article V: Sectors of Economic Cooperation

I. Industrial Cooperation

The two sides shall promote industrial cooperation, and, in particular:
   a. facilitate cooperation between their respective economic institutions and business sectors;
   b. examine ways to facilitate the establishment of joint ventures;
   c. promote cooperation between small and medium-sized enterprises of both sides;
   d. seek ways to increase Palestinian industrial output through, inter alia, the promotion of a program of industrial [I: parks] [P: zones] in accordance with an agreed concept and in cooperation with all relevant institutions; and
   e. dedicate special efforts to attract the international business sector and in particular multinational firms.

II. Agricultural Cooperation

The two sides recognize the importance of promoting cooperation in the field of agriculture, and shall in particular:
a. promote cooperation between their respective private farming sectors;

b. facilitate and promote smooth trade between the respective markets;

c. examine ways to facilitate the establishment of joint ventures;

d. establish channels for the exchange of information on farming methods, irrigation, water and soil treatment, herbicides, pesticides, etc.;

e. cooperate and coordinate in the field of plant protection and veterinary diseases;

f. promote joint efforts to combat desertification and encourage the development of agricultural projects in arid and semi-arid areas.

3. Environment

a. The two sides shall promote cooperation in preventing the deterioration of the environment, controlling pollution and ensuring the proper protection and rational use of natural resources in their respective areas, with a view to ensuring environmentally sustained development and promoting regional environment projects.

b. Cooperation in the protection of the environment will focus, inter alia on preparing proposals for projects, studies, and recommendations on:

   (1) development and implementation of appropriate treatment of liquid, solid and hazardous wastes and the control, storage, discharge, transportation and disposal of hazardous materials, pollutants, and radioactive waste;

   (2) prevention and control of marine pollution from ships and from land-based sources;

   (3) preventing and minimizing the harmful effects of pollution on soil, water and air quality;

   (4) use of appropriate tools of environmental management and environmental monitoring methods, including the adoption of and use of internationally accepted environmental principles and standards of Environment Impact Assessment and environmental information systems;

   (5) development of programs of combating desertification, and protection of nature and endangered species and the preservation of forests and natural reserves; and

   (6) promotion of environmental education and awareness programs.

c. Both sides shall cooperate in preventing the transfer of internationally banned and restricted chemicals including, pesticides, insecticides, and fertilizers between their respective areas.

d. Both sides shall cooperate in setting an emergency warning system to respond to events or accidents which may generate environmental pollution, damage, or hazards.

e. The Environmental Experts Committee established under this Agreement will implement the environmental cooperation proposed above in coordination with the SCC.

4. Energy

The two sides shall promote cooperation between them in order to:

a. develop plans to promote the use of environmentally clean alternative sources of energy such as solar and wind energy;

b. enhance cooperation in energy conservation;

c. promote, within the framework of regional cooperation, projects for their mutual benefit in the field of electricity; and

d. develop options for joint ventures which will include the international business sector in the field of energy production, management and supply.

5. Transport

a. The two sides shall promote cooperation in the field of transport and related infrastructure, in order to accommodate any increase in the flow of passengers and goods, and modernize the transportation infrastructure through:

   (1) promoting joint technological and research programs; and

   (2) assisting and facilitating the establishment of a Palestinian Standards and Specifications Institute in this field based on international standards.

b. The two sides will work towards normal movement of vehicles across the crossing points with Jordan and Egypt.

6. Tourism

a. In order to best utilize the unique advantages provided to the tourism industry in conditions of stability, the two sides shall examine ways to:

   (1) increase the volume of incoming tourism;
(2) plan and develop the necessary infrastructure, facilities and services in order to accommodate increased demand;
(3) encourage the involvement of major foreign, regional, as well as multinational tourist conglomerates and entrepreneurs; and
(4) continue and expand the existing vocational training programs, in the various tourist vocations.
(5) encourage joint ventures in the tourism field in all areas of mutual benefit including on the Dead Sea. In this regard Palestinian private projects as well as joint ventures in accordance with the DOP, will be located as agreed on the shore of the Dead Sea.

b. The two sides shall exchange information and promote cooperation on planned tourism development projects and tourism marketing projects, tourist exhibits, exhibitions, conventions and publications.
c. The two sides shall facilitate and encourage smooth movement of tourists between their respective areas.
d. The two sides shall also encourage the development of cooperation programs between their competent organizations in this fields.

Article VI: Scientific and Technological Cooperation
The two sides shall promote cooperation in scientific research and technological development, and shall devote special attention to the following:

a. establishment of contacts between research and scientific institutions of both sides;
b. organization of joint scientific meetings (seminars and workshops);
c. joint research and development activities aimed at encouraging scientific progress and the transfer of technology and know-how;
d. training activities and mobility programs for researchers, scientists and specialists from both sides; and
e. development of an environment conducive to research, application of new technologies and adequate protection of intellectual property rights for the results of such research.

Article VII: Cultural and Educational Cooperation
1. Cultural Cooperation
The two sides shall promote cultural cooperation and encourage the development of cooperation between their institutions or organizations in the fields of art, music, theater, literature, literary translations, publishing, cinema and film-making.

2. Media and Communication:
The two sides shall promote and encourage direct cooperation between news agencies, newspapers, and radio and television stations. In addition, the two sides will cooperate with third countries in order to promote the exposure of the benefits of the peace process to the respective societies.

3. Educational Cooperation
a. The two sides shall promote cooperation by encouraging and facilitating exchanges in the field of education and by providing appropriate conditions for direct contacts between schools and educational institutions of both sides.
b. The two sides shall cooperate with the aim of raising the level of general education and professional training of their respective populations, taking into consideration priorities to be determined by each side.
c. The cooperation shall focus, in particular, on the following areas:
   (1) cooperation among educational/training institutions;
   (2) exchanges of information between universities;
   (3) language training; and
   (4) other ways of promoting better mutual understanding of their respective cultures.

4. Sports and Youth
a. The two sides shall encourage cooperation in sports and physical culture, especially through the exchange of sports delegations and teams, as well as through the organizing of sports meetings and games.
b. The two sides shall encourage contacts and exchanges between youth organizations and shall promote exchanges of high school and university students.

Article VIII: The People-To-People Program
1. The Two sides shall cooperate in enhancing the dialogue and relations between their peoples in accordance with the concepts developed in cooperation with the Kingdom of Norway.
2. The two sides shall cooperate in enhancing dialogue and relations between their peoples, as well as in gaining a wider exposure of the two publics to the peace process, its current situation and predicted results.
3. The two sides shall take steps to foster public debate and involvement, to remove barriers to interaction, and to increase the people to people exchange and interaction within all areas of cooperation described in this Annex and in accordance with the overall objectives and principles set out in this Annex.

Article IX: Drugs
1. In addition to the cooperation provided for in Article II of Annex IV of this Agreement concerning legal assistance in criminal matters, the two sides shall cooperate with a view to, inter alia:
   a. improving the effectiveness of policies, including information and public awareness, educational and sociological activities, directed at countering the supply of, and illicit trafficking in, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and reducing the abuse of these products;
   b. encouraging a joint approach to reducing demand; and
   c. encouraging a joint approach to prevent the use of the Two sides, financial systems to launder capital arising from criminal activities in general and drug trafficking in particular.
2. Cooperation shall take the form of, inter alia, exchanges of information and, where appropriate, joint activities on establishing social and health institutions and information systems, and implementing projects in these spheres, including training and research projects.

Article X: Methods and Modalities of Cooperation
1. The SCC shall determine methods and modalities for the implementation of cooperation between the two sides.
2. Cooperation shall be implemented, in particular, by:
   a. regular dialogue;
   b. regular exchange of information and ideas in every sector of cooperation including meetings of officials and experts;
   c. transfer of advice, expertise and training;
   d. initiating and conducting joint activities such as seminars and workshops; and
   e. technical, administrative and regulatory assistance.
3. The SCC, its subsidiary working groups and bodies or various official agencies that may be asked to promote this cooperation, will develop joint action programs in the various fields of cooperation within six months of the entry into force of this Agreement.
4. Other fields of cooperation may be agreed upon by the two sides.

Article XI: Miscellaneous
Nothing in this Annex shall derogate from the provisions set out in any other part of this Agreement.

ANNEX VII: RELEASE OF PALESTINIAN PRISONERS AND DETAINEES, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

Release of Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees
1. The release of detainees and prisoners, as agreed upon in Article XVI of this Agreement will be carried out in three stages.
2. The following categories of detainees and/or prisoners will be included in the abovementioned releases:
   a. all female detainees and prisoners shall be released in the first stage of release;
   b. persons who have served more than two thirds of their sentence;
   c. detainees and/or prisoners charged with or imprisoned for security offenses not involving fatality or serious injury;
   d. detainees and/or prisoners charged with or convicted of non-security criminal offenses; and
   e. citizens of Arab countries being held in Israel pending implementation of orders for their deportation.
3. Detainees and prisoners from among the categories detailed in this paragraph, who meet the criteria set out in paragraph 2 above, are being considered by Israel to be eligible for release:
   a. prisoners and/or detainees aged 50 years and above;
   b. prisoners and/or detainees under 18 years of age;
   c. prisoners who have been imprisoned for 10 years or more; and
   d. sick and unhealthy prisoners and/or detainees.

4. The third stage of release will take place during the permanent status negotiations and will involve the categories set out above, and may explore further categories.

PALAESTINIAN-ISRAELI INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP ("OSLO II"): ADDRESSES AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY, WASHINGTON, DC, 28 SEPTEMBER 1995 [EXCERPTS]

ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK RABIN:

The President of the United States, the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the President of Egypt, the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Now, after a long series of formal, festive statements, take a look at this stage. The King of Jordan, the President of Egypt, Chairman Arafat and us, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel, on one platform.

Please take a good, hard look. The sight you see before you at this moment was impossible, was fantastic, just two or three years ago. Only poets dreamed of it; and, to our great pain, soldiers and civilians went to their deaths to make this moment possible.

Here we stand before you, men whom fate and history have sent on a mission of peace: to end, once and for all, one hundred years of bloodshed.

Our dream is also your dream. King Hussein, President Mubarak, Chairman Arafat, all the others and above all the President, Bill Clinton - a president working in the service of peace - we all love the same children, weep the same tears, hate the same enmity and pray for reconciliation. Peace has no borders.

Yes, I know: our speeches are already repeating themselves. Perhaps this picture has already become routine. The handshakes no longer set your pulse racing; your loving hearts no longer pound with emotion, as they did then. We've begun to get used to each other. We're like old acquaintances. I can tell you about all about Arafat's quirks. He can tell you all about mine. We have matured in the two years since we first shook hands here, the handshake that was the sign and symbol of the start of reconciliation. Today we are more sober. We are gladdened by the potential for reconciliation but are also wary of the dangers that lurk on every side. The enemies of yesterday share a common enemy today: the terrorism that sows death in our homes and on the buses that ply the streets. The sounds of celebration here cannot drown out the cries of innocent citizens who traveled those buses to their deaths. And your eyes shining here cannot erase for a single moment the sight of the lifeless eyes of the students who were going to their classes and the housewives who were on their way to market when hatred struck them down. We are pained by their deaths and remember them with love.

I want to say to you, Chairman Arafat: Do not let the land flowing with milk and honey become a land flowing with blood and tears. Don't let it happen. If all the partners to peace-making do not unite against the evil angels of death by terrorism, all that will remain of this ceremony are color snapshots, empty mementos. Rivers of hatred will overflow again - and swamp the Middle East. We, Gentlemen, will not permit terrorism to defeat peace. We will not allow it. If we do not have partners in this bitter, difficult war, we will fight it alone. We know how to fight. We know how to win. My brother Jews: Thousands of years of exile and the dream of generations have returned us to our historic home in the Land of Israel, the Land of the Prophets.
Etched on every vineyard, every field, every olive tree, every flower is the deep imprint of Jewish history, of the Book of Books that we have bequeathed to the entire world, of the values of morality and justice.

Every place in the Land of the Prophets, every name is an integral part of our heritage of thousands of years, of the Divine Promise to us and to our descendants. Here is where we were born. Here is where we created a nation. Here we forged a haven for the persecuted and built a model democratic state.

But we are not alone here on this soil, in this land. And so we are sharing this good earth today with the Palestinian people - in order to choose life. Starting today, an agreement on paper will be translated into reality on the ground. We are not retreating. We are not leaving. We are yielding - and we are doing so for the sake of peace.

Our neighbors, the Palestinian people: We who have seen you in your misery and poverty for generations, we who have killed and have been killed, are walking beside you now toward a common future and we want you as good neighbors.

Ladies and Gentlemen:
This week the Jewish people in its thousands of places of dispersion has marked the New Year and in their holiday prayers, Jews everywhere are saying:

"May we be remembered and inscribed before You in the Book of Life and of blessing and peace and prosperity, of deliverance and comfort and opportunity, we and all Your People, the House of Israel, for a good life and peace."

These are my wishes to all the Jewish people. These are my wishes to all the citizens of Israel: a good life and peace. These are also our wishes to our neighbors and to all the world's peoples: a good life and peace.

Ladies and Gentlemen:
Look at us again. Look at this scene on the stage, here in the White House. You are not excited anymore. You have grown accustomed to it. But in order for peace to be complete, in order for this picture to be complete and for the Middle East to become a jewel in the world's crown, it still lacks two people: the President of Syria and the President of Lebanon. I call upon them to come and join us, to come to the platform of peace.

Ladies and Gentlemen:
If and when this happens, we will again ask President Clinton to be our gracious host; we will again ask King Hussein, President Mubarak, Chairman Arafat and all the others to return here, to be partners in the glorious picture of all the peoples of the Middle East dwelling in security.

Ladies and Gentlemen:
Let me extend my wish, to all of us, that we may meet here again - and soon. Happy New Year.

US PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON:

The agreement that now will be signed means that Israel's mothers and fathers need no longer worry that their sons will face the dangers of patrolling Nablus or confronting the hostile streets of Ramallah. And it means that Palestinians will be able to decide for themselves what their schools teach, how their houses should be built and who they will choose to govern [...]

Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. Chairman, you are showing that it is not by weapons but by will and by word that dreams best become reality. Your achievement shines as an inspiration to others all around this world who seek to overcome their own conflicts and to secure for themselves the blessings of peace.

Chapter by chapter Jews and Arabs are writing a new history for their ancient lands. Camp David, the declaration of principles signed here two years ago, the peace last year between Jordan and Israel:
with each of these the truth of this book has become clear to the world as courageous leaders step beyond the bounds of convention.

They build for their peoples a new world of hope and peace. Now, as this new chapter begins, it is fitting that we are joined by so many from the camp of peace.

**PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat:**

We are gathered today under the sponsorship of President Clinton, who has generously offered to host the signing of this agreement.

It has been two years since we met at the White House to sign the Declaration of Principles, to which we and our Israeli partners have agreed to in Oslo. We meet again today to make new headway in giving hope to this historic process, the process of realizing a credible peace, reconciliation and coexistence between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples and the peace of the brave, which we achieved on Egyptian land at Taba, under President Mubarak's auspices.

A significant portion of Palestinian national rights reverts today to the Palestinian people through their control of the cities, villages and populated areas. Recovery of this portion is a step in the implementation of the interim agreement, which we are gathered here to witness its signing. There is also a step which paves the way to free and democratic Palestinian elections, capping thereby the political components required for the establishment of an independent Palestinian national entity on the Palestinian territories. […]

The permanent status negotiations will deal with such issues as settlements, the delineation of the borders, the rights of Palestinian refugees as determined by the international legitimacy and the fundamental issue concerning the status of Jerusalem, which our people, irrespective of their faith - Moslems, Christians or Jews - consider Jerusalem to be the heart and soul of their entity and the center of their cultural, spiritual and economic life.

I would say that the sanctity of Jerusalem for us all dictates that we make it the joint cornerstone and the capital of peace between the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples inasmuch as it is a beacon for believers all over the world.

We urge you all to recognize the importance of this historic interim step that demonstrates the irreversibility of the peace process. Its distinct significance lies in the verdict passed by history, the international community and human civilization at the turn of the century; that a just and comprehensive peace be established on this sacred land whereby the Israeli and Palestinian peoples would coexist on the basis of mutual recognition of the rights, while enjoying equality and self-determination without occupation or repeated wars and without terrorism.

At this point, I must tell our Israeli partners, from this solemn rostrum and in the presence of our brethren and friends who have come here from the region and from all of the world, particularly those who contributed to the realization of this agreement, that our past experience underscores the need to be more credible and committed to our steps in the future.

And the commitment should be precise, honest and mutual. For our part, we will honor our commitments. That's why the continuation and expansion of the settlement drive, as the situation in the city of Hebron and elsewhere shows, lead to the persistence of tensions. Likewise, continued qualms about a new independent Palestinian birth convey to each and every Palestinian the feeling that his or her life shall remain in jeopardy. Today, standing before you, I tell you with courage and a sense of responsibility that our participation in the great peace process means that we are betting everything on the future.

Therefore we must condemn and forswear violence totally, not only because the use of violence is morally reprehensible, but because it undermines Palestinian aspirations to the realization of peace,
the exercise of our political and national options and the achievement of economic and cultural progress in Palestine and in the region.

From this day on we do not want to see any waste of or threat to any innocent Palestinian life or any innocent Israeli life. Enough killing and enough killing of innocent people [...] For us to succeed on both fronts, we are bound to base the emerging Palestinian political system on the principles of liberty, democracy, separation of powers, freedom of expression and national initiative. We are also bound to continue building Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian national economy.

But this enterprise is still in its early stages and our institutions have yet to mature. The road ahead remains long, indeed. We look forward to your continued support of our people and we thank all friendly and brotherly donors for their assistance.

ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHIMON PERES:

Mr. President of the United States of America, Majesties, Excellencies and friends,

In these Holy Days for our people, we pray: “Who shall be cast down and who shall be uplifted.”

God’s verdict, our choice. I felt its meaning when, hours before Rosh Hashanah, we did not know if we would fail or succeed. And once it was decided, I knew that a dream had become a contract and an impasse had become an opportunity. Nobody forced us, not everybody agreed with us. Yet it was done not out of fear or weakness.

It was our free choice. Our moral preference: Not to compel ourselves to be the rulers of another people, to be the rulers of the Palestinian people. Once the agreement will be implemented, no longer will the Palestinians reside under our domination. They will gain self-rule and we shall return to our heritage.

The talks were like negotiating on a tightrope - over a scenery full of mountains of hatred and chasms of fear. The road was uncharted, the process unprecedented. Yet we have arrived.

The agreement should be judged by its potential, not just by its content. It will introduce the agenda of the twenty-first century into the miseries of the Middle East. An agenda of cultural pluralism, economic prosperity, market economy, industry, science, budgets that give priority to education and, finally, a democracy supported by participation and offering equality. Now, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians and Israel can convert the rift into a height of culture and economy, carrying the peace to awaiting destinations, to invite the Syrians and the Lebanese to join in, so as to make it comprehensive, for all of us.

It is an agreement to end confrontation and a promise to the young generations - Muslims, Christians, Jews - to be free from the clouds of war, the insults of tyranny, the alienations of suspicion. To enable them to travel freely, pray uninterrupted and see in their pasts not a burden, but a permit - for their own genesis.

There is no future to posterity if there is no peace. I watched the change at the negotiations in Eilat and Taba. Had they taken place a few years ago, probably everybody - the Palestinians and us - would have come with rifles. Now they carried doubts. Doubts are better than rifles. So, finally, it wound up as a group, almost a united group, in search of peace.

I could not but think of the young boys and girls who lost their lives enabling these meetings to become an opportunity for the next generation. Prime Minister Rabin and I are experienced enough to relate to the youngsters. We knew that the choice we made contains risks, but avoiding it would invite hopelessness.

We served a world sick of violence, an age tired of failure, a future anxious for a new vision.

I would like to thank the United States, its people, its President, for the unique role they played in the peace-making, the Russians for co-sponsoring it, the Europeans for their strong backing to build a
European-like future. I thank President Mubarak and King Hussein for being at peace and advancing peace, all over and invite Chairman Arafat to the new endeavor. We wish the Palestinian people peace, democracy, prosperity. We were born in the same cradle, then we fought each other on the same front. Too long. Now we can embark on a voyage to make our relations family-like again.

I wish the Jewish people, my brothers and sisters, a happy New Year, on the road to fulfill our ancient dream: "To be a free people in our land, the land of Zion and Jerusalem." To be free in a commonwealth of peace and freedom, emerging in our troubled and promising land, beloved land, in the Middle East.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: WASHINGTON SUMMIT, JOINT DECLARATION, OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, WASHINGTON, DC, 28 SEPTEMBER 1995

President Clinton, His Majesty King Hussein, President Mubarak, Prime Minister Rabin, and Chairman Arafat met today to review the dramatic progress which has already been made on the road to realization of a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in the Middle East and to consider ways and means together to reinforce and accelerate that progress.

The leaders affirmed the historic importance of the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement and praised the dedication and skill of the negotiating teams led by Foreign Minister Peres and Chairman Arafat. They expressed their support for the Palestinian Authority as it assumed self-government responsibilities under the agreement and their hope that Palestinian elections would be held as soon as possible. The leaders pledged to do everything possible to ensure successful and complete implementation of the agreement. They agreed to have their representatives meet to discuss ways to support this process and build upon it to achieve a comprehensive peace.

The leaders noted their appreciation for the international efforts undertaken since September 13, 1993 to support the Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles and its implementing agreements. They recognized the importance of economic cooperation and development in supporting a lasting peace in the region and committed themselves to enhance mutual coordination for the common benefit of their people and all the region. In this regard, they pledged their full support for the upcoming Amman economic summit and for the establishment of a Middle East Development Bank. They reiterated their call for an end to the Arab boycott as soon as possible.

The five leaders expressed their condemnation in the strongest possible terms of all acts of violence and terror. They reaffirmed their determination to confront all enemies of peace and reiterated the need for all possible measures to be taken - founded upon the rule of law - to ensure security for the citizens of Israel and for the Palestinian people. The leaders reviewed progress in the Syria-Israel negotiations and reaffirmed their conviction that early conclusion of a peace treaty between these two countries and between Israel and Lebanon would be key steps toward their common goal of a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in the region.

SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE SAUD AL-FAISAL, STATEMENT AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 50TH SESSION, NEW YORK, 10 OCTOBER 1995 [EXCERPTS]

In the name of Allah, most compassionate, most merciful.

[...]

Distinguished Delegates:

We continue to follow, with keen interest, the developments in the Middle East peace process in both the bilateral and multilateral tracks. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has supported this process since its inception at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, and has actively worked to advance the
bilateral talks between the Arab parties and Israel. It has also participated, through its delegations, in the various working groups stemming from the multilateral talks.

This interest, coupled with the effective participation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, reflects the genuine desire of the Arab parties in the achievement of a just and comprehensive peace in the region. We have repeatedly emphasized that the multilateral talks are part and parcel of the peace negotiations which began in Madrid, and that they are complementary to the bilateral talks, and not a substitute thereto. It was on the basis of this understanding that we participated in the working groups. We believe that any progress in the multilateral talks is necessarily linked to progress in the bilateral talks between the parties most directly concerned.

The signing of the Declaration of Principles between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Israeli Government in Washington in September of 1993, raised hopeful expectations, and signaled the first step toward the achievement of a just and permanent settlement of the question of Palestine. However, the Palestinian-Israeli agreement faced a number of obstacles as a result of Israeli intransigence, which curtailed the ability of the Palestinian National Authority to exercise its responsibilities and expand its authority throughout the West Bank, in accordance with the principles of the agreement.

The continued construction of settlements by Israel in the Occupied Territories, and its detention of large numbers of Palestinians, as well as its imposition of various restrictions on the Palestinian people, are among the practices that violate the text and spirit of the agreement. It is incumbent upon the two co-sponsors of the peace process to compel the Israeli Government to abide by its commitments by refraining from placing obstacles in the course of the negotiations and during the actual implementation of the second phase of the Declaration of Principles, which was signed recently in Washington. This should lead to the redeployment of Israeli occupation forces, prepare for the first Palestinian elections, and transfer more authority to the Palestinians. It is clear that further progress in the peace process will depend on fulfilling the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Conversely, any disregard of these rights will result in blocking the peace efforts.

With regard to the Agreements reached between Jordan and Israel, my country has already expressed its welcome of the progress realized on this track. However, we fail to see any noticeable progress on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. The issue of the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is quite clear, and is related to the principle of the sanctity of international borders. On its part, Syria has demonstrated a willingness to meet the objective requirements for peace. It has raised the level of its representation in the bilateral talks and embarked upon a positive and serious effort to reach a settlement. Its constructive efforts, however, have not been matched by the Israeli side. With regard to the Lebanese-Israeli track, it is governed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 425, which calls for the immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territory.

Mr. President:

The question of Jerusalem - al-Quds al-Shareef - is at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and is of utmost concern for the Arab and Muslim world. The manner in which this issue is handled could determine the future of the peace process. The decision to delay negotiations on Jerusalem until the final stage of the peace talks should not be taken as indicative of the lessening of its importance, but rather as to give the peace process a chance to create the proper environment for the required goodwill that would help in the successful resolution of this highly sensitive issue.

We regret that the Israeli authorities continue to take steps whose purpose is to change the demographic character and create new realities in the status of Jerusalem, with the intention of prejudicing the negotiations on the final status of the city. Our position remains that any settlement of this issue must take into account the resolutions of international legality, and in particular U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 which calls for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 252 regarding Jerusalem.
Any permanent and comprehensive settlement must also address the issue of the return of Palestinian refugees, and the release of Palestinian prisoners, as well as the issue of settlements created by Israel in the Occupied Territories, in violation of the letter and spirit of the Declaration of Principles and in breach of international law and the Geneva Conventions. […] 

SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE SAUD AL-FAISAL, ADDRESS TO THE 11TH SUMMIT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, CARTAGENA, COLOMBIA, 14-20 OCTOBER 1995 [EXCERPTS]

In the name of God, the most merciful, the most gracious, and peace be upon the most Honorable of Prophets and Messengers

Distinguished Delegates:

The Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli conflict in general have always been among the most important items on the agenda of previous Non-Aligned Movement conferences. Our current conference is convened after the Middle East peace process has taken some steps in the direction of laying the foundations for a just, comprehensive and lasting solution to this chronic conflict. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has supported this process since its inception at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, and has actively worked to advance the bilateral talks between the Arab parties and Israel. It has also participated in the work of the various working groups emanating from the multilateral talks.

Our interest and participation reflect the genuine Arab desire and sincere intentions towards the achievement of a just and comprehensive peace in the region. We have repeatedly stated that the multilateral talks are not a substitute for the bilateral negotiations but a compliment to the peace process. It was on this basis that we participated in the working groups. Hence, any progress in the multilateral talks has to be assessed in the light of whatever progress has been achieved in the bilateral negotiations.

The signing in Washington in September 1993 of the Declaration of Principles between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Government of Israel gave rise to optimism on the ground that it represented the first step towards a peaceful and just settlement of the Palestinian question. However, the implementation of this agreement was soon to stumble over a series of Israeli obstacles and impediments in the way of enabling the Palestinian Authority to exercise its duties and expand its competence to cover the entire West Bank, as called for in that agreement.

The continued establishment of settlements in the Occupied Territories, the continued imprisonment of a large number of Palestinians, and the imposition of oppressive restrictions against the Palestinian people, are contrary to the spirit and letter of the agreement. It is therefore incumbent upon the two co-sponsors of the peace conference to prompt the Israeli Government to fulfill its commitments in accordance with the agreement recently signed in Washington on the second phase of the implementation of the Declaration of Principles. This agreement covers the redeployment of the Israeli occupation forces, the preparation for the first Palestinian elections, and the transfer of additional responsibilities to the Palestinian National Authority. Progress in the peace process will always depend on the responsiveness of this process to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Ignoring these rights will always hinder the peace process.

My country has already welcomed the progress realized on the Jordanian-Israeli track. We unfortunately fail to notice any concrete progress on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. The question of the occupied Syrian Arab Golan is a clear-cut question governed by the principles of international law. Syria has gone a long way in creating the appropriate environment for the achievement of a settlement with Israel both with regard to the upgrading of the level of representation in the bilateral negotiations and the demonstration of seriousness and readiness to provide the objective requirements for a peaceful settlement. This constructive posture on the part of the Syrian Government has not so far been matched by a comparable Israeli response. As to the Lebanese track, it is governed by Security
Council Resolution 425, which unequivocally demands immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied Lebanese territories.

Mr. President:

The question of Jerusalem - al-Quds al-Shareef - is at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and is of utmost concern for the Arab and Muslim world. The future of the peace process depends entirely on the handling of this question. The decision to defer the consideration of this question to the final phase of the peace negotiations was not meant to undermine its importance. Quite the contrary, it was in response to the desire of giving the peace process a chance to create an atmosphere of confidence conducive to the successful handling of this highly sensitive issue. It is regrettable to note that the Israeli authorities continue to effect demographic and institutional changes of the status of Jerusalem that will prejudice the forthcoming negotiations on the final status of this city. Our position on this question was and continues to be that any settlement of this question has to be based on the resolutions of international legality, most notably Security Council Resolution 242 which requires Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967, and 252 relevant to Jerusalem. Equally, for any settlement to be comprehensive and durable, it must address the question of the return of the Palestinian refugees, the release of the Palestinian prisoners, and the question of Israeli settlements established in the occupied territories in violation of international law and the fourth Geneva Conventions as well as the letter and spirit of the Declaration of Principles.

FINAL DOCUMENT, 11TH SUMMIT OF HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, CARTAGENA DE INDIAS, COLOMBIA, 18-20 OCTOBER 1995 [EXCERPTS]

CHAPTER II: ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

MIDDLE EAST

Palestine

131. They reaffirmed their unflinching support for the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people to secure their inalienable rights to self-determination and independence and reiterated their demand for the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Palestinian and other Arab lands including Jerusalem.

132. They pointed out that the responsibility of the United Nations in this matter should continue until the Palestinian people exercise their inalienable right to self-determination, until an independent and sovereign State is established within its national territory, and until the problem of refugees is settled in conformity with human rights instruments and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. They therefore insisted on the need for the General Assembly to reaffirm, at its fiftieth regular session, its position on the major aspects of a definitive peace settlement, including the status of Jerusalem, the illegal settlements and refugees. They regretted the decision by Israel to confiscate Palestinian land and property in Jerusalem as well as its attempts to alter the religious and historic character of the Holy City. In this respect, they reaffirmed all Security Council and General Assembly resolutions related to Jerusalem and considered the Israeli actions contrary to these resolutions as null and void. They voiced serious concern at the obstacles faced to implement the Agreement. They called for the full and scrupulous implementation of the Agreements, and in particular the provisions of Security Council resolutions 242, 338, 465 and 478. They underlined the need for the mechanism dealing with the issue of Palestine set up by the General Assembly to continue operating in an effective way. The Heads of State or Government expressed their support to the call made by the Jerusalem Committee, held in Ifrane, Morocco, 16-17 January 1995, to the U.N. Security Council, in particular the two co-sponsors of the Peace Conference to take the necessary measures to compel Israel to desist from carrying out any settlements and Judaisation of the Holy City of Jerusalem and any geographic or demographic changes therein, and to comply with the agreement and conventions providing for the preservation of the Palestinian institutions and the Islamic and Christian holy sites in the Holy City of Jerusalem in implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions.
133. They expressed that the Declaration of Principles signed in Washington on 13 September 1993, the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 20 September 1995 and the establishment of the Palestinian efforts taken by Palestine and Israel.

134. They considered that the arrangement relating to a Palestinian interim self-government should be widened quickly so that the Declaration of Principles is applied as rapidly as possible to the totality of occupied territories, with a view to giving effect to the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of a Palestinian State.

135. In this context, they welcomed the conclusion of the Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip concluded in Taba, Egypt and signed in Washington by President Arafat and the Israeli Prime Minister as an important and substantial step towards the fulfilment of the national rights of the Palestinian people. They expressed the hope that further vigorous steps shall be taken for the complete Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 in order that comprehensive peace and common prosperity should prevail on the area.

136. They concurred with the Secretary-General of the United Nations that in order to sustain support for the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it will be essential to promote economic and social development in the occupied Palestinian territories. In this context, they called upon the participants of the Conference to Support Middle East Peace, which took place in Washington on 1 October 1993, to deliver the pledged assistance which is vital for the establishment of peace.

137. They also stressed the need for the full participation of Palestine in the Special Commemorative Meeting of the United Nations in New York under conditions and facilities applicable to Observer States of the United Nations at the meeting.

The Peace Process

138. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed their support for the peace process initiated at the Madrid Peace Conference of October 1991 which aims at achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 425 and the principle of land for peace which ensure the full Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian and other Arab occupied territories.

139. The Heads of State or Government noted with appreciation the commendable efforts exerted by the Syrian and Lebanese Government in order to open up possibilities for achieving progress in their full commitment to peace in the Middle East, and demanded that Israel totally withdraw from the occupied Syrian Golan and Lebanese territories, in implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and in accordance with international law, and the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

140. They took note of the Washington declaration of 25 July 1994, signed by Jordan and Israel, which put an end to the state of belligerency between them and opened the way for the return of occupied Jordanian territories and the restitution of the right to the water resources, thereby contributing to the normalization of relations. They also welcomed the conclusion of the Jordan-Israel Treaty of Peace of 26 October 1994, which in their view constitutes a transcendental step toward the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

141. They considered that all the measures and actions adopted by Israel, the occupying power, such as its illegal decision of 14 December 1981 that purport to alter the status of the occupied Syrian Golan, are null and void, constitute a flagrant violation of international law and the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and have no legal effect. They called upon Israel to comply with Security Council resolution 497 (1981) and to withdraw fully from the occupied Syrian Golan, to the lines of 4 June 1967, in implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

142. They reiterated the principle that the acquisition or control of land or maritime areas by force is inadmissible, contradicts the principles of international law, and does not generate any rights.
FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A FINAL STATUS AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (THE BEILIN-ABU MAZEN FINAL STATUS AGREEMENT), 31 OCTOBER 1995

[In Oct. 1995 Mahmoud Abbas and Yossi Beilin finalized a document, drafted secretly over a period of a year and half in various capitals, which tried to provide a framework for final status negotiations but was never formally adopted by either Israel or the Palestinians. The existence of the document was denied by both parties for five years before being published in Sept.2000.]

The attainment of peace between the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples, resolves the core problem at the heart of the Israeli-Arab conflict and commences an era of comprehensive peace contributing thereby to the stability, security, and prosperity of the entire Middle East.

The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereafter "the PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people;

Within the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991; Aiming at the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects; Reaffirming their adherence to the commitments expressed in the Declaration of Principles (hereinafter "the DOP") signed in Washington D.C. on September 13th 1993, the Cairo Agreement of May 4th 1994, and the Interim-Agreement of September 28th, 1995; Reaffirming their determination to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security; Declaring as null and void any agreement, declaration, document or statement which contradicts this Framework Agreement; Desiring of reaching a full agreement on all outstanding final status issues as soon as possible, not later than May 5th 1999, as stipulated in the DOP; Hereby agree on the following Framework for a Final Status Agreement:

ARTICLE I: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL

1. As an integral part of this Framework Agreement and the full Final Status Agreement:
   a. The Government of Israel shall extend its recognition to the independent State of Palestine within agreed and secure borders with its capital al-Quds upon its coming into being not later than May 5th 1999.
   b. Simultaneously, the State of Palestine shall extend its recognition to the State of Israel within agreed and secure borders with its capital Yerushalayim.
   c. Both sides continue to look favorably at the possibility of establishing a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, to be agreed upon by the State of Palestine and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

2. The State of Israel and the State of Palestine (hereinafter: "the parties") will thereby extend mutual recognition of their right to live in peace and security within mutually agreed borders as defined in Article II of this agreement and in the Final Status Agreement. In particular, the Parties shall:
   a. Recognize and respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political and economic independence.
   b. Renounce the use of force, and the threat of force as an instrument of policy and commit themselves to a peaceful resolution of all disputes between them.
   c. Refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts of violence, subversion or terrorism against the other party.
   d. Take effective measures to ensure that acts of or threats of violence do not originate from or through their respective territories, including their airspace and territorial waters, and take appropriate measures against those who perpetrate such acts.
   e. Undertake not to join, assist, or cooperate with any military or security coalition, organization, or alliance hostile to either party.
   f. Exchange and ratify the instruments of peace between them as shall be defined in the full Final Status Agreement.
ARTICLE II: THE DELINEATION OF SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS
1. The secure and recognized borders between the State of Israel and the future State of Palestine are described in the attached Maps and in Annex One of the Final Status Agreement. The Parties recognize that these borders, including their respective subsoil, airspace and territorial waters shall be inviolable.
2. The parties shall define the route and mode of implementation of, as well as the extent of, territory to be yielded by Israel for the agreed extra-territorial passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (as described in Annex One of the Final Status Agreement).
3. The border in the Jerusalem area is to be delineated in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of this Framework Agreement.
4. The Parties shall recognize the final borders between the two states as permanent and irrevocable.

ARTICLE III: THE CREATION OF NORMAL AND STABLE INTER-STATE RELATIONS
1. Upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the peace treaty, the Parties agree to establish full diplomatic and consular relations between them and to promote economic and cultural relations including the free movement of people, goods, capital and services across their borders.
2. The Parties shall continue to cooperate in all areas of mutual interest and will seek to promote jointly and separately similar regional cooperation with other states in the area and the international community.
3. The Parties shall seek to promote mutual cultural relations and will encourage mutual programs for the dissemination of their respective national customs, folklore and traditions between them.
4. The Parties shall secure freedom of access to places of religious, and historical significance on a non-discriminatory basis. Access to, worship in, and protection of all holy places and sites shall be guaranteed by both Parties.

ARTICLE IV: SCHEDULE OF ISRAELI MILITARY WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
1. In implementing UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the parties agree that the withdrawal of Israeli Military and Security Forces shall be carried out in three stages:
   a. Withdrawal from the Central areas of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip, (as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement and attached Map/s), to commence not later than May 5th 1999 and be completed not later than September 4th, 1999;
   b. Withdrawal from the Eastern areas of the West Bank (as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement), to commence not later than September 5th 1999 and be completed not later than January 4th, 2000;
   c. Withdrawal from the Western areas of the West Bank (as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement) to commence not later than January 5th 2000 and be completed not later than May 4th 2000.
2. Thereafter Israel shall maintain a minimal residual force within agreed military compounds and in specified locations. This residual force will comprise:
   a. Three reinforced battalions, two existing Military Emergency Stores, and integral logistical forces (their location and terms of lease, duration, mode of deployment, function and numerical strength, are detailed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement).
   b. Three Early Warning stations and three Air Defense Units as defined and agreed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement will be maintained until May 5th 2007 or until peace agreements and bilateral security arrangements between Israel and the relevant Arab parties are attained, whichever comes last.
3. The Parties agree to the formation of an Israeli-Palestinian Coordinating Security Commission (hereinafter "the CSC") to oversee the implementation of Israel's military withdrawal, to establish the modalities governing its residual military presence, and to coordinate all other security matters (its structure and authorities are detailed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement). The CSC shall also implement an agreed schedule for the introduction of Palestinian Security Forces (hereinafter "PSF") into Palestinian territories commensurate with and parallel to the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The Parties agree that the CSC shall commence its deliberations not later than May 5th, 1998 (see Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement).
4. Joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols will be held along the Jordan River as well as along both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian border, in order to deter, prevent and combat the infiltration or organization of cross-border terrorism and other forms of violent activities. The mandate and duration of these patrols shall be determined by the CSC, as detailed in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement.

5. The Parties agree that the State of Palestine shall be demilitarized. The PSF shall remain subject to agreed limitations as defined in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement. By mutual agreement, and not before May 5th 2007, Palestinian self-defense capabilities shall be negotiated by the Parties.

6. The Parties agree that the co-sponsors and other parties agreed upon, shall be invited to guarantee the arrangements for Israel’s military withdrawal and other bilateral security agreements as stipulated in this Framework Agreement. In their capacity as guarantors, the said third-parties shall also be invited to participate in observation, verification and other technical duties to be agreed in the CSC. The said third parties shall accordingly be requested to establish and finance a permanent International Observer Force (hereafter the IOF) whose mandate and functions are described in Annex Two of the Final Status Agreement.

ARTICLE V: ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

1. Subsequent to the establishment of the Independent State of Palestine and its recognition by the State of Israel as described in Articles I and III of this agreement:
   a. There will be no exclusive civilian residential areas for Israelis in the State of Palestine.
   b. Individual Israelis remaining within the borders of the Palestinian State shall be subject to Palestinian sovereignty and Palestinian rule of law.
   c. Individual Israelis who have their permanent domicile within the Palestinian State as of May 5th 1999, shall be offered Palestinian citizenship or choose to remain as alien residents, all without prejudice to their Israeli citizenship.
   d. Within the agreed schedule for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian territories as described in Article IV and Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement, the Israeli Government and its security forces shall maintain responsibility for the safety and security of Israeli settlements outside the areas of Palestinian security jurisdiction, pending the transfer of said areas to full Palestinian rule.
   e. The CSC shall establish the mechanism for dealing with security issues relating to Israeli citizens in Palestine and Palestinian citizens in Israel.

ARTICLE VI: JERUSALEM

1. Jerusalem shall remain an open and undivided city with free and unimpeded access for people of all faiths and nationalities.

2. The Parties further agree that a reform of the current Jerusalem Municipal System and its boundaries shall be introduced not later than May 5th 1999, and shall not be subject to further change by law or otherwise, unless by mutual consent, prior to the fulfillment of the provisions of paragraph 9 below. This reform shall expand the present municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and shall define the city limits of the “City of Jerusalem”, to include: Abu Dis, Eyzariya, ar-Ram, Az-zaim, Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev, Givon, and adjacent areas in the attached map/s.

3. Within the “City of Jerusalem”, neighborhoods inhabited by Palestinians will be defined as “Palestinian boroughs” The exact borders of the “City of Jerusalem” and of the Israeli and Palestinian boroughs are delineated and described in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement and attached Map/s. The number of Israeli boroughs and of Palestinian boroughs will reflect the present demographic balance of 2:1. This proportion will be updated in accordance with the modalities, criteria and schedule as described in Annex Three to this Final Status Agreement.

4. The Parties agree to maintain one Municipality for the “City of Jerusalem” in the form of a Joint Higher Municipal Council, formed by representatives of the boroughs. These representatives will elect the Mayor of the “City of Jerusalem” In all matters related to the areas of the “City of Jerusalem” under Palestinian sovereignty, the Joint Higher Municipal Council shall seek the consent of the Government of Palestine. In all matters related to the areas of the “City of Jerusalem” under Israeli sovereignty, the Joint Higher Municipal Council shall seek the consent of the Government of Israel.

5. The “City of Jerusalem” shall consist of the Joint Higher Municipal Council, two sub-municipalities - an Israeli sub-municipality, elected by the inhabitants of the Israeli boroughs, and a Palestinian sub-
municipality, elected by the inhabitants of the Palestinian boroughs - as well as a Joint Parity Committee for the Old City Area as described in paragraph 12 below.

6. The Parties further agree that the municipality of the "City of Jerusalem" shall:
   a. Delegate strong local powers to the sub-municipalities including the right to local taxation, local services, an independent education system, separate religious authorities, and housing planning and zoning, as detailed in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement;
   b. Develop a twenty-five year Master Plan for the "City of Jerusalem" with agreed modalities for its balanced implementation, including safeguards for the interests of both communities.
   c. Provide for Israeli and Palestinian citizens resident within the jurisdiction of the City of Jerusalem Municipality and sub-municipalities to vote and seek election for all elected posts as shall be specified in the Jerusalem Municipal bylaws.

7. Within the "City of Jerusalem" both parties recognize the Western part of the city, to be "Yerushalayim" and the Arab Eastern part of the city, under Palestinian sovereignty, to be "al-Quds" (see attached Map/s).

8. Upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the peace treaty between them:
   a. The Government of the State of Palestine shall recognize Yerushalayim, as defined under Article VI, paragraph 7 and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement, as the sovereign Capital of the State of Israel.
   b. The Government of the State of Israel shall recognize al-Quds, as defined under Article VI, paragraph 7 and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement, as the sovereign Capital of the State of Palestine.

9. The ultimate sovereignty of the area outside Yerushalayim and al-Quds, but inside the present municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, shall be determined by the parties as soon as possible. Each party maintains its position regarding the sovereign status of this area. A joint Israeli-Palestinian committee for determining the final status of this area shall be established not later than May 5th, 1999 and shall commence its deliberations immediately thereafter. Without prejudice to the determination of the final status of this area:
   a. Palestinian citizenship shall be extended to Palestinian residence of this area.
   b. In certain matters Palestinian citizens residing in this area shall resort to Palestinian law (as detailed in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement).
   c. The Parties will enjoy free access to and use of the Qalandia Airport in this area. A new designated Palestinian terminal shall be constructed, to commence operation concurrent with the signing of the Treaty of Peace (for the modalities of operation, see Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement).

10. The Parties acknowledge Jerusalem's unique spiritual and religious role for all three great monotheistic religions. Wishing to promote interfaith relations and harmony among the three great religions, the Parties accordingly agree to guarantee freedom of worship and access to all Holy Sites for members of all faiths and religions without impediment or restriction.

11. In recognition of the special status and significance of the Old City Area (see map/s) for members of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faiths, the parties agree to grant this area a special status.

12. The Parties further agree that:
   a. The Palestinian sub-municipality shall be responsible for the municipal concerns of the Palestinian citizens residing in the Old City Area and their local property.
   b. The Israeli sub-municipalities shall be responsible for the municipal concerns of the Israeli citizens residing in the Old City Area and their local property.
   c. The two sub-municipalities shall appoint a Joint Party Committee to manage all matters related to the preservation of the unique character of the Old City Area (its structure and modalities are detailed in Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement).

13. The State of Palestine shall be granted extra-territorial sovereignty over the Haram Ash-Sharif under the administration of the Al-Quds Awqaf. The present status quo regarding the right of access and prayer for all, will be secured.

14. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre shall be managed by the Palestinian sub-Municipality. The Joint Parity Committee, shall examine the possibility of assigning extra-territorial status to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.
15. Supervision of persons and goods transiting through the “City of Jerusalem” shall take place at the exit points. Other security matters related to persons, vehicles and goods suspected of involvement in hostile activity are dealt with in Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement.

ARTICLE VII: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES
1. Whereas the Palestinian side considers that the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes is enshrined in international law and natural justice, it recognizes that the prerequisites of the new era of peace and coexistence, as well as the realities that have been created on the ground since 1948, have rendered the implementation of this right impracticable. The Palestinian side, thus, declares its readiness to accept and implement policies and measures that will ensure, insofar as this is possible, the welfare and well-being of these refugees.

2. Whereas the Israeli side acknowledges the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the war of 1947-1949. It further acknowledges the Palestinian refugees’ right of return to the Palestinian state and their right to compensation and rehabilitation for moral and material losses.

3. The parties agree on the establishment of an International Commission for Palestinian Refugees (hereinafter "the ICPR") for the final settlement of all aspects of the refugee issue as follows:
   a. The Parties extend invitations to donor countries to join them in the formation of the ICPR.
   b. The Parties welcome the intention of the Government of Sweden to lead the ICPR and to contribute financially to its activities.
   c. The Government of Israel shall establish a fund for its contribution, along with others, to the activities of the ICPR.
   d. The ICPR shall conduct all fundraising activities and coordinate donors’ involvement in the program.
   e. The ICPR shall define the criteria for compensation accounting for:
      (1) moral loss;
      (2) immovable property;
      (3) financial and economic support enabling resettlement and rehabilitation of Palestinians residing in refugee camps.
   f. The ICPR shall further:
      (1) adjudicate claims for material loss;
      (2) prepare and develop rehabilitation and absorption programs;
      (3) establish the mechanisms and venues for disbursing payments and compensation;
      (4) oversee rehabilitation programs;
      (5) explore the intentions of Palestinian refugees on the one hand and of Arab and other countries on the other, concerning wishes for emigration and the possibilities thereof;
      (6) explore with Arab governments hosting refugee populations, as well as with these refugees, venues for absorption in these countries whenever mutually desired.
   g. The ICPR shall implement all the above according to the agreed schedule defined in Annex Four to the Final Status Agreement.

4. The ICPR shall be guided by the following principles in dealing with the "refugees of 1948" and their descendants as defined in Annex Four to the Final Status Agreement:
   a. Each refugee family shall be entitled to compensation for moral loss to a sum of money to be agreed upon by the ICPR.
   b. Each claimant with proven immovable property shall be compensated as per the adjudication of the ICPR.
   c. The ICPR shall provide financial and economic support, enabling the resettlement and rehabilitation of Palestinians residing in refugee camps.
   d. The refugees shall be entitled to financial and economic support from the ICPR for resettlement and rehabilitation.

5. The State of Israel undertakes to participate actively in implementing the program for the resolution of the refugee problem. Israel will continue to enable family reunification and will absorb Palestinian refugees in special defined cases, to be agreed upon with the ICPR.

6. The Palestinian side undertakes to participate actively in implementing the program for the resolution of the refugee problem. The Palestinian side shall enact a program to encourage the rehabilitation and resettlement of Palestinian refugees presently resident in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, within these areas.
7. The PLO considers the implementation of the above a full and final settlement of the refugee issue in all its dimensions. It further undertakes that no additional claims or demands arising from this issue will be made upon the full implementation of this Framework Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII: ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN STANDING COMMITTEE
1. The Parties shall establish an Israeli-Palestinian Standing Committee (hereafter: "IPSC"), which will commence activities upon the signing of this Framework Agreement.
2. This IPSC shall be authorized to deal with all matters related to the smooth transition between the Interim Agreement and Final Status Agreement.
3. The IPSC shall also coordinate activities related to the implementation of the Final Status Agreement.

ARTICLE IX: WATER RESOURCES
1. The Parties agree that they possess the same natural water resources essential for each nation's livelihood and survival.
2. Water rights and issues are laid out in Annex Five to the Final Status Agreement.
3. With a view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all water problems between them, the Parties jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development of their water resources should not in any way harm or imperil the water resources of the other.
4. The Parties further agree to the following:
   a. The development of existing and new water resources to increase availability and minimize wastage.
   b. The prevention of contamination of water resources.
   c. The transfer of information and joint research and the review of the potential for water enhancement.
5. The Parties agree to prepare as soon as possible, but not later than May 5, 1999, an agreed upon coordinated separate and joint water management plan for the joint aquifers that will guarantee optimal use and development of water resources for the benefit of the Israeli and Palestinian nations.
6. The Parties agree to seek to extend their joint cooperation to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in particular with regard to the waters of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea and to seek to promote wider regional understanding on the exploitation and management of water resources in the Middle East.

ARTICLE X: TIME FRAME AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. The Preparatory Period: May 5th 1996 to May 4th 1999
1. With the signing of this Framework Agreement and its entry into force not later than May 5th 1996, the Preparatory Period for Final Status shall commence. Immediately thereafter, the Parties shall:
   a. Establish the IPSC (Israeli-Palestinian Standing Committee) along the lines laid down in Article VIII.
   b. Extend invitations to donor countries to join the Government of Sweden and themselves in formation of the ICPR (International Commission for Palestinian Refugees).
The Preparatory Period shall end not later than May 4th 1999.
2. During this period it is agreed that the following shall be implemented:
   a. The Final Status Agreement with all Annexes will be prepared, based on the agreements and principles laid down in this Framework Agreement.
   b. Consequently, and based on the mechanisms for border delineation set out in Annex One to the Final Status Agreement, the joint delineation of borders and official extra-territorial and other passages shall be finalized.
   c. The Israeli-Palestinian Coordinating Security Commission (CSC) shall be established and commence its deliberation, not later than May 5th 1998. The CSC shall establish the mechanism for dealing with security issues relating to Israeli citizens in the State of Palestine, and Palestinian citizens in the State of Israel.
   d. The Parties shall invite the co-sponsors to the Peace Process and other agreed upon third parties, to establish an International Observer Force (IOF) as agreed upon in Annex two to the Final Status Agreement.
   e. The Government of Israel shall establish a program to encourage Israeli settlers to resettle within Israel's sovereign territory. Settlers wishing to take part in this program shall be compensated by the Israeli government before January 1st, 1999, according to guidelines to be announced within three months of the entry into force of this Framework Agreement.
   f. The agreed upon reformed Jerusalem Municipal System shall be inaugurated not later than May 5th 1999.
g. Both sides shall prepare and agree on a Jerusalem Master Plan as described in Article VI.

h. In accordance with Article VII of this Framework Agreement, the PLO shall establish a program to encourage the rehabilitation and resettlement of Palestinian refugees presently residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, within these areas.

i. The Parties shall promote the work of the ICPR as stipulated in Article VII to this Agreement.

j. The Parties shall prepare an agreed upon coordinated, separate and joint water management plan for the joint aquifers.

k. As soon as possible, but not later than May 4th 1999, the interim period shall come to an end and a full Final Status Agreement shall be signed and a Peace Treaty shall be initiated.

B. The Implementation Period: May 5th 1999 to May 4th 2000

1. With the signing and entry into force of the Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Agreement, the implementation of the Final Status settlement will commence. The creation of the Independent State of Palestine within secure and recognized borders shall be promulgated by the PLO and its relevant agencies. Immediately thereafter, but not later than within two months, the Peace Treaty shall be signed.

2. The Government of the State of Israel shall extend immediate and full diplomatic recognition to the State of Palestine and to al-Quds as its capital, as described in Article VI and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement.

3. The Government of the State of Palestine shall extend immediate and full diplomatic recognition to the State of Israel and to Yerushalayim as its capital, as described in Article VI and Annex Three to the Final Status Agreement.

4. Provisions relating to the normalization of Israeli-Palestinian relations shall be implemented as described in Article III.

5. Upon entry into force of the Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Agreement, the withdrawal of Israeli Military and Security Forces shall commence and the agreed security provisions shall be implemented according to the schedule described in Article II and Annex Two to the Final Status Agreement.

6. Within the “City of Jerusalem” elections for the two sub-municipalities will be held. The two sub-municipalities shall appoint a Joint Parity Committee for the Old City Area (as outlined in Article VI paragraph 12 to this agreement), and a proportional (2:1) Joint Higher Municipal Council which will elect the Mayor of the “City of Jerusalem.”

7. The parties agree to continue to work jointly and separately within the framework of the multilateral working groups and other relevant fora towards:
   a. The establishment of a Middle East free from hostile coalitions and alliances;
   b. The creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction both conventional and non-conventional within the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable settlement.


1. Israeli residual forces shall remain on Palestinian territory. The CSC shall continue to coordinate Israeli and Palestinian security needs.

2. Responsibility for the security of Israeli citizens residents in the State of Palestine, shall remain with the CSC.

D. The Post-November 5th 2007 Period

Remaining Israeli residual forces shall withdraw from the Palestinian State contingent on the attainment of peace treaties and security arrangements between Israel and the relevant Arab parties.

APPENDIX I - LIST OF ANNEXES

1. Borders
   - Border Delineation Mechanism
   - Description of borders
   - Extraterritorial Passage Gaza-West Bank

2. Security
   - Military Redeployment
   - Residual Forces
Permit me to say that I am deeply moved. I wish to thank each and every one of you, who have come here today to take a stand against violence and for peace. This government, which I am privileged to head, together with my friend Shimon Peres, decided to give peace a chance - a peace that will solve most of Israel’s problems.

I was a military man for 27 years. I fought so long as there was no chance for peace. I believe that there is now a chance for peace, a great chance. We must take advantage of it for the sake of those standing here, and for those who are not here-and they are many.

I have always believed that the majority of the people want peace and are ready to take risks for peace. In coming there today, you demonstrate, together with many others who did not come, that the people truly desire peace and oppose violence. Violence erodes the basis of Israeli democracy. It must be condemned and isolated.

This is not the way of the State of Israel. In a democracy there can be differences, but the final decision will be taken in democratic elections, as in the 1992 elections which gave us the mandate to seek peace with our neighbors.

But the path of peace is preferable to the path of war. I say this to you as one who was a military man, someone who is today Minister of Defense and sees the pain of the families of the IDF soldiers. For them, for our children, in my case for our grandchildren, I want this Government to exhaust every opening, every possibility, to promote and achieve a comprehensive peace. Even with Syria, it will be possible to make peace.

This rally must send a message to the Israeli people, to the Jewish people around the world, to the many people in the Arab world, and indeed to the entire world, that the Israeli people want peace, support peace. For this, I thank you.
PROJECT "CHARLIE" - "CHARTER FOR GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS"
PROPOSED BY YOSSI ALPHER, 1 DECEMBER 1995

[“Charlie” was the code-name of a project organized by Yossi Alpher of track-II talks, held in 1994-95 between PA/PLO officials and Israeli settlers in Jerusalem and Europe. First details of the discussions were published in April 1996. The proposed Charter below was not agreed!]

The PLO and the Settlers of Judea, Samaria (West Bank) and Gaza:
A Charter of Principles for Good Neighbourly Relations

PREFACE

The Oslo agreements have made us political neighbours. On the basis of the present political reality, all the settlements in Judea, Samaria (West Bank) and Gaza will remain the neighbors of the Palestinian Authority, led by the PLO, at least until a final status agreement is reached.

Accordingly, it is fitting that we sit and discuss the possibilities for dialogue in the spirit of good neighbours; attempt to solve problems with civility; and exchange views with regard to the long-range political options - even as we acknowledge the broad divide between our views.

PRINCIPLES

At this juncture, we agree upon the following points:

1. With the application of autonomy in Judea and Samaria (West Bank), both parties pledge to deal with one another with civility, to prevent and condemn any instance of violence, and to maintain normal and tranquil life in the region.
2. The parties confirm that the Oslo I and II agreements, along with the laws prevailing in Israel and in the Palestinian Authority, constitute the shared basis for living together, until such time as a new agreement supersedes any of these.
3. With regard to local disagreements, e.g. concerning land rights or environmental issues, the settlers and the PLO seek to address them themselves, at the local level, and will turn to the authorities only in the event of failure.
4. At the ideological-political level, the two parties will seek to continue and expand their dialogue, with the goal of defining additional common denominators.
5. The parties also seek to cultivate dialogue at the local level between the residents of settlements and the residents of nearby villages and towns.

DRAFT BASIC LAW FOR THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, 11 DECEMBER 1995

[This is the fourth draft, which at the time of its publication, was still under discussion].

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 1: The Palestinian people are the source of all authority which shall be exercised, during the transitional period, through the legislative, executive and judicial authorities in the manner provided for in this Basic Law.

ARTICLE 2: The government of Palestine shall be based on parliamentary democracy and pluralism, with consideration by the majority for the rights and interests of the minority and respect by the minority of the decisions of the majority.

ARTICLE 3: The Arabic language shall be the official language of Palestine.
ARTICLE 4: The flag of Palestine shall be of the following colors and dimensions: Its length twice its width, divided horizontally into three equal parallel parts, the upper black, the middle white and the lower green, thereon placed from the base a red triangle whose base and height equal the breadth and half the length of the flag, respectively.

ARTICLE 5: Jerusalem shall be the capital of Palestine. During the transitional period the Palestinian Authorities may set up the Government Headquarters in any other place in Palestine.

ARTICLE 6: Sovereignty over the national resources in Palestine is vested in the Palestinian people, and shall be exploited and disposed of in the interests of the Palestinian people according to law.

ARTICLE 7: (1) This Basic Law shall be the Supreme Law of Palestine in the Transitional Period and any other law which is inconsistent with any of its provisions shall be null and void.
(2) Subject to Article 120, this Basic Law may not be amended except by a two thirds majority of the elected Council.

CHAPTER TWO: I. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

ARTICLE 8: Palestine recognises and respects the fundamental human rights and freedoms prescribed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination the Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punished and other Conventions and Covenants which secure such rights and freedoms. Palestinian authorities shall adhere to the said international agreements.

ARTICLE 9: Every person has the right to life.

ARTICLE 10: Women and men shall have equal fundamental rights and freedoms without any discrimination.

ARTICLE 11: All persons are equal in human dignity. No person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no person shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation. No effect shall be given to any statement or confession obtained as a result or under the threat of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

ARTICLE 12: Every person shall have the right to participate in public life and to nominate himself to public office in accordance with the law.

ARTICLE 13: Every person has the right to liberty and security of person. No person shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No person shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.

ARTICLE 14: Every person shall have right to freedom of thought, conscience and expression and publication of his opinion either orally, in writing or in the form of art or through any other form of expression, subject to observance of restrictions imposed by law for the respect of the rights or reputations of others, the protection of national security or of public order or of public health or morals.

ARTICLE 15: The freedom of formation of political parties is guaranteed provided that their aims and activities do not conflict with the basic principles prescribed in this Basic Law and that they conduct their activities in a peaceful manner. The law shall set out the rules governing the formation of political parties.

ARTICLE 16: Subject to the provisions of Article 14 of this Basic Law, the freedom of the press, printing, publication and media is guaranteed. Censorship of the press is prohibited, and no newspaper shall be subject to warning, suspension or termination through governmental or administrative action.

ARTICLE 17: No person shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. The law shall provide protection against such interference or attacks.

ARTICLE 18: Security of the home is guaranteed; it may not be entered or inspected except in pursuance of a reasoned judicial order and in accordance with the law.
ARTICLE 19: Every person is entitled to own private property, interference in which shall be prohibited except in accordance with the law and for the public interest. Private property may not be expropriated except for public interest in consideration of fair compensation and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the law.

ARTICLE 20: Freedom of economic activity is guaranteed. The law shall set out the rules and extent of supervision in pursuance of the requirements of public interest.

ARTICLE 21: The families of martyrs, the injured and the handicapped have the right to care and rehabilitation, which shall be provided by the Palestinian authorities.

ARTICLE 22: Motherhood, childhood, the family, the young and the youth have the right to protection and to the availability of proper opportunities for the development of their talents. Such protection is a duty on society to be discharged by the Palestinian authorities within the limits stipulated by law.

ARTICLE 23: The law shall set out the rules pertaining to social security.

ARTICLE 24: Work is a right, duty and honor. The Palestinian authorities shall endeavor to provide equal opportunities to citizens to enable them to exercise this right under laws which provide for social justice. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour except in the following circumstances:

1. Any service of a military character or any national service required by law, save for conscientious objectors;
2. Any service exacted in cases of emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community;
3. Any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations.

ARTICLE 25: (1) Every person has the right to education which shall be free and compulsory until the secondary stage in public institutions. The Palestinian authorities shall endeavor to provide education at all stages;
(2) Minorities, religious or otherwise, and others who meet the conditions prescribed by law shall have the right to establish private schools and educational institutions, provided they observe the general conditions laid down in the law;
(3) The education authorities shall supervise all education. Universities and centres of scientific research shall enjoy respect and autonomy in the manner provided in the law.

ARTICLE 26: The right to peaceful assembly is recognised. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

ARTICLE 27: (1) The right to freedom of association with others is recognised to all persons, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of their rights;
(2) No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the security forces and the police in their exercise of this right.

ARTICLE 28: No Palestinian may be deported, deprived of his nationality, prevented or prohibited from returning to or leaving Palestine or surrendered to any foreign authority except in accordance with extradition agreements.

ARTICLE 29: The surrender of persons granted political asylum by the Palestinian authorities in accordance with international law is prohibited.

ARTICLE 30: Every person has the right to address the public authorities on personal matters of concern to him or on public matters.
ARTICLE 31: Jerusalem is a city holy to the three divine religions. In compliance by Palestine with its spiritual heritage, Palestinian authorities shall provide conditions for tolerant co-existence between religions in Jerusalem and the rest of Palestine.

ARTICLE 32: Freedom of belief and worship and exercise of religious functions are guaranteed, subject to non-violation of public order or morality.

ARTICLE 33: Freedom of access and visit to holy places and religious buildings and sites are guaranteed for all, citizens and non-citizens, without discrimination. Freedom of worship for the followers of such places is also guaranteed. The exercise of the foregoing, freedoms shall be subject to the requirements of public security, order and morality.

II. PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

ARTICLE 34: Every person whose fundamental rights or freedoms, as provided in this Chapter and Chapter Three, have been violated shall have the right to challenge the violation before courts of law and to demand compensation, where appropriate.

ARTICLE 35: An independent Commission for Human Rights with juridical personality shall be established by law to monitor and ensure the observance of human rights and freedoms in Palestine. Its formation, functions and powers shall be defined by law and shall be without prejudice to any powers given to individuals, to the Attorney General, to the Audit Office and to the Courts under this Basic Law or any other law.

CHAPTER THREE: THE RULE OF LAW

ARTICLE 36: The rule of law is the basis of government in Palestine.

ARTICLE 37: All Palestinian authorities and organs as well as all individuals and persons in Palestine shall be subject to the law and shall be accountable for its violation. The independence of the judiciary, its immunity, respect for and execution of its decisions are basic guarantees for the protection of rights and freedoms and the establishment of the rule of law.

ARTICLE 38: All persons shall be equal before the courts and the law, and are entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth or other status.

ARTICLE 39: The right of recourse to the courts is guaranteed for everyone and no administrative act or decision may exclude its review by the courts.

ARTICLE 40: Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty in a lawful trial in which he has been afforded guarantees to defend himself. Every person charged with a serious criminal offence shall have a lawyer to defend him.

ARTICLE 41: (1) Punishment is personal, and no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than tone that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the applicable law and penal procedure; (2) Collective punishment is prohibited.

ARTICLE 42: Except in cases of flagrante delicto, no person may be arrested, searched, detained or have his liberty restricted in any manner or prevented from free movement, except by order given by a competent court or the prosecution service in accordance with the law and only where such is required for the needs of the investigations and security of society. The law shall determine the period of detention on remand. No detention or imprisonment is permitted except in places which are subject to laws regulating prisons.
CHAPTER FOUR: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

ARTICLE 47: The elected Council (the Council) shall exercise legislative authority during the transitional period. The life of the Council shall be until the end of the transitional period.

ARTICLE 48: The Council shall be composed of the President and 88 Members elected in general elections in accordance with the Elections Laws.

ARTICLE 49: (1) The Council shall have two ordinary sessions every year, each to last for no longer than 3 months, commencing on 1st October and 1st April, but on the following day if the 1st falls on a national holiday.
(2) The Council may prolong its session if its business is not concluded, and in any event a session may not end before approval of the budget.

ARTICLE 50: The President or Speaker may call for the Council to meet in extraordinary session for any period to discuss or debate or decide on matters specified in the Agenda for the extraordinary session. The Speaker shall also call for such extraordinary session if he receives such a request from not less than one third of the Members of the Council signed by them and specifying the Agenda. The Council shall not discuss or debate any matter not specified in the Agenda to the extraordinary session.

ARTICLE 51: At its inaugural meeting, the Council shall elect from amongst its Members, a Speaker, a Deputy Speaker and a Rapporteur, who shall compose the office of the Speaker. The Speaker, Deputy Speaker who Rapporteur must not be Members of the Executive or Ministers, and shall hold office during the life of the Council.

ARTICLE 52: Every Member of the Council shall take an oath in the terms provided for in Article 69.

ARTICLE 53: The President shall open each session of the Council and lay down the programme of his Government, provided that the Prime Minister may deputise for him.

ARTICLE 54: The quorum of all Meetings of the Council shall be 50% of its Members. All decisions of the Council shall be taken by a simple majority of the Members present unless otherwise provided for in this Basic Law and in particular Article 7(2).

ARTICLE 55: All Meetings of the Council shall be public, save that at the request of the Government or by a decision of the Council, a Meeting may be closed to the public if the national interest so requires.

ARTICLE 56: Members of the Council shall not be held civilly or criminally liable for anything said or opinions expressed by them in the Council or for voting in the Council, whether the meeting is public or in meetings closed to the public, or in Committees of the Council.
ARTICLE 57: Members of the Council shall enjoy legal immunity during the life of the Council and save for arrestable crimes discovered during their commission, no criminal proceedings may be instituted against a Member except with the permission of the Council, and when the Council is not in session, the Speaker's permission, who shall inform the Council at its next session the action he took.

ARTICLE 58: (1) No Member of the Council may exploit his position as a Member of the Council to influence any business or matter.
(2) The law shall determine what type of work, business or affairs a Member of the Council may conduct.

ARTICLE 59: Members of the Council may propose the enactment of laws and may question the Government generally or individual Ministers according to the rules of Procedure of the Council.

ARTICLE 60: The Council shall have the following functions:
(1) Approval of Laws;
(2) Debating the policy of the Government;
(3) Approval of the Budget and Development Plans;
(4) Approval of a general amnesty or pardon;
(5) Accepting the resignations of Members of the Council;
(6) Approval of Appointment of Cabinet Ministers;
(7) Withdrawal of Confidence in the Government or a Cabinet Minister as provided for in Article 84 of this Basic Law.

ARTICLE 61: The Annual Budget Plan must be laid before the Council at least two months before the beginning of the financial year and no Budget shall be operative until and unless it is approved by the Council.

ARTICLE 62: (1) Voting on the Budget shall be Chapter by Chapter.
(2) Reallocation of budgetary amounts as between Chapters is prohibited except as provided in the law.

ARTICLE 63: The Council may establish temporary Committees from among its Members to investigate any matter within its jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 64: The salaries, allowances and expenses of the Members of the Council shall be determined by Law.

ARTICLE 65: A vacancy in the membership of the Council, whether caused by death, resignation or otherwise, shall be filled by the holding of a by-election in the District concerned.

ARTICLE 66: The Council shall lay down by-laws or rules for the determination of its procedure and the carrying out of its functions.

CHAPTER FIVE: EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

ARTICLE 67: The Executive Authority during the transitional period shall be exercised by the President and a Cabinet of Ministers in the manner provided for in this Basic Law.

I. THE PRESIDENT

ARTICLE 68: The President shall be elected in a general election for the Presidency in accordance with the Elections Law and shall by virtue of his election and office be the Head of the Executive Authority.

ARTICLE 69: Before assuming office, the President shall take the following oath in the presence of the Bureau of the Presidency of the Palestine National Council: “I swear by Almighty God to be faithful to the Nation of Palestine and to its national heritage and to preserve this Basic Law and the law, serve the Palestinian People and faithfully carry out the duties entrusted to me according to law.”

ARTICLE 70: The term of the Presidency shall be five (5) years and no person may be President for more than two consecutive terms. The first term of the first President and any successor in the transitional period shall expire with the expiry of the transitional period.

ARTICLE 71: If the office of the President becomes vacant or if the President permanently incapacitated, the Speaker of the Council shall assume his powers and duties in a caretaker capacity until
a new President takes office, which shall be no more than 60 days from the date of occurrence of the vacancy or the proof of permanent incapacity.

ARTICLE 72: The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian forces.

ARTICLE 73: (1) The President shall sign and promulgate the laws within 30 days after their approval by the Council, and if not signed within the said period, such laws shall be deemed promulgated.

(2) The President has the power to initiate or propose laws to the Council or issue secondary legislation, including Orders and Regulations if authorised to do so by the primary law.

ARTICLE 74: The President may grant a special pardon and commute sentences. General pardon shall be prescribed by law.

ARTICLE 75: The President shall exercise his powers through Orders and Resolutions and Decrees in the manner prescribed by this Basic Law or any other law.

ARTICLE 76: The President’s salary, allowances and expenses shall be determined by law.

II. THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY.

ARTICLE 77: The President shall appoint a Cabinet of Ministers (the Cabinet) consisting of a Prime Minister and Ministers. He has the power to dismiss them or accept their resignation and has the power to preside over their Meetings.

ARTICLE 78: (1) The Cabinet shall assist the President in the performance of the executive authority of the government in the manner provided in this Basic Law.

(2) The President shall submit the names of the Prime Minister and Ministers to the Council to obtain approval to their appointment.

(3) Every Minister in the Cabinet shall be an elected Member of the Council save that the President may appoint non Members of the elected Council as Ministers, provided their number does not exceed 20% of the total number of Cabinet Ministers. Ministers who are non-Council Members may participate in the debates of the Council but may not vote.

ARTICLE 79: The Cabinet shall generally be responsible for the government and administration of the affairs of the country.

ARTICLE 80: (1) The Cabinet shall be composed of a Prime Minister and such other Ministers as the public interest may require. The resolution of appointment shall designate a Ministry for which the Minister shall be responsible;

(2) A Minister may hold more than one portfolio, as may be determined in the resolution of appointment;

ARTICLE 81: The Prime Minister and Ministers shall, before assuming office, take the oath provided for in Article 69 of this Basic Law in the presence of the President.

ARTICLE 82: Neither the Prime Minister nor any Ministers may purchase or lease any government property, not even through public auction, nor may any one of them have a financial interest in any contract concluded with government bodies, nor may he, while being a member of the Cabinet, be a member of the board of directors of any company or carry on a trade or practice a profession or receive a salary or any other remuneration from any company or any other source.

ARTICLE 83: The Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers are jointly responsible to the President and to the Council for the general policy of the country as is within the competence of the Cabinet and each Minister is responsible to the for them actions of his Ministry.

ARTICLE 84: The Prime Minister may propose a vote of confidence in the Cabinet before the Council. A no-confidence motion in the Cabinet or a particular Minister may also be proposed by at least 10 Members of the Council and may be passed by a simple majority, in which case, the Cabinet or Minister, as the case may be, must present the resignation of the Government or Minister to the President.

ARTICLE 85: The powers of the various Ministries shall be determined by regulations made by the Cabinet and endorsed by the President.
ARTICLE 86: Without prejudice to the generality of Article 79 of this Basic Law, the Cabinet shall have the following powers:
(1) To lay down the general policy within the powers entrusted to the Cabinet in the light of submissions by Ministers;
(2) Implementation of the general policies laid down by the appropriate Palestinian authorities;
(3) Preparation and approval of the annual budget for its presentation to the Council;
(4) Supervision of the administrative organs;
(5) Follow up on the implementation of laws and ensuring observance thereof;
(6) Follow up performance of their duties and powers by the various Ministries and all other units of the administrative organ;
(7) Consideration of the proposals and policies of the various Ministries in respect of the performance of their functions;
(8) Any other powers entrusted to the Cabinet by this Basic Law or any other law.

ARTICLE 87: Every Minister shall have the following powers within his Ministry:
(1) Propose the general policy of the Ministry and supervise its implementation after its approval;
(2) Supervise the conduct of affairs in his Ministry and give the necessary instructions in that respect;
(3) Implement the budgetary provisions pertaining to his Ministry;
(4) Propose legislation pertaining to his Ministry;
(5) Delegate, as need be, some of his powers to the Under-Secretary of the Ministry, heads of divisions or senior officials of the Ministry;
(6) Any other powers entrusted to him by laws, regulations and resolutions made in pursuance thereof.

ARTICLE 88: Each Minister shall submit to the Cabinet detailed reports on the activities of his Ministry, its policies, plans and achievements compared with the aims set out for the Ministry in the Ministry plan, and shall also submit the Ministry’s proposals and recommendations as to its future policy. These reports shall be submitted on a regular basis so that the Cabinet would be fully informed of the activities and policies of each Ministry.

ARTICLE 89: The appointment of officials and their terms of employment shall be in accordance with the laws in force in that respect.

ARTICLE 90: In the provision of administrative services and attending to the rights of individuals, simplification of procedures, expeditiousness and propriety in performance shall be observed within the limits of the law and public interest.

ARTICLE 91: The executive authority shall avail the widest opportunity for the participation of citizens, political parties, trade unions and other organizations in the discussion of policies before their determination, through announcing such policies and consultation with the said bodies.

ARTICLE 92: The Cabinet, its Prime Minister and Ministers shall exercise the powers and duties provided for their predecessors in legislation in force on the coming into force of this Basic Law, until such laws are amended or replaced, as the case may be.

III. SECURITY FORCES AND THE POLICE

ARTICLE 93: (1) Security forces and the police are a regular force created for the service of the people, protection of society and to maintain security and public order. It shall perform its duties within the limits provided by law with full respect of rights and freedoms without prejudice or discrimination. All persons must cooperate with and assist the police in the performance of their duties.
(2) Security forces and the police shall be regulated by law.

IV. PUBLIC BODIES AND INSTITUTIONS

ARTICLE 94: Specialized public bodies and institutions may be established by the President to assist the government in formulating policies within the general fields of activity. Such bodies and institutions may be autonomous bodies enjoying juridical personality exercising activities entrusted to them under their terms of reference; in which case they shall be established by law.
V. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ARTICLE 95: For purposes of local government the country shall, by law, be divided into administrative units and municipalities enjoying juridical personality. Each unit shall have a popular council directly elected in the manner provided in the law. The law shall determine the competence of such administrative units, their financial resources, relations with the central authority, their role in the preparation and implementation of the development plans and supervision of the various fields of activity. Division shall be, as far as possible, on the basis of number of inhabitants and their concentration.

VI. GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 96: No administrative unit or any official thereof may sign or undertake a financial obligation except within the allocations provided for in law, and no effect shall be given to any disposition in contravention of this provision.

ARTICLE 97: No administrative unit or any official thereof may take decisions or issue instructions or regulation in contravention of laws in force, and no effect shall be given to decisions, instructions or regulations made in contravention of the said laws.

ARTICLE 98: Each administrative unit shall be entitled to exercise the powers, carry out the duties and issue resolutions, instructions and regulations for that purpose within the mandate prescribed to it by law.

ARTICLE 99: Appointment to public offices and specialized bodies and institutions shall be on the basis of competence, experience and ability to perform in accordance with the nature of the public office and functions and aims of the body or institution.

VII. FINANCE

ARTICLE 100: General taxes and duties may not be imposed, amended or repealed except by law, and no total or partial exemption may apply except in the circumstances provided for in the law.

ARTICLE 101: The law shall set out the rules pertaining to the preparation of the general budget and for the disposition of funds allocated therein.

ARTICLE 102: The law shall set out the rules governing the collection of public funds and the procedure for spending therefrom.

ARTICLE 103: The beginning of the financial year shall be determined by law. If the budget law is not passed before the commencement of the new financial year, spending shall continue on the basis of monthly allocations of one twelfth of the previous budget for each month.

ARTICLE 104: All that is received in taxes and other revenue must be paid to the public treasury and included in the budget. No part of the funds of the general budget may be allocated or spent for any purpose whatsoever except in accordance with the law.

ARTICLE 105: An Audit Office shall be established and its autonomy shall be guaranteed by law. The Office shall assist the administrative organ in supervising the collection of public revenue and spending therefrom within the limits set out by the budget. The Audit Office shall submit to the President and to the Council an annual report regarding its activities, observations showing financial violations, if any, and the responsibility arising therefrom.

The law shall provide for the immunity of the head of the Audit Office and shall give him the powers necessary for him to carry out his duties in the best possible manner.

ARTICLE 106: Public loans shall be confirmed by law. A public loan may be concluded or guaranteed by a law or within the allocations prescribed for that purpose in the budget law.

ARTICLE 107: Banks shall be regulated by law.
CHAPTER SIX: THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

I. THE JUDICIARY

ARTICLE 108: The judicial authority shall be an independent authority to be exercised by the Supreme Court and other Courts in accordance with this Basic Law and any other law.

ARTICLE 109: Judges shall be independent and, in their judicial function, shall be subject only to the law. No other authority may interfere in individual cases or in the administration of justice.

ARTICLE 110: There shall be a Chief Justice, in that capacity, shall be the Head of the Judicial Authority and President of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice shall be a judge of the Supreme Court appointed by Presidential Decree with the approval of the High Judiciary council except that the first Chief Justice appointed in pursuance of this Article shall not require such approval.

ARTICLE 111: A High Judiciary Council shall be established by law with the Chief Justice as Chairman. The law shall establish the composition and powers of this Council as well as its rules of procedure. The opinion of the Council shall be taken in respect of draft legislation pertaining to the organization of the judicial authority, including the public prosecution.

ARTICLE 112: (1) The law shall provide for the rules governing the appointment, transfer, secondment and promotion of judges and other matters pertaining to the judiciary;
(2) Judges shall be irremovable, and the law shall regulate their disciplinary accountability.

ARTICLE 113: A Supreme Court shall be established by law comprising:
(1) A High Constitutional Court which shall have exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review of constitutionality of laws and regulations and construction of legal provisions in the manner prescribed by law;
(2) A Court of Cassation in criminal, civil and commercial matters in the manner prescribed by law;
(3) A High Court of Justice which shall have jurisdiction over administrative and other disputes in the manner prescribed by law.
(4) The law shall determine the types of other courts, their organization, jurisdiction and procedure.
(5) No law, administrative order or action may be excluded from review by the judiciary.

ARTICLE 114: Hearings shall be in public, unless the court determines otherwise in the interests of public order or morality, and in all cases judgments shall be pronounced in open Court.

II. ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

ARTICLE 115: Public and Government cases shall be conducted by the Attorney-General in the name of the people.

ARTICLE 116: (1) The appointment, transfer and dismissal of the Attorney-General and public attorneys in his office shall be in the manner and subject to the conditions prescribed by law;
(2) The law shall determine the powers, competence and formation of the service.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUDING AND TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 117: This Basic Law shall apply during the transitional period, but shall not affect the powers and duties of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its organs including its powers to represent the Palestinian people in foreign and international relations and relations with foreign governments and international organizations.

ARTICLE 118: Laws shall be promulgated in the name of the Palestinian people, and shall be published in the Official Gazette after signature and promulgation by the President. They shall come into force 30 days from publication unless the law provides otherwise.

ARTICLE 119: The provisions of laws and legislative shall not apply except to matters occurring as from the date on which they come into force. Where required and in non-criminal matters, laws may provide otherwise.
ARTICLE 120: None of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in this Basic Law may be suspended, and such rights and freedoms shall remain governed by the provisions of this Basic Law and the laws enacted in pursuance thereof.

ARTICLE 121: Laws, regulations and decisions in force in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank before the coming into effect of this Basic Law shall remain in force to the extent that they do not conflict with the provisions of this law, until they are amended, repealed or replaced in pursuance of this or any other law.

ARTICLE 122: This Basic Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall come into force on the date of its promulgation.


 [...] The Conference reaffirmed that the question of Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif is the prime cause of all Muslims, and expressed its solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization in its just struggle for removing the effects of the Israeli occupation and the building of Palestinian national institutions on the land of Palestine so as to achieve the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including their rights to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of their own independent State on the soil of their homeland with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital.

29. The Conference called upon member States to continue the consolidation of their solidarity with the Palestinian people and to continue supporting the position of the PLO in its negotiations for the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all of the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif.

30. The Conference expressed its support for the peace process in the Middle East and welcomed the agreements concluded in its framework. It also welcomed the signing of the agreement on the implementation of the second phase of the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles and called for respect of all its components. It noted that the success of the peace process hinges on the implementation of resolutions of international legitimacy, including resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978) of the Security Council, on the basis of Arab and international understanding of those resolutions, and the ‘land for peace’ formula and the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their national and political rights. It affirmed that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East region can only be achieved through complete and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from all of the Palestinian and Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif, the Syrian Golan and the occupied Lebanese territories.

31. The Conference reaffirmed that the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif is an integral part of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and to it apply all the provisions applicable to the other occupied territories; and reiterated the necessity of its return to Palestinian sovereignty as capital of the State of Palestine. It called upon all States to refrain from having any dealings with the Israeli occupation authorities which might be interpreted, in any way, by those authorities as an implicit recognition of the fait accompli imposed by the proclamation of Al-Quds as the capital of Israel. It reaffirmed that all legislative, administrative and settlement measures and arrangements that aim at changing the legal status of the Holy City are null and void and are in contradiction with the international agreements and conventions. It called upon all States to comply with Security Council resolution 478 (1980), which invites Member States not to transfer their diplomatic missions to the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif. It invited the international community, and in particular, the two co-sponsors of the Peace Conference, to compel Israel not to effect any geographical or demographic changes in the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif during the transitional period that might affect the outcome of the negotiations on the final status of the city.
RESOLUTION NO. 1/23-P ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The Twenty-third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Session of Peace, Solidarity and Tolerance), held in Conakry, Republic of Guinea, from 17 to 20 Rajab, 1416H (9 to 12 December, 1995),

Having considered the report of the Secretary General on the cause of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict contained in document no. ICFM/23-95/PAL/D.1,

Proceeding from the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

Pursuant to the resolutions of the Islamic conferences on the cause of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict,

Recalling all the resolutions issued by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States on the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the other occupied Arab territories,

Reaffirming Security Council resolutions 681 (1990) and 904 (1994) on the carnage at the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron and the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 465 (1980), 476 (1980) and 478 (1980) on the city of Al-Quds AL-Sharif and the Islamic resolutions emphasizing that the question of Al-Quds Al-Sharif constitutes the heart of the Palestine issue which is the prime cause of all Muslims and the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that a just and comprehensive peace will only be achieved with the return of the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif to Palestinian sovereignty as capital of the State of Palestine,

Reaffirming the need for all States of the world, including their executive, legislative and other institutions to abide by and respect the resolutions of the Security Council on the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif,

Reaffirming that the Palestine cause is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories, its annexation of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the Syrian Golan, its continued denial of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and its disrespect for the human rights of the Palestinians constitute a flagrant violation of the relevant resolutions of international legitimacy and the principles of international law as well as the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Proceeding from Islamic and international resolutions which reaffirm the legitimacy of the struggle waged by the Palestinian people under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole legitimate representative, for the re-establishment of their sovereignty over their land and the exercise of their inalienable national rights,

Expressing deep concern at Israel’s continuing terrorist and repressive measures and practices, its continued policy of deportation and mass reprisals against Palestinian and Arab citizens in all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, is siege of the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the desecration of the holy shrines,

Condemning the continuous Israeli aggression against southern Lebanon and western Beqa’a and emphasizing that the Israeli policies, practices and expansionist plans threaten not only the Arab States and the peace process but also the Islamic countries and endanger international peace and security,

Following with interest the peace efforts being exerted for the achievement of a just and comprehensive solution of the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978) and of the formula of “land for peace”, and the legitimate national and political rights of the Palestinian people,

Commenting the efforts made by the Palestine Liberation Organization throughout the occupied Palestinian territories for the reconstruction of what had been destroyed by the Israeli occupation, as well as the efforts exerted by its National Authority for the rehabilitation of the Palestinian national economy and its consolidation, with a view to the establishment of the Palestinian State, and stressing the importance of supporting those efforts by all possible ways and means,
1. **Reaffirms** all the resolutions of the Islamic conferences relating to the Palestine cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict;

2. **Reaffirms** that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without a full and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian and Arab territories occupied since 1967, including the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, the occupied Syrian Golan and the occupied Lebanese territories;

3. **Reaffirms** also that the Palestine cause is the prime cause of all Muslims, and expresses its solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization in its just struggle for removing the effects of Israeli occupation and building Palestinian national institutions on the land of Palestine, with a view to fulfilling the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of their independent State on their national soil, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital;

4. **Calls on** member States to further strengthen their solidarity with the Palestinian people, and support their just and legitimate struggle for ending Israeli occupation and achieving all their goals of freedom and independence, and to continue supporting the PLO in its negotiations for the full withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, including the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and for the guarantee of the transfer of all powers and responsibilities in the occupied Palestinian territories, including the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, to the Palestinian National Authority;

5. **Welcomes** the conclusion of the agreement for the implementation of the second stage of the Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles as an important step towards the achievement of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the region, and calls for commitment to the speedy implementation of all its provisions, including the expansion of the Palestinian self-rule area, the release of the Palestinian detainees, the completion of the Palestinian election, honouring the chronological programme of the agreement;

6. **Expresses** its support and backing for the peace process in the Middle East, which is aimed at bringing about a just and comprehensive solution to the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and welcomes the agreements concluded believes that the success of the peace process in the Middle East hinges on the fulfilment of the following principles and basic premises:

   **First:** That it is based on the resolutions of international legality, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978), and the obligation to implement them in accordance with the Arab and international understanding of those resolutions, which guarantee full Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif, as well as from the occupied Syrian Golan, to the lines of 4 June 1967, and the occupied Lebanese territories, and on the basis of the formula “land for peace”; of the legitimate national and political rights of the Palestinian people, and of the need to enable them to exercise their right of return in conformity with General Assembly resolution 194 (III);

   **Second:** Applicability of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) to all Arab occupied territories, including the Palestinian territories;

   **Third:** The fact that Al-Quds is the heart of the Palestine question which, in turn, is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Al-Quds is an integral part of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and to it apply all the provisions applicable to the other occupied territories under the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, and the necessity of its return to Palestinian sovereignty as capital of the State of Palestine, as a guarantee for peace and security in the region;

   **Fourth:** Dismantling the settlements already established in the occupied territories, as they are illegal under the international resolutions including resolution 465 (1980) of the Security Council, and cessation of the settling of Jews in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the Syrian Golan, combined with the necessity of providing international guarantees to that effect;

   **Fifth:** The need to secure international protection for the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, to implement the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Hague Treaty of 1907, to halt all of Israel’s terrorist and repressive practices against the Palestinian people, to release all Palestinian detainees in the occupied territories, to halt the expropriation and attempted transformation of Islamic and Christian properties and waqfs, to halt the continuing violations of Islamic and Christian holy places and to halt the excavations which endanger those shrines;
7. **Urges** all States and concerned parties to extend their support to the international programme of economic, social and cultural development in the occupied Palestinian territories, to avail the Palestinian people of the necessary approved assistance for the reconstruction of its national economy and to back up its national institutions and enable it to establish its independent State with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital;

8. **Reaffirms** the continued and constant responsibility of the United Nations vis-à-vis the Palestine question until a just and comprehensive solution to all its aspects is achieved, securing an end to occupation and the exercise by the Palestinian people of their inalienable national rights, and calls for more effective participation of the United Nations in promoting the success of the peace process in the Middle East;

9. **Urges** the international community, and particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, to compel Israel to implement the resolutions of international legitimacy without delay or procrastination and to desist from violation the principles of international law and abide by the principles of international legitimacy;

10. **Invites** all States of the world to refrain from having any dealings with the Israeli occupation authorities which might in any way be interpreted by those authorities as an implicit recognition of the fait accompli they have imposed by the declaration of Al-Quds as the capital of Israel. In this context, it should be recalled that Security Council resolutions 465, 476 and 478 of 1980 rule that the Israeli measures relating to the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif are null and void and affirm that all the legislative, administrative and settlement measures aimed at changing the legal status of the Holy City are null and void, have no legal effects whatsoever and are a violation of international agreements, conventions and norms;

11. **Strongly deplores** the resolution of the United States Congress on the transfer of the United States Embassy to the city of Al-Quds, and considers it a provocation of the feelings of the Muslim world, a flagrant disregard of the Islamic and Christian sanctities, and a serious violation of all international resolutions on the city of Al-Quds, including Security Council resolution 478 (1980), as well as a threat to stray the peace process, and calls upon the United States Administration not to respond to this resolution of the Congress in conformity with its responsibilities as a sponsor of the peace process;

12. **Calls for** abiding by the provisions of the Islamic boycott against Israel and for considering the legislation, rules and provisions governing the boycott - 'the general principles of the Boycott, Islamic law, the internal regulations and sessional meetings of the regional offices' - as part of their own current national legislations, and setting up the necessary offices and mechanisms to serve that end;

13. **Strongly condemns** Israel’s persistence in its aggressive scheme to partition the Ibrahimi Mosque enclosure in the occupied city of Al-Khalil, which aims at seizing and Judaizing most of it and establishing a Jewish synagogue on its site. It calls on the member States to continue their coordination and intensive efforts in the various international forums to prevent the implementation of this scheme and preserve the Ibrahimi enclosure as a mosque solely for Muslims, as it has been through the ages. It warns that any slackness in those efforts would encourage Israel to undermine the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque and other Islamic and Christian shrines, which would affect the peace process. It also invites them to endeavour to restore the old town in Al-Khalil and preserve the heritage and culture of that ancient city, as well as settle Palestinian families therein, in order to face Jewish settlement in the city. It further reaffirms that the redeployment of Israeli forces outside the occupied West Bank cities must apply to all cities and not exclude Al-Khalil;

14. **Strongly condemns** the Israeli repressive measures and practices against the Palestinian citizens. Also strongly condemns Israel’s expansionist settlement policy and regards all settlements established or to be established by Israel in Al-Quds Al-Sharif and in all other parts of the occupied Palestinian territories and the Syrian Golan as null and void, in accordance with international legitimacy, and appeals to all States to refrain from taking any steps that might facilitate the process of settlement in the occupied territories; invites the member States to request the United Nations Security Council to set up an international committee to supervise and monitor the prevention of the settlement process in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories;

15. **Invites** member States to work within the framework of the United Nations and in international institutions and forums to compel Israel to release the detainees, bring back the deportees, put an end to the method of collective punishment and desist from any works that would endanger life and the environment in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories;
16. **Strongly condemns** Israel’s continuing occupation of southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa region, its arbitrary practices and military acts of aggression against the Lebanese citizens and against the Palestinian refugees in their camps in Lebanon, calls upon the United Nations Security Council to take the necessary measures to put an immediate end to those acts of aggression, and demands Israel’s immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal from Lebanese territory. It affirms its resolve to maintain the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders. It stresses the necessity of implementing Security Council resolutions concerning Lebanon, in particular resolution 425 (1978), and expresses its appreciation for the achievements of the Supreme Tripartite Arab Committee. It also calls on the international community to contribute to the International Fund for the Reconstruction of Lebanon;

17. **Strongly condemns** the policy of Israel in refusing to comply with Security Council resolution 497 (1981) and in imposing its jurisdiction, its laws and its administration on the occupied Syrian Golan, as well as Israel’s policies of annexation, establishment of settlements, expropriation of lands, diversion of water resources and imposition of Israeli nationality on Syrian citizens. It considers that all those measures are null and void and constitute a violation of the rules and principles of international law relating to occupation and war, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. It demands the complete withdrawal of Israel from the entire occupied Syrian Golan to the lines of 4 June 1967;

18. **Calls on** the international community and the Security Council to compel Israel to comply with United Nations resolutions, particularly Security Council resolution 487 (1981), to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to implement the resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) calling for the subjection of all Israeli atomic facilities to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System, and to obtain Israel’s renunciation of nuclear armament and its submission of a full report on its stockpile of nuclear weapons and ammunition to the Security Council and the IAEA, as those steps are essential for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons, in the Middle East region, which is a fundamental factor for the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the region;

19. **Calls on** the member States to coordinate their positions in all international forums in order to preserve the principled position of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on all the resolutions on the issue of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict;

20. **Commends** the efforts exerted by the Al-Quds Committee, under the Chairmanship of His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco;

21. **Reaffirms** the continued responsibility of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to fulfil the tasks assigned to it for the benefit of all the Palestinian citizens wherever they may be living, and calls upon the member States to request the Secretary General of the United Nations to see to it that the Conciliation Committee undertakes, in collaboration with UNRWA and the concerned States, the preparation of a comprehensive inventory of Palestinian refugees and their property and the formulation of an integrated conception for the settlement of their problems on the basis of General Assembly resolution 194 (III);

22. **Requests** the Secretary General to take necessary measures for continuing and strengthening contacts and coordination on the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict between the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the European Union, and the United Nations and the specialized agencies, and express its appreciation for all the latter’s supportive stands and assistance for the just struggle of the Palestinian people;

23. **Requests** the Secretary General to follow up on the implementation of this resolution and to submit a report thereon to the next Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers;

**RESOLUTION NO. 2/23-P ON THE CITY OF AL-QUDS AL-SHARIF**

The Twenty-third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Session of Peace, Solidarity and Tolerance), held in Conakry, Republic of Guinea, from 17 to 20 Rajab, 1416H (9 to 12 December, 1995),

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary General on the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, continued in document ICFM/23-95/PAL/D.2,
Proceeding from the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

Pursuant to the Islamic resolutions which reaffirm that the issues of Al-Quds Al-Sharif forms the core of the Palestinian issue, which is the foremost Islamic cause and the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that no comprehensive and just peace can be achieved without the return of Al-Quds Al-Sharif to Palestinian sovereignty as the capital of the State of Palestine,

Recalling the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, in particular the Council’s resolutions 465, 476 and 478 of 1980 on the city of Al-Quds, which consider as null and void the Israeli law annexing Al-Quds and claiming it as the unified capital of Israel,

Amazed by the decision taken by the Congress of the United States of America to transfer the United States Embassy to the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif; considering it to be a flagrant violation of the resolutions of international legitimacy; and reaffirming the need for all States of the world, including their executive, legislative and other institutions, to respect and abide by the resolutions of the Security Council on the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif,

Expressing its deep concern at the escalation of Israel’s acts of aggression against the Holy Places in the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and also over the deteriorating situation of the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and all Islamic and Christian Holy Places, in particular the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, as a result of the increasing Judaization and settlement,

Expressing its full solidarity with the just struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO, so as to enable it to face up to the forthcoming stage and firmly establish its National Authority in all the occupied Palestinian territories, including the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif,

Reiterating Security Council resolution 681 (1990), which provides for the applicability of all the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, concerning the protection of civilians in time of war, to the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif,

Following attentively the continued peace efforts for the achievement of a just and comprehensive settlement of the issue of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and the legitimate national and political rights of the Palestinian people,

Commending the constant efforts made by the Al-Quds Committee under the chairmanship of His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco,

1. Reaffirs all the resolutions issued by the relevant Islamic conferences, including those adopted by the Third Islamic Summit Conference on Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the recommendations of the Al-Quds Committee at its former sessions, in particular the recommendations adopted by its fifteenth session;
2. Invites the Contact Group charged with the affairs of the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and constituted pursuant to the recommendation of the fifteenth session of the Al-Quds Committee, which was held in Ifran, Morocco, on 16 and 17 January 1995 to do its very best to ensure that the resolution on Al-Quds Al-Sharif to be adopted by the current session of the United Nations General Assembly is commensurate with the nature of recent conditions and developments, as well as with the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the aspirations of the Muslim world and the developments facing this issue;
3. Invites the member States to continue extending their support to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to extend all forms of assistance to the Palestinian people for the transfer of all authorities and responsibilities in the occupied Palestinian territories, including the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, to the Palestinian National Authority;
4. Asserts that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East will not be realized unless Israel withdraws from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, at the forefront of which is the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, being an integral part of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, subject to whatever is applicable to all the occupied territories in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. It also underlines the need for the city to return to Palestinian sovereignty as the capital of the State of Palestine, as a guarantee for peace and security in the region;
5. Invites all States to refrain from having any dealings with the Israeli occupation authorities which might be interpreted in any way by those authorities as an implicit recognition of the fait accompli imposed by the proclamation of Al-Quds as the capital of Israel, and reaffirms that all legislative, administrative and settlements procedures and measures aimed at altering the legal status of
the Holy City are null and void and constitute a violation of international agreements, conventions and norms, as proclaimed by international legitimacy resolutions, which include the Security Council resolutions 465, 476 and 478 of 1980, as well as those of the General Assembly, all of which invalidate the Israeli procedures in question;

6. Also invites the member States to face up to the serious developments ensuing from the continued Israeli expansionist policy in Al-Quds Al-Sharif, to confront it with all possible means, to provide material resources for the preservation of the Islamic shrines, and to support the steadfastness of its citizens and institutions in facing up to the Israeli schemes aimed at annexing the city of Al-Quds and wiping out its Arabo-Islamic character;

7. Further invites the international community, and in particular the two co-sponsors of the Peace Conference, to compel Israel not to effect any geographical or demographic alternation in the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif during the transitional period and to refrain from any action or measure which might affect the outcome of the negotiations on the final status of the city;

8. Emphasizes the need for the dismantling of the existing settlements in the occupied territories and for the reversal of the Jewish settlement movement, particularly in the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, together with the provision of international guarantees to ensure the above;

9. Calls upon all States to adhere to Security Council resolution 478 (1980), which invites the Member States to uphold the provisions of that resolution and refrain from transferring their diplomatic missions to the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif; takes note of the general response of the States of the world to this resolution and their abidance by it, and strongly condemns the resolutions of the United States Congress on the transfer of the United States Embassy to the city of Al-Quds, and considers it a provocation of the feelings of the Muslim world, a flagrant disregard of the Islamic and Christian sanctities, and a serious violation of all international resolutions on the city of Al-Quds, including Security Council resolution 478, as well as a threat to destroy the peace process, and calls upon the United States Administration not to respond to that resolution of the Congress, in conformity with its responsibilities as a sponsors of the peace process;

10. Strongly condemns Israel for the orders it has issued for closing the Palestinian institutions in Al-Quds Al-Sharif and preventing them from operating freely, and considers such measures a violation of the agreements concluded between the Palestinian and Israeli parties within the framework of the peace process, as well as a blatant violation of international conventions and agreements, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949;

11. Strongly condemns the Israeli occupation authorities for the festivities organized in commemoration of the so-called Third Millennium of the construction of Al-Quds City, which represents a disorientation campaign aimed at distorting historical facts concerning the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and invites the States of the world to boycott those festivities;

12. Invites the member States to extend all forms of support and assistance to the citizens of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, to establish developmental, economic, cultural, social and architectural projects, to construct housing units for the citizens of Al-Quds, to restore their existing houses, to consolidate their steadfastness, and to save institutions in Al-Quds Al-Sharif from destruction and loss;

13. Affirms the commitment of member States to pursue and coordinate their action with regional and international organizations for the implementation of the international resolutions adopted by United Nations and its specialized agencies, in particular UNESCO, to stop the hostile measures and aggressive practices and the excavation work in the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and to safeguard its cultural and historical heritage;

14. Reaffirms the resolutions of earlier Islamic conferences which call for the extension of support to the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the consolidation of the steadfastness of its citizens, through the implementation of the following activities:
   a. Inviting all Islamic States that have not yet signed the twinning of their capitals with the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, the capital of the State of Palestine, to take early action to that effect and to sponsor projects inside the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif in support of it and its steadfast citizens;
   b. Issuing the postage stamp of Palestine;
   c. Organizing charity fairs in favour of the Al-Quds Fund of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;
d. Undertaking contacts, symposia and festivals to counteract the acts of truth distortion and disorientation of public opinion carried out by Israel through the organization of the so-called Third Millennium of the City of Al-Quds, and to expose those false allegations;

e. Sustained coordination on the topic of Al-Quds Al-Sharif with all international and regional forums and organizations and the holding of international symposia on Al-Quds in different countries, in particular in the current circumstances, so as to expose to international public opinion the dangers facing Al-Quds Al-Sharif and to extent more efforts to safeguard the Holy City;

f. Sustained coordination with non-governmental organizations and the holding of a symposium of Al-Quds Al-Sharif jointly with them;

g. Extending support to educational institutions in Al-Quds Al-Sharif, both schools and universities, and enabling them to fulfil their mission against the Judaization of the Holy City;

h. Extending financial support for the restoration of historical buildings and derelict houses in Al-Quds Al-Sharif and for the construction of houses for Arab citizens so as to bolster their steadfast resistance and thwart the plans for the Judaization of the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif;

i. Issuing the postage stamp of the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif;

15. Condemns Israel’s persistence in the confiscation of Palestinian land in Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the establishment of settlements there with the purpose of cutting off the Arab city of Al-Quds from the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories, as well as its undertaking of excavation works around the Holy Mosque of Al-Quds and tunnel digging in its surrounding area; calls upon the international community to force Israel to discontinue such practices, which may compromise the peace process, and reafirms the need to preserve the Arab entity and Islamic character of Al-Quds Al-Sharif;

16. Strongly condemns the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision, issued on 23 September 1993, claiming the Blessed Mosque of Al-Aqsa as part of the territory of the State of Israel, and considers it as a premeditated provocation aimed at opening the way for Zionist extremist gangs to continue their violations against the sanctity of the Blessed Mosque of Al-Aqsa, to establish their presence in its precincts, and to continue looting the religious, historical and cultural relics in Al-Quds and the occupied territories;

17. Requests the Secretary General to follow up on the implementation of this resolution and to submit a report thereon to the next Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL, STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, SUMMIT MEETING, MADRID, 16 DECEMBER 1995

The following statement was issued by the European Council at its summit meeting held on 15-16 December 1995, at Madrid:

The European Council welcomes the Interim Agreement between the PLO, signed in Washington on 28 September.

The European Council deeply regrets the tragic assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and supports the undertaking given by the new Prime Minister, Mr. Peres, to take the peace process forward with the same resolve. It accordingly appeals for rapid progress to be made on the Syrian track and for all parties to step up their efforts to reach a comprehensive, just and lasting peace.

It welcomes the rapid disbursement of the EIB loans for ECU 250 million granted to the Palestinian Authority, and hopes that the Commission will submit to it, at the earliest opportunity, draft directives for negotiating an agreement with the EU. It similarly welcomes the implementation of the measures needed to coordinate the monitoring of the Palestinian elections.

It notes with satisfaction the progress made at the Amman Economic Summit and trusts that positive results will be achieved at the Ministerial Conference for Economic Assistance to the Palestinian People, to be held in Paris on 9 January 1996.

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US PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION NO. 96-8, SUSPENDING RESTRICTIONS ON US RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, WASHINGTON, DC, 4 JANUARY 1996

PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION NO. 96-8

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Suspending Restrictions on U.S. Relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994, part E of title V, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Public Law 103-236, as amended, ("the Act"), I hereby:

(1) certify that it is in the national interest to suspend application of the following provisions of law until March 31, 1996:
   (A) Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2227), as it applies with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization or entities associated with it;
   (B) Section 114 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (22 U.S.C. 287e note), as it applies with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization or entities associated with it;
   (C) Section 1003 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2502); and
   (D) Section 37, Bretton Woods Agreement Act (22 U.S.C. 286w), as it applies to the granting to the Palestine Liberation Organization of observer status or other official status at any meeting sponsored by or associated with the International Monetary Fund.
(2) certify that the Palestine Liberation Organization continues to abide by the commitments described in section 583(b)(4) of the Act.

You are authorized and directed to transmit this determination to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.

(Signed) WILLIAM J. CLINTON

EUROPEAN UNION PRESIDENCY, DECLARATION ON THE SITUATION IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, 5 JANUARY 1996

On 5 January 1996, the following declaration was made by the Presidency of the European Union on the situation in the Palestinian territories:

Recalling the undertaking by the Palestinians and the Israelis to abide by the Declaration of Principles and to continue the negotiations, the European Union reaffirms the need to continue the peace process in the Middle East.

The Union wishes to express its concern at the difficulties in implementing the Declaration of Principles which have arisen in the last few days, both in Gaza and in the West Bank. It particularly deplores the acts of violence which have occurred and reaffirms in this connection its condemnation of all violence, whatever its origin.

The European Union is also concerned at the incidents connected with continued Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. While welcoming the decision to stop work on disputed land in Efrat, further
to the meeting of the Israeli Cabinet on 1 January, it would point out that the total cessation of the work on settlements is vital to the smooth operation of the peace process.

The European Union welcomes the fact that, in spite of these difficulties, the Israeli-Palestinian talks on the process of autonomy started again in Cairo on 3 January. It hopes that these talks will open the way to progress on the principal questions outstanding.

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FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ, MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, PARIS, 9 JANUARY 1996

Following the signing of the Interim Agreement on September 28, 1995, representatives of the donor community, Israel and the Palestinian Authority gathered in Paris on January 9, 1996 at the ministerial level. Together they endeavoured to re-energize the assistance effort for the Palestinian people and to provide additional support to the process of peace and reconciliation now underway in the region. The Ministerial Conference on Economic Assistance to the Palestinian People was hosted and chaired by the Government of France. Substantial preparation was undertaken by the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee under the chairmanship of Norway, including the European Union, the United States, the Russian Federation, Japan, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Tunista, the World Bank and the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied territories. Representatives of regional and extra-regional parties as well as international organizations attended.

The participants expressed their strong desire to contribute to the success of the peace process. They resolved to send an unequivocal signal to the Palestinian people, all Middle Eastern nations and the international community that we stand with the Palestinian people as it takes risks for peace and begins to play a larger role in shaping its destiny. Donors underlined the importance they attach to the elections due to take place in the West Bank and Gaza Strip on January 20, 1996.

The participants reaffirmed their support for Palestinian self-government authority pursuant to the Interim Agreement within the context of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

1. Conference participants emphasized the importance of improving the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people through a comprehensive effort to create jobs, improve physical and social infrastructure, and establish the basis for sustainable economic development.

2. In April 1995 the Palestinian Authority, the Government of Israel, and the international community adopted a Tripartite Action Plan aimed at reducing the Palestinian budget deficit and at stimulating economic development. The participants praised the signature of a revised version of this accord which takes into account the most recent economic and political developments. The Government of Israel will assist and facilitate Palestinian economic development. The international community is committed to support and contribute to the economic development in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

3. The Palestinian Authority also underscored the importance of the Core Investment Programme, which was unanimously adopted by the Palestinian Cabinet and presented by the Palestinian Authority during the meeting of the Consultative Group of the World Bank in October 18-19, 1995. This Programme, with its focus on economic development and employment creation, contains investments totalling US$ 550 million. The investment projects include, inter alia, roads, wells, schools and hospitals as well as water and other infrastructure projects.

4. Donors demonstrated their support for the US$550 Core Investment Programme and other priority projects presented by the PA, including the establishment of industrial zones, the ongoing assistance programmes as well as financing the recurrent cost deficit of US$75 million, by mobilizing the following resources:
   a. Undisbursed commitments amounting to US$500 million;
   b. Commitments in 1996 to the Core Investment Programme, other priority projects recurrent cost deficit and other forms of assistance, amounting to US$865 million.
This amounts to more than US$ 1.3 billion. This will be mobilized by the donor community in 1996. In addition, a number of donor countries would continue to provide substantial levels of in-kind assistance.

5. The Conference requested that the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee follow-up on all issues raised during this Conference, and additional project proposals put forward by the Palestinian Authority. The AHLC would undertake to hold an informal meeting in April.

6. The Palestinian Authority committed itself to a medium-term economic strategy focused on private investment as the engine of growth. The plan aims to help the Palestinian economy to take its place in a regional and global environment of trade and investment.

7. The United States and the European Union announced their intention to improve ways of promoting Palestinian exports through the granting of duty-free status and other trade privileges.

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EUROPEAN UNION PRESIDENCY, STATEMENT ON THE PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS, 22 JANUARY 1996

On 22 January 1996, the following declaration on the Palestinian elections was made by the Presidency of the European Union:

The European Union expresses its deep satisfaction at the successful conclusion of the first ever Palestinian general election.

It conveys its congratulations to all those candidates elected to the Palestinian Council and to Mr. Arafat on his election as President of the Council and sends its sincerest good wishes to these duly elected representatives of the Palestinian people as they assume the responsibilities of their office.

The European Union also congratulates the Palestinian people for the political maturity they have shown in their approach to democracy and the elections for the Palestinian Council and its President. It applauds the way in which the vast majority of candidates and election officials alike have fulfilled their obligations during the election process. It welcomes the fact that the electoral process itself was conducted in a generally peaceful atmosphere in which potentially disruptive and divisive incidents did not cast a shadow over proceedings or give rise to tension or violence which might have undermined the democratic process.

The European Union underlines the importance of the successful conclusion of the Palestinian elections for the Middle East Peace Process as a whole. Not only have they conferred democratic legitimacy on the Palestinian Authority. They have confirmed the commitment of the Palestinian people and their democratically elected leaders to the Palestinian track of the Peace Process and the peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict. They have confounded opponents of the Middle East Peace Process who seek to undermine it through violence and terror.

The European Union is proud to have had a leading role in the international observation of the Palestinian elections. It thanks the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel for the trust and confidence they put in the European Union for the observation of the elections and the coordination of the international observation operation. The EU pays tribute to all those who have participated in the observation operation for their dedication and professionalism, without which the Union would have been unable to fulfil its responsibilities as coordinator.

The European Union now urges the Palestinian people to build on these elections to establish their democratic institutions and strengthen the rule of law and the respect for human rights. They can be sure of the Union's full support in this endeavour. For its part, the European Union re-affirms its unreserved political and economic commitment to the Middle East Peace Process, the establishment of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the region and the well-being of the Palestinian people. It stands ready to assist further in whatever capacity the parties to the Process consider appropriate.
As part of the Programme adopted by the Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (MWGWR) of the Middle East peace process, the Government of Norway has sponsored certain activities of the agenda.

Within this context comparative studies on water legislation, institutions and pricing of the Core Parties were commissioned and executed.

As an outcome of these studies the Parties, facilitated by the Government of Norway and the Office of Gavel holder, have identified common denominators in their water resources management systems and proclaimed this Declaration on Principles for Cooperation among the Core Parties on Water-related Matters and New and Additional Water Resources. Although the Core Parties in the Middle East Peace Process are considered to be Jordan, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, and the PLO for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority, for the purposes of this Declaration, the term the Core Parties are those who are signatories to this Declaration.

The Core Parties agree that this Declaration and the cooperation thereunder will not affect or alter in any form or manner any of the bilateral or other agreements or undertakings among them, nor does it prohibit or constrain any bilateral arrangements, understandings or agreements aimed at enhancing cooperation in water-related matters.

The Core Parties view this Declaration as an expression of:

- The role of the multilateral talks in promoting cooperation and confidence-building in the field of water resources and in the importance of cooperation for the promotion of matters of mutual interest.
- A joint resolve to cooperate among them in the development of new and additional water resources.
- The importance of water resources management on the basis of locally compatible legal, economic and institutional frameworks and principles.
- The recognition that cooperative efforts among them will facilitate the development of new and additional water resources for their joint benefit.
- The ability to cooperate on the basis of the common denominators identified within their respective water management systems.

The Core Parties proclaim as objectives of their cooperation:

- identifying the needs of new and additional water resources;
- identifying potential new and additional water resources and the development thereof;
- combining their cooperative efforts in the development of new and additional water resources; and
- enhancing their water supply, and increasing the efficiency of its use.

The Declaration consists of three parts, namely: Common denominators, Principles of cooperation on new and additional water resources, and Cooperation on other water-related matters.

**COMMON DENOMINATORS**

The Core Parties identified and agreed to the following common denominators in their water legislation as a basis for cooperation among themselves:

1. **Water resources in legislation**
   Their respective water legislations apply to all types of water resources including waste water and desalinated water.

2. **Ownership and administration of water resources**
   All water resources of each party are publicly owned and/or centrally controlled. They are used for the benefit of their respective societies. The Core Parties promote public participation in water re-
sources management. Well drilling, water production and supply are allowed only by permit or license. A Central Water Authority/Government Agency exists in each of the Core Parties, and exercises effective control over water resources.

3. Allocation
Domestic uses occupy the first priority in the allocation of water resources.

4. Drought measures
The Core Parties will take appropriate measures in periods of drought and water scarcity.

5. Water quality and protection
Water quality standards for various water uses have been adopted by each of the Core Parties; water preservation is an overriding concern, and enforcement powers exist in the hands of competent authorities to prevent water pollution, and to mitigate any negative environmental impacts on them at the expense of the polluters.

6. Data and record-keeping
Obligations exist, pursuant to the legislation of each Core Party, to measure, monitor and keep proper record of all water production, supplies and consumption.

7. Compliance and enforcement
Proper sanctions against non-compliance are explicit in the respective legislation of each of the Core Parties. Enforcement of the water legislation is the norm.

8. Water charges
Water is not supplied free of charge in any of the Core Parties. Tariff structures, taking into account different extents of cost recovery, apply to domestic, industrial and agricultural sectors. These tariffs are periodically reviewed and adjusted.

PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION ON NEW AND ADDITIONAL WATER RESOURCES

1. Definitions
For the purpose of this Declaration:
1.1 New and additional water resources are only those potential water resources which are not existing water resources, and which are not part of new and additional water resources developed pursuant to bilateral agreements.
1.2 Existing water resources are the individual resources of each of the respective parties’ renewable, non-renewable and waste water resources.
1.3 Cooperating Parties are those of the Core Parties, signatories to this Declaration, which actively participate in the development of any specific project relating to new and additional water resources.
1.4 A New and Additional Water Resources Project, hereinafter the Project, means a project among Cooperating Parties to develop new and additional water resources by specific agreement.

2. General principles
2.1 The development of new and additional water resources will not adversely affect the development or utilization of existing water resources.
2.2 All arrangements with respect to new and additional water resources will be limited in time and subject to periodic mutual review.

3. Mechanisms of cooperation
3.1 Cooperation among the Core Parties will be carried out by their respective water institutions through joint bodies on a ministerial and managerial level to be established, as appropriate, for each respective Party.
3.2 Each Project requires the consensus of all the Cooperating Parties for implementation.

4. Ownership and utilization
4.1 New and additional water resources, developed in joint effort by the Core Parties for the benefit of some or all of them, will be considered as part of their own water resources only to the extent of the share allocated to them.
4.2 Details concerning the utilization and ownership will be the subject of separate agreements for each Project.
4.3 Each Core Party can apply its legislation, within its respective jurisdiction, on the share allocated to it by each Project.

5. Technical, economic and financial issues
5.1 Projects will be technically, economically, and financially sustainable.
5.2 The Cooperating Parties will carry their respective share of the project financing including the costs of operation, maintenance, and amortization of the Project. Due regard will be given to less developed Cooperating Parties and joint efforts will be made to assist in the obtaining of financing on favourable terms, provided that no such efforts affect any of the bilateral donor/recipient arrangements or protocols.
5.3 The Cooperating Parties agree to participate jointly in the raising of the funds needed for the Project implementation, and to secure the funds needed for the operation and maintenance of the new water system.
5.4 The cost to each of the Cooperating Parties of water derived from new and additional resources will be based upon the cost of production, operation, maintenance and amortization.
5.5 Water derived from the new and additional resources will not be subject to levies on account of conveyance, storage, treatment, or protection in excess of levies which the owner of the project would normally incur.
5.6 Cooperating Parties may, by mutual consent, trade the use of their respective shares of the waters from new and additional resources, provided that such trading does not cause harm to the shares allocated to any other Cooperating Parties.

6. Environmental management
6.1 All Projects will be based on environmentally sound principles.
6.2 The Cooperating Parties give preference to those Projects which utilize advanced technological water usage methods.
6.3 Each Cooperating Party is responsible for the protection of the Project against environmental pollution originating within its jurisdiction.

7. Water protection
7.1 Each Cooperating Party is responsible for the prevention of harm to those parts of the Projects under its jurisdiction.
7.2 Such responsibility includes inter alia the preservation of water quality and the prevention of unauthorized withdrawals.

8. Operation and maintenance
The Cooperating Parties will set the standards for the operation and maintenance of the Projects.

9. Areas of cooperation
It is understood that the following potential areas of cooperation in the development of new and additional water resources for the Cooperating Parties will be further studied in order to determine their feasibility:
9.1 acquisition and import of water including the possibility of carrying such waters through existing or new supply systems (wheeling);
9.2 development of desalination plants;
9.3 rainfall enhancement; and
9.4 any other relevant area of cooperation.

COOPERATION ON OTHER WATER-RELATED MATTERS
Cooperation on other water-related matters, although originating among the Core Parties, will be open to regional and extra-regional parties of the Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources.

1. Cooperation on specific sectors
The Parties express their desire to cooperate among themselves and with other interested Parties on the following other water-related matters:
1.1 weather forecasting, climatology, weather modification, and meteorology;
1.2 environmental conservation;
1.3 sustainable water-related natural resources management and desertification control;
1.4 enhancement of public awareness and participation; and
1.5 human resources development

2. Proposed areas of cooperation
The Core Parties will in due time explore possible cooperation among themselves and with other interested parties in the following areas:
2.1 collection, filing, processing, transmission and exchange of water data and related information.
2.2 preparation of plans for flood-protection and utilization; with emphasis on development of early warning systems;
2.3 development of norms, standards and specifications for water devices, equipment and infrastructure;
2.4 transfer and adoption of advanced technology throughout the chains of water storage, conveyance and application, including automation and controls of water systems; particularly related to reduction of crop water requirements;
2.5 water-energy interactions, with emphasis on desalinization;
2.6 establishment of a regional centre; and
2.7 identification of ways to achieve optimal use of water in the agricultural sector.

3. Mechanism of cooperation
3.1 The Cooperating Parties will decide on the mechanism of their cooperation on other water-related matters set out in this section.
3.2 All decisions with respect to cooperation on other water-related matters will be adopted by consensus.

4. Specific cooperation
4.1 The Core Parties agree to hold regional seminars on various water-related matters;
4.2 The Core Parties agree to publish the results of their cooperation in a regional publication.

5. Extended cooperation
The Cooperating Parties may by consensus agree to include additional water-related matters in their cooperation.

* * *

FINAL STATEMENT, SUMMIT OF PEACEMAKERS,
SHARM EL-SHEIKH, 13 MARCH 1996

[The statement was issued by the Co-Chairmen, Egyptian Pres. Mubarak and US Pres. Clinton].

The Summit of Peacemakers has just concluded. This meeting took place at a time when the peace process confronts serious threats. The summit had three fundamental objectives: to enhance the peace process, to promote security and to combat terror.

Accordingly, the participants here today:

• Express their full support for the Middle East peace process and their determination that this process continue in order to accomplish a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the region.
• Affirm their determination to promote security and stability and to prevent the enemies of peace from achieving their ultimate objective of destroying the real opportunity for peace in the Middle East.
• Reemphasize their strong condemnation of all acts of terror in all its abhorrent forms, whatever its motivation and whoever its perpetrator, including recent terrorist attacks in Israel, consider them alien to the moral and spiritual values shared by all the peoples of the region and reaffirm their intention to stand staunchly against all such acts and to urge all governments to join them in this condemnation and opposition.
To that end, we decided:

(a) To support the Israel-Palestinian agreement, the continuation of the negotiating process, and to politically and economically reinforce it, to enhance the security situation for both, with special attention to the current and pressing economic needs of the Palestinians.

(b) To support continuation of the negotiation process in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement.

(c) To work together to promote security and stability in the region by developing effective and practical means of cooperation and further assistance.

(d) To promote coordination of efforts to stop acts of terror on bilateral, regional and international levels; ensuring instigators of such acts are brought to justice; supporting efforts by all parties to prevent their territories from being used for terrorist purposes; and preventing terrorist organizations from engaging in recruitment, supplying arms, or fund raising.

(e) To exert maximum efforts to identify and determine the sources of financing for these groups and to cooperate in cutting them off, and by providing training, equipment and other forms of support to those taking steps against groups using violence and terror to undermine peace, security or stability.

(f) To form a working group, open to all summit participants, to prepare recommendations on how best to implement the decisions contained in this statement, through ongoing work, and to report to the participants within thirty days.

♦ ♦ ♦

SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE SAUD AL-FAISAL, STATEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE OF PEACEMAKERS SHARM EL-SHEIKH, 13 MARCH 1996

I would like to convey to you, at the outset, the greetings and best wishes of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, who has honored me to represent him in this important meeting, which is concerned with a subject that has captured most of our attention and thoughts, and is a major source for our preoccupation at this critical and sensitive junction of the history of our region.

The importance of our meeting today lies in the fact that it expresses, in a profound way, our collective commitment to peace, and our full determination to eliminate all impediments and obstacles that may hinder its path. The justifications for our meeting today are present in every episode of the cycle of violence that has befallen this region in the past. As we all did during the massacre of the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, where we unanimously condemned all forms of violence and terror, we equally condemn today, unanimously, the violent acts that took place in Tel Aviv and the Occupied Territories. All these acts are directed at innocent civilians, and require us to strongly condemn them no matter who the perpetrators or what their justifications.

The participants here today, through this important conference, not only wish to deal with the issue of violence in the Middle East, but strive to uproot violence and energize the peace process with a view to speedily realizing its noble goals. These goals are aimed at realizing a just, comprehensive and durable peace in the region based on the Security Council Resolutions relevant to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the principle of land for peace, and will lead to the closing of the curtain on the acts of war and crises and conflicts that have plagued the region for decades, and will usher a new era of prosperity, progress and tranquillity.

We are totally convinced that while the question of confronting violence and terror requires firmness and serious action to uproot, it equally and simultaneously requires due attention to avoid measures that could inflict punishment not only on the perpetrators of these despicable acts but also on the innocent civilians who are victims of these crimes. Collective punishment, closure and any type of violence against innocent people will in turn generate more violence.

Four years have passed since the launching of the peace process at the Madrid Conference. During this period many concrete steps have been taken and many gains attained. We would like to express
our appreciation and gratitude to the co-sponsors of the peace conference. We also note, with great satisfaction, the efforts exerted by President Bill Clinton and his Administration to enhance the peace process. We would also like to register our appreciation to the international community for the material and financial support it has provided to promote the peace process. We hope that our meeting today will achieve tangible results that will energize the peace process and create the right and necessary environment for expediting the Syrian and Lebanese tracks of the bilateral negotiations and lead to the successful conclusion of the final status negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel, that encompass the most delicate and sensitive issues of the Palestinian problem.

We are confident that achieving these results will constitute a determined response to all the enemies of peace in the Middle East, whichever side they belong to, since they use violence to hinder this noble process. The true assurance of ending the cycle of violence and the tragedy of terrorism lies indeed in giving the peace process a strong impetus to resume its path based on international legality and the principles established by the Madrid Conference.

To this end, we call upon the co-sponsors of the peace process to reconvene the Conference of Madrid in a resumed session to evaluate the achievements of the peace process, and to take all necessary measures to insure the realization of a just, comprehensive and durable peace in the region.

May God guide us all to the realization of our noble goals.

* * *

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL, REVISION OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COVENANT, 21ST SESSION, GAZA, 24 APRIL 1996

The Palestinian National Council, at its 21st session held in the city of Gaza, Emanating from the Declaration of Independence and the political statement adopted at its 19th session held in Algiers on November I, 1988, which affirmed the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means and accepted the two-states solution;

* And based on the introduction of the Declaration of Principles signed in Washington DC September 19, 1993, which included the agreement of both sides to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political right;

* And reaffirming their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process;

And based on international legitimacy represented by the United Nation’s resolutions relevant to the Palestinian question, including those relating to Jerusalem, Refugees and Settlements, and the other issues of the permanent status and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338;

* And affirming the adherence of the Palestine Liberation Organization to its commitments deriving from the DOP (Oslo:), the provisional Cairo agreement, the letter of mutual recognition signed on September 9 and 19, 1993, the Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo 2), signed in Washington DC on September 28, 1995, and reconfirm the resolution of the Central Council of the PLO adopted in October 1993, which approved the Oslo agreement and all its annexes;

* And based on the principles which constituted the foundation of the Madrid Peace Conference and the Washington negotiations; decides

1. The Palestinian National Charter is hereby amended by canceling the articles that are contrary to the letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel, September 9-10,1993.

2. Assigns its legal committee with the task of redrafting the Palestinian National Charter in order to present it to the first session of the Palestinian Central Council.

* * *
WHITE HOUSE, STATEMENT CONCERNING THE AMENDMENT OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER, WASHINGTON, DC, 24 APRIL 1996

President Clinton warmly welcomes the Palestine National Council's vote to revoke the sections of the Palestinian Covenant that called for the destruction of the State of Israel. By an overwhelming majority, the Palestine National Council has honored an important commitment made in the Interim Agreement signed here in September 1995. It is a major step forward on the road to a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The President applauds this action as a decisive statement, at this difficult moment, that those who champion peace will not be deterred by the murderous acts of those desperate to prevent the people of the Middle East from building a better future.

UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, JOINT STATEMENT ON US-ISRAELI RELATIONS, 30 APRIL 1996

President Clinton and Prime Minister Peres have concluded two days of intensive discussions on a broad range of issues relating to the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Those discussions reflect the deep, long-standing and unique bonds of friendship which have characterized the U.S.-Israeli relationship and the legacy of shared values, common interests, and mutual respect for democracy that have made this close and special relationship endure.

The President and Prime Minister reviewed the extent of the U.S.-Israeli relationship in all its dimensions. They agreed that this cooperation in security, economic, and diplomatic areas is grounded in institutions that are functioning extremely effectively to the benefit of both countries. At the same time, they agreed that, in view of continuing threats to regional peace and stability, and in particular the dangers posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced military technologies, U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation will grow in importance.

To this end, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that a steering committee headed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs would be established to explore means of enhancing and, where appropriate, formalizing, that cooperation. Two working groups will report to the steering committee. The first, dealing with security and defense matters, will consider all options including the possibility of more formal security accords, for how best to meet common threats in the years to come. It will also identify ways to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. aid to Israel. The second will deal with other policy matters relating to U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation.

The two leaders affirmed that the strategic partnership between the two countries will continue to be based on two key principles: first, the United States unshakable commitment to Israel's security and its determination to minimize the risks and costs Israel confronts as it pursues peace; and second, the U.S.-Israeli mutual commitment to a comprehensive peace and their determination to move toward that goal.

With respect to Israel's security, the President specifically reaffirmed the United States commitment to maintain Israel's qualitative edge and to preserve and to strengthen Israel's capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any adversary or likely combination of adversaries.

The President and Prime Minister took great pride in signing the U.S.-Israel Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Accord. This agreement sets out practical measures enabling their two countries to make the best possible use of expertise, resources, and capabilities in the war against terror. A Joint Counter-Terrorism Group has been established to monitor and oversee the implementation of the agreement. Israel and the United States also agreed to seek to coordinate their efforts with the international effort against terror launched at Sharm al-Sheikh on March 13, 1996.

The President and the Prime Minister also took note of the joint statement on theater missile defense cooperation signed by the Prime Minister and Secretary of Defense Perry April 28. The United States and Israel recognize the defense of Israel will be made more effective by undertaking necessary steps
to ensure that Israel's theater missile defenses are supported by related United States capabilities. The two leaders expressed satisfaction with the positive results to date of the ongoing bilateral dialogue on issues relating to the transfer of equipment and technology to third countries.

With respect to their determination to achieve a comprehensive peace, the two leaders agreed on the importance of implementation of agreements reached and the need to expand the orbit of Arab-Israeli peacemaking with a view toward achieving normal, peaceful relations between Israel and all its Arab neighbors. They welcomed the decision by the Palestinian National Council to cancel all the provisions of the Palestinian National Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist or are otherwise inconsistent with the September 1993 exchange of letters between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat. This action is an important demonstration by the Palestinians of their commitment to honor the terms of the 1993 Oslo Accords.

The President and Prime Minister also expressed satisfaction with the improved understanding reached last week on Southern Lebanon as a result of Secretary of State Christopher's negotiating efforts and after discussions with the governments of Israel and Lebanon and in consultation with Syria. They noted the importance of prompt activation of the monitoring committee and consultative group established by the understanding.

Finally, The President and the Prime Minister agreed on the need to end the Arab boycott and to eliminate discrimination against Israel in all international organizations, including the United Nations.

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PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PRESIDENT YASSER ARAFAT,
LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER SHIMON PERES ON THE AMENDMENT
OF THE PALESTINIAN COVENANT, GAZA, 4 MAY 1996

Dear Mr. Peres,

I convey my best wishes to your Excellency, and I would like to convey to you the recent historic resolution adopted by the Palestinian National Council at its 21st session held in Gaza city.

As part of our commitment to the peace process, and in adhering to the mutual recognition between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Government of Israel, the PNC was held in Gaza city between 22-25 of April 1996, and in an extraordinary session decided that the Palestine National Charter is hereby amended by cancelling the provisions that are contrary to the letters exchanged between the PLO and the government of Israel on 9/10 Sept. 1993.

Please find enclosed copies of the official Arabic and English texts of the PNC's resolutions.

We remain committed to the peace process.

Yasser Arafat
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO
President of the Palestinian National Authority

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PLO AND ISRAEL NEGOTIATION DELEGATIONS, JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, FIRST SESSION OF THE PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS, TABA, 6 MAY 1996

Delegations of Israel and the PLO met in Taba, Egypt on May 5-6, 1996 for the first session of the permanent status negotiations.

The two sides conveyed their gratitude to President Mubarak and the Egyptian Government for their hospitality in hosting the first session of the permanent status negotiations.
The two sides reaffirmed their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, and their desire to achieve a just, durable and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.

The two sides reiterated their recognition of their mutual legitimate and political rights, and their adherence to the mutual recognition and commitments in the letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel on September 9th and 10th 1993.

The two sides agreed that their negotiations on permanent status would be based on the Declaration of Principles of 1993 and the Interim Agreement of 1995.

The two sides reaffirmed their understanding that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in accordance with the Declaration of Principles.

The two sides reiterated their commitment to pursue their aim of achieving a permanent, just, comprehensive peace settlement and to continue to combat terror in order to pave the way for a Palestinian-Israeli future devoid of terror and violence, a future of peace, security and stability.

The two sides further agreed to form a steering negotiation group comprised of 4-5 persons from each side that would develop the concept of the permanent status agreement, define the framework and modalities of the negotiations, and then establish working groups as required.

The steering negotiation group will meet periodically, both formally and informally, at such times and places as agreed by the two sides with the aim of advancing the negotiations in the most effective manner.

Israel and the PLO agreed that the negotiations on permanent status between them will be conducted on the basis of Article V of the Declaration of Principles, which reads as follows:

**Article V**

TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.

It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Both sides agreed to expedite their common work in the People to People program, as initiated by the Government of Norway.

Both sides decided to expedite the work of their various committees in order to ensure in coordination the full implementation of the Interim Agreement.
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMMITTEES AND DELEGATIONS, EUROPEAN POSITIONS AND INITIATIVES CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST PROCESS SINCE OCTOBER 1995, 7 MAY 1996 [EXCERPTS]

[The following note was drawn up by the Directorate-General for Research for the Delegations for Relations with the Mashreq Countries and the Gulf States, with the Maghreb Countries and the Arab Maghreb Union, with Israel, Ad Hoc Delegation for Relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization; Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy]

[...]

4. Recommendation from the European Parliament to the Council on the election of the Council and President of the Palestinian Authority and the role of the European Union, adopted on 15 December 1995. Parliament recommends that the Council should increase the Union’s commitment to the peace process in order to secure an agreement between the Palestinian Authorities and the Israeli Government, prepare without delay the legal, economic and trade facilities to encourage the economic development of the Palestinian territories, by beginning exploratory negotiations on the conclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean association agreement with the Palestinian authorities, and stepping up its mediation activities in respect of all the countries in the region in order to advance the peace process and help create a climate of greater security and trust in which the elections may take place. It also recommends ensuring that Parliament’s delegation is closely involved in the work of the European Union Electoral Unit.

5. Resolution on the terrorist attacks and the peace process in the Middle East, adopted on 14 March 1996. Stressing the need for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, the only means of bringing about the security and economic development for which all the populations concerned are hoping, Parliament strongly condemns the recent terrorist attacks in Israel, the leaders of followers to commit acts of violence and destroy the peace process. It regrets that the Syrian Government has refused to condemn these acts of terrorism and ascribed them to what it terms ‘acts of resistance’. Parliament also condemns the Iranian Government for its political and practical support for the terrorists, noting that the critical dialogue with Iran has not produced any concrete results to date. It welcomes, however, Jordan’s tough stance towards the terrorists, and appreciates the efforts made by the Palestinian Authority to uphold the law and arrest those responsible for these crimes. Finally, Parliament stresses its belief that there is no viable alternative to the peace process initiated at the Madrid Conference (1991) for ensuring long-term peace and stability in the region. (…)

- Calls on the European Investment Bank to speed up the commitment, at the earliest opportunity, of ECU 250 million in the form of appropriations for projects to develop the Territories covered by the peace agreements;
- Confirms that there will be observation of the elections to the Palestinian Council and that the international operation for observing these elections will be coordinated. To that end, the Council and the Commission have set up the European Electoral Unit which is already fully operational, since all its members have already been appointed and an ECU 10 million budget has been assigned to it;
- Agrees to prepare an international ministerial conference on economic assistance to the Palestinian people. The aim of the conference will be to consider economic and trade requirements, technical assistance and ways of promoting economic and social development in the territories covered by the peace agreements. The conference will take place after agreement on revision of the tripartite action plan and on a new development strategy;
- To that end, invites the Commission to submit specific proposals relating to cooperation and trade’.

[...]

3. On the same date, 2 October 1995, the Council adopted negotiating directives (on a recommendation from the Commission) for a Euro-Mediterranean association agreement with Lebanon. The Council envisages that the new agreement, concluded for an indefinite period, should replace the 1978 cooperation accord and govern all economic and trade relations. It should include measures on financial, social and cultural co-operation, and political dialogue and institutional matters. The Council also asked for the text to include a clause on respect for democratic principles and human rights.
4. On 22 December 1995 the Council adopted conclusions on future EU economic aid to the West Bank and Gaza. The Council agrees with the strategy proposed by the Commission in its communication COM(95)505 which it says should serve as the foundation for the community’s position at the Paris ministerial conference on the Middle East peace process in January 1996.

5. From 25 to 29 October 1995, following the signing on 28 September 1995 of the agreement extending autonomy to the whole of the West Bank, the EU troika (Mr. Solana, Mrs. Sudre, Mrs. Agnelli and Mr. Marin, Vice-President of the Commission) visited Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Gaza, Syria and Jordan, where it also attended the opening of the Amman economic summit (see point IV.1). The visit made it possible for the Union to confirm its support for the peace process in the region. […]

11. On 18 April 1996, following the Israeli shelling of southern Lebanon the Commission issued the following statement: ‘The European Commission has learnt with horror the news of the attack on the city of Qana which struck the headquarters of the United Nations peacekeeping troops (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon. It deplores the high number of civilian deaths. The Commission recalls the European Union’s statement of 15 April regarding the situation in the Middle East and once again urges all parties to show the greatest moderation and to cease their military activities, in the belief that violence can only serve the enemies of peace’.

12. The Commission decided to grant initial humanitarian aid to the displaced people in southern Lebanon. A sum of ECU 600 000 would be allocated; this exceptional operation would last for one or two months, but the Commission was prepared if necessary to grant further funds for the civilian victims of the crisis.

13. The Committee of the Regions on 15 November 1995 adopted its opinion on the Commission communication to the Council and Parliament on strengthening EU Mediterranean policy. It largely agrees with the commission analysis and supports the objective of achieving a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010.

(MEMO)

• Observation of the Palestinian elections (in January 1996) and aid for the Palestinian territories.

The European Union was invited to participate in the coordination of the future Palestinian elections and to provide observers at the meeting of 23 May 1995 between the Commission Vice-President Mr. Manuel Marin, the Palestinian authority responsible for electoral matters and an adviser from the Israel foreign ministry. The proposal was adopted by the Council on 1 June 1995. The Union committed half of a budget of ECU 7 m to train local administrations, set up polling offices and provide legal assistance for negotiators. The Council made provision for assistance of up to ECU 10 m from the European Community’s general budget for the preparation and observation of the Palestinian elections.

The General Affairs Council of 17 July 1995 considered a draft decision on implementing joint action for observation by the European Union of the Palestinian elections. Mr. Carl Lidbo, a former Swedish Minister of Justice and Trade, was appointed chairman of the European Union electoral unit.

• For the period 1994-1998 the Council proposed a sum of ECU 500 m from the Community budget to be paid to the ‘Occupied’ territories as direct aid. ECU 50 m would be paid each year in the form of non-refundable grants. The European Investment Bank intends to grant ECU 250 m in the form of long-term loans over the same period.

• In 1995 Commission aid concentrated on:

The Middle East conflict. They have confounded opponents of the Middle East Peace Process who seek to undermine it through violence and terror.

The European Union is proud to have had a leading role in the international observation of the Palestinian elections. It thanks the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel for the
trust and confidence they put in the European Union for the observation of the elections and the coordination of the international observation operation. The EU pays tribute to all those who have participated in the observation operation for their dedication and professionalism, with the Union would have been unable to fulfil its responsibilities as coordinator.

The European Union now urges the Palestinian people to build on these elections to establish their democratic institutions and strengthen the rule of law and the respect of human rights. They can be sure of the Union’s full support in this endeavour. For its part, the European Union reaffirms its unre- served political and economic commitment to the Middle East Process, the establishment of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the region and the well-being of the Palestinian people. It stands ready to assist further in whatever capacity the parties to the Process consider appropriate.'

- 26 February 1996:

'The EU expresses its revulsion at the criminal and cowardly attacks perpetrated on 25 February in Jerusalem and Ashqelon. It condemns in the strongest terms these acts of terrorism. It sends its sincere condolences to the families of the victims and to the government and people of Israel and expresses its hopes for the recovery of the wounded. Decisive action is required by everybody who is in a position to control or combat the terrorist elements opposed to the peace process. The EU acknowledges the efforts which the Palestinian authorities and President Arafat have already made to combat terrorism, but urges on them the need to make them more effective and to step up their action in this regard in line with the Oslo Agreements. At this sad moment, the EU reaffirms its conviction and hope that those in favour of the Peace Process will continue to take it forward. Otherwise, they will play into the hands of the criminals who have committed these and previous attacks and those who oppose the Peace Process. The EU pays particular tribute to those courageous leaders who have chosen the way of dialogue and peace and are upholding it ad reaffirms its full support for them.

- 3 March 1996:

The European Union has learned with shock, consternation and profound dismay the news of the new terrorist attack perpetrated this morning in Jerusalem. Once more, innocent lives have been mown down by the blind and criminal violence of a cowardly attack which the EU condemns in the strongest terms. While sending the most heartfelt condolences to the families of the victims and to the government and people of Israel, the EU appeals to everybody to give no quarter to the criminal network of those terrorist groups which are trying to hinder the Peace Process by bloody acts which offend the conscience of mankind. In this regard, the EU, while acknowledging the efforts made by the Palestinian Authority.

(a) to support the Israeli-Palestinian agreements, the pursuit of the negotiation process and its political and economic reinforcement, in order to improve the security of both sides, with special attention to the pressing economic needs of Palestinians;
(b) to support the pursuit of the negotiation process in order to obtain a global agreement;
(c) to promote the coordination of bilateral, regional and international efforts to put a stop to acts of terror, to ensure that the instigators of such acts are brought to justice, to support efforts by all parties to prevent their territory from being used for terrorist purposes and to prevent terrorist organizations from organizing recruitment, arms deliveries or obtaining funds;
(d) to make a maximum effort to identify and determine the sources of financing of these groups, to cooperate to stop them and to provide training, equipment and other forms of support to those acting against groups using violence and terror to undermine peace, security and stability;
(e) to set up a working group open to all summit participants to prepare recommendations on the best way of applying the decisions outlined in this statement and to report to the participants within 30 days.'

✦ ✦ ✦
Pursuant to Article VII of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995, the two sides agree to the establishment of a Temporary International Presence in the city of Hebron ("TIPH"). This agreement will remain in force until such time as Israeli forces redeploy from Hebron, whereupon it will be superseded by a new agreement to be negotiated by the two sides and the TIPH established by this Agreement will be replaced by a new TIPH to be established under the new agreement ("the new TIPH").

A Temporary International presence will be established in the city of Hebron. As detailed in paragraph 4 below, the TIPH will, in anticipation of the Israeli redeployment in Hebron, act as an advance party for the new TIPH, assist in promoting stability and in monitoring and reporting the efforts to maintain normal life in the city of Hebron, thus creating a feeling of security among Palestinians in the city of Hebron. The organizational structure, operational guidelines, logistics, support and privileges and immunities of the TIPH shall be in accordance with the Modalities on the establishment of the TIPH established by Norway with the agreement of the two sides.

The two sides shall request Norway to provide 50-60 persons, citizens of Norway, as TIPH personnel, consisting of field observers, office staff and support personnel, as agreed between the two sides. Consistent with its stated task, the TIPH personnel shall have no military or police functions.

The tasks of the TIPH personnel will be:

- to begin preparations for the establishment of the new TIPH;
- to contribute by their presence to a feeling of security to the Palestinians of Hebron;
- to help promote stability and an appropriate environment conducive to the enhancement of the well-being of the Palestinians in Hebron and their economic development; and
- to provide reports as set out in paragraph 6 below.

In order to facilitate the carrying out of the TIPH tasks, a building will be chosen in the city of Hebron as a seat for the TIPH.

The TIPH will report to the following:

- On specific events - to a Joint Hebron Committee ("JHC"), comprised of two representatives from each side. The senior Palestinian representative will be the Mayor of Hebron and the senior Israeli representative will be he head of the Civil Administration in the city of Hebron. A representative of the TIPH will be invited on a bi-weekly basis to participate in the JHC meeting in order to report on the TIPH activities.
- Periodically - to the Monitoring and Steering Committee established pursuant to the Interim agreement.

The members of the TIPH shall wear distinctive uniforms with a special emblem, as agreed by the two sides, and their vehicles shall be marked with the same emblem. TIPH members may carry pistols for self-defense purposes.

The TIPH will enjoy freedom of movement for the performance of its tasks within the city of Hebron. Such freedom of movement shall not be restricted, except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure.

The TIPH and its members shall, in conformity with the Modalities referred to in paragraph 2, be accorded such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of their tasks, and for the
independent exercise of their functions, including immunity of the TIPH premises. The presence and activities of the personnel assigned by Norway to the TIPH will be in accordance with Israel's responsibility for security in Hebron consistent with the DOP and dates of its implementation.

The expenses of the TIPH will be borne by Norway.

The TIPH may commence its operation immediately after the signing of this Agreement and continue to function for a period of three months or until such earlier date on which this agreement is superseded by a new agreement pursuant to paragraph 1 above. With the consent of the two sides, the TIPH may extend the period or change the scope of its operation, as agreed.

Signed:  
Mr. Joel Singer    Dr. Saeb Erakat

GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL, COMMUNIQUÉ BY THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, 59TH SESSION, RIYADH, 1-2 JUNE 1996 [EXCERPTS]

The Council discussed recent development in the peace process in the Middle East in light of the fixed principles embodied in the positions it had adopted in support of the achievement of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace based on the terms of reference of the Madrid Peace Conference, particularly Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and the principle of land for peace, a peace that will ensure an end to Israeli occupation of all Arab territory and enable the Palestinian people to assert its legitimate rights, including the right to exercise self-determination and establish an independent State on its native soil.

The Council reiterated its firm stand in support of the Syrian position calling for full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan to the 4 June 1967 boundary line.

Reiterating its strong condemnation of Israeli aggression against Lebanon and reaffirming its full support for and solidarity with the Lebanese people, the Council also affirms the need for adherence to the understanding reached on 27 April 1996 as a preliminary step towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 452 (1978). It urges the Security Council to compel Israel to pay the compensation required for the repair of facilities and infrastructure destroyed by Israeli attacks and for the human casualties incurred.

In the light of the outcome of the Israeli elections, the Council stressed the need to require the incoming Israeli Government to remain fully and meticulously committed to the implementation of all the agreements reached as part of the peace process in the Middle East, as a strategic option from which there can be no retreat.

In the context, the Council urges the co-sponsors of the Madrid Peace Conference, and particularly the United States of America, to make the greatest efforts to ensure that the peace process continues, that the Palestinian-Israeli agreement are implemented fully and speedily and that serious progress is made towards bringing the final-phase negotiations on such important and basic issues as Jerusalem, the settlements, the refugees and the final status of the occupied Palestinian territories to a positive outcome. There must also be a speedy resumption of the bilateral negotiations on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks so as to ensure the achievement to tangible progress that will promote the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East.
At the kind invitation extended by His Excellency President Hafez Al-Assad of the Syrian Arab Republic, to His Excellency President Hosni Mubarak of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and to Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, who delegated His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard, the three leaders held meetings in Damascus on June 7 and 8, 1996.

Out of their faith in the common fate of the Arab Nation, the feelings of mutual responsibility towards that Nation, and the profound role being undertaken by the three countries for the preservation of their vital interests, and on the basis of the fraternal bonds between their states, the three leaders reviewed the Arab situation, bearing in mind the Alexandria Declaration. They reviewed the future of the peace process in the light of the political circumstances of the regional and international arenas and the latest developments in the area, with a spirit of responsibility and a sincere desire to exert the utmost effort and enroll all possible energies to mobilize the Arab Nation, to close its ranks, take care of its interests, and restore its usurped rights.

The three leaders confirmed the determination of their countries to realize comprehensive and just peace as a strategic option; this requires that Israel should also seriously adhere to it, since any retreat from what has been achieved is totally unacceptable. The leaders agreed that any retreat from the principles on which the peace process was established or any withdrawal from the obligations and commitments previously reached, or any delay in their implementation, would put Israel in confrontation with the international community and would also constitute a real threat of a return in the region to the dilemma of tension and violence for which Israel would be fully to blame.

The three leaders stressed that the only way to realize peace requires full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, including the Golan Heights to the lines existing before June 4, 1967, the southern part of Lebanon, and the occupied Palestinian lands, foremost among them Al-Quds [Jerusalem], in compliance with Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 425, and the concept of land-for-peace; and it also requires that the Palestinian people are able to practice their legitimate rights including that of self-determination and the establishment of an independent state on its national soil.

In this context, the three leaders called on the international community, especially the two sponsors of the peace process, to continue to back that peace process, pushing it ahead towards the realization of the stated objectives. They expressed confidence that the Arab Nation, with solidarity and a unified stand, would be able to defend its legitimate rights against any position triggered by the continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab lands or by the settlement policy which is regarded as defiance of the will of the international community.

The three leaders demanded anew that a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear arms, be set up in the Middle East, and they underscored the necessity for Israel to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject its nuclear facilities to international inspection in line with the guarantees provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The three leaders, reviewing the situation in the Arab arena, resolved to go ahead with all efforts to close ranks and re-build Arab solidarity in the framework of firm commitment to the Charter of the League of Arab States, the Arab Charters for maintaining joint national security, and protection of the best interest of the Arab Nation according to international law. In order to realize this goal, the three leaders agreed that an Arab summit conference be convened in Cairo on June 21 to 23, 1996, and that President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt would extend invitations to the Arab leaders.
The three leaders expressed the solidarity of their countries with their sister state of Bahrain in its efforts to realize security and stability in face of disorder, subversive acts and foreign interference. They also expressed the hope that Turkey would adopt a policy that would be in harmony with good neighborliness, mutual interest, and respect for the interests of the Arabs, and in this context, expressed concern over the recent Turkish/Israeli agreement, calling on Turkey to reconsider it.

While looking forward to their next meeting to continue the march of political coordination and cooperation among the three countries, the leaders expressed their thanks to His Excellency President Hafez Al-Assad for his reception and accommodation of the tripartite summit.

GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, GUIDELINES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT, JERUSALEM, 17 JUNE 1996 [EXCERPTS]

[The new coalition consisted of Likud, including the Tsomet and Gesher factions, the National Religious Party, Shas, Agudat Israel and Degel Hatorah, Yisrael Baaliyah, and the Third Way.]

The Government presented to the Knesset will act on the premise that the right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal and indisputable, that the State of Israel is the State of the Jewish people, whose democratic government guarantees equality for all its citizens, and whose main goal is the ingathering and integration of the Jewish people.

The striving for national unity, social justice, and personal liberty, and the search for genuine peace with all of our neighbors while safeguarding national and personal security, shall serve as the basis for the Government's policies.

The Government will work to achieve the following goals:

1. Achieving peace with all our neighbors, while safeguarding national and personal security.
2. Reinforcing the status of Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the Jewish people.
3. Increasing immigration to Israel, and integrating new immigrants in all walks of life.
4. Creating conditions for a free, thriving economy and social welfare.
5. Strengthening, broadening and developing settlement in Israel.
6. Promoting values of the State of Israel as a Jewish, democratic state, while maintaining a proper balance between the will of the majority and the rights of individual and minorities.
7. Broadening education and strengthening the bond to Jewish heritage and the realization of Zionism.

I. PEACE, SECURITY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

1. The Government of Israel will work to broaden the circle of peace with all of its neighbors, for the good of Israel's citizens and the region's inhabitants, while safeguarding Israel's vital interests.
2. The Government will reinforce and develop its peaceful relations with Egypt and Jordan.
3. The Government of Israel will conduct negotiations with Syria without pre-conditions.
4. The Government will work to raise the level of relations with other Arab countries which have connections with Israel: Qatar, Oman, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, and will work towards mutual recognition and cooperation with Arab countries with which Israel does not have diplomatic relations.
5. The Government of Israel will use all means at its disposal to bring home the prisoners of war and missing in action and all those who worked for the security of the state, and will insist on this point during negotiations with all relevant parties.
6. The Government will negotiate with the Palestinian Authority, with the intent of reaching a permanent arrangement, on the condition that the Palestinians fulfill all their commitments fully.
7. The Government of Israel will propose to the Palestinians an arrangement whereby they will be able to conduct their lives freely within the framework of self-government. The Government will oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state or any foreign sovereignty west of the Jordan River.
and will oppose "the right of return" of Arab populations to any part of the Land of Israel west of the Jordan River.

8. In any political arrangement, Israel shall insist on ensuring the existence and security of Jewish settlements and their affinity with the State of Israel. The Government of Israel will continue to bear full responsibility for the Jewish settlements and their residents.

9. The Government views the Golan Heights as essential to the security of the state and its water resources. Retaining Israeli sovereignty over the Golan will be the basis for an arrangement with Syria.

10. The State of Israel will keep strengthening the Israel Defense Forces and other security forces to deter potential enemies, prevent war and defend the state and its citizens.

11. The Government will exercise its right to use the IDF and security forces to act against the threat of terrorism everywhere, to ensure the well being of the country's residents and the Jewish people.

12. The Government will act to remove the threat to the northern border and will ensure economic development to residents in the north.

13. The Government's privatization policy will take into account the essential nature of the defense industries to the country's security.

14. The Government will promote Israel's foreign relations to enhance its security and peace, and to further the goal of economic and cultural growth.

15. The Government will nurture its special, close relationship with the United States, on the basis of the commitment of both to the values of liberty, justice, democracy, and the commonality of their interests.

16. The Government will act to strengthen relations with Russia and other CIS states, bearing in mind Russia's status in the international community and the interests shared by Israel and these countries.

17. The Government of Israel will continue efforts to have Israel added as an associate member of the European Union, and will act to strengthen its ties with Europe.

18. The Government will strengthen its relations in all spheres with countries in East Asia, especially economic ties with the fast-developing market in the region.

19. The Government will strive to develop relations with all countries desiring peace and will increase Israel's involvement in international organizations.

20. The Government will initiate and cooperate in international efforts against terrorist organizations and those countries which shelter and aid such organizations.

21. The Government will act with determination against any manifestation of anti-Semitism throughout the world, and will work to enhance the ties and mutual responsibility between Israel and Jewish communities in the Diaspora.

II. JERUSALEM

1. Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, is one city, whole and undivided, and will remain forever under Israel's sovereignty.

2. Freedom of worship and access to the holy places will be guaranteed to members of all faiths.

3. The Government will thwart any attempt to undermine the unity of Jerusalem, and will prevent any action which is counter to Israel's exclusive sovereignty over the city.

4. The Government of Israel, through its ministries and through the Jerusalem Municipality, will allocate special resources to speed up building, improve municipal services for Jewish, Arab and other residents, and to reinforce the social and economic status of the Jerusalem metropolitan area.

[...]
4. The Government will uncompromisingly combat all attempts to impair the rights of all residents to exercise their full civil and economic rights, without forced mediation by - or dependence on - any union, movement, organization or party.

[...]
Mr. Speaker, Members of Knesset,

Clearly, we must first reinforce the primary circle of peace. The Government of Israel will act to
strengthen its ties with Egypt and Jordan. In my discussions with President Mubarak of Egypt and
King Hussein of Jordan, we expressed our mutual desire to work together to deepen, broaden and
strengthen the cooperation and mutual ties between our countries.

We will work to raise the level of relations with other Arab States which have ties with Israel: Qatar,
Oman, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania.

Mr. Speaker,

Broadening the circle of peace with all our neighbours, while safeguarding the vital interests of
our country is a foremost goal of the Government. From this podium I address the leaders of all Arab
countries with a call for peace. I call especially on our immediate neighbours, Syrian President Hafez
al-Assad, Lebanese President Elias Hrawi, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and all other Arab leaders.

Come, let us conduct direct negotiations for peace, negotiations without pre-conditions which will ad-
vance the Middle East to an era of stability and prosperity. This is the key: no pre-conditions. Each side
will be able to present its views and position without requiring that the other side agree to these positions
in advance.

We will not dictate our views to you and you will not dictate your views to us. We will sit and negotiate
seriously, prudently and responsibly to reach an agreement... We will encourage this spirit. We will en-
courage pioneering settlement in the Land of Israel: in the Negev, the Galilee, Judea and Samaria, and
the Golan. The settlers are the real pioneers of our day, and they deserve support and appreciation.

But above all, we will guard and strengthen Jerusalem, the eternal capital of the Jewish people, undi-
vided under the sovereignty of the State of Israel.

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS,
FLORENCE, 22 JUNE 1996

1. The European Council strongly reaffirms that peace in the Middle East region is a fundamental interest
of the European Union. The peace process is the only path to security and peace for Israel, the Pales-
tinians and the neighbouring States. The European Union remains dedicated to supporting it. Along-
side the co-sponsors, the European Union's aim is that Israel and its neighbours may live within secure,
recognized and guaranteed borders and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians shall be respected.

2. The European Union encourages all parties likewise to re-engage themselves in the peace proc-
есс, to respect and implement fully all the agreements already reached and to resume negotiations
as soon as possible on the basis of the principles already accepted by all parties under the Madrid
and Oslo frameworks. These cover all the issues on which the parties have agreed to negotiate,
including Jerusalem, noting its importance for the parties and the international community, not
least the need to respect the established rights of religious institutions.

3. The European Union recalls the essential principles on which successful conclusion of the nego-
tiations should be based. They have been enshrined in United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978). The key principles - self-determination for the Pal-
estinians, with all that it implies, and land for peace - are essential to the achievement of a just,
comprehensive and durable peace.

4. On this basis the European Union will continue to support the early resumption of the final status
negotiations which opened on 5 May and the negotiations between Israel and Syria, as well as the
opening of negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, fully respecting the territorial integrity, in-
dependence and sovereignty of Lebanon. The European Union remains committed to supporting the cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon.

5. The European Union considers important the commitments the parties have made regarding security. It welcomes the cooperation which the Palestinian Authority has extended to Israel in this field. It condemns all acts of terrorism and will continue to support the parties in their fight against it, its perpetrators and its political, economic and social causes.

6. The European Union recognizes the serious effects which the recent border closures are having on the Palestinian economy. It acknowledges the recent partial easing of the closure. While recognizing Israel’s security needs, it encourages Israel to lift completely the remaining restrictions.

7. The European Union appeals to all parties in the region to avoid and prevent actions which would prejudice the successful resumption of negotiations and thereby impede the course of the peace process.

8. The European Union pays tribute to the leaders in the region who have chosen the path of peace. It will continue to do everything possible to ensure that the work already begun is pursued and brought to its conclusion.

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FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ, ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE, CAIRO, 23 JUNE 1996

[EXCERPTS]

(The summit in Cairo, sponsored by Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, was the first since the Gulf Crisis. Syria demanded to end the normalization process with Israel as long as it does not conform to the “land for peace” formula. Although Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and Tunisia, opposed this, the final statement was strong. The following is the section that relates to the peace talks.)

In response to the invitation by President Hosni Mubarak of the Arab Republic of Egypt, their majesties, highnesses and excellencies the kings, presidents, and emirs of Arab states held a summit conference in Cairo on June 21 to 23, 1996. Expressing appreciation of the inaugural speech delivered by President Mubarak as chairman of the conference, the Arab leaders decided to consider this speech an official document of the summit. In response to the hope and aspirations of the Arab world, in the belief of the single destiny of Arab states, in line with fraternal Arab ties, and in light of the current critical phase in the Middle East peace process, the Arab leaders met to study the situation emerging in the region, to activate joint Arab work, to intensify Arab consultation, coordination, and cooperation, and to boost the effectiveness of closing Arab ranks and building Arab solidarity as a means towards realization of the principles and goals of united Arab operations, the utilization of the Arab world's potentialities to protect its interests and restore its rights and bolster efforts aiming at achieving a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

1. Out of their national responsibility, and since the Palestinian issue is the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab leaders affirm that the achievement of a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East requires that Israel withdraw fully from all occupied Arab lands including Arab Jerusalem, and that the Palestinian people be allowed to practice their rights of self-determination and to establish an independent state with Arab Jerusalem as its capital.

2. The Arab leaders also call for full Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 lines, and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon to internationally-recognized borders in line with UN Security Council resolutions 242, 338, and 425, and the land-for-peace principle. On this basis, the Arab leaders call for resumption of negotiations on all tracks.

3. The commitment of the Arab countries to resuming the peace process in order to realize a just and comprehensive peace is a strategic goal that can be achieved within international legitimacy and requires a reciprocal serious commitment by Israel, the return of occupied territories, and a guarantee of parallel and equal security for all countries in the region, in line with the principles agreed upon at the Madrid Conference, notably the land-for-peace principle.
4. The communiqué states that the Arabs would have to react in kind if Israel did not follow through on the land-for-peace principle agreed to by both sides as the basis for negotiations begun five years ago in Spain, and that if the Israeli government withdrew from past agreements or delayed implementation of them, this would lead to a relapse of the process with all the dangers of taking the region back to the whirlpool of tension, a situation that would be the sole responsibility of the Israeli government.

5. The Arab leaders confirm their commitment to the resolutions of international legitimacy which make it imperative not to recognize or accept any position based on Israeli settlement activities on occupied Arab lands, because such illegal positions would neither grant a right nor create a commitment. The Arab leaders consider the building of settlements and populating them with Jewish settlers a violation of the Geneva conventions and the Madrid framework, and an obstacle hindering the peace process, and therefore demand a halt to all Israeli settlement activities in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights and the Palestinian territories, especially Jerusalem, and the removal of all such settlements. They affirm their rejection of an alteration of the demographic features and legal position of Arab Jerusalem, and emphasize that realization of a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East can only be attained by resolving the issue of Jerusalem and the problem of the Palestinian refugees on the basis of their right to return, of international legitimacy, and the relevant UN resolutions.

6. In view of this, and to achieve the success of the peace process on the Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian tracks, the Arab leaders call on the two sponsors of the peace process, together with the European Union, the Non-Aligned Movement, other concerned states, the United Nations, and all international organizations to guarantee that Israel will not violate the bases of the peace process or negate its pledges concerning the interim state or the issues to be discussed at the final phase of negotiations. Stressing that the Palestinian question is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, they pledge the necessary political and economic support for the Palestinian people and their national authority, and reiterate the necessity for ending the Israeli siege of the Palestinian people.

7. The Arab leaders confirm their support for Lebanon, which faces continued Israeli attacks on its territories, people and sovereignty, calling on the international community to guarantee an immediate and unconditional halt to these hostilities and an end to the occupation as well as making Israel responsible for compensating Lebanon for all the damage it has caused.

8. The Arab leaders call on Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, reiterating their call to free all countries in the region, including Israel, from weapons of mass destruction, foremost among them nuclear weapons, and affirming their determination to prevent an arms race that would add to the tension and waste their resources and energies. They also affirm that achieving a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the real guarantee of security for all countries in the region.

9. In line with their belief in the importance of bolstering Arab comprehensive national security in face of challenges to the sovereignty and unity of Arab countries and their natural resources, and the close connection between Arab national security in its comprehensive concept and the national security of each individual Arab state, the Arab leaders emphasize their intention to build up Arab solidarity as the right way of realizing the goals of joint Arab work based on respect for the essential pillars of the Arab world, foremost among which are the commitment to principles of respecting the sovereignty, independence, and regional security of each country, non-interference in other countries' internal affairs, and resolving bilateral disputes between Arab states by peaceful means, in line with the principles of international law, the charters of the Arab League and of the United Nations, and the agreements concluded within their context.

10. In connection with joint Arab interests, and in view of international economic developments which make it imperative to form larger alliances, the Arab leaders affirm that the ability of the Arab states to enhance their role and boost their contributions on the international arena require realization of Arab development and consolidation of the role of joint Arab economic action and the implementation of their decisions. The Arab leaders have therefore directed the Arab League Economic and Social Council to draw up and execute comprehensive economic and social plans that would enable the Arab world to realize its higher economic goals and deal on equal terms with other partners in the current international economic system. They confirm their concern to consolidate the role of the League of Arab States, and their intention to enhance its role and re-
main committed to its charter and resolutions. They also confirm their commitment to the financial requirements of the Arab League.

11. The Arab leaders express solidarity with the State of Bahrain and full support for the measures taken by the Gulf state to bolster its security and stability, denouncing attempts to interfere in Bahrain’s internal affairs and stressing their support for Bahrain against any threats regardless of who poses them. They further urge Iran to prevent sabotage aimed at Bahrain, in the interest of the security and stability of the region.

12. The Arab leaders confirm the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over the Islands of Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Moussa, and their support for all peaceful measures taken by the UAE to restore this sovereignty, and urge Iran to end its occupation of these three islands and put an end to the de-facto policies by following peaceful means to end the dispute in line with international law, including acceptance of referral of the issue to the International Court of Justice. The Arab leaders assigned the Secretary-General of the Arab League to follow up on this issue and submit a report at the next Arab Summit.

13. The Arab leaders, expressing concern about the military cooperation agreement signed between Turkey and Israel, call on Turkey to reconsider this agreement in order to prevent any negative bearing on the security of the Arab states.

14. The Arab leaders state that Iraq cannot resume its position in the Arab ranks until it halts all aggression against its neighbors, holding the Iraqi regime solely responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people under the UN sanctions, but opposing any action that would partition the nation. The Arab leaders call on the Iraqi government to refrain from hostile policies which provoke neighboring Arab states, and to implement all relevant security Council resolutions, notably the release of all Kuwaiti and other detainees, and acceptance of a compensation mechanism as the right way of lifting the sanctions and providing suitable conditions for Iraq’s return to the Arab ranks. They also welcome the recent agreement between Iraq and the United Nations to carry out Resolution 986 as a positive step towards alleviating the suffering of the Iraqi people.

15. The Arab leaders welcome the signing of a declaration of principles between Yemen and Eritrea to refer their dispute to international arbitration and to resume their peaceful ties in view of their neighborly relations and mutual interests, stating that this would have a positive effect on the stability of international navigation interests in the Red Sea.

16. The Arab leaders, voicing deep concern for the human and financial damages inflicted upon Libya as a result of UN Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883, point to the UN’s failure to respond to efforts exerted by Libya, the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and others in this connection, and support an Arab League proposal to have the two Libyan suspects in the 1988 bombing of a PanAm jet tried in the World Court by Scottish judges under Scottish law, and urge a positive position in this regard to end the unjustified suffering of the Libyan people, calling for lifting the sanctions against Libya. Failure to do this could prompt Arab countries to consider ways to spare the Libyan people more damage.

17. The Arab leaders voice concern over the continued deterioration in the situation in Somalia, and call on the leaders of the Somali factions to shoulder their responsibility to realize national reconciliation, discard their differences and form a national authority representing the Somali people.

18. While denouncing attempts to label legitimate national resistance as terrorism, the Arab leaders condemn all forms of terrorism and sabotage launched in certain countries including some Arab states, and voice their support for the efforts and measures aimed at holding an international conference to deal with the various aspects of the international phenomenon of terrorism while asserting commitment to the firm right of resisting occupation and aggression.

19. The Arab leaders extend condolences to the Yemeni people who have suffered from recent floods and confirm their support to the Yemeni Republic, calling on relevant international organizations to extend all forms of assistance and support to Yemen.
II. REGIONAL SITUATIONS

3. We welcome the enormous achievements attained in the Middle East peace process over the past several years. These include landmark agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, serious negotiations between Israel and Syria, and greater ties between Israel and her Arab neighbors. We also welcome increased economic cooperation in the region and trust that the Arab League will soon terminate its boycott of Israel. We are strongly committed to the full implementation of all agreements reached, and we will continue to provide our full support to those who take risks for peace.

The conclusion, on 28 September 1995, of the interim Israeli-Palestinian agreement on the Gaza Strip and West bank, as provided for in the 1993 Declaration of Principles, was a fundamental step forward in the Middle East Peace Process. We welcome the opening, on 5 May 1996, of the negotiations on permanent status. We look forward to the resumption of these negotiations.

We welcome the election of a Palestinian Council, and of its Executive Authority. We urge the Palestinian authority, under its Head, Mr. Yassir Arafat, to promote the development of democratic institutions, the rule of law, transparency of public administration and respect for human rights.

We welcome all donors' efforts including the meeting in Paris on 9 January of the Conference on Economic Assistance which reaffirmed the international community's support for the Palestinian economy, and urge donors to fulfill pledges made. We recognize the importance of economic growth and prosperity to underpinning peace and note the need for increased regional economic cooperation and development. We welcome steps toward facilitating economic activities in the West Bank and Gaza. We welcome the steps taken by the Government of Israel to ease the closure in the West Bank and Gaza. Recognizing that Israel has legitimate security needs, we look forward to the complete lifting of the closure. We acknowledge the important contribution of multilateral negotiations in all their aspects to the peace process. We also welcome the establishment of economic institutions and facilities which have grown out of the multilateral working groups.

We note the preeminence of the theme of security in Israel's recent election campaign. We are convinced that the security of all people of the region can eventually be achieved only through comprehensive, equitable and lasting peace.

The Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, 13 March 1996, gave all the leaders of the world the opportunity to reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism and their desire to pursue a comprehensive peace, to support regional stability and to fight terrorism, whatever the motive and whoever the perpetrators. We urge the international community to continue to uphold the logic of the "peace-makers". We believe that terrorist threats will also be curbed by the elimination of isolation and poverty, especially in the Palestinian territories, by the progressive restoration of confidence and by the successful outcome of the peace negotiations.

We urge all parties to adhere to the 26 April 1996 Understanding which restored calm along the Lebanese-Israeli border. We call upon the Consultative Group that will be assisting in the reconstruction needs of Lebanon to accelerate its work.
At a time when the Middle East Peace Process requires a renewed impetus, we urge all the parties to fulfill their obligations, including agreements already signed, and to continue their efforts in favour of a comprehensive peace on the basis of the Madrid process, the principle of land for peace and other principles enshrined in the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. […]

FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE DAMASCUS DECLARATION,
JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, 13TH SESSION, MUSCAT, 14 JULY 1996

At the end of their thirteenth session, held in Muscat, Oman on July 13 and 14, the foreign ministers of the Damascus Declaration countries today issued a communiqué emphasizing concern for cooperation within the context of the principles of the communiqué of the Arab Summit held in Cairo on June 21-23, and supporting the strong stance adopted by the Arab leaders at that conference on Arab solidarity, the service of Arab interests, and restoration of lost rights. They also reaffirmed their condemnation of the recent explosion at the Saudi town of Al-Khobar and pledged their full support to the Kingdom in its fight against terrorism, stressing their confidence that Saudi Arabia is capable of dealing with such acts.

The eight Arab foreign ministers reiterated the solid position adopted by their countries concerning the requirements of the Middle East Peace Process and the necessity of commitment to the grounds on which it has been based since the Madrid Conference, including full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 lines, as well as unconditionally from southern Lebanon, and from all occupied Palestinian territories; and a guarantee of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the establishment of an independent state on Palestinian soil.

The Ministers praised the wide-ranging international support for the Arab stance on peace, which has been reflected in statements by the European Summit in Florence, the G-7 Summit in Lyon, and the African Summit in Yaounde, as well as previous statements issued by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. They stressed in this connection that resuming peace negotiations requires commitment to the essential principles of the process, notably UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 425, and the concept of land-for-peace.

The Ministers voiced grave concern over statements made by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyaho during his recent visit to the United States, especially his persistence in fostering Israeli occupation of Arab lands and keeping Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty as capital of the Jewish state, saying that this attempt to impose a fait accompli undermines serious negotiations and represents a violation of the concept of land-for-peace and the solid principle on which the peace process is based, which is realizing balanced security for all countries in the region without exception, not just the security of Israel.

The communiqué stated that Netanyaho’s call for unconditional resumption of peace talks represents an attempt to evade commitment to the basic elements of the peace process, and that when compared with his stance contradicting its essence, his calls for reciprocity are calls for returning the region to an atmosphere of confrontation and tension. The ministers expressed surprise that Netanyaho speaks about democracy and human rights while Israel continues its occupation policies and violations of the rights provided for by the Geneva Convention, and called on all sponsors of the peace process, notably the United States, Russia, the European Union, China, Japan, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations, to guarantee that Israel does not violate these principles.

The ministers reiterated their countries’ support for Syria’s demands for a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East on the basis of international legitimacy, and for Damascus’ position in the face of obstacles from the Jewish state and Israeli lies about Syria which aim at delaying the peace process. They also stressed the necessity of having Israel join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
and open all its nuclear facilities to international inspection as a basic step towards making the Middle East and Gulf regions free of weapons of mass destruction.

They called on Iraq to comply fully with the relevant security council resolutions, release all Kuwaiti and other detainees, return Kuwaiti property, allow a compensation mechanism, comply fully with the efforts of the United Nations inspection team and refrain from any provocative or hostile act that would threaten the security of Kuwait or of any other country, and welcomed the memorandum of understanding between Iraq and the United Nations to implement security council resolution 986 allowing Baghdad to sell U.S. $ 2 billion worth of oil, as a positive step towards alleviating the suffering of the Iraqi people. They also stressed their concern for the unity of Iraq and rejection of any threat to the sovereignty of Iraqi territories.

The ministers reviewed developments of relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran out of their concern for positive neighborly ties with Teheran, stressing the importance of security and stability in the Gulf and the world as a whole. Renewing their solidarity with Bahrain and their full support for all measures taken to bolster her security and stability, they voiced rejection of any interference in her internal affairs and expressed appreciation of Syrian efforts to halt media campaigns between Bahrain and Iran as a first step towards clearing the air between the two countries. Reviewing the efforts of the United Arab Emirates to regain control peacefully and in line with international law, over the islands of Abu Moussa, and Greater and Lesser Tunbs, they referred to the repeated sincere calls on Iran by the UAE, the GCC, the Damascus Declaration countries, the Arab League and most recently the Arab Summit Conference, and expressed support for all peaceful measures to restore UAE’s sovereignty over the three islands.

The ministers stated that their countries look forward to positive developments in the ties between Turkey and Syria, and voiced optimism at new signs in Turkish policies to establish cooperation between Damascus and Ankara, bolstering joint interests between Turkey and the Arab world. They expressed hope that the Turkish government would reconsider the military agreement with Israel to prevent any negative effect on Arab security.

Turning to the phenomenon of international terrorism, the ministers confirmed their condemnation of the terrorist blast in Al-Khobar and their support for all measures taken by Saudi Arabia, and expressed confidence in the Kingdom’s ability to deal with such acts of terror. While deploring attempts to brand legitimate resistance as terrorism, the ministers condemn all acts of terror, sabotage and chaos aimed at undermining the security and stability of any country, and support efforts to hold an international conference to deal with various aspects of this phenomenon, calling for coordination of global efforts to halt acts of violence and terror, to guarantee that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice, and to take measures to prevent terrorist elements from using the lands of any country to obtain finance or weapons or media coverage to instigate acts of violence.

Expressing satisfaction with the agreement of principle between Yemen and Eritrea to refer their dispute to international arbitration, the ministers pointed out the importance of establishing good neighborly ties between the two countries. They voiced concern over the deteriorating situation in Somalia, and called on all Somali factions to reach comprehensive national reconciliation, and to form a unified national authority representing all the people. They also called on Afghan factions to reach a cease fire and implement the Makkah Accord.

The communiqué confirmed support for the Arab League and the necessity for commitment to its Charter and resolutions in order to preserve the higher interests of the Arab world. In conclusion, the ministers thanked the leader, government and people of Oman for their hospitality, and agreed to hold their next meeting in Cairo in January of 1997.
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, LIST OF ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF THE OSLO AGREEMENT, GAZA, 15 JULY 1996

[The following list was presented to the Israeli side and circulated by the PA to international organizations and UN member states].

The list includes twenty-three Israeli violations of the agreement. They are:

1. Prejudicing the final status: The Israeli government has acted in contrary to what the agreements stipulated in terms of not prejudicing the results of the final status negotiations. The memorandum mentioned, as an example, the Israeli measures aimed at imposing a fait accompli in Jerusalem, fragmenting the geographic unity of Palestinian towns and villages, expansion of settlements, and land confiscation.
2. Suspending the safe passage agreement.
3. Violating the agreement’s stipulations on economic relations and obstructing Palestinian imports and exports.
4. Obstructing movement on the Gaza coast and along the road extending from the Netzarim junction to the seashore, in addition to hindering the Palestinian police from fulfilling their tasks.
5. Delaying the transfer of civilian powers and responsibilities in Hebron because of the postponement of the military redeployment.
6. Violating what has been agreed on regarding the al-Muwasi coast in that the Israeli army imposed a naval blockade on the Gaza coasts and prevented fishermen from pursuing their profession.
7. Violating the agreement on Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem in that a cement wall was built, a settlement road was constructed, and walls were erected for the construction of a parking lot near the tomb.
8. Failing to release prisoners according to what was agreed upon between the two sides.
9. Violations in the sphere of environment, such as uprooting hundreds of trees and allowing settlement sewage to flow through the Palestinian territories, thus causing dangerous environmental disasters.
10. Violations related to tourism and antiquities.
11. Violating what has been agreed on regarding postal service in that the delivery of Palestinian mail to Egypt, Jordan, as well as international mail, is still being impeded.
12. Planning and construction: Israel has violated what agreed upon by escalating the policy of demolishing houses.
13. Violations against sick people and opening fire on citizens.
14. Violation of the agreement regarding the movement of personalities and officials from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank and vice versa.
15. Education: Israel has violated the agreement by closing universities, raiding other universities, and depriving the sons of Gaza from studying at West Bank universities.
16. Suspending the subcommittees’ work and failing to hand over civilian powers.
17. Failing to dissolve the Israeli Civil Administration in accordance with the agreement’s stipulations.
18. Failing to hand over the electricity authority to the PA in accordance with the agreement’s stipulation.
19. Refusing to hand over the al-Fari’ah experimental agricultural station to the PA.
20. The Israeli side’s insistence on dealing directly with Palestinian citizens. This is considered a violation of the agreement.
21. Insistence on holding a magnetic ID card as a condition for the Palestinians entering into Israel.
22. Continuing the siege on the PA areas.
23. The ineffectiveness of the mechanism of cooperation and coordination between the two sides because of the intransigent Israeli positions.
1995-1996

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, 29TH ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING,
JAKARTA, 20-21 JULY 1996 [EXCERPTS]

1. The Twenty-Ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held in Jakarta from 20 to 21 July 1996. […]

POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION
[…]

14. The Foreign Ministers on the one hand welcomed the progress achieved in the Middle East peace process since August last year, in particular in the implementation of the PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government Arrangement of 1993 as well as the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995, the first Palestinian elections on 20 January 1996 and the beginning of the final status negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis in Taba in May 1996. On the other hand, the Ministers viewed with concern the current critical phase of the Middle East peace process following the recent general elections in Israel. In this regard, they stressed the importance of continuing the peace process to restore the rights of the Palestinians, the return of the occupied Arab territories, as well as ensuring balanced and equal security in the region, consistent with the principles agreed upon at the Madrid Conference of 1991, particularly the reciprocal principle of land-for-peace, and the assurance given to all parties. […]

EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK, ADDRESS TO THE INAUGURAL SESSION OF THE PAN-ARAB SUMMIT, CAIRO, 22 JULY 1996

Your Majesties, Excellencies and Royal Highnesses,

In reviewing the present regional situation, we are first encountered by the dire need of advancing a just and comprehensive peace process, and the commitment of the concerned parties to the basics of peace laid down by the international community over the years, according to principles agreed upon by the parties themselves.

It is needless to stress that peace to the Arab nation in an inalienable strategic goal.

We are not warmongers and we reject violence. According to all heavenly religions peace is a course that is to be adopted.

It is a precondition to realize the various people's aspirations for development, construction and progress; hence, our peace option is that of one who is capable and confident, and not an option of the oppressed who has no other alternative.

Therefore, we insist on pursuing the road to peace and struggle until it is complete and fructified. None of us wishes to return to war and destruction, nor seek to revert to the state of no-war, no-peace. We are sincerely determined to struggle for peace until the end. We are prepared to face its challenges and aftermath as long as the other party agrees on this course, and accepts to endure the peace commitments and its consequences. Naturally, peace is a legal and factual state that can only be achieved by the will of both parties, mutual wish and equal endeavor.

Perhaps it is convenient here to add several points which I believe are essential and important to clarify the true envisagement of peace not only from the Arab viewpoint but also from that of the international community of which we are an integral part and cannot be isolated from its values and principles.

First: We seek to realize a comprehensive and just peace which will continue until the goal agreed upon by the parties is attained and wins widespread international blessings following the signing of final accords with all neighboring parties which have not yet reached peace agreements with Israel, namely Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority.
Second: The negotiations which we all seek to resume and continue in order to reach comprehensive peace cannot be carried out in a vacuum, but rather are governed by the Madrid framework, namely the commitment to Security Council resolutions number 242, 338 and 425 as well as the principle of land for peace which will be realized by a total withdrawal from the Golan Heights and Lebanon, and recognizing the Palestinian people’s legitimate political rights, which can only be achieved by practising their right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state.

Third: It is unacceptable to any party to seek, by words or deeds, to destroy this legal fact, for it constitutes the basics on which the bilateral and multilateral negotiations have been carried out since the Madrid conference was held late in October 1991. It is a framework within which all parties are committed to work.

Fourth: No party has the right to rule or avoid tackling any point in the negotiations because all parties are committed to deal with issues tabled on the agenda according to the Madrid formula, foremost among which are issues related to the final status of the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. It any party allows itself to choose what to negotiate and what not, then this means that the other parties have the same right, which thus reverts the peace process to the zero point or rather totally destroys it.

Fifth: Goodwill in negotiations requires from all parties to commit themselves to the honest and accurate implementation of any agreements reached. Without this, no peace drives could be possible resumed or completed and all past agreements would be gone with the wind, and people's confidence in peace and their belief in coexistence would be dispersed.

Sixth: As we have always avoided the resort to threats and imposing a fait accompli on the other party in negotiations, namely, Israel, and as we have always adhered to our commitments, therefore, we ask Israel, from the same standpoint, to strictly fulfill its pledges and commitments within the context of the peace process, away from any threats or attempts to impose a status quo, or adopting extremist stances that do not abide by concluded agreements.

Seventh: We have and still believe that realizing an equitable and comprehensive peace is the sole means to achieve security and stability for all parties. Security cannot be realized by the occupation of land and ignoring others' rights, not by adopting the concept of regional expansions and superiority, not by the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, or the resort to oppression and violence. Such practices undermine peace and security, jeopardize stability and development, and dash hopes in a better future.

Against this background of concepts and principles, we call upon the new Israeli government to cooperate with us so as to complete the peace process without slackness or hesitation. We call upon the Israeli government to prove its commitment to real peace known to the international community, not more and not less. We do not base our policies on previous rulings. We are only concerned with what is actually down to earth. We make our decisions according to firm objective facts. We do not resort to putting obstacles on the path of sublime aims in which we believe and to which we are devoted.

GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, CABINET COMMUNIQUÉ ON SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES, JERUSALEM, 2 AUGUST 1996

[The Netanyahu govt. tried to reverse the settlement policies of the previous Rabin/Peres administrations, deciding to concentrate these under the authority vested in the defense establishment.]

At the Government meeting today, 2.8.96: Regarding planning and construction, the Cabinet decided that Government offices will operate with respect to settlement activities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, under the authority vested in the defense establishment and the Minister of Defense in this sphere, and within the framework of the State budget as approved in the appropriate sections and all these in accordance with the instructions of the Prime Minister.
The Cabinet also decided that all new permission for planning, the discussion of zoning plans, and the granting of authorization to these plans, will be granted only after the Minister of Defense gives his approval.

Some ministers expressed reservations about the need to obtain the Minister of Defense's approval, and also proposed that a ministerial committee on settlement be created. These reservations were not put to a vote, and the decision was unanimously approved.

The Prime Minister said:

1. The previous government placed chains and bonds upon the natural development of the Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.
2. It obviously placed no such chains upon Arab communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, or upon Jewish communities within the Green Line.
3. Thus, for example, if one wanted to open a kindergarten in Ariel, it would have been necessary to appeal to the committee on exceptions comprised of ministers of the Government of Israel and, even then, it was unclear whether this exceptional permission would be given.
4. Clearly, this situation is unacceptable to us. Accordingly, we are today issuing a proposal to correct this discrimination against the Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.
5. Obviously, within the context of removing these chains, there are also natural supervisory measures governing the construction and settlement process, as required in all countries governed by the rule of the law, and these are outlined in the proposal before us.

The Prime Minister also said that this decision is designed to replace sweeping authorization which created unjust discrimination against the development of existing communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

If a proposal for the creation of a new community is made, it will require the special approval of the full Cabinet.

☆☆☆

ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU AND PLO/PA CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT, JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE, 4 SEPTEMBER 1996 [EXCERPTS]

[The press conference came at the end of talks held between Netanyahu and Arafat at Erez Checkpoint to get to know each other and to determine the format of the negotiations on Hebron and other issues.]

Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu: After my talks today here I can observe that both parties reiterate their commitment to the interim agreement and their determination to carry out its implementation. However I would like to emphasize that we have to take into account the needs and the requirements of both sides on the basis of reciprocity, and the assurance of the security and well being of both Israelis and Palestinian alike. I have heard in the Palestinian press and Palestinian quarters that my intention is to fragment, to break up the agreement. This is not true, this is not our intention. We want to advance the issues of concern to all of us and we want to do so in such ways to facilitate negotiations on a final status. I also want to make clear that our position is to not only move on the peace process but to also improve the prosperity and economic conditions of the Palestinian population. We think that prosperity and peace go hand in hand and I believe that we can advance to achieve both goals for the benefit of both peoples, Mr Chairman please.

Chairman Yasser Arafat: First of all would like to thank Prime Minister, Mr. Netanyahu for this positive meeting which enables us to cooperate more and more and implement the agreement. I would like to emphasize here once again our commitment to pursue the cooperation with Israel and our commitment to cooperate with Israel in all aspects in accordance with the agreement. This cooperation in all fields will continue respective of our critical differences. Our commitment for both parties is unchangeable. I believe that we and Mr. Netanyahu and his government will walk together to ad-
vance the peace process, the peace of the brave. We shall not forget it was Mr. Shamir and Mr. Netanyahu who started the peace process in Madrid. I have informed Mr. Netanyahu that our first contact to start the peace in the region was with the late Mr. Begin and the channel was through Mr. Sadat. We are determined to work with Mr. Netanyahu and with his government. I offer him in front of you my heart full congratulations on the election choice of the Israelis of making him Prime Minister, and we will work together as we did with his predecessor.

Q: (Hebrew) Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. Chairman, have you reached agreement on security arrangements in Hebron? Will it be possible to discuss this, and have you reached or hope to reach agreement on the question of further redeployment?

PM Netanyahu: (Hebrew) We have set the program for the work of the joint steering committees, and these issues will be discussed in the framework of the steering committees.

Chairman Arafat: (Arabic) There is a committee that will deal with this issue.

Q: Mr. Netanyahu, you said you were committed to the implementation of the agreement. Have you decided with the Palestinians or do you have any specific date for the redeployment from Hebron and for the redeployments, and are you interested in real negotiating?

PM Netanyahu: I spoke of the pressures of security and the assurance of the well-being with Palestinians and with Israelis and I think these are real issues. They will be discussed as I said in the steering committees.

Q: (Hebrew) Mr. Prime Minister, for many years you had very harsh things to say about this man who is now standing by your side, Yasser Arafat. You based your entire election campaign against the agreement that the previous government achieved with this man, Yasser Arafat, and now...?

PM Netanyahu: (Hebrew) First of all, I would like to remind you that throughout the election campaign, before we received the mandate from the Israeli voters, I made it absolutely clear that we are committed to the agreements and to the outline of the peace process, and that we would maintain contacts with the Palestinian Authority in order to do precisely what we are doing here. In other words, first of all, to try and iron out the differences on the issues remaining on the agenda in the Oslo 1 and Oslo 2 agreements, and then to conduct negotiations on the final status arrangement. I also made it clear that I would meet with Mr. Arafat when I would feel that this was important or vital to the interests of the State of Israel. I am doing what I said.

Q: (Arabic) Mr. President, is there an agreement concerning the Gaza airport and the new helicopters that you received?

Chairman Arafat: (Arabic) First, with regard to the helicopters I have already used them. But with regard to the airport Gaza, there is a committee that is discussing the matter.
Q: Mr President, do you see after this meeting that the stage will be set for the talks on the final status talks away from the settlement policy of Israelis? And for the Prime Minister: will you continue to expand the settlements?

Chairman Arafat: There is option for us to reactivate our negotiations at all levels, including the permanent status negotiations.

PM Netanyahu: We have our position on the question of settlements and the Palestinian Authority has its position. This is well known and we have as you know a mechanism in the final status negotiations to discuss these differences.

Q: Mr. Prime Minister, beyond that symbolisms and the media statements, are you going to implement what had been agreed upon between the PLO and the former government? And for Mr. President Arafat, how do you see the settlement issue and did you discuss this with the Prime Minister?

PM Netanyahu: I think that it has to be understood that the principle that I have been talking about, namely the principle of reciprocity, this principle is not a slogan, it's meaningful. It encompasses the basic principle by which we negotiate, sign agreements and carry out agreements. A contract is as good as its fulfillment by both sides. There are outstanding issues on the Palestinian side, and there are outstanding issues on the Israeli side. We are going to bring these issues together to the steering committees and try to resolve them, not necessarily one by one, but in packages if you will, in order to advance the process. I have said that I think that in relation to the principle of reciprocity, we must concern ourselves with the question of security and the preservation of a normal system being for both populations. Again this is not a slogan, it's not a trick. If we don't do it, if security breaks down, we saw already what happens if the peace process breaks down. So the ideas or the principles that I am presenting here, and not for the first time, I think are truly the safeguards of advancing peace. And I think that with these principles in mind we can advance peace, and we intend to.

Q: But there is already an agreement signed between the former Israeli government and the PLO.

PM Netanyahu: That is correct.

Q: So?

PM Netanyahu: So we are going to discuss this issue in the steering committee and you are welcome to come and ask your questions after the meeting with the steering committee.

Chairman Arafat: I have nothing to add but to say that we will continue to negotiate and to coordinate in all levels by all means.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS, FIRST POPULAR REFUGEE CONFERENCE, DHEISHEH REFUGEE CAMP, BETHLEHEM, 13 SEPTEMBER 1996

To our struggling people, to our refugees everywhere in the Diaspora:

The drafting committee for the recommendations and decisions of the first refugee conference in the district of Bethlehem, held in Deheishe refugee camp on 13 September 1996, presents to the people in general, and to the refugees in particular, the recommendations compiled in broad, popular meetings held in all refugee sites in the Bethlehem district in the course of the past months, and in a series of workshops conducted between June 4-14, 1996. These recommendations were discussed by the participants on the day of the conference, some of them were cancelled and others amended, the last section was added - all of it in a constructive and democratic atmosphere, which allowed every individual refugee participant to express freely his/her opinions and suggestions concerning this conference document. This document is a product of a collective effort of the refugees in the Bethlehem district. Their pluralistic and democratic approach and mentality made possible the creation of this document, which will function as a tool for measuring and judging positions, and will serve as a guideline to every refugee in his/her evaluation and judgement of the work of the elected representatives.
Dear refugees wherever you are, join us! Here we are, starting the spark and knocking the walls of the container [referring to Ghassan Kanafani’s famous novel “Men Under the Sun”]. Hold your popular conferences wherever you are. Move forward!

The Drafting Committee of the Recommendations of the First Conference of the Refugees in the Bethlehem District Deheishe, 13 September 1996

Part I. General Principles

We, the refugees in the district of Bethlehem, participants in the conference in Deheishe refugee camp, the spring of national spirit, declare the following:

1. Time has come for the refugee community to organize itself in popular committees and to design a strategic program of struggle based on the hidden capacities of the people - the refugees themselves - who, with their unity, patience, and clear objectives, have maintained the struggle for their national rights. The refugees thus still hold a basic advantage in the struggle against the enemy, especially in the current international, Arab, and local circumstances. In order to achieve the implementation of the internationally legitimized resolutions in the era of the final status negotiations between Israel and the PNA, such programs must also take into consideration the strength and capacities found on the Arab and international level in regards to the refugee issue.

2. The refugees in the Bethlehem district express their concern and a warning against the implications of the weakness of the Oslo agreements on the refugee issue, and state their readiness to continue, and to renew, the struggle for the transfer of negotiations on the refugee question from the current bi-lateral forum to the hall of the United Nations.

3. Based on the above, we, the participants in the conference, declare to the public and swear to our people and to our refugee brothers all over the Diaspora, that we will continue the struggle for the implementation of UN Resolution 194 which states our right to return and to compensation. The strength of this resolution derives from the international consensus that has prevailed for decades. We declare our commitment to the internationally legitimized stand on Palestinian refugee issues, especially to resolutions 513, 2452 (1968) and 2535 (1969), 2963 (1972) and General Assembly Resolution 3236 (1974) which recognized the Palestinian people's unconditional right to self determination and confirmed the refugees' right to return to their homes and property.

4. In addition to our demand for the implementation of the UN resolutions, we raise our strong demand for the implementation of the International Declaration of Human Rights, particularly of Article 13 related to our issue.

5. Any negotiations or programs on the refugee question which bypass the international resolutions and decisions on our right to return to our homeland and property, or contradict the international human rights declaration, will receive, from our side, nothing but struggle and resistance. Our criteria for support and acceptance of any party, regardless whether local or international, will be its commitment to the international resolutions on the refugees and their implementation.

6. By this call for action and struggle for the implementation of the international resolutions, we demand from the bodies [i.e. refugee councils] to be elected, as well as from the PNA, to join efforts against calls for the solution of the refugee question in regional frameworks [resettlement], and to always take into consideration Arab solidarity and support. However, such Arab coordination must not be at the expense of the independent decision of the Palestinian people and their right of return.

7. The participants warn of the dangers of UNRWA involvement in the current political process, which favors the opponent and liquidates UNRWA's original objectives. While we condemn strongly all approaches aimed at the liquidation of UNRWA, we demand Arab and international intervention in order to re-establish UNRWA's role based on its responsibilities and internationally legitimized decisions. We demand the activation of UNRWA's bodies and departments for the implementation of the international decisions, particularly Resolution 194, and steps to oblige it to act - in the framework of the UN and outside it - in accordance with international decisions, and not by opposing or bypassing them.

8. In this context, the participants demand all parties - Arab and international - who respect the international legitimacy, to intervene in order to connect UNRWA with the UN High Commission
for Refugees (UNHCR) whose operation is based on the UN refugee charter. This charter uses a broader definition of refugees than UNRWA, and can cover all our refugees. Moreover, it forbids the host countries to issue citizenship status to the refugees. Also, UNCHR’s political authority and role is stronger when it comes to the matter of refugee repatriation.

9. It is important to remember that the refugees in the Bethlehem district are following with concern some of the Arab parties in the Multilateral Refugee Working Group, which are bypassing and re-treating from internationally legitimized decisions, and trying to avoid the Palestinian national rights, the PLO, and the right of return by supporting resettlement schemes as an alternative to the right of return. Therefore, we demand these parties to respect the international legitimacy and our rights, and we remind them that the current balance of forces may not last. Although the US may be willing to provide funds for the resolution of their financial crisis, it will not be able to provide security and protection. Our national and Arab rights are negotiable and not subject to deals.

10. Therefore the Conference appeals to Arab host countries to understand the specific character the refugee camps on their territory, and to abstain from engagement in regional politics which will be at the expense of refugees’ right to their historical homeland.

11. In the framework of the general principles, the participants confirm that the refugee bodies to be elected should design programs which serve not only to continue the struggle for our legitimate national rights, but are able to promote democracy, civil and human rights. Any separation between these two dimensions is unacceptable. It should be clear that popular refugee support for parties - elected or not, official or not - and for any negotiating team, will depend on their respect for democracy, national and human rights.

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Part II. The Palestinian National Authority

The participants, while understanding the restrictive circumstances of the PNA, its role in the struggle for the national rights, and the numerous obstacles to national reconstruction, believe that refugee mobilization for the implementation of internationally legitimized decisions does not contradict the PNA’s aims. Therefore we demand that the PNA not only understand the objective need for the establishment of a popular refugee movement, but also support this movement with the following:

1. Based on study of past experience, the PNA must reconsider its negotiation program and methods. All negotiations on the refugee question must be channelled back to the arena of the United Nations and its bodies, so as to pressure the UN and the international community to implement the legitimate resolutions and all relevant human rights declarations. [The PNA must] take its source of power from the people, and stand up against any effort to cancel, or change these international resolutions.

2. The PNA must design a comprehensive policy aimed at strengthening Palestinian-Arab-Islamic coordination so as to unify positions and their implementation, and in order to formulate a united Palestinian-Arab-Islamic strategy in refugee negotiations, which will adhere to internationally legitimized decisions (including all relevant human rights conventions) that emphasize our right of return, self determination, and the establishment of the independent Palestinian state. These resolutions, especially Resolution 194, must become a principled stand from which no opinion or move by the negotiators should deviate.

3. The new negotiating strategy must be based on the positions of refugees all over the Diaspora, and their opinion must be taken into consideration in all matters pertaining to them, their struggle, and their future.

4. We demand that the PNA and the PLO, the only legitimate representative of our people, set initiatives to support the efforts for the establishment and development of bodies of coordination between the camps and dispersed refugees, so as to confront the schemes aimed at transforming us into separate communities in different countries. We demand [that the PNA and the PLO] support all activities aimed at mobilizing the refugees under the slogan, “the right of return is a sacred right and the red line which must not be crossed.”

5. [We demand that the PNA] reject the policy of transfer of UNRWA tasks to the PNA, and oppose efforts to legally terminate UNRWA, a step which would lead to the criminal dispersion of the Palestinian people and to its expulsion from the homeland.
6. [We demand that the PNA] reject the concept of “compensation” as an alternative to the right of return as a legal concept.
7. [We demand that the PNA] refuse its support of all tendencies and efforts aimed at transforming UNRWA into a financing or development agency in accordance with US policy.
8. [We demand that the PNA] design a set of strategic plans for the improvement of living conditions in the refugee camps and outside them, which protect the identity of the camps and serve refugee interests, and do not go to the expense of the refugees' national right of return.
9. We demand that PNA include in its school curricula materials on the refugee issue, on the massacres our people have witnessed, the destruction of the villages and the suffering of those expelled, the long heroic struggle and its tradition, the heavy price paid, and about the justice of our case.
10. Concerning refugee participation in municipal elections, and in the light of the current hot debate on this matter, we recommend the following: refugee camps should be regarded as one social, political, and legal unit with a distinguished character whose identity must be protected. Therefore they must not be pushed, or included, in municipal elections; however, refugees who reside in cities and pay municipal taxes, have the right to participate in the elections, including the right to vote and stand for election, as they see fit.

Part III. Organization and Administration

1. The participants recommend that the popular conferences in the remaining districts should be held on the basis of the experience in Bethlehem and the Gaza Strip.
2. The participants decided to elect the Refugee Council of the Bethlehem District. They recommend that similar councils be elected in each district and in all sites in the Diaspora. Each district conference will decide the number of members elected to its council. In the case of Bethlehem, we elected a 49 member Council.
3. The elected Council members will later elect a “bureau” (or any other name chosen) which will execute the decisions and recommendations of the Council in the periods between its meetings. Moreover, the “bureau” will have to implement the recommendations of the district conference.
4. The “bureau” (or any other name) must join the councils elected in other districts and in the Diaspora in order to collectively prepare a General Refugee Conference both inside and outside [Palestine].
5. The General Palestinian Refugee Conference inside and in the Diaspora will elect one leading “bureau” to follow up the struggle for the refugees' national rights (right of return), and the struggle for civil refugee rights in their areas of domicile, e.g. the right to work, education, health, environment, culture, movement, expression, and all those human and civil rights protected by international conventions. To this end, carefully designed and comprehensive programs should be used to achieve civil rights parallel to the struggle for national rights based on internationally legitimized resolutions.
6. The participants recommend that the elected Council coordinate its work with other elected councils in the Diaspora so as to transfer the refugee file [from the PNA] to these democratically elected bodies. The General Refugee Conference will thus be the only body authorized to negotiate - through the PLO - on the refugee issue. [These negotiations] will be held in the arena of the United Nations and will be based on international resolutions and Arab and international solidarity. The General Refugee Council elected by the General Refugee Conference will be the body to follow up the refugee issue. The time of paternalism and of appropuses imposed on the refugees without prior consultation will thus end.
7. Frameworks of coordination must be established in order to connect the various initiatives in the Diaspora; the experience of former popular activities must be used in order to bypass foreign restrictions. A refugee charter should be drafted in order to regulate the relations between the various regions in the Diaspora; this charter must be based on the right of return and internationally legitimized decisions.
8. We recommend the organization of conferences, events, and campaigns with a popular character in all refugee sites, inside and outside, emphasizing the right of return and explaining current developments related to the refugee issue.
9. [We recommend] the establishment of local, non-governmental organizations in all refugee sites; NGOs should work in a coordinated fashion in each region to implement programs based on so-
cial needs; [these programs] should be conducted professionally in order to avoid political factionalism (e.g. Committees in Defense of the Right of Return in Lebanon);

10. The elected local refugee councils should establish a center for documentation and for the collection of data and information on refugees, which will - at a later stage - serve as the basis for the establishment of a general refugee information center. This is because we cannot rely on data issued by UNRWA, whose figures, especially in the field of planning, are not always accurate.

11. We recommend that all elected councils in the Diaspora proceed on the basis of democracy, pluralism, flexibility, and tolerance in order to represent all the refugee strata, and in order to preserve the independence of the decisions of the refugee movement; to resist all attempts of co-optation, so as to preserve the refugee issue as the national and un-negotiable priority of the Palestinian people.

12. The participants recommend the publication of newsletters, magazines, and other written materials specializing on the refugee issues.

13. Concerning the Service Committees Suggested by the PNA Local Affairs Ministry in the refugee camps, we declare the following: The Ministry of Local Affairs which proposed the establishment of such committees must explain clearly what are the aims, authorities, organizational structure, and expected role of these committees. Based on this information, the decision whether or not to cooperate with these committees will be taken.

Part IV. Civil Rights

1. The participants recommend to the elected Council to organize study days, workshops, lectures, debates, and opinion polls in order to explore refugee needs and priorities.

2. The participants recommend to the elected refugee councils to coordinate amongst each other and with the PNA, in order to design development plans for the refugee camps which will be complementary to the plans aimed at achieving the right of return and national rights. No way should the [development plans] contradict the latter. The role of the local NGOs, working for the achievement of civil rights and the fulfillment of the various needs, will be defined accordingly.

   [The participants recommend] to focus the effort on the reduction of housing density in the refugee camps, on the alleviation of poverty and all other sources of suffering, and to work for general and mental refugee health. The fear and concern of resettlement schemes must not prevent the provision of professional services for the improvement of conditions in regard to work opportunities, education, health, environment, and other social affairs. Studies and research are crucial in order to identify and tackle the relation between living conditions and their effect on political attitudes towards the refugee issue and vice versa. It is time for refugees, inside or outside the camps, to live in dignity.

Part V. General National Issues

1. The participants at the Deheishe conference emphasize that they are part and parcel of the Palestinian people and an important factor in the struggle for national liberation aimed at achieving self determination, the establishment of the independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and the right of return of all refugees to their homeland.

2. The participants emphasize their strong support for the Palestinian people’s right to Jerusalem as the capital of its independent state; the right of the people on Jerusalem is un-negotiable and not subject to bargaining.

3. The participants express their emotional and moral unity with the prisoners in Israeli jails. We call for their immediate release and demand that the PNA place the issue of political prisoners at the top of their agenda.

4. The participants, deeply concerned about the ongoing construction of settlements, demand the formulation of a comprehensive national plan, based on the peoples’ strength, in order to fight the settlers and to protect the land.

5. Stating our determination to cling to our national rights, we are not opposed to the international desire for peace in the region, a peace which will be for the peoples of the region. However, we emphasize that there will be no peace, if our national rights - especially our right to return to our homeland as protected by international law - are neglected. Therefore, peace in the Middle East is
directly linked to the Palestinian people's right to self determination, and to the recognition of all
its national rights by means of the implementation of the internationally legitimized resolutions,
most fundamentally the right of return.

Conclusion

The participants declare that the right of return and the refugee issue are the core of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Therefore, any effort at the establishment of a just peace in the region will fail if
it does not include a just solution for the refugees based on internationally legitimized resolutions,
especially Resolution 194.

We do not oppose peace. We are for a peace built on mutual respect for internationally recognized
rights, and hold that the implementation of the right of return and the respect of the Palestinian na-
tional rights are the key to ending the conflict in the whole region.

GERMAN, FRENCH AND BRITISH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT,
THREE-POWER LETTERS TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU
AND PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PRESIDENT YASSER ARAFAT,
LONDON, 25 SEPTEMBER 1996

[The letters are from German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, French President Jacques Chirac
and British Prime Minister John Major.]

LETTER TO BENJAMIN NETANYAHU

Dear Prime Minister,

We were pleased to receive you this week and to re-emphasize our friendship towards the State of
Israel, as well as to examine with you the prospects for the peace process. You informed us of your
concern to respect the undertakings agreed and to pursue talks with the Palestinian authorities. We
have since expressed our grave concern at the serious events which have just occurred in the autono-
mous territories and which risk endangering the Middle East peace process.

Following on from our conversations with you, we wish to make a joint and formal appeal to you to
take the necessary steps to restore calm. We welcome the announcement of the decision to close the
tunnel under the Holy City and wish other measures to be taken in the same spirit.

We consider that everyone involved should show moderation and carry out their responsibilities. We
strongly wish to see an immediate resumption of the negotiations at the highest level between your-
self and Mr. Yasser Arafat, on the basis of terms agreed by the two sides. We are making the same
appeal to the President of the Palestinian Authority. Such negotiations would provide the opportunity
to examine all the outstanding issues. They should enable the signed agreements to be implemented
in full, in preparation for an agreement on the final status of the Palestinian territories.

We regard this as the only way of restoring lasting peace in the territories and guaranteeing Israel's
security.

We are counting on your authority and your vision as a statesman to ensure that wisdom and peace
prevail, for the sake of all the peoples in the region.

Please accept, Prime Minister, the assurance of our highest consideration.

(Signed) Jacques Chirac Helmut Kohl John Major

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LETTER TO YASSER ARAFAT

Mr. President,

As you know, only this week we received the Prime Minister of the State of Israel, Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu, in order to examine with him the prospects for the Middle East peace process. He informed us of his wish to comply with the undertakings signed and to continue the talks with the Palestinian authorities.

We have since expressed our grave concern at the tragic events which have just unfolded in the Palestinian territories and which could jeopardize the Middle East peace process.

We wish, by way of this joint formal appeal, to encourage you to continue to take all measures necessary to restore calm. We are making the same emphatic appeal to the Prime Minister of the State of Israel.

We consider that in the current circumstances both sides must show moderation and assume their responsibilities in full.

We strongly wish to see an immediate resumption of negotiations at the highest level between you and Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu, on the basis of terms agreed by the two sides. Such negotiations would provide an opportunity to examine all the outstanding issues, and should enable the agreements signed to be implemented in full with a view to agreement being reached on the final status of the Palestinian territories.

This appears to us to be the only approach capable of bringing lasting calm back to the territories and of ensuring the safety of all the peoples in the region. We know that your commitment to the continuation of the peace process will lead you to do all that you can to ensure that common sense and reason prevail.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of our highest consideration.

(Signed) Jacques Chirac Helmut Kohl John Major

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ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE SITUATION IN THE WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP AND JERUSALEM, JERUSALEM, 26 SEPTEMBER 1996

The Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs met this evening (Thursday), 26 September 1996, and received briefings and assessments concerning the situation in the areas of Judea, Samaria, Gaza, and Jerusalem from the Defence Minister, IDF commanders, the Israel Police, and the heads of the GSS.

The Committee held a discussion, and took the following decisions:

1. The Government expresses its deep sorrow for the victims who died today, joins in the painful mourning of the families, and wishes a full recovery to those injured.
2. The shooting on the part of the Palestinian Police, and the incitement to violence, constitutes a severe violation of the Interim Agreement, and their continuation will place the continuation of the peace process at risk.

Article XV of the Interim Agreement, which concerns the "Prevention of Hostile Acts" determines that:

Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime, and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and against their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders.

The Government calls for the renewal of the political peace negotiations, in accordance with the framework agreed upon between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, without any prior conditions.
3. The Government is firm in its determination to defend the citizens of Israel, the residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and the soldiers of the IDF, by all means necessary, and it instructed the IDF, the Israel Police, and the other security forces to take every step required to do so.

4. The Government expresses its appreciation to the soldiers of the IDF, the Israel Police, and the other security authorities which stand in the war against violence and terrorism.

5. The Government of Israel demands that the Palestinian Authority restrain, and effect the cessation of, the violent activities and the creation of ferment from within its territory against the citizens of Israel and the soldiers of the IDF.

I'd like to say a few words about the situation in the Middle East. I deeply regret the injuries and the loss of life we've seen in the West Bank and Gaza in the last few days. It points to the urgency for both sides not only to end the violence, but to take positive steps to resolve the issues that divide them.

Over the past 24 hours we have been in constant touch with the Israelis and the Palestinians. Our message to them is this: It is in everyone's interest to resolve their differences peacefully, to work together on security and to avoid any actions that could make progress on the peace between Israelis and Palestinians more difficult.

The events of the past two days stand out precisely because we have made so much progress towards peace in these past few years. Violence was becoming the exception, not the rule. The overwhelming majority of Israelis and Palestinians want peace, and they have been doing the hard work to build it. So, again, let me say: I ask both sides to end this violence, to get back to the business of peace, to implement the agreements they've reached, to resolve their differences through negotiations.

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter dated 26 September 1996 from the representative of Saudi Arabia on behalf of the States Members of the League of Arab States, contained in document S/1996/790, that referred to the action by the Government of Israel to open an entrance to a tunnel in the vicinity of Al Aqsa Mosque and its consequent results,

Expressing its deep concern about the tragic events in Jerusalem and the areas of Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem and the Gaza Strip, which resulted in a high number of deaths and injuries among the Palestinian civilians, and concerned also about the clashes between the Israeli army and the Palestinian police and the casualties on both sides,

Recalling its resolutions on Jerusalem and other relevant Security Council resolutions,

Having discussed the situation at its formal meeting on 27 September 1996, with the participation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of a number of countries,

Concerned about the difficulties facing the Middle East peace process and the deterioration of the situation, including inter alia its impact on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, and urging the parties to fulfil their obligations, including the agreements already reached,

Concerned about developments at the Holy Places of Jerusalem,
1995-1996

1. Calls for the immediate cessation and reversal of all acts which have resulted in the aggravation of the situation, and which have negative implications for the Middle East peace process;
2. Calls for the safety and protection of Palestinian civilians to be ensured;
3. Calls for the immediate resumption of negotiations within the Middle East peace process on its agreed basis and the timely implementation of the agreements reached;
4. Decides to follow closely the situation and to remain seized of the matter.

KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, STATEMENT CONDEMNING ISRAELI ACTIONS AGAINST PALESTINIANS, RIYADH, 28 SEPTEMBER 1996

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been following with deep anxiety the developments in the situation in the Palestinian arena stemming from Israeli aggression on unarmed Palestinians, and in particular the Israeli decision to dig a tunnel under Al-Aqsa Mosque. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia views these practices of the Israeli authorities as a flagrant violation of the outcome of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land-for-peace, and the resolutions of international legitimacy, notably UN Resolutions 242, 338, and 425.

An official Saudi statement yesterday reiterated the absolute adherence of the government of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd Bin Abdulaziz to all efforts for the enhancement of the pillars of security, stability and peace in the region, which is still suffering greatly as the result of Israel’s actions, and urged the international community to put an end to these tyrannical Israeli practices that aim at undermining the initiatives working for implementation of the UN resolutions whether in deed or in spirit. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, along with its friends everywhere, is determined to go ahead in its intensive efforts to make this region a haven of security, peace and prosperity.

US PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON, STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THE MIDDLE EAST SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON, DC, 29 SEPTEMBER 1996

The loss of life and the tragedy of the violence in the Middle East this week have been a terrible development for the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples, a blow to all those who worked for a lasting peace, and encouragement to those who oppose a lasting peace.

Earlier this week I called on Israelis and Palestinians to end the cycle of violence, to restore calm, to recommit themselves to the hard work of building peace through negotiations. There has been some progress since then towards ending the confrontation, but not enough. Therefore, after consulting Secretary Christopher, who has literally been working around the clock with the regional leaders to resolve this problem, I have invited Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat to come to Washington as soon as possible. They have accepted my invitation, as has King Hussein of Jordan. I have also invited President Mubarak of Egypt. He is seeing whether it is possible for him to attend. I expect the meetings to take place early this week.

The United States has often played a pivotal role in bringing Arabs and Israelis together to work out their differences in peace. It is our responsibility to do whatever we can to protect the peace process and to help move it forward. This is such a moment. The events of this week are all the more shocking because the Israelis and the Palestinians have taken so many giant steps towards peace in the last couple of years. They have shown the world that they want peace. They know that they must make hard choices to achieve that goal. I am prepared to do everything in my power to help the Israelis and the Palestinians end the violence and begin the peace process again in earnest.

We have to return to the path of peace along which they have already travelled so far.
POPE JOHN PAUL II, APPEAL FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
CASTELGANDOLFO, 30 SEPTEMBER 1996

Unfortunately, once again painful events have occurred which upset the already fragile peace process in the Middle East. Following the bloody episodes of recent days in Jerusalem and other places, all we can do is entrust so much pain to God, beseeching him to transform such sufferings into a loyal commitment in favour of a true, just and lasting peace.

In this difficult hour, I would like, with insistence, to ask the Israeli and Palestinian populations and their leaders for a courageous effort in order not to suffocate the hope of peace and to avoid further provocations, other injustices and consequently new violent reactions.

It is the duty of believers - Jews, Christians and Muslims - to seek every way which favours understanding and reciprocal faith in favour of peace in a land which God willed to be holy.

FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, MOSCOW, 1 OCTOBER 1996

The latest developments in the Palestinian territories have been closely followed in Moscow. The situation there, certain lull notwithstanding, remains extremely complicated. Efforts by the Russian co-sponsor of the Middle East peace process have been focused on an energetic promotion of the cessation of the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation and resumption of serious negotiations between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian leadership.

In our view, a certain reduction of tensions has become possible thanks to the multilateral steps undertaken in the last few days. The adoption of the Security Council resolution, a politically ponderous and balanced basis for placating the situation, was a matter of crucial importance.

On 28 September 1996, the United Nations Security Council adopted, by virtual unanimity, a resolution with regard to Palestinian-Israeli clashes. The tragic events in Jerusalem and in the territory of the Palestinian Authority, invaded by Israeli troops, have revealed, with all obviousness, the absolute perniciousness of the stalemate in the negotiating process - a stalemate lasting already for a few months.

This is the aspect that is especially emphasized in the Security Council resolution the Russian side made a significant contribution to. The resolution contains a call for the immediate reversal of all acts which have prompted the outburst of violence. The need is stressed to immediately resume negotiations on the agreed basis, rather than from scratch.

These are the aspects which were accentuated in the statement by Mr. Yevgeni M. Primakov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the formal meeting of the Security Council. The meeting itself, unprecedented as for the level and the number of participants (over 30 Foreign Ministers) and held with our active support, has resulted in an earnest political discussion of ways to overcome the crisis and become a reflection of the international community's deep concern over the fates of the peace process in the region.

Russia is satisfied that the Security Council proved capable of an adequate response to the perilous developments in the Palestinian territories. The Russian side expresses the hope that the Security Council's decision, one pursuing specific results and balanced at the same time, will prompt all the parties concerned - including the participants in the Washington, DC, meeting - to display maximal restraint, goodwill, and political foresight, as well as will give a powerful impetus to the re-animation of the Middle East peace process on all the negotiating tracks.
The Council of Ministers of the European Union is appalled by the recent violence and the resulting casualties in Jerusalem and throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It offers its sincere condolences to the families of those Palestinians and Israelis who have lost their lives, and its sympathy to the injured.

The European Union strongly calls upon both parties to abide by UN Security Council Resolution 1073 of 28 September 1996. The European Union calls upon both the Israeli authorities and the Palestinians to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any actions or words which lead to further violence, it urges both sides to avoid resorting to disproportionate force, in particular the use of firearms, tanks and helicopter gunships. It calls on the Government of Israel to prevent its forces re-entering autonomous areas in Zone A, contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Interim Agreement. It further calls on the Palestinian Authority to exert full control over Palestinian forces and to maintain calm in the autonomous areas.

The Troika has discussed the Union’ concerns of meetings in New York with Israeli Foreign Minister Levy and in Luxembourg with President Arafat.

The European Union recognises that the recent incidents were precipitated by frustration and exasperation of the absence of any real progress is the root of the unrest and calls on Israel to match its stated commitment to the Peace Process with concrete actions to fulfil its obligations, as well as to refrain from any action likely to create mistrust about its intentions.

The Union notes that the particular events which triggered the current crisis concerned the fears of Palestinians that their position in Jerusalem was being further eroded. The Union recalls that parties have agreed, under the terms of the Declaration of Principles not to take any action which would preclude the outcome of the Permanent Status Negotiations. It will work to ensure that this commitment is implemented by both sides. Following Security Council Resolution 1073 of 28 September 1996, the Union believes that it would help greatly to restore calm and confidence if the Hasmonean tunnel in Jerusalem were restored to its original state, it furthermore calls for the cessation and reversal of all acts that may affect the status of the Holy Places in Jerusalem.

The European Union reaffirms its policy on the status of Jerusalem. East Jerusalem is subject to the principles set out in UN Security Council Resolution 242, notably the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and is therefore not under Israeli sovereignty. The Union asserts that the Fourth Geneva Convention is fully applicable to East Jerusalem, as it is to other territories under occupation. The Council stresses the importance of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement which is based on a common commitment to the Peace Process. In this context, it calls on Israel to give clear practical demonstration of its confirmed intention to implement fully the agreements already reached with the PLO.

- timely implementation of the agreements reached, including completion of the first phase of Israel’s troop redeployment, notably from Hebron, and the release of Palestinian prisoners;
- positive steps to alleviate the economic plight of the Palestinians, including the early lifting of the closures, guaranteeing safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, and the lifting of obstacles to international aid efforts and the realisation of infrastructural projects (e.g. Gaza airport, Gaza harbour, industrial zones). For its part, the Council responded favourably to the request of President Arafat for an additional 20 M ECUS assistance from the European Union in response to the budgetary problems of the Palestinian Authority.
- resumption of full co-operation in order to ensure Internal security both in Israel and the areas under Palestinian authority.
- refraining from measures that preclude the outcome of the final status negotiations, including annexation of land, demolition of houses, new settlement construction and expansion of settlements;
- engagement of the next stage of negotiations as set down in the Declaration of Principles.
The Union welcomes the Initiative to host a meeting in Washington between the parties. It hopes this meeting will lead to the re-commencement of constructive negotiations on the basis of the principles of Madrid and the terms of the Declaration of Principles. The security partnership which was created between Israel and the Palestinians has been one of the main achievements of the Peace Process. We call on both sides to dedicate themselves to recovering this trust and cooperation which epitomised the spirit of the Peace Process. Now more than ever the Union encourages the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to co-operate of all levels. Good neighbourly policies are indispensable to Israel’s security in the long-term. That security can be found only on the basis of a renewed partnership between Israel and its Palestinian neighbours.

As it declared at the Florence European Council in June 1996, peace in the Middle East is a vital interest of the European Union. Accordingly, the European Union is ready to play an active part in efforts to recommence the negotiations, commensurate with its interest in the region, and on the basis of its major contribution to the Peace Process so far. The Union is currently preparing a Ministerial Troika visit to the Middle East for talks with the main parties in the Peace Process.

ASSISTANT SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER ABDUL-RAHMAN MANSOURI, STATEMENT TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 51ST SESSION, NEW YORK, 1 OCTOBER 1996

[EXCERPTS]

In the name of Allah, Most Compassionate, Most Merciful;
Blessings and peace be upon the most noble of prophets.

Mr. President:
The Arab leaders, at their summit meeting in Cairo last June, expressed their firm commitment to continue the peace process which they regard as an irreversible strategic goal. The Cairo meeting confirmed that the realization of a just and comprehensive peace within the realm of international legality presupposes a serious and unequivocal commitment on the part of Israel to abide by the principles of the Madrid Peace Conference and Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 425, as well as the “land-for-peace” formula. The Arab leaders also made it clear that any breach by Israel of these principles and agreed-upon commitments and agreements, or any delay in their implementation would result in a setback to the peace process with all its dangers and consequences. The failure of the Israeli Government to demonstrate a degree of seriousness and commitment to the peace process comparable to that demonstrated by the Arab states is a cause of deep concern and anxiety. Since assuming office, the Government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has continued to issue statements and undertake actions that do not serve the cause of peace. In contrast to the Arab states’ commitment to the Madrid principles, the Security Council resolutions and the land-for-peace formula, the statements made by the Israeli Government indicate an insistence on consolidating of its occupation of Arab lands, maintaining its annexation of East Jerusalem, and delaying the agreed upon redeployment of its troops from al-Khalil (Hebron), as well as its continued closure of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, together with its proclaimed rejection of withdrawing from the Syrian Golan Heights. Recently, the Israeli authorities opened a tunnel under al-Aqsa Mosque, which constitutes a flagrant infringement upon the Islamic sanctuaries and a clear violation of resolutions of international legality with respect to the status of Jerusalem.

Statements by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu that Israel is prepared to resume negotiations without preconditions are no more than an attempt to distance himself from the Madrid-based principles and fundamentals of the peace process, in particular the land-for-peace formula. Such a position only indicates a serious setback. Hence, we call upon the two co-sponsors of the Madrid Peace Conference, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, to exert their utmost efforts to ensure the continuity of the peace process based on the principles and the fundamentals upon which it was launched, and to resume negotiations on all tracks in order to attain a just and permanent settlement. We value the positive
and constructive positions pertaining to this matter as reflected in the statements of the European Union in Florence and that of the Group of 7 in Lyon. Furthermore, we reiterate our call to all concerned parties to fulfill their commitments to provide economic assistance to the Palestinian people. While we call upon members of the international community to increase their economic assistance to the Palestinian Authority, we should remember that actions undertaken by Israel prevent the Palestinians from benefiting from this aid. Moreover, any efforts exerted to achieve regional cooperation would be meaningless and ineffective unless accompanied by tangible progress in the peace process on all its tracks.

Mr. President;
The issue of Jerusalem - al-Quds al-Shareef - is at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and is of utmost concern to the Arab and Muslim world. The manner in which this issue is dealt with could determine the future of the peace process. We regret to see the Israeli authorities continue to undertake measures aimed at changing the demographic composition and creating new realities in the status of Jerusalem, with the intention of prejudicing the negotiations on the final status of the city. The position of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remains that any settlement of this issue must take into consideration the resolutions of international legality, and in particular U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 which calls on Israel to withdraw from territories it occupied in 1967, and Security Council Resolution 252 pertaining to al-Quds al-Shareef. It is natural for any permanent and comprehensive settlement to address the issue of the repatriation of Palestinian refugees, and the release of Palestinian prisoners, as well as the issue of existing settlements and those being constructed by Israel in the Occupied Territories in violation of the letter and spirit of the Declaration of Principles and in total disregard of international law and the Geneva Conventions.

US PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON, SUMMARY ON THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, WHITE HOUSE NEWS CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, DC, 2 OCTOBER 1996 [EXCERPTS]

[The Israeli-Palestinian talks in Washington with US mediation ended unsuccessfully.]

The four of us have agreed that I will speak about our two days of meetings and then do my best to faithfully answer questions that you have about it. And of course, the other three leaders will have a chance to be heard after the press conference.

I’d like to begin by thanking King Hussein, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Chairman Arafat for coming here to Washington at this critical and very difficult moment for the Middle East peace process. Their journey reflects a true commitment to peace and an understanding that there is no alternative to the path of peace their people have traveled so far along in the last few years. I invited them here with three urgent goals in mind. First, to seek to curb the terrible violence and death that we saw last week. Second, to get the Israelis and Palestinians talking again at the highest levels. And, third, to help both parties return to the hard work of building peace through negotiations.

Today I can report progress on these goals. First, the Israelis and Palestinians clearly are talking again at the highest levels. I believe the calm, constructive, face-to-face meetings Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat have had here will help to build trust between them and promote progress on the issues that still divide them. The prime minister and the chairman agree that they are partners in peace, understand that it is vital to take into account each other’s needs and concerns, and realize the important of removing the frictions between them.

Second, the prime minister and Chairman Arafat have recommitted themselves to a nonviolent future, to renouncing violence in the resolution of their disputes.

Third, they are ready to renew and intensify negotiations on implementing the interim agreement, with Hebron as the first priority. They are committed to engaging immediately in talks and to achieving tangible progress quickly.
To assist them in this effort I am sending Dennis Ross, our special Middle East coordinator, to the region now. The very first meeting will take place on Sunday morning at Erez. They want to resolve the problem of Israeli redeployment from Hebron, and they want to achieve this as soon as possible. I might point out that these talks will be occurring continuously, and these will be the first continuous peace talks that have been held since the prime minister assumed office with the Palestinians.

Finally, the leaders also understand the need to make arrangements between their security forces so that cooperation is more reliable and the situation on the ground is stabilized. They are prepared to do what is needed to achieve that as well.

All of us should put the meeting we have had over the last two days into the proper perspective. The peace process did not start today and it will not be finished tomorrow. For three years now, the Israelis and the Palestinians have been moving forward along the path to a lasting peace. Every step is hard. It requires both sides to make difficult decisions and to keep their eyes fixed on the prize of lasting peace. But the progress they have made has proved to the world that progress is possible and peace is possible. Both sides know there is no turning back. Just as there can be no peace without security, there can be no true security without peace.

I believe Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat understand the choice they face every day. It is the choice between cooperation and conflict, between progress and regression, between hope and fear. The Israeli and Palestinian people have chosen to strive for cooperation, progress, and hope. Now it falls to their leaders to guide them toward those goals, to help them stay true to their choice, and ultimately to succeed.

In this effort, we are all profoundly privileged to have a partner in King Hussein. He has shown the world equal parts [of] courage and wisdom; and he has especially shown that here this week. I thank him for being here. I rely on his counsel. The peace process has not better friend. Most of all, let me again than Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat, who cam here at very difficult times with tensions high. I am convinced they both want a more peaceful, prosperous future for their people. I am convinced they both want a more secure future for their people, and I believe they are both prepared to do the hard work that is necessary to achieve their goals.

For our part, the United States will always be there to help. We remain committed to our common goal—a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. We recognize our special responsibility to protect the peace process at moments of extreme difficulty, to help move it forward. We have embraced this responsibility because those who take risks for peace must be able to count on the United States.

We have accomplished quite a few things and I think the most important one is to cement the principle that the path to peace is through negotiations and not through violence; that is, that the principle that we must cease any forms of violence and that If anyone has a grievance he brings it to the negotiating table and nowhere else - I think that is a central principle by which we can guide peace. I want to assure you about our commitment to peace. This is our compass. It is our map. It is our hope for our children and for the children of the Palestinians as well.

We known that such a peace in inextricably bound with security and that peace can progress as long as security holds. Last week we had a breakdown in security and the peace collapsed. And what we need and have committed to do is to rebuild the foundations of security; the old ones that were there that need refurbishing, but also new ones because we recognize that a new situation now exists. Something has happened. And we need additional security arrangements to address the new situation that exists, and I think everyone recognizes that, and President Clinton alluded to that.
We are also in the pursuit of peace, we’ve made it very clear that we are committed to the redeployment in Hebron. We said it continuously, and we said it again. We are not reluctant to do it. We are prepared to do it. But in such a way as to avoid a breakdown that would collapse the peace process not only in Hebron but altogether. And this will require intensive negotiations. This is perhaps the most important practical thing that we have decided: to begin as early as possible on Sunday [6 October] simultaneous negotiations on Hebron and on security, and to continue those negotiations until completion. I am absolutely committed to them, and I have decided with Chairman Arafat that we will have our senior people engaged in it. If there is a problem, they should be able to address it, and if they cannot, then we will sit down together and finish it. I think that these two days will give us that new beginning that I hope will achieve progress. I do not have any illusions whatsoever about the difficulties ahead. It is a very tense period fraught with dangers right now, until we restore peace to its peaceful track and until we convince each other that these new sentiments of confidence have the backup in deed and action on both sides. But, in my heart I know that the children of Israel are safer tonight because of these consultations that we had here and I want to thank again President Clinton for his very good offices.

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRTARY, STATEMENT ON THE FREE TRADE AREA EXTENDED TO WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, WASHINGTON, DC, 3 OCTOBER 1996

President Clinton signed legislation last night that will expand duty free treatment of products imported from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and help to spur economic development throughout the region. This new trade initiative reflects the continuing commitment of the United States to help open new economic opportunities for the Palestinian people - a vital element of the Declaration of Principles signed at the White House in September 1993. It also provides tangible US support for the Peace Process and promotes greater economic cooperation among Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority.

The proposal grants products of the West Bank and Gaza Strip special trade status, identical to those accorded products of Israel under the Israel-US Free Trade Agreement. Such a special trade status will provide new employment opportunities for Palestinians outside Israel proper and lure increased foreign investment to the West Bank and Gaza.

The Palestinians have agreed to grant duty free access on US imports to the West Bank and Gaza Strip and national treatment within the territories, to assist the United States in verifying compliance with US trade laws, and to prevent unlawful transshipment of products not qualifying for duty-free access. In addition, the Palestinians will support all efforts to end the Arab League Boycott of Israel in all its respects.

The President would like to thank Chairman William Roth (R-DE) of the Senate Finance Committee, Ranking Member Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Senator Hank Brown (R-CO), Chairman of the Ways & Means Committee William Archer (R-TX), Ranking Member Sam Gibbons (D-FL), Phillip Crane (R-IL), Chairman of the Trade Subcommittee, Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), Ranking Member of the Trade Subcommittee, and Representative Clay Shaw (R-FL), for their efforts to enact the legislation with overwhelming bipartisan support.

PLO CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT AND US SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER, JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE, GAZA, 6 OCTOBER 1996

CHAIRMAN ARAFAT: We had the privilege to meet with His Excellency this evening, especially his visiting us after our very important discussion, which had been fixed during the summit conference which took place in Washington, at the White House, under the supervision of his excellency, President Clinton. We have, to thank and repeat again, our thanks from our hearts to His Excellency, President Clinton, for what he has done, especially the courageous step for this meeting, which took place in Washington, in a very essential and very important period. Also, the visit of His Excellency,
Mr. Christopher, his delegation, the part of the summit conference and the American effort to protect and to push forward the peace process. We have here to repeat, in his presence, that we are committed to the peace process and we will do all our best from our side to follow-up with the peace process. Also, we hope that the other side - the Israeli - especially, will follow-up on the same line for the accurate and honest implementation of what has been agreed upon.

I have to repeat again my thanks for your presence, which will give us more support to push forward the peace process. Please convey to his excellency, President Clinton, my best regards and best thanks from our hearts for what he is doing to protect the peace process and to push it. Many thanks, many thanks, many thanks.

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I have just concluded a valuable meeting with the Chairman. One that I hope will contribute to making progress in the days ahead as the negotiations resume. President Clinton asked me to come out here to meet with both the Prime Minister and the Chairman, to work with them to try to ensure progress in the negotiations.

I think the recent violence underscores and makes it absolutely important that the parties address their differences quickly, and that they do so in a way to find areas of agreement between them. One of the things that has been clarified during my visit here is that the parties intend to negotiate within the four corners of the agreement. They intend to take steps toward implementation that are consistent with the agreement and do not seek to modify it. I think that is an important clarification that the Prime Minister made both in private and in public today in Jerusalem. I have stressed to both parties that it is important that they understand each other’s needs and requirements and work hard to find mutual interests. I think it is so essential that both parties in this negotiation emerge as winners, otherwise both will be losers. There can be no peace for the Israelis or the Palestinians without security and there certainly can be no security without peace.

The peace process offers the Palestinians the historic opportunity that they so long desired to build their own political and economic institutions. The peace process offers them an opportunity to end the conflict and confrontation and to replace it with a true reconciliation between the parties. Much, much progress has been made in the last three years and much more progress is within reach if we don’t fail in our tasks.

The United States will continue to support these negotiations in every way that we know how. I have asked Dennis Ross and his experienced team to work with both sides in the coming days to help them reach agreement.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for meeting with me tonight and I wish you the very best of luck and good fortune in the days of negotiation ahead. Thank you.

QUESTION (in Arabic): The negotiations will start in an hour. Do you expect any progress to come out of them?

CHAIRMAN ARAFAT (in Arabic): We hope, as I said, that the other party abides by the accurate and honest implementation of what has been signed and agreed upon. In this respect, I have to point out that Mr. Dennis Ross will follow through with us on these negotiations which will take place tonight and continue over the next few days to reach the basic form which can bring about success as well as protect the peace process. In this respect, I have to refer to the visit of European Union representative Dick Spring from Ireland, as well as the efforts made by Egypt and President Mubarak, in this respect.

QUESTION (in Arabic): ...the role of the United States in advancing the peace process, particularly when the United States ...(inaudible).

CHAIRMAN ARAFAT (in Arabic): Do not forget that the agreements were signed at the White House under the auspices of President Clinton. The United States is one of the two sponsors of the conference. The co-sponsor is Russia. We should not forget that President Clinton took that brave and
important step at the conference which he held a short while ago at the American White House. This effort, which President Clinton is undertaking, is being followed through by Mr. Christopher, Mr. Dennis Ross and the accompanying delegation.

QUESTION: Chairman Arafat, have you heard anything new in your discussions, this evening, that gives heart or greater optimism about the success of these talks, and secondly, do you think it is possible that there will be any significant progress or breakthrough before the US election.

CHAIRMAN ARAFAT: Their presence, no doubt, is very important for the peace process, and their efforts, you can not forget, because the continuity of their efforts will protect the peace process. I am sure of that.

QUESTION: Mr. Netanyahu has said he will not reopen the agreement. Your officials have always accused the Israelis of trying to re-negotiate Hebron. Are you now convinced that the Israelis will not try to open an agreement which has already been signed? Are you convinced?

CHAIRMAN ARAFAT: It is better not to speak about these matters before this meeting which will take place this evening in the presence of Mr. Dennis Ross, and we will not be alone, as I have mentioned.

QUESTION: Are you more confident...?

CHAIRMAN ARAFAT: We will have to wait and see.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have said twice today that it's important that no agreement can be reached if there are one winner and one loser, and that both sides have to be winners. If this is true, why was the White House summit perceived as having a winner and a loser. And how will you prevent that from happening in these negotiations?

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Carol, with all due respect to you and your colleagues, I think that was perception of the press. Both parties gained important results from the Washington meeting. They had an opportunity to get to know each other better, which is by no means insignificant in this matter. They pledged themselves to renounce violence; most importantly, they committed themselves to these very negotiations that will start tonight, intensively, continuously, and with US participation. That's something that from our standpoint is a positive result for both parties.

QUESTION: Chairman Arafat, it seems clear that the perception was that you came away from the summit in Washington with nothing; there was no agreement other than to keep talking. If an agreement is not reached within a few weeks, do you think that the violence will explode again? And for Secretary Christopher, are you also worried that the violence could resume if an agreement is not reached soon?

CHAIRMAN ARAFAT: First of all, it is very important to put into your consideration that the whole atmosphere is not easy, and for this we have to do all our best to achieve something concrete from these talks, especially, in the presence of Mr. Dennis Ross with us, according to the wishes of President Clinton. No doubt it will achieve something which will protect and save the peace process.

QUESTION: And if something is not achieved, will the violence flair up again?

CHAIRMAN ARAFAT: You have to ask the other side, not me.

QUESTION: Are you worried that the violence would flair up again, sir?

CHAIRMAN ARAFAT: You have to ask the other side.

SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: As I said earlier today, the situation is somewhat calmer. The closure is beginning to be eased, but it is still a dangerous situation. That is the reason why we think it is so urgent for
the parties to make progress in these negotiations and to achieve some tangible results. The Chairman told me he was doing everything he could to introduce and ensure that calm would remain, but I think the dangers in the situation are quite clear to all. I think that is why the President invited the parties to Washington - a really quite unusual moment for him to have done that - and I think that we all need to try to strive to achieve progress here so as to minimize the risks of violence in the future. Thank you very much.

FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC, ADDRESS AT THE TECHNION – TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, HAIFA, 21 OCTOBER 1996 [EXCERPTS]

My dear friends, peace is the cornerstone of French policy. Some have thought at times that by defining its Arab and Mediterranean policy France ran the risk of bringing into question its privileged relationship with Israel. For me, the opposite is true.

France has always had a strong Mediterranean vacation. We have long-standing and fruitful relations with the Middle East. Our friendship with all the countries of the region is a plus for Israel and for peace. The ties we maintain with Syria and Lebanon proved their usefulness during the serious crisis last April. Thanks to those ties and to our constancy friendship with Israel, France was able to play an important role on that occasion, alongside other partners ... As a friend to all sides, France can and must play its fully part in the region.

The same is true for Europe. It cannot be content with being the main provider of funds and the main economic partner for the Middle East. It must increasingly contribute to the peace process. Our friendship with Israel is both trustful and demanding. Yes, France expects a lot of your country. We understand that Israel should give pride of place in its preoccupations to the security of its citizens. We all remember vividly the terrible bomb attacks that caused so much suffering at the beginning of the year.

We known how much every one of you may feel threatened. The French have had terrorism on their soil. They share with you the same determination to fight it. That is why I took the initiative of a G7 conference on the subject. Nothing can ever justify having recourse to terrorism.

Be assured that we will be by your side every time your people are attacked by fanaticism, hatred and blind violence. In different forms, it is in fact the same enemy that we must all flight together.

And yet I am convinced that security cannot be guaranteed by force. If one’s owed is not kept, if agreements reached are not adhered to, there will be no peace. And if there is no peace, there will be no security.

If a fair, and lasting peace is not assured for all the peoples of the Middle East, let us be under no illusion, violence and terrorism will return. The tragic events of last month show evidence of this ...

Let us not allow the logic of confrontation to overcome the logic of reconciliation! Let us not allow history to slip backwards! Let us not allow the forces of the past, the suspicions, the fears, submerge the achievements of peace!

Consider the distance already traveled! I have in mind the statesmen of vision who with courage and lucidity have engaged the region along the path toward peace, sometimes at the cost of their lives. Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat. Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat. King Hussein and President Mubarak. Let us listen to their message, and follow the path they have laid down ....

Who could have imagined, only a few years ago, that Israel would manage to establish the foundations for harmonious coexistence with the Palestinian people, to make peace with Egypt and Jordan, to start the process of establishing normal relations with several other Arab states, to have its existence accepted by those who only recently were still refusing to do so?
As for the accords to be reached in the region, everyone knows on what principles they should be based: the right of peoples to self-determination and the exchange of territories for peace.

From a historical standpoint, the Israelis and the Palestinians have done the most difficult part: They have recognized each other.

It called for courage on the part of Israel to overcome the dramatic events of the past, to extend a hand to the Palestinians, and to accept them as a people.

It called for courage on the part of the Palestinian Liberation Organization to recognize Israel. In electing their Legislative Council the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza showed that they massively approved, and without mental reservation, the option based on confidence in reason and in the future.

The dialogue thus started has enabled spectacular progress to be made. There have also been moments of crisis and dramatic events. Last month dozens of Israeli and Palestinian victims paid the heaviest price for the falterings of the peace that is still to come. But the dialogue continued. The meetings between the prime minister of the state of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the president of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, show that the dialogue has survived despite the most serious difficulties.

However, commitments must become reality. Strong gestures must be made. The autonomy of the Palestinians must be fully translated into facts. The agreements entered into must be completely implemented. The Palestinians must be able to move about, work without let or hindrance, rebuild a ravaged economy. The tripartite plan of action, adopted jointly by Israel, the Palestinians, and the international community, must be revitalized so that the Palestinian territories can enjoy prosperity. And lastly the negotiations on the definitive status of the Palestinian territories must get under way without delay, on all the issues that were planned. The Palestinians must be able to exercise their right to self-determination.

My dear friends, with you I shall not try to finesse. You know what our thinking is, we the French, and the Europeans, regarding the terms of a lasting settlement.

As long as the Palestinians are not able to take charge of their own affairs, as long as they are not entitled to the dignity enjoyed by all other peoples, as long they have to make do with a second-rate collective existence, frustrations and bitterness will persist. And we all know the bitter fruits they produce.

On the contrary, a recognized Palestinian state would provide Israel with a true partner. Only such a partner will be capable of making, and adhering to, the commitments that are necessary for the security of Israel.

Lastly a just and balanced agreement will have to deal with the most difficult questions, Jerusalem, the situation of the refugees, and the future of the settlements. We must face reality squarely. Without a negotiated solution to these problems, peace in the Middle East can but illusory. Such is the price of security.

FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC, ADDRESS BEFORE THE PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, RAMALLAH, 23 OCTOBER 1996

Mr. Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and of the Palestinian Authority, Dear Yasser Arafat, Mr. Chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Ministers, Members of the Legislative Council,

I feel it a great honour to be the first foreign Head of State to be invited to speak before the first Assembly to be freely elected by the people of Palestine, on its own land.

Yesterday in Jerusalem, today in Ramallah, I measured how much every man and even woman of this land of Palestine is happy to welcome, on his, on her own soil, the representative of a country that is a friend. I could see the emotion in the eyes, the gestures. And this morning I share that emotion. The
emotion of being with you in the building of long-yearned for national institutions, of which this Legislative Council is one of the pillars. The emotion of accompanying a dignified and brave people along the road to peace. And, last but not least, the emotion of meeting in his own land the man who embodies that choice, Chairman Yasser Arafat.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Franco-Palestinian relations go back a long time. In the darkest hours, France was by your side, supporting your will to achieve self-determination. President Arafat, you reminded me recently that on two occasions France saved your life. Since then, you have been a regular visitor to Paris. And you chose to break your journey in Paris on your return from the Washington Summit. A few weeks earlier, in Paris, it was you, Mr. President of the Legislative Council, who launched the cooperation between our Parliaments.

In speaking before your institution today, my intention is to register with due solemnity the importance France attaches to your Assembly, the expression of Palestinian democracy. You are one of the tangible achievements of the peace process. I wish to pay tribute to the exemplary work you are doing and to your role in building a democratic Palestinian State. And I know how attached you are to the freedom and to the human rights you were denied for so long.

Ladies and Gentlemen, as elected representatives of the people you now hold an indivisible part of the national Palestinian sovereignty. Your responsibility to your people and to history is therefore capital. Like us in earlier times, you are engaged in the apprenticeship of democracy. Your task is all the more important that everything has to be created.

Like all democratic peoples, you are intent on pursuing your debates with dignity. Like them, you strive to draw up the best possible legislation. Like them, you try to define the political options and to express them clearly. Those are the tasks all nations assign to their representatives. May you find the rules that will ensure the balance between the executive and the legislative power. Such are, Mr. Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Mr. Chairman of the Legislative Council, your moral obligations towards the Palestinian people. I know that that is the road you are following.

This stands much to your credit. The respect for democratic principles is one of the assets that gives you wide international support and strengthens the confidence in you on the part of your partners.

Europe, which did a lot to help the holding of the general elections in January 1996, will continue to support you in the establishment of a State governed by the rule of law. There are still many difficulties on the way, but we are conscious of what has already been achieved, and we know how tenacious the Palestinians can be.

Your past has been marked by exile and sorrow. And sadly, the last few weeks have also seen tragedy and grief. Once again women, men and children have died. Palestinians, but also Israelis. For the sake of those who have died, for your own sake, for the sake of all of us who support you, do not give in when things are difficult! Resist the temptation of withdrawal and hatred! Keep your hope alive! Think of all the obstacles that have been overcome since the time - which was only yesterday - when many denied the very existence of the Palestinian people! Like others, your people has a history and a culture with roots in its own land, a profound unity and a natural aspiration to choose freely its destiny, to have its own State.

Victims of a history that was not their own, the Palestinians became a people without a land. You have known trials and exile, and yet you have held fast. Remain firm on the principles! Go on holding the olive branch! As you were already saying fifteen years ago, Dear President Arafat, and I quote you: 'Victory is not won by arms, but by faith, determination, abnegation and a just cause'. The Palestine Liberation Organization, in the difficult times it went through, gained legitimacy and international recognition. In accepting Israel's right to exist the Palestinian people agreed to a sharing of the land. And then, from Madrid to Oslo and Taba, Israel accepted the progressive exercise of your sovereignty.
I said it yesterday to your Israeli neighbours and partners, and I say it again today: the peace process is still fragile. It is true that decisive steps have been taken towards the 'peace of the brave' that President Arafat called for, referring to General de Gaulle. But we are only at mid-stream. Time is not on the side of peace, therefore not on the side of the two peoples, the Palestinian and the Israeli, who alike both want peace. Each new confrontation shows the mortal danger that lies in not moving forward. I have come here with a feeling of urgency.

I am conscious of the frustrations and the humiliations you may feel. I know the daily suffering you endure. But it is vital to remain cool and calm. Despite disappointments, to keep a level head. Together we must fight the temptation of violence, that can always reappear. We must beat off all extremists, throw back the forces of hatred. In rejecting violence as a way of expressing your claims you will be faithful to the action pursued indefatigably by President Arafat. You will also be faithful to those promoters of peace, President Sadat and, later, Yitzhak Rabin, who died for having shown vision and conviction in wanting reconciliation and peace.

There are those who think that the past weighs too heavily. But it can also be the source of mutual knowledge, that must change into understanding and cooperation. Such cooperation will be made both necessary and difficult by the relative scarcity of natural resources, particularly land and water. On both sides a lot of political courage will be needed. Peace has a price, but peace is priceless.

Today, in order to move forward, first the agreements that have been signed must be respected, both in letter and in spirit.

The period of autonomy must enable the two parties to measure what has been accomplished by both sides, to learn to live side by side, and to show that peace and neighbourly relations are not utopias.

The status is transitory: it must not be unduly prolonged. As of now, new settlements must stop, because continuing the process would seriously impair the likelihood of harmonious coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. The changes in the status quo in Jerusalem, the pulling down of houses, the expulsions, the construction and use of restricted highways must cease.

The unity of the Palestinian territories must also be preserved. In compliance with what was agreed, there must be freedom of movement within the West Bank and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. And finally the Palestinians must be able to exercise their right to economic development without which peace would be illusory. This implies that the territories should no longer be closed off, but also that they should be free to develop external trade. The construction of a port at Gaza, that France has decided to support, with our European partners, is an economic and a political necessity.

You know that Europe is the biggest donor of aid to the Palestinian economy. Such assistance will continue. Our purpose is a political one: Europe wants the Palestinians, through development, to reap the dividends of peace.

This determined action is part of an unwavering perspective: from Venice, in 1980, to Florence this year, the European Union has constantly come out firmly in favour of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. We will continue to mobilize the Union to ensure that its political role shall be commensurate with its economic commitment, so that it becomes a co-sponsor of the peace process. Our message will remain based on the principles I set out a few months ago in Cairo: the settlement of the Palestinian question is the key, the heart of a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

In order to achieve such a comprehensive peace, Israel's legitimate aspiration for security must be understood and accepted everywhere. Israel, assured of the peaceful intentions of its Arab neighbours, will become convinced that the existence of a Palestinian State, far from being a threat, will on the contrary be an element of its security. And then, as President Arafat put it, may the values of tolerance become the foundation of a new 'culture of peace' that will 'submerge the whole region'!
France is prepared to contribute to the definitive settlement by fostering political dialogue, by encouraging the setting up of institutions and by helping economic development. We do not forget the dispersed fragments of your nation, the majority in fact, who aspire to set eyes once more - for many for the first time - on their homeland. Due regard must be given to the rights of the refugees, which were asserted by the international community nearly fifty years ago, but never exercised. And lastly, there cannot be a peace that would exclude the “City of Peace”, Jerusalem. This was demonstrated by recent tragic events.

The whole world has its eyes on Jerusalem, the thrice Holy City. I can understand the passions it inspires. Its holiness, for the Muslims and the Christians, as for the Jews, cannot be dissociated from its existence as a city. That means that in order to retain its unique identity, its plurality must be preserved. The solution for Jerusalem cannot be solely religious, or solely national. It is necessary that freedom of access for the faithful, all the faithful, be guaranteed everywhere. And any idea of sovereignty, from whatever quarter, must be fitted into the framework of the negotiated compromise planned by the Oslo agreements. This compromise solution will have to take into account the aspirations and the rights of all the parties concerned.

Mr. Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and of the Palestinian Authority, Mr. Chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Ministers, Members of the Legislative Council,

To consolidate and extend autonomy. To settle the question of refugees. To imagine the status of Jerusalem. To set up your State. These are so many goals to be attained, so many problems to be solved, but their difficulty should not frighten us. Let us rather measure what has been achieved. The fact is that the most difficult part has already been done: mutual recognition and agreement on the stages to be completed in order to reach peace.

You have been able to achieve such results thanks to the support of the international community, the courage and vision of true statesmen, but also thanks to the unity you have managed to demonstrate, despite your dispersal. More than ever, preserve that unity!

In this long quest, France will be by your side so that, in rediscovered harmony, all the peoples on this historic land and shall live in peace.

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ISRAELI GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE, MAJOR PLO VIOLATIONS OF THE OSLO ACCORDS, JERUSALEM, 25 OCTOBER 1996

1. Failure to Change the PLO Covenant - The PLO was obligated to amend the clauses in the Palestinian National Covenant which called for the destruction of Israel no later than 7 May 1996 (Article XXXII (9)). On 24 April 1996, the PLO’s Palestinian National Covenant (PNC) met and approved such an amendment in principle, yet “the vote did not actually change the Covenant, but gave authority to a PNC legal committee to do so or to draw up a completely new charter within six months.” (Jerusalem Post, 25 April 1996) Six months have passed, and no such changes have been made, nor has the PLO specified which particular articles will be changed or when the changes will go into effect. By leaving the Covenant intact, the PLO sends a clear message that it has not renounced violence nor accepted Israel’s right to exist.

2. Incitement to Violence Against Israel - The Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership is obligated to refrain from incitement to violence, as part of their commitment to foster mutual understanding and to combat terrorism (Article XXII). Nonetheless, PA Chairman Yasser Arafat has repeatedly called for jihad (holy war) against Israel, praised prominent terrorists such as Yihya Ayyash “the Engineer” and encouraged acts of violence against Israelis. On 21 October 1996, Arafat met with a delegation of Hebron Arab notables and, in response to their complaints about the presence of Jewish settlers in the city, he rebuked them, saying, “What? Have you run out of stones in Hebron?” (Voice of Israel, 22 October 1996) Previously, on 6 October 1996, Arafat called Israel a “demon” and urged Arabs to use “all means” at their disposal to fight Israel. (New York Times, 7
August 1996) Speaking before Palestinian forces in Gaza on 24 September 1996, Arafat said, "They will fight for Allah, and they will kill and be killed... Palestine is our land and Jerusalem is our capital". (Ma'ariv, 4 October 1996) Incitement by Arafat and other senior PA officials encourages violence and undermines attempts to foster peace and mutual understanding.

3. Opening Fire on Israeli Forces - In September 1996, Palestinian policemen opened fire on Israeli soldiers and civilians during the disturbances in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, resulting in the deaths of 15 Israelis. The PA leadership actively instigated the rioting and took no steps to halt the armed attacks by PA police against Israeli forces. This was the most grievous violation of the Oslo Accords to date by the Palestinians. As Joel Singer, legal advisor to Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres and one of the chief architects of the Oslo Accords, put it, "The Palestinian policemen committed a very, very serious violation of the one of the basic principles in the agreement with Israel. Nothing can justify such behavior." (Near East Report, 21 October 1996) The Accords require that the Palestinian police act to prevent violence and cooperate with Israeli security forces (see, for example, Annex I, Article II). The conceptual foundation of the Oslo Accords is the rejection of violence and force as tools in the conduct of bilateral relations. By initiating violence against Israelis, the PA has violated a cornerstone of the agreement.

4. Failure to Confiscate Illegal Arms and Disarm and Disband Militia - The PA is obligated to disarm and disband all militias operating in the autonomous areas and to confiscate all unlicensed weapons (Article XIV; and Annex I, Articles II(1) and XI). Nevertheless, five militias - Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP, the DFLP and Fatah - continue to remain armed, and the PA has refused to disarm them. The PA has failed to undertake a systematic crackdown on illegal weapons, and has confiscated just a few hundred of the tens of thousands of weapons circulating in the autonomous areas. The PA's violation of these provisions of the accord have allowed terror groups to remain active and well-armed and to carry out deadly attacks against Israelis.

5. Failure to Extradite Suspected Terrorists to Israel - The PA is required to turn over for trial all suspects whose extradition is requested by Israel (Annex IV, Article II (7)), yet they have not extradited any of the 19 terror suspects whom Israel has sought for crimes such as murder and attempted murder. By failing to turn over wanted suspects to Israel, the PA has allowed terrorists to go unpunished, thereby encouraging others to carry out attacks in the knowledge that they will not have to answer for their actions.

6. Opening PA Offices in Jerusalem - The PA is required to locate all offices and ministries exclusively in areas under its jurisdiction (Article I (7)). Nevertheless, the PA has violated this provision by maintaining governmental offices such as the Orient House in Jerusalem. The PA Ministry of Religious Affairs and the PA Office of the Mufti are both located in Jerusalem, and several other PA offices operate in other sections of the city. In addition, Palestinian policemen operate in Jerusalem in contravention of the agreements. They have been involved in activities such as kidnapping, torturing and killing human-rights activists, journalists and suspected collaborators with Israel and punishing perpetrators of "morals crimes".

7. Recruiting Terrorists to Serve in the Palestinian Police - The PA is required to submit a list of all potential police recruits to Israel for approval (Annex I, Article IV (4)) to forestall the possibility that members of terrorist groups will join the PA security services. The PA has consistently failed to provide comprehensive listings of potential recruits to Israel and has proceeded to recruit policemen without Israeli consent. In several instances, the PA has even drafted wanted terrorists to serve in its security forces. Abd al-Majid Doudin, who helped plan the suicide bombing in Jerusalem on 21 August 1995, was convicted and sentenced by a PA court to 12 years imprisonment, but was subsequently freed and hired by the Palestinian police in Jericho. Similarly, Rajah and Amr Abu-Sita, who murdered Uri Megidish on 8 March 1993, and whose extradition was requested by Israel, were drafted to serve in the PA police in Gaza. (Yediot Ahronot, 22 June 1994) Such steps by the PA endanger the prospects for cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security forces and pose a security threat by providing terrorists with access to weapons and intelligence information.

8. Exceeding the Limit on the Number of Palestinian Police* - Under the Gaza-Jericho accord of May 1994, the PA was permitted to deploy a total of 9,000 policemen (Annex I, Article III (3)), but in actuality the number of Palestinian policemen was nearly 20,000. Under Oslo-II, the PA
may deploy up to 24,000 policemen in Areas A and B, including Gaza, (Annex I, Article IV (3)), yet they have exceeded this figure by at least 10,000. Reports in late September 1996 suggest that the PA security forces may exceed 50,000 men.

9. Abuse of Human Rights and the Rule of Law - The PA is obligated to conduct its affairs “with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law” (Article XIX). As various international human rights groups, such as Amnesty and Middle East Watch have pointed-out, the PA security forces have systematically utilized arbitrary arrests, detention and torture. Human rights activists, such as Bassam Eid, have been abducted by PA security agents, and freedom of the press has been virtually eliminated, with no criticism of the regime tolerated in the Palestinian media.

10. Conduct of Foreign Relations - The agreements explicitly forbid the PA from conducting foreign relations, allowing instead the PLO to conduct relations on the PA’s behalf for a limited set of purposes, such as concluding economic and cultural agreements (Article IX). Nevertheless, the PA has violated this provision and engaged repeatedly in diplomacy on the bilateral, multilateral (i.e. Arab League) and international (i.e. United Nations) levels.

*Clarification: Para. 8 should be amended as follows:
The size of the Palestinian Police - under the terms of the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian Police at this stage should comprise no more than 24,000 policemen (a further 6,000 may be recruited at a later stage). Despite this, in practice the Palestinian Police consists of over 28,000 policemen. In addition, the Agreement provides that every candidate for recruitment must be notified to Israel, which has the right to object. In practice, only 18,000 Palestinian policemen have been notified to and approved by Israel. In other words, the employment of over 10,000 policemen is in breach of the Agreement.

** EUROPEAN COUNCIL, CONCLUSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, DUBLIN, 28 OCTOBER 1996 **

The Heads of State and Government at the Special Meeting of the European Council in Dublin on 5 October asked Ministers at their next meeting to consider a mandate for the appointment of an EU envoy to the Middle East Peace Process. The situation created by the deterioration in the Peace Process has underlined the need for the European Union to contribute actively to advancing the Peace Process, commensurate with its substantial political and economic engagement in the region.

Ministers meeting at the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 28-29 October have decided to appoint as the EU’s envoy to the Peace Process Ambassador Miguel Angel Moratinos, who would have the following mandate.

- to establish and maintain close contract with all the parties to the Peace Process, other countries of the region, the US and other interested countries, as well as relevant international organisations, in order to work with them in strengthening the Peace Process;
- to observe peace negotiations between the parties, and to be ready to offer the EU’s advice and good offices should the parties request this;
- to contribute where requested to the implementation of international agreements reached between parties, and to engage with them diplomatically in the event of non-compliance with the terms if these agreements;
- to engage constructively with signatories to agreements within the framework of the Peace Process in order to promote compliance with the basic norms of democracy, including respect for human rights and the rule of law;
- to report to the Council’s bodies on the possibilities for EU interventions in the Peace Process, and on the best way of pursuing EU initiatives and ongoing MEPP-related EU business including the political aspects of relevant EU development projects;
- to monitor actions by either side which might prejudice the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.

It was also decided that the envoy will be guided by, and report under the authority of, the Presidency to the General Affairs Council on a regular basis, and as the need arises. The tasks of the envoy will be without prejudice to the role of the commission which will be fully associated in these tasks.

The EU strongly supports the US’s active and constructive role in the Peace Process. It wishes to associate itself with efforts contributing to the advancement of the Peace Process in an effective and complementary way. The envoy will bring the Union’s perspective and ideas for narrowing the gap between the parties, and for possible confidence-building measures between them.

☆☆☆

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ECONOMIC CONFERENCE, “CAIRO DECLARATION,” CAIRO, 14 NOVEMBER 1996

On 12-14 November 1996, the Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference was held in Cairo, Egypt, under the presidency of His Excellency Husni Mubarak. The conference, cosponsored by the United States and the Russian Federation, with the support of Canada, the European Union, and Japan, brought together senior government and private sector leaders from the Middle East and North Africa, as well as from other parts of the world.

Conference participants thanked President Mubarak and the Government of Egypt for hosting this event, and for the excellent organization and generous hospitality provided. The participants expressed their appreciation for Egypt’s leadership in the question for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Participants of the Cairo Economic Conference expressed their unwavering commitment to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, on the basis of the terms of reference of the Madrid Peace Conference established by UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338.

In this vein, they reaffirmed their determination to build upon the agreements reached among the parties and underlined the utmost importance of the faithful and expeditious implementation of those agreements by all parties in particular on the Israel-Palestinian track.

They further recommitted themselves to broadening and deepening peace and achieving progress on all outstanding issues on all the Arab-Israeli negotiating tracks of the peace process. They urged all parties to pursue measures and policies which would help build confidence between the people of the region.

The theme for the Cairo Economic conference was “Building for the Future: Creating a Friendly Environment.” The Conference provided an opportunity to encourage international and regional investment in the Middle East and North Africa.

The region’s economic, commercial, and trade potential was highlighted, which is being greatly enhanced by important economic reform programs currently being undertaken by many states in the region. These reforms, which include privatization, structural reform, and removing trade barriers, have provided for a more business friendly economic climate throughout the region.

International private sector representatives were given the opportunity to investigate in detail the increased economic and commercial opportunities in the region. Individual countries represented their investment and development programs, and cross-border opportunities were highlighted as well.

Constructive and fruitful discussions were held on topics of particular relevance to both the countries of the region and the international business community.
The participants stressed the crucial importance of the development of the Palestinian economy. They noted with concern that the already weak Palestinian economy is suffering from restrictions and closures which hinder the daily movement of Palestinian labor and trade.

The recognized the need of all parties in the region to live in peace, prosperity and security, the improvement of which will enhance the economic viability of the region as a whole.

The reiterated that removing restrictive measures and closures will prevent the decline of and contribute positively to the performance of the Palestinian economy, as well as the political atmosphere surrounding the peace process in its entirety.

The status of the economic institutions called for by the MENA conferences previously held at Casablanca and Amman was reviewed during the conference. The significant progress made on establishing the Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association in Tunis was welcomed by the participants. They underscored the importance of the Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development in the Middle East and North Africa in Cairo and its potential contribution to the promotion of capital flow to the region, to building infrastructure projects, and to the development of the private sector in the region.

The conclusion of the drafting of the agreement establishing the bank was welcomed. Countries were encouraged to sign the agreement and complete their funding and ratification procedures promptly in order to enable the bank to begin operations in 1997. Work on establishing a Regional Business Council was also reviewed, and the relevant parties recommitted themselves to moving this important initiative forward.

The Executive Secretariat of the MENA Conferences in Rabat has continued to develop successfully its programs and activities in fostering public/private partnership in the region between conferences.

The activities of the REDWG Monitoring Committee Secretariat, established in Amman pursuant to the Amman Declaration and formally inaugurated and institutionalized in May 1996, were reviewed. The activities of REDWG and the work of its monitoring committee in areas covered by the Copenhagen Action Plan (i.e., infrastructure, tourism, trade and finance) were also reviewed. Participants expressed their appreciation for the work done by the committee.

Government and private sector participants at the conference reaffirmed their commitment to continue to work as partners for peace and prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa. They underscored the importance of the economic underpinnings of peace. Nevertheless, they reaffirmed the urgency of achieving concrete progress in the political dimension of the Middle East peace process.

The participants expressed their appreciation for the unique role played by the World Economic Forum, whose tireless efforts were critical to the success of the conference. They also expressed their gratitude to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, for its important contribution to a number of conference sessions.

The participants decided to meet again in late 1997 in Doha, Qatar, for the fourth Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference.

LEVAN OF ARAB STATES, STATEMENT DENOUNCING EXPANSION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, CAIRO, 24 NOVEMBER 1996

The Secretariat of the League of Arab States is following with grave concern the decision of the Israeli Government to expand the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, occupied Arab Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights. It reaffirms that the measures taken by the Israeli Government to that end contribute to the tension in the region and generate an increase in acts of violence,
addition to the fact that those practices are causing a loss of confidence in the sincerity of the Israeli Government in moving forward in the peace process, and threaten to undermine that process.

The Secretariat of the League of Arab States, in denouncing those measures, holds the Israeli Government fully responsible for the outcome of its practices, which are incompatible with the rules and principles of international law, the decisions of international legitimacy and the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. It reaffirms that the continuation by the Israeli Government of those practices, and the acts of repression, terrorism and torture committed by it against citizens in the occupied Arab territories, will merely result in the creation of a thick wall of mistrust, compounded by the Israeli court's latest decision that Israeli interrogators are permitted to continue their bodily torture of Palestinian detainees. The Secretariat considers this decision to be a flagrant violation of the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the spirit of the current peace process in the region.

The Secretariat of the League of Arab States calls upon the States involved in the peace process in the Middle East, and in particular the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the States members of the European Union, to move speedily and effectively to maintain the momentum achieved in the peace process and to compel Israel to abide by the provisions of international law and the decisions of international legitimacy, especially Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 252 (1968), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978), and the principle of land for peace, with a view to transforming the Middle East into a region of peace, security and stability.

While the current public perception may be that it is only the Hebron issue which is stalling the peace talks, top Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat says that in fact all of these issues must be dealt with before the Palestinians will proceed to the final status negotiations.

1. The Israeli Government must dissolve its civil administration and withdraw its military government from the West Bank.
   Article 1, Provision 5, pg 8, Interim Agreement: “After the inauguration of the Council the Civil Administration in the West Bank will be dissolved and the Israeli Military government shall be withdrawn.”
2. The Israeli government must not use the term “Judea and Samaria.” The Interim Agreement refers to the “territories” as “West Bank.”
3. The Israeli government must recognize the territorial integrity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
   Article 11, pg 14, Interim Agreement: “The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.”
5. The Israeli government must implement the provision relating to the complete redeployment of Israeli forces and to the assumption of the responsibility of public order for Palestinians in Area B, by the Palestinian Authority.
   Article 13, Provision 2, pg 16: “There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli forces from Area B. Israel will transfer to the Council and the Council will assume responsibility for public order for Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.”
Also, Provision B2, pg 17: “The Palestinian police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents in which only Palestinians are involved.”

6. The Israeli government must adhere to the Agreement regarding the movement of Palestinian police in Area B.
   Article 13, Security Provision B4, pg 17: “... there months after the completion of redeployment from Area B, the DCOs may decide that movement of Palestinian policemen from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian towns and villages in Area B on roads that are used only by Palestinian traffic will take place after notifying the DCO.”

7. The Israeli government must implement the further redeployment phases from the West Bank.
   Article 17, Provision 8: “The Council Jurisdiction will extend gradually to cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues to be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, through a series of redeployments of the Israeli military forces. The first phase of the redeployment of Israeli military forces will cover populated areas in the West Bank (cities, towns, refugee camps and hamlets) as set out in Annex I, and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e., 22 days before the day of the elections.
Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence immediately upon the inauguration of the Council and will be effected in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be concluded no later than 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.”

8. The Israeli government must abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, in accordance with Article 22, provision 1, pg 24: “Israel and the Council shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda against each other, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.”

9. The Israeli government must move forward on the issue of displaced Palestinians, as specified in Article 27, Provision 2, pg 26: “The continuing committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of admissions of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with the necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.”

10. The Israeli government must honor the implementation of the agreement concerning the safe passages of persons, vehicles and goods between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Article 10, Annex 1, pg 61-64.

11. The Israeli government must immediately agree to resume the permanent status negotiations which commenced on 5 May, 1996. Article 31, Provision 5, pg 27: “Permanent Status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but no later than 4 May, 1996, between the parties. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover the remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, Refugees, Settlements, Security arrangements, Borders, Relations and Cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

12. The Israeli government must refrain from initiating or taking any step that may change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and thus should cease all settlement activities in the West Bank including East Jerusalem and in the Gaza Strip. Article 31, Provision 7, pg 28: “Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.”

13. The Israeli government must consider the transfer of the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Jeftlik area to the Palestinian Council in the first phase of the further redeployment phases.
   Article 31, Provision 14, pg 29: “While the Jeftlik area will come under the functional and personal jurisdiction of the Council in the first phase of redeployment, the area’s transfer to the territorial jurisdiction of the Council will be considered by the Israeli side in the first phase of the further redeployment phases.”

14. The Israeli government must respect and preserve the normal and smooth movement of people, vehicles and goods within the West Bank and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and remove the closure imposed on the Palestinian people immediately.
   Article 1, Annex 1, Provision 2, pg 32: “In order to retain the territorial integrity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit and to promote their economic growth and the
demographic and geographical links between them, both sides shall implement the provisions of
this Annex, while respecting and preserving without obstacles normal and smooth movement of peo-
ple, vehicles and goods within the West Bank and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.”

15. The Israeli government must remove all forms of the closure imposed on the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, and must not undermine the importance of the Palestinian development programs.

16. The Israeli government must respect the unity and integrity of the Palestinian people in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, and the fact that they are accountable to the Palestinian Authority only.

17. The Israeli government must respect the Agreement on Jewish Holy Sites in areas under the
Palestinian Authority’s jurisdiction.

18. The Israeli government must take note of the fact that Israeli-Palestinian joint patrols should
have begun their function on roads crossing Areas A, B and C in the West Bank.

19. The Israeli government must implement the provision in respect to movement of the Joint Mo-
bile Units in Area B. Each DCO will be allowed, within three months after
the completion of the redeployment in its respective district, to decide that joint patrols will
function on roads crossing Areas A, B and C.

20. The Israeli government must immediately stop all building activities in and around the Rachel’s
Tomb area.

21. The Israeli government must implement the provisions concerning the Mawasi Beach in the
Gaza Strip.

22. The Israeli government must honor the agreement on Hebron, as specified on Article 7, Annex
1, pg 51-53. It should be noted that the implementation of the Israeli forces redeployment from
Hebron should have been completed on 28 March 1996.

23. The Israeli government should have concluded with the Palestinian Authority arrangements
concerning passage of privately owned Palestinian vehicles on both Rafah and Allenby ter-
minals. Special arrangements will be agreed upon by the two sides regarding the passage of goods,
buses, trucks and privately owned vehicles.”

24. The Israeli government must take note that the Allenby bridge will be open through the year
except on Yom Kippur.

25. The Israeli government must relocate the Erez crossing point to a location within Israel adjacent
to the delimiting line.

26. The Israeli government must honor the Agreement concerning the free and normal movement of
people, vehicles and goods in the West Bank, between cities, towns, villages and refugee camps,
and that such movement shall be affected by checkpoints or roadblocks.

27. The Israeli government must immediately enter negotiations with the Palestinian Authority to
review the amended protocol on International passages.

28. The Israeli government must implement the Agreement regarding the security of the airspace.

29. The Israeli government must refrain from imposing closures on the Sea of Gaza.
30. The Israeli government must implement the provision relating to the establishment of the Gaza Sea Port. Article 1, Provision 4, pg 73.


32. The Israeli government must not violate any of the provisions of the protocol on Economic Relations. It should be noted that if the Israeli government continues its policy of preventing Palestinian workers from working in Israel, the whole protocol on Economic Relations will need to be reviewed by the two sides. Annex 5, pg 212-300.

33. The Israeli government must honor the Agreement regarding the release of prisoners and detainees. Annex 7, pg 314. It should be noted that all Palestinian female prisoners should have been released from 28 September, 1995.

34. The Israeli government must honor its commitments to enlarge the size of the Jericho Area.

DESCENDANTS OF THE FAMILIES OF HEBRON'S JEWISH COMMUNITY,
STATEMENT ON SETTLEMENT IN HEBRON, TEL AVIV, 6 DECEMBER 1996

[The Association of Hebron Descendants (some 50 persons of the city’s pre-1929 Jewish community) was launched in Oct. 1996 following the tunnel incident violence. The group opposes the Hebron settlers as none of them has any connection to the original Jewish community of the city.]

Seek Peace of Hebron
We, descendants of the families of Hebron’s ancient Jewish community - sons, daughters, grandchildren, and great grandchildren of the Jews who lived in Hebron for hundreds of years - want peace.

Peace for the City, Peace for Israel
At a time when the city of our forefathers and foremothers is in the eye of a storm threatening to explode the political process and to destroy the prospects of peace, we feel an obligation to say what is in our hearts.

Settlers living in the heart of Hebron do not have the right to speak in the name of the old Jewish community. Their pretensions to be representing or following the way of our parents is deceitful. These settlers are alien to the way of life of the Hebron Jews, who created in over the generations a culture of peace and understanding between peoples and faiths in the city.

The settlers who took possession of Jewish property in the heart of Hebron in the name of our families and our heritage are being dishonest. No one gave them the right to inherit our parents, whether private or community property. And they intend to add to their crime by taking possession of additional land and property.

Hebron Is Critical to Peace
Therefore, the government must evacuate the handful of settlers from the city at once, before they manage to explode the peace process and destroy the prospects for peace.

Signed: Amnon Bierman (Zarfati family), Eitan Roger (Mani, Hasson families), Ahuva Donivsky (Slonim family), Ronen Doron (Slonim family), Yael Doron (Slonim family), Yisrael Finkelstein (Einhorn family), Becky Freistadt (Gershon family), Moshe Gelmor (Hasson family), Rachel Grundland (Zarafati family), Chaim Hanegbi (Bajaio family), Michal Hasson (Hasson family), Ovadia Hasson (Hasson family), Rami Hasson (Hasson family), Tamar Hasson (Hasson family), Orit Hasson-Walder (Hasson family), Chaim Hazan (Avishar family), Eitty Horn (Franco family), Ruth Horowitz (Mani family), Ayner Horowitz (Mani family), Tamar Horowitz (Mani family), Rachel Tourgeman (Tourgeman family), Yair Kidan (Schneirson family), David Maroc (Schneirson family), Dafne Mendelowitz (Zarfati family),
ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE PEACE PROCESS,
JERUSALEM, 6 DECEMBER 1996 [EXCERPTS]

1. The Prime Minister briefed the ministers that the Cabinet will in the coming weeks discuss the pattern of the permanent settlement with the Palestinians. He said that he has a clear conception of a permanent settlement which would assure the State of Israel's vital interests. He will present this conception to the Cabinet, and will enable the Cabinet to fully discuss the issue.

2. The Prime Minister instructed the ministers not to allow government offices to leave Jerusalem. He said that he is banning government offices from leaving Jerusalem, and that any special request must be submitted to him.

3. The Prime Minister briefed the Cabinet on his visit to Europe and his meetings with heads of state there. He said that the expectation that the visit would place Israel under heavy pressure was not realized, and that we had succeeded in presenting European leaders with the facts regarding our positions. We made it clear that Israel champions a policy of openness vis-à-vis Europe. To the extent that Europe shows a more balanced and considered position, cooperation with it will increase.

Today, in most European countries and the U.S., it is understood that we are conducting the negotiations with goodwill. The Prime Ministers meeting with the U.S. Vice President emphasized the continuity in U.S. Israeli relations, and the composition of the new administration underscores the fact that the friendship between the two countries will continue alongside the common aspiration to advance peace between Israel and the Arab world.

Regarding the negotiations with the Palestinians, the Prime Minister emphasized that Israel favors the reciprocal implementation of commitments. The negotiations regarding Hebron have been exhausted, and it is possible to reach agreement on the remaining issues in a political-level meeting, unless the other side raises new obstacles at the last minute. The real question at this stage is whether the Palestinian side is interested in reaching an agreement.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION NO. 51/129 ON PALESTINE REFUGEES’ PROPERTIES AND THEIR REVENUES, NEW YORK, 13 DECEMBER 1996

The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 36/146 C of 16 December 1981 and all its subsequent resolutions on the question,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of resolution 50/28F of 6 December 1995,
Taking note also of the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine covering the period from 1 September 1995 to 31 August 1996,
Recalling that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of international law uphold the principle that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her property,
Recalling in particular its resolution 394 (V) of 14 December 1950, in which it directed the Conciliation Commission, in consultation with the parties concerned, to prescribe measures for the protection of the rights, property and interests of the Palestine Arab refugees,

Taking note of the completion of the programme of identification and evaluation of Arab property, as announced by the Conciliation Commission in its twenty-second progress report, and of the fact that the Land Office had a schedule of Arab owners and file of documents defining the location, area and other particulars of Arab property,

Recalling that in the framework of the Middle East peace process the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Government of Israel agreed, in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements of 13 September 1993, to commence negotiations on permanent status issues, including the important issue of the refugees, and calling for the commencement of those negotiations,

1. Reaffirms that the Palestine Arab refugees are entitled to their property and to the income derived therefrom, in conformity with the principles of justice and equity,

2. Requests the Secretary-General to take all appropriate steps, in consultation with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, for the protection of Arab property, assets and property rights in Israel and to preserve and modernize the existing records;

3. Calls once more upon Israel to render all facilities and assistance to the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;

4. Calls upon all the parties concerned to provide the Secretary-General with any pertinent information in their possession concerning Arab property, assets and property rights in Israel which would assist the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution;

5. Urges the Palestinian and Israeli sides, as agreed between them, to deal with the important issue of Palestine refugees’ properties and their revenues in the framework of the final status negotiations of the Middle East peace process;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its 52nd session on the implementation of the present resolution.

EUROPEAN UNION COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, DUBLIN, 13-14 DECEMBER 1996

1. The European Council express support for the Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process and welcomes the declared willingness of all parties to cooperate with him. It calls on all parties to recognise his appointment as a further demonstration of the Union’s commitment to promoting peace in the Middle East.

2. Recalling its Declaration at Florence on 21 June and the Council’s Declaration at Luxembourg on 1 October, it reaffirms its support for the fundamental principles of a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East, notably land for peace and self-determination for the Palestinians, with all that this implies.

3. The European Council is gravely concerned by the continuing deterioration in the peace process. It calls on all parties actively to discourage violence and work for a reduction of tension so that negotiations can resume on all tracks in accordance with the principles of Madrid and the terms of the Declaration of Principles.

4. The European Council calls for an early resolution of the deadlock over Hebron, implementation of the other outstanding elements of the Interim Agreements, and the early resumption of the Permanent Status Negotiations.

5. The settlements issue is eroding confidence in the peace process. Settlements contravene international law and are a major obstacle to peace.

6. Palestinian social and economic development require the immediate lifting of the blockade. The European Council urges the Israeli authorities to remove all restrictions except where Israel’s legitimate security interests are manifestly engaged, as in the case of acts of terrorism. The dire economic consequences - with their effect of breeding discontent and violence - have dissipated...
the optimism generated by the establishment of Palestinian self-rule. The Council has instructed
the Special Envoy to promote concrete and immediate measures to address these issues.
7. The European Council urges the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authorities to
cooperate at all levels in the interests of security and to take all necessary measures to con-
trol extremists and combat terrorism.
8. In the spirit of the Barcelona Process the European Council calls on the Mediterranean partners
which are concluding Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, to join with the Union in a
common effort to advance the development and integration of the Palestinian economy within
the region. The European Council recalls that both the Association Agreement with the Pales-
tinian Authority and the similar Agreement with Israel commit the parties to promote compli-
ance with the basic norms of democracy, including respect for human rights and the rule of law.

FORMER US OFFICIALS, LETTER TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU
REGARDING SETTLEMENTS, WASHINGTON, 14 DECEMBER 1996

Dear Prime Minister:
The undersigned have been involved in negotiating on behalf of the United States in the Middle
East peace process over the past twenty years. The policy of the administration from both political
parties that we have served has been premised on the conviction that a lasting solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict that ensures equity for all sides is in the interest of both the United States and our
friends in the region.

We know that you are working hard to reach an agreement on the transfer of Hebron to the Palestin-
ian Authority and congratulate you on continuing your efforts toward this important step. We recog-
nize that this agreement has taken difficult and protracted negotiations, and your dedication and that
of your cabinet colleagues to bring about successful resolution of these issues merit our deepest re-
spect. Certainly, there must be security for all citizens of Israel as a central requirement of this or any
future agreement. Yet there must also be a negotiated accord among the parties on the division of
lands in dispute.

We write because we are concerned that unilateral actions, such as the expansion of settlements,
would be strongly counter-productive to the goal of a negotiated solution and, if carried forward,
could halt progress made by the peace process over the last two decades. Such a tragic result would
threaten the security of Israel, the Palestinians, friendly Arab states, and undermined US interests in
the Middle East.

We, therefore, urge you as prime minister of the State of Israel, just as we also urge all on the Arab
side, not to take unilateral actions that would preclude a meaningful negotiated settlement and a com-
prehensive and lasting peace.

Sincerely,

(Signed:) James A. Baker III, Former Secretary of State
Richard Fairbanks, Former Middle East Peace Negotiator
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Adviser
Brent Scowcroft, Former National Security Adviser
Franck C. Carlucci, Former National Security Adviser
Robert S. Strauss, Former Middle East Peace Negotiator
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Former Secretary of State
Cyrus R. Vance, Former Secretary of State
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, DECISION ON SETTLEMENTS, 15 DECEMBER 1996

Restoring Parity
The Government of Israel's decision on 13 December 1996 to restore National Priority A status to the Jewish communities of Judea and Samaria put an end to four years of social and economic discrimination. The Government's decision is intended to reinstate social and economic parity between the Jewish communities and other developing areas of the country. Thus, for example, educators traveling to teach children in Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria will once again be subsidized by the government, as they were prior to 1992. These communities will now enjoy the same benefits as do those in the Jordan Valley, the Golan, the Gaza District and parts of the Negev and Galilee.

Consistent With Oslo
The Government's decision is fully consistent with the agreements signed by Israel and the Palestinians. Neither the Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993 nor the Interim Agreement ("Oslo 2") of 28 September 1995 contains any provisions prohibiting or restricting the establishment or expansion of Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Indeed, when he presented the Oslo 2 accords before the Knesset on 5 October 1995, the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin stated, "I wish to remind you, we made a commitment, meaning we reached an agreement, we made a commitment to the Knesset not to uproot any settlement in the framework of the Interim Agreement, nor to freeze construction and natural growth".

While there is a clause in the accords which prohibits changing the status of the territories, it was intended to ensure only that neither side would take unilateral measures to alter the legal status of the areas (such as annexation or declaration of statehood).

No Change in Land Policy
The government decision does not call for the establishment of new settlements, nor does it affect Israel's strict policy not to requisition private land for the establishment of settlements. Housing construction is allowed only on public land after an exhaustive investigation has confirmed that no private rights exist regarding the land in question.

Sending a Message to Terrorists
Jewish communities have flourished in Judea, Samaria and Gaza for thousands of years. The aim of terrorists is to instill fear among the residents of these communities and uproot them. The Government means to ensure that the terrorists will not achieve their goal.

ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON SETTLEMENTS, JERUSALEM, 19 DECEMBER 1996

At the weekly Cabinet meeting today (Thursday), 19.12.96:

The Prime Minister said that the Government of Israel is working very closely with the U.S. administration in order to advance the cause of peace, and this is in spite of the fact that we and the U.S. administration have different approaches on the issue of settlements. Israeli policy on the issue of settlements is in complete accord with what the Prime Minister stated to President Clinton at the beginning of the former's term. The principle of the policy is to continue construction within the framework of the borders of existing settlements; private lands will not be expropriated for the construction of homes; decisions on new settlements will be made only by the full cabinet; and the policy does not contradict the Oslo Accords, as was also stated by the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, STATEMENT ON HEBRON SHOOTING, JERUSALEM, 1 JANUARY 1997

On behalf of all [of] Israel's citizens, I want to express my shock and revulsion at the crime committed in Hebron today. We condemn it completely. It is a despicable crime. We still don't know if anyone was killed in Hebron today. We hope and we pray that there won't be any further fatalities as a result of this attack.

We extend our wishes for a speedy recovery to all those wounded in this attack, and I expressed these sentiments directly in a phone call to Chairman Arafat a short while ago. We all have to do whatever we can to restore calm and tranquillity, and law and order, to Hebron. I have spoken to the Minister of Defense, who is en route to Hebron to help quiet things. I have instructed the heads of our security arms to do everything that is necessary to restore stability in the city.

I call on all residents of Hebron - both Jews and Arabs alike - to act with restraint and responsibility. There have been - over the recent times - acts of violence on both sides and against both sides. There were Molotov cocktails hurled, there was physical aggression. All this must stop. We have to start a new era of peaceful coexistence with security in Hebron.

From the initial reports that have reached my office, it appears that this act, this crime, was committed by someone who tried to obstruct the impending agreement on Hebron. Someone, by the way, who is from outside the city of Hebron.

I think the agreement we have been laboring on for several months has been designed to prevent precisely such acts of violence. I have said repeatedly that undue delay in its conclusion and its implementation creates a twilight period of uncertainty and instability that could induce the kind of attacks that we have seen today. And that is why we are committed to the speedy resolution of this agreement, properly concluded, and no crime will stand in our way of doing so.

I again call on all Palestinians and Israelis, inside and outside of Hebron, to act and demonstrate responsibility and restraint. We have to live side by side with each other. This has been ordained by history and by geography. We have to do so in security and coexistence. The way of peace is the only way to assure that we achieve these aims, it is our only alternative."

US PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON, STATEMENT ON THE HEBRON AGREEMENT, WASHINGTON, DC, 14 JANUARY 1997

Good evening. A few minutes ago, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat called me to tell me that they have reached agreement on the Israeli redeployment in Hebron. This achievement brings to a successful conclusion the talks that were launched in Washington last September, and it brings us another step closer to a lasting, secure Middle East peace.
Once again, the Israelis and the Palestinians have shown they can resolve their differences and help to build a brighter future for their children by finding ways to address each other's concerns. And once again, the forces of peace have prevailed over a history of division.

Israel will promptly redeploy its troops. The parties will establish practical security arrangements to strengthen stability and improve cooperation. There will also be an agreed road map for further redeployment by Israel. The Palestinians have reaffirmed their commitments, including their commitment to fight terrorism.

I thank Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat for their leadership. King Hussein also deserves special recognition and gratitude for his work for peace. I also want to express my appreciation to President Mubarak for his support. Finally, let me thank Secretary Christopher who worked on this all weekend long, and our United States team. And especially let me thank our Special Middle East Coordinator, Dennis Ross, who has worked so hard and so long to help conclude this agreement.

Today's agreement is not an end in itself. Bringing its words to life will require active and continuous cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian officials. It will demand every effort to stop those who would choose confrontation over cooperation. In short, this is not a time to relax. It is a time to reinforce our commitment to peace.

That’s why it is so important that the Israelis and the Palestinians have agreed to continue to work on the remaining issues contained in their agreements. As they do, the United States will do all it can to help. We will do everything we can to build a just and durable peace - a peace that will mean a better life for Israelis, for Palestinians, for all the people of the Middle East. And now I'd like to ask Mr. Berger to come up here and give you the details from our perspective of what’s happened over the last couple weeks.

[...] I think it's a good omen, because keep in mind this agreement was not just about the Hebron redeployment. It was about a timetable for further redeployment; it was about other arrangements that would shape their future working relationship. So this is - there’s much more in this agreement now. And Mr. Berger can answer more questions about it.

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PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE REDEPLOYMENT IN HEBRON
("HEBRON AGREEMENT"), 15 JANUARY 1997

[See also Map 2 in the annex.]

In accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and in particular of Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement, both Parties have agreed on this Protocol for the implementation of the redeployment in Hebron.

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING REDEPLOYMENT IN HEBRON

1. Redevelopment in Hebron
The redeployment of Israeli Military Forces in Hebron will be carried out in accordance with the Interim Agreement and this Protocol. This redeployment will be completed not later than ten days from the signing of this Protocol. During these ten days both sides will exert every possible effort to prevent friction and any action that would prevent the redeployment. This redeployment shall constitute full implementation of the provisions of the Interim Agreement with regard to the City of Hebron unless otherwise provided for in Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement.

2. Security Powers and Responsibilities
   a. (1) The Palestinian Police will assume responsibilities in Area H-I similar to those in other cities in the West Bank; and
(2) Israel will retain all powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area H-2. In addition, Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for overall security of Israelis.

b. In the context - both sides reaffirm their commitment to honor the relevant security provisions of the Interim Agreement, including the provisions regarding - Arrangements for Security and Public Order (Article XII of the Interim Agreement); Prevention of Hostile Acts (Article XV of the Interim Agreement); Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence (Article II of Annex I to the Interim Agreement); Guidelines for Hebron (Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement); and Rules of Conduct in Mutual Security Matters (Article XI of Annex I to the Interim Agreement).

3. Agreed Security Arrangements
   a. With a view to ensuring mutual security and stability in the City of Hebron, special security arrangements will apply adjacent to the areas under the security responsibility of Israel, in Area H-1, in the area between the Palestinian Police checkpoints delineated on the map attached to this Protocol as Appendix I (hereinafter referred to as “the attached map”) and the areas under the security responsibility of Israel.

   b. The purpose of the above mentioned checkpoints will be to enable the Palestinian Police, exercising their responsibilities under the Interim Agreement, to prevent entry of armed persons and demonstrators or other people threatening security and public order, into the above mentioned area.

4. Joint Security Measures
   a. The DCO will establish a sub-office in the City of Hebron as indicated on the attached map.

   b. JMU will operate in Area H-2 to handle incidents that involve Palestinians only. The JMU movement will be detailed on the attached map. The DCO will coordinate the JMU movement and activity.

   c. As part of the security arrangements in the area adjacent to the areas under the security responsibility of Israel, as defined above, Joint Mobile Units will be operating in this area, with special focus on the following places:

      (1) Abu Sneinah
      (2) Harat A-Sheikh
      (3) Sha’aba
      (4) The high ground overlooking new Route No. 35.

   d. Two Joint Patrols will function in Area H-1.

      (1) a Joint Patrol which will operate on the road from Ras e-Jura to the north of the Dura junction via E-Salaam Road, as indicated on the attached map; and

      (2) a Joint Patrol which will operate on existing Route No. 35, including the eastern part of existing Route No. 35, as indicated on the attached map.

   e. The Palestinian and Israeli side of the JMUs in the City of Hebron will be armed with equivalent types of weapons (Mini-Ingraham sub machine-guns for the Palestinian side and short M16s for the Israeli side).

   f. With a view to dealing with the special security situation in the City of Hebron, a Joint Coordination Center (hereinafter the “JCC”), headed by senior officers of both sides, will be established in the DCO at Har Manoah/Jabel Manoah. The purpose of the JCC will be to coordinate the joint security measures in the City of Hebron. The JCC will be guided by all the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement, including Annex I and this Protocol. In this context, each side will notify the JCC of demonstrations and actions taken in respect of such demonstrations, and of any security activity, close to the areas under the responsibility of the other side, including in the area defined in Article 3(a) above. The JCC shall be informed of activities in accordance with Article 5(d)(3) of this Protocol.

5. The Palestinian Police
   a. Palestinian police stations or posts will be established in Area H-1, manned by a total of up to 400 policemen, equipped with 20 vehicles and armed with 200 pistols, and 100 rifles for the protection of the police stations.
b. Four designated Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) will be established and stationed in Area H-1, one in each of the police stations, as delineated on the attached map. The main task of the RRTs will be to handle special security cases. Each RRT shall be comprised of up to 16 members.
c. The above mentioned rifles will be designated for the exclusive use of the RRTs, to handle special cases.
d. The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in Area H-1.
   (1) Activities of the RRTs armed with rifles in the Agreed Adjacent Area, as defined in Appendix 2, shall require the agreement of the JCC.
   (2) The RRTs will use the rifles in the rest of Area H-1 to fulfill their above mentioned tasks.
e. The Palestinian Police will ensure that all Palestinian policemen, prior to their deployment in the City of Hebron, will pass a security check in order to verify their suitability for service, taking into account the sensitivity of the area.

6. Holy Sites
   a. Paragraphs 2 and 3(a) of Article 32 of Appendix 1 to Annex III of the Interim Agreement will be applicable to the following Holy Sites in Area H-1:
      (1) The Cave of Othniel Ben Knaz / El-Khalil;
      (2) Elonei Mamre / Haram Er-Rameh;
      (3) Eshel Avraham / Balotat Ibrahim; and
      (4) Maayan Sarah / Ein Sarah.
   b. The Palestinian Police will be responsible for the protection of the above Jewish Holy Sites. Without derogation from the above responsibility of the Palestinian Police, visits to the above Holy Sites by worshippers or other visitors shall be accompanied by a Joint Mobile Unit, which will ensure free, unimpeded and secure access to the Holy Sites, as well as their peaceful use.

7. Normalization of Life in the Old City
   a. Both sides reiterate their commitment to maintain normal life the throughout the City of Hebron and to prevent any provocation or friction that may affect the normal life in the city.
   b. In this context, both sides are committed to take all steps and measures necessary for the normalization of life in Hebron, including:
      (1) The wholesale market - Hasbah - will be opened as a retail market in which goods will be sold directly to consumers from within the existing shops.
      (2) The movement of vehicles on the Shuhada Road will be gradually returned, within 4 months, to the same situation which existed prior to February 1994.

8. The Imara
   The Imara will be turned over to the Palestinian side upon the completion of the redeployment and will become the headquarters of the Palestinian Police in the City of Hebron.

9. City of Hebron
   Both sides reiterate their commitment to the unity of the City of Hebron, and their understanding that the division of security responsibility will not divide the city. In this context, and without derogating from the security powers and responsibilities of either side, both sides share the mutual goal that movement of people, goods and vehicles within and in and out of the city will be smooth and normal, without obstacles or barriers.

CIVIL ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE REDEPLOYMENT IN HEBRON

10. Transfer of Civil Powers and Responsibilities
   a. The transfer of civil powers and responsibilities that have yet to be transferred to the Palestinian side in the city of Hebron (12 spheres) in accordance with Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement shall be conducted concurrently with the beginning of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron.
   b. In Area H-2, the civil powers and responsibilities will be transferred to the Palestinian side, except for those relating to Israelis and their property, which shall continue to be exercised by the Israeli Military Government.
11. Planning, Zoning and Building
   a. The two parties are equally committed to preserve and protect the historic character of the city in a way which does not harm or change that character in any part of the city.
   b. The Palestinian side has informed the Israeli side that in exercising its powers and responsibilities, taking into account the existing municipal regulations, it has undertaken to implement the following provisions:
      (1) Proposed construction of buildings above two floors (6 meters) within 50 meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the list attached to this Protocol as Appendix 3 (hereinafter referred to as “the attached list”) will be coordinated through the DCL.
      (2) Proposed construction of buildings above three floors (9 mtrs) between 50 and 100 meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the attached list will be coordinated through the DCL.
      (3) Proposed construction of non-residential, non-commercial buildings within 100 meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the attached list that are designed for uses that may adversely affect the environment (such as industrial factories) or buildings and institutions in which more than 50 persons are expected to gather together will be coordinated through the DCL.
      (4) Proposed construction of buildings above two floors (6 meters) within 50 meters from each side of the road specified in the attached list will be coordinated through the DCL.
      (5) The necessary enforcement measures will be taken to ensure compliance on the ground with the preceding provisions.
      (6) This Article does not apply to existing buildings or to new construction or renovation for which fully approved permits were issued by the Municipality prior to January 15th, 1997.

12. Infrastructure
   a. The Palestinian side shall inform the Israeli side, through the DCL, 48 hours in advance of any anticipated activity regarding infrastructure which may disturb the regular flow of traffic on roads in Area H-2 or which may affect infrastructure (such as water, sewage, electricity and communications) serving Area H-2.
   b. The Israeli side may request, through the DCL, that the Municipality carry out works regarding the roads or other infrastructure required for the well being of the Israelis in Area H-2. If the Israeli side offers to cover the costs of these works, the Palestinian side will ensure that these works are carried out as a top priority.
   c. The above does not prejudice the provisions of the Interim Agreement regarding the access to infrastructure, facilities and installations located in the city of Hebron, such as the electricity grid.

13. Transportation
   The Palestinian side shall have the power to determine bus stops, traffic arrangements and traffic signalization in the city of Hebron. Traffic signalization, traffic arrangements and the location of bus stops in Area H-2 will remain as they are on the date of the redeployment in Hebron. Any subsequent change in these arrangements in Area H-2 will be done in cooperation between the two sides in the transportation sub-committee.

14. Municipal Inspectors
   a. In accordance with paragraph 4.c of Article VII of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, plain-clothes un-armed municipal inspectors will operate in Area H-2. The number of these inspectors shall not exceed 50.
   b. The inspectors shall carry official identification cards with a photograph issued by the Municipality.
   c. The Palestinian side may request the assistance of the Israel Police, through the DCL of Hebron, in order to carry out its enforcement activities in Area H-2.

15. Location of Offices of the Palestinian Council
   The Palestinian side, when operating new offices in Area H-2, will take into consideration the need to avoid provocation and friction. Where establishing such offices might affect public order or security the two sides will cooperate to find a suitable solution.
16. Municipal Services
In accordance with paragr. 5 of Article VII of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, municipal services shall be provided regularly and continuously to all parts of the city of Hebron, at the same quality and cost. The cost shall be determined by the Palestinian side with respect to work done and materials consumed, without discrimination.

MISCELLANEOUS

17. Temporary International Presence
There will be a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). Both sides will agree on the modalities of the TIPH, including the number of its members and its area of operation.

18. Annex I
Nothing in this Protocol will derogate from the security powers and responsibilities of either side in accordance with Annex I to the Interim Agreement.

19. Attached Appendices
The appendices attached to this Protocol shall constitute an integral part hereof.

Done at this 15th day of January 1997.

For the Government of the State of Israel   For the PLO
D. Shomrom       S. Erakat

APPENDIX 1
(Hebron Redeployment (Map – see Appendices to this Volume, the ed.))

APPENDIX 2
(Article 5)

Agreed Adjacent Area
The Agreed Adjacent Area (“AAA”) shall include the following:

1) An area defined by a line commencing from AAA Reference Point (RP) 100, proceeding along old Route No. 35 until RP 101, continuing by a straight line to RP 102, and from there connected by a straight line to RP 103.
2) An area defined by a line commencing at RP 104, following a straight line to RP 105, from there following a line immediately westward of checkpoints 4,5,6,8,9,10,11,12 and 13, and from there connected by a straight line to RP 106.
3) An area defined by a line connecting RPS 107 and 108, passing immediately northward of checkpoint 15.

APPENDIX 3
(Article II)

List of Locations
The area of Al Haram Al Ibrahimi/the Tomb of the Patriarchs (including the military and police installations in its vicinity).
Al Hisba / Avraham Avinu
Osama School / Beit Romano (including the military location in its vicinity)
Al Daboya / Beit Hadassah
Jabal Al Rahama / Tel Rumeida
The Jewish Cemeteries
Dir Al Arbein / the Tomb of Ruth and Yishai
Tel Al Jaabra / Givaat Avot Neighborhood (including the police station in its vicinity)
The Road connecting Al Haram Al Ibrahimi / the Tomb of the Patriarchs and Qiryat Arba

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US SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER, US LETTER OF ASSURANCE TO ISRAEL, WASHINGTON, DC, 15 JANUARY 1997

[Christopher’s letters of assurance to Prime Minister Netanyahu and to Arafat - were part of the Hebron agreement although not official. Only the letter to Netanyahu was made public]

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I wanted personally to congratulate you on the successful conclusion of the “Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron.” It represents an important step forward in the Oslo peace process and reaffirms my conviction that a just and lasting peace will be established between Israelis and Palestinians in the very near future.

In this connection, I can assure you that it remains the policy of the United States to support and promote full implementation of the Interim Agreement in all of its parts. We intend to continue our efforts to help ensure that all outstanding commitments are carried out by both parties in a cooperative spirit and on the basis of reciprocity.

As part of this process, I have impressed upon Chairman Arafat the imperative need for the Palestinian Authority to make every effort to ensure public order and internal security within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I have stressed to him that effectively carrying out this major responsibility will be a critical foundation for completing implementation of the Interim Agreement, as well as the peace process as a whole.

I wanted you to know that, in this context, I have advised Chairman Arafat of US views on Israel’s process of redeploying its forces, designating specified military locations and transferring additional powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority. In this regard, I have conveyed our belief that the first phase of further redeployments should take place as soon as possible, and that all three phases of further redeployments should be completed within 12 months from the implementation of the first phase of the further redeployments but no later and mid-1998.

Mr. Prime Minister, you can be assured that the United States’ commitment to Israel’s security is ironclad and constitutes the fundamental cornerstone of our special relationship. The key element in our approach to peace, including the negotiations and implementation of agreements between Israel and its Arab partners, has always been a recognition of Israel’s security requirements. Moreover, a hallmark of US policy remains our commitment to work cooperatively to seek to meet the security needs that Israel identifies. Finally, I would like to reiterate our position that Israel is entitled to secure our position that Israel is entitled to secure and defensible borders, which should be directly negotiated and agreed with its neighbors.

Sincerely,

Warren Christopher

EUROPEAN UNION PRESIDENCY, LETTERS TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY ON THE HEBRON AGREEMENT, BRUSSELS, 15 JANUARY 1997

[On 15 Jan. 1997, the Pres. of the EU Council addressed the following letter to PM Netanyahu and Pres. Arafat on the conclusion of the Hebron Agreement.]

Dear Mr. Prime Minister/Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, I should like warmly to congratulate you and President Arafat/Prime Minister Netanyahu on the agreement you have reached today on redeployment in Hebron. This agreement marks an important step on the road towards a just and stable peace in the Middle East, as it can provide the new momentum that is necessary to reinvigorate the peace process. Allow me to express the hope that the Hebron agreement will strengthen the atmosphere of mutual confidence which is indispensable for the further implementation of the Oslo agreements.
Over the past days the European Special Envoy to the Middle East, Ambassador Moratinos, has been in frequent contact with you, President Arafat/Prime Minister Netanyahu, and his American colleagues. Let me assure you that collectively and through its Special Envoy the European Union, in close contact and coordination with the United States, will continue to do its utmost to assist you in making progress on the difficult road to a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement. The statesmanship which you have demonstrated in reaching this agreement deserves our admiration and augurs well for the speedy and successful resumption of talks on the other outstanding issues.

(Signed) Hans van Mierlo
President of the Council of Ministers of the European Union,
Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

US SPECIAL MIDDLE EAST COORDINATOR DENNIS ROSS, NOTE FOR THE RECORD
PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU AND PA PRESIDENT YASSER ARAFAT, 15 JANUARY 1997

The two leaders met on January 15, 1997, in the presence of the US Special Middle East Coordinator. They requested him to prepare this Note for the Record to summarize what they agreed upon at their meeting.

Mutual Undertakings
The two leaders agreed that the Oslo peace process must move forward to succeed. Both parties to the Interim Agreement have concerns and obligations. Accordingly, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to implement the Interim Agreement on the basis of reciprocity and, in this context, conveyed the following undertakings to each other:

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Israeli Responsibilities

The Israeli side reaffirms its commitments to the following measures and principles in accordance with the Interim Agreement:

Issues for Implementation

1. Further Redeployment Phases
   The first phase of further redeployments will be carried out during the first week of March.

2. Prisoner Release Issues
   Prisoner release issues will be dealt with in accordance with the Interim Agreement's provisions and procedures, including Annex VII.

Issues for Negotiation

3. Outstanding Interim Agreement Issues
   Negotiations on the following outstanding issues from the Interim Agreement will be immediately resumed. Negotiations on these issues will be conducted in parallel:
   a. Safe Passage
   b. Gaza Airport
   c. Gaza Port
   d. Passages
   e. Economic, financial, civilian and security issues
   f. People-to-people

4. Permanent Status Negotiations
   Permanent status negotiations will be resumed within two months after implementation of the Hebron Protocol.

Palestinian Responsibilities

The Palestinian side reaffirms its commitments to the following measures and principles in accordance with the Interim Agreement:

1. Complete the process of revising the Palestinian National Charter

2. Fighting terror and preventing violence
   a. Strengthening security cooperation
   b. Preventing incitement and hostile propaganda, as specified in Article XXII of the Interim Agreement
   c. Combat systematically and effectively terrorist organizations and infrastructure
   d. Apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists
   e. Requests for transfer of suspects and defendants will be acted upon in accordance with Article II (7)(f) of Annex IV to the Interim Agreement
   f. Confiscation of illegal firearms

3. Size of Palestinian Police will be pursuant to the Interim Agreement.

4. Exercise of Palestinian governmental activity, and location of Palestinian governmental offices, will be as specified in the Interim Agreement.

The aforementioned commitments will be dealt with immediately and in parallel.

Other Issues

Either party is free to raise other issues not specified above related to implementation of the Interim Agreement and obligations of both sides arising from the Interim Agreement.

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ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ APPROVING THE HEBRON PROTOCOL AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, JERUSALEM, 15 JANUARY 1997

At a special Cabinet meeting held on Wednesday, 15 January 1997, the Cabinet decided as follows:

1. To approve the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, as well as the Note for the Record and the Agreed Minute, which were initialled by representatives of Israel and the Palestinians on Shevat 5757, 14 January 1997.
2. The Government will act to maintain all the conditions and requirements necessary for the existence, security and consolidation of the Jewish community in Hebron.

3. Details of the further stages of the redeployment in Judea and Samaria will be determined by the Government of Israel.

4. The Government will soon begin to discuss the principles of the permanent status arrangements, with the aim of concluding its deliberations prior to the implementation of the second stage of the further redeployment, at the very latest.

5. The Government reiterates that a fundamental condition for the continuation of the [peace] process with the Palestinians is the mutual fulfilment of the obligations of both sides, as itemized in the Note for the Record of 14 January 1997.

The Cabinet decision was adopted by a vote of 11 to 7. Upon the adoption of the decision, Minister Benjamin Begin announced his resignation from the Government.

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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Statement to the Knesset on the Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron, Jerusalem, 16 January 1997

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of Knesset,

There are difficult days. Every step that we take in the city of the patriarchs and the matriarchs is difficult, even when we redeploy in Hebron. We are not leaving Hebron, we are not redeploying from Hebron. In Hebron, we touch on the very basis of our national consciousness, the bedrock of our existence. Everyone whose heart beats with national feeling, with Jewish feeling, cannot help but feel the weight of the responsibility placed on our shoulders, and the supreme obligation to preserve our heritage.

At the same time, we cannot ignore reality. I must say to the Members of the Knesset and the citizens of Israel, that we inherited a difficult reality. The agreements signed by the previous governments are binding upon the Government of Israel. We said this in the election campaign, we said this after the election campaign, before the establishment of the government and afterwards. These agreements which we inherited were framework agreements, full of breaches, and we criticized them - and rightly so - because they did not take into proper account the problem of security; they did not take into account the full significance of the agreements for our national security; they did not demonstrate sufficient concern for the fate of the settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, including the fate of the Jewish community in Hebron.

We inherited difficult agreements. This is the reality. One could try to ignore it. We chose not to ignore this reality. These agreements comprised written texts; but worse, was the “oral law.” At least part of the previous leadership - I do not wish to include them all sought to use these agreements to bring about objectives and goals which in my view are dangerous - potentially disastrous for our future. This was true both with regard to Hebron and with regard to the permanent status arrangements.

With regard to Hebron, we inherited a framework agreement full of holes. I want to clarify that this is an agreement of two to three pages, which comprises a list of general instructions. This is the “written law.” I say that there was also an “oral law”, in which at least part of the coalition - an important part - had the courage and the integrity to openly state their intention, their goal - in placards posted on streets and in buses. Part of the coalition did conceal its intention was to uproot the Jewish community in Hebron, to remove it. Some of the Labor ministers of the previous government did not conceal that this was their opinion, and the goal of the government.

I want to make this clear, not in order to indulge in polemics but to clarify a fundamental point: We are committed to the written agreements. We are not committed to the ‘oral law.” Our viewpoint and our objectives are completely different. We do not want to remove the Jewish community from Heb-
ron. We want to preserve and consolidate it. We do not want to remove ourselves from Hebron; we want to remain in Hebron. From this different objective are derived those items, those paragraphs, those components which were inserted into the agreement as a result of the negotiations. The agreement today is of course much broader, much more detailed.

But the major point that I wish to convey to the members of Knesset with regard to our policy is that it is our different objective, in this case to remain in Hebron, that dictates in the details in the agreement before you. From this different objective, we saw to it that there would be areas of separation, we removed the rifles, we saw to it that there would be an IDF presence in the territories overlooking the Jewish community and the major routes, through joint patrols. We saw to it that the Jewish community would be protected from high Palestinian buildings that could threaten or encroach on Jewish homes. We saw to improved and more numerous security mechanisms between us and the Palestinian security forces in order to make possible a reality of security, a reality of living, a reality of development and consolidation for the Jewish community.

I can therefore say with confidence that this is an agreement that is better, more secure, more responsible than that which we inherited. But above all, I would like to appeal to the residents of Hebron. I know that you are fearful today, and I would like to say to you, brothers and sisters, that we are concerned for you, that we do not see you as an insignificant appendage. We see you as dear brothers. We are concerned for each and every one of you. We do not see you as 400 insignificant Jews, but as our representatives.

I do not say today that there are no dangers. I do not say that this is a perfect agreement - it cannot be. We received it in its crude form as a flawed agreement. But neither do I say that we did not act to distance ourselves from dangers and to limit them. This is what we did. But in the last analysis, every agreement is dependent upon the goodwill of the signatories. I call from this podium upon the Palestinians and our Arab neighbors to support the agreement, to fulfill all its provisions, in order that security should be preserved. A better, more secure agreement is important to both sides. An agreement that will not be upheld, security that will founder will be bad for both sides.

Until now, Hebron has been a symbol of division and conflict because of the hostility between Palestinians and Israelis. Now we have an opportunity to prove that Hebron can also serve an opposite example one of cooperation, of co-existence, a paradigm of peace.

With the signing of the Hebron agreement, we are embarking on a fateful course, which will not be simple, whose final goal, on the conclusion of the negotiations on the permanent status arrangements, is to bring peace with security between us and the Palestinians.

I want to say again to the Members of Knesset. In this agreement, too, under the general framework of Oslo, we inherited an agreement which was not to our liking. The agreement was divided into a written text which is binding, and an “oral law” whose purpose, at least for part of the leadership, a considerable part, would have produced negative results: withdrawal to the ’67 lines or almost; the establishment of a Palestinian state; and event he division of Jerusalem.

We are committed, of course, to the written agreements. We have demonstrated today that we are fulfilling our commitments. But our goals are different. We are using the time interval in the agreement to achieve our goals: to maintain the unity of Jerusalem, to ensure the security depth necessary for the defense of the State, to insist on the right of Jews to settle in their land, and to propose to the Palestinians a suitable arrangement for self-rule but without the sovereign powers which pose a threat to the State of Israel.

This is the mandate which the government which I head received from the voters. With this, we will go forward. In following this course, not only is our goal different but also the way to achieve this goal, as is the way to move forward, to conduct negotiations.
We insisted on three fundamental principles in the course of the negotiations, both on Hebron and on the agreement to follow Hebron.

The first is the principle of reciprocity. We established the principle of reciprocity in an official document as a basic principle for the continuation of the process of the permanent status negotiations. This is now an integral part of the agreement. Both sides agreed on a list of mutual undertakings and clarified that the fulfillment of the agreement, the fulfillment of the understandings of one side will be dependent upon the fulfillment by the other side. I do not know any other interpretation of the word “agreement”. An agreement that obliges only the Israeli side, where only the Israeli side gives and the Palestinian side takes, is not an agreement. An agreement in which both sides accept the mutual commitment to fulfill obligations - this is an agreement. What we have today in the documents before you is the anchoring and formalization of the principle of reciprocity, for the first time since the Oslo agreements.

The second important issue that was clarified in the agreements and documents achieved in the course of these negotiations is that the implementation of the redeployments will be an Israeli decision that will not be a matter for negotiation with the Palestinians. This decision must comply with Israel’s security considerations, as Israel sees fit. It is Israel that will define the security zones. But before this, it is Israel that will determine the nature and scope of the three redeployments - not only the first and second, but also the third. This is also the way in which the United States interprets the agreement. And I believe this is [a] very important distinction. For us, for the entire Knesset, there must be absolute consensus on the supreme importance that Israel will be able to define, accord to its own understanding, the security needs of the State of Israel and to carry out the further redeployments according to this understanding.

The third achievement, beyond the reciprocity and to Israeli definition of the redeployments, is the time frame. I believe that this is not something that stands alone. Rather, it allows us room for maneuver, room to test reality, room to test reciprocity in the fulfillment of the agreement.

These three elements are a significant change, and a change for the better, compared to our situation not long ago, only a few months ago. We were in the midst of an almost uncontrolled dash to the “67 lines. Nine months from today we might have found ourselves almost at these borders, with the only subject in effect remaining on the agenda - Jerusalem. This situation - I say to both the opposition and the coalition - we have change completely. We will conduct negotiations with the time, the ability and the freedom for political maneuver that we did not enjoy before. We will conduct the negotiations carefully, responsibly, with discretion. I am convinced that our goals of preserving Jerusalem, preserving the security depth, preserving Israel’s ability to defend itself, and a suitable arrangement with the Palestinians - I am convinced that these are goals which the large majority of the Israeli people support, and that the large majority of the people support the course which we have set, insisting on reciprocity and security.

In practical terms - not in the Hague court, but in the court of international opinion, and not only international opinion - it was until recently self-understood, almost an axiom, that the only item on the agenda was an agreement in which Israel must fulfill all its commitments and in which the other side owes nothing. All its commitments were ignored. What we have today in the international community, signed with an official seal, is an agreement which is binding, in which the principle of reciprocity is clear.

These agreements contain important improvements as well as the time in which we will be able to bring to completion the goal which we seek to attain, which I believe is shared by all Members of Knesset. I believe that the large majority of the people supports this course. I believe with all my heart that this is the only way to achieve the aspiration which we all share: peace with security, peace for generations and not for one year, peace for generations and not for one year, peace for our children and also for our grandchildren. After the arguments will end, and after the smoke and dust will settle, I believe that we will achieve these goals.

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EUROPEAN UNION COUNCIL, STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, BRUSSELS, 20 JANUARY 1997

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The Council discussed the Middle East peace process in the light of a report by Special EU Envoy Mr. Moratinos. It welcomed the recent signing of the protocol on implementation of Israeli redeployment in Hebron as an important step towards full implementation of the Interim Agreement and the start of final status negotiations.

The Council recalled the letter of assurances from the Council President to President Arafat, stating that the European Union will use all its political and moral weight to ensure full implementation of the agreements already reached and continue its active role in promoting and strengthening the peace process.

The Council welcomed the role which the EU’s Special Envoy Mr. Moratinos was able to play, in close coordination with the United States in its crucial role as facilitator, in promoting this outcome.

The Council underlined the importance of using the momentum created by the Hebron agreement in order to achieve progress as soon as possible in the Syrian and Lebanese tracks of the peace process and to revitalize the multilateral track. The Council also emphasized the urgency of improving the Palestinian social and economic situation.

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JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA, STATEMENT ON SETTLEMENTS, JERUSALEM, 21 JANUARY 1997

A COMMITMENT TO CONTINUED NATURAL GROWTH

Israel is committed to safeguarding the Jewish communities of Judea, Samaria and Gaza and ensuring their continued natural growth and development.

Under the previous government, the Jewish population of Judea, Samaria and Gaza grew by approximately 50%. As the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said, "I am not ready for there to be a law in Israel to forbid building houses in existing settlements, or a kindergarten or a cultural center in a place where people live today" (Associated Press, January 10, 1995). Former Prime Minister Shimon Peres also stated, "Building which is necessary for normal life, like schools, private apartments, we are not going to stop" (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, January 25, 1995).

CONSISTENT WITH OSLO

Israel's policy is fully consistent with the terms of the Oslo Accords. Neither the Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993 nor the Interim Agreement ("Oslo 2") of September 28, 1995 contains any provisions prohibiting or restricting the establishment or expansion of Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

When he presented the Oslo 2 accords before the Knesset on October 5, 1995, the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin stated, "I wish to remind you, we made a commitment, meaning we reached an agreement, we made a commitment to the Knesset not to uproot any settlement in the framework of the Interim Agreement, nor to freeze construction and natural growth".

While there is a clause in the accords which prohibits changing the status of the territories, it was intended to ensure only that neither side would take unilateral measures to alter the legal status of the areas (such as annexation or declaration of statehood).
NO REQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND

As a matter of policy, Israel does not requisition private land for the establishment of Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Housing construction is allowed only on public land after an exhaustive investigation has confirmed that no private rights exist regarding the land in question.

Current government decisions restrict building to within the municipal boundaries of existing communities.

THE RIGHT OF JEWS TO LIVE IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA

Jews have a historical, moral and legal right to live in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

THE HISTORICAL RIGHT

The Jewish communities of Judea, Samaria and Gaza signify the return of the Jewish people to their ancestral homeland. Since the dawn of Jewish history, Jews have resided in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. It is unthinkable that Jews would not be able to live in areas which are the cradle of Jewish civilization, religion and culture.

THE MORAL RIGHT

Jews have the right to live wherever they may choose. The assertion that Jews should not be allowed to live in a certain area because they are Jews smacks of racism and segregation.

THE LEGAL RIGHT

The legal right of Jews to reside in Judea, Samaria and Gaza was given its first modern expression in the 1922 League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. Article 6 of the Mandate required the mandatory power to encourage “close settlement by Jews on the land”.

The legal right of Jews remains in force today. As the internationally recognized legal expert and former US Undersecretary of State Eugene V. Rostow has written, “The right of the Jewish people to settle in Palestine has never been terminated for the West Bank...” (American Journal of International Law, Vol. 84, July 1990, p. 718).

Some have argued that Jewish communities in the areas violate Article 49 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides that, “The occupying power shall not deport or transfer part of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” The Convention, however, is not applicable to Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Yet even if it were applicable, Article 49 would not be relevant. Drafted four years after the end of World War II, it was intended to prevent forced transfers of civilians such as those which took place in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland before and during the war. Thus it has no bearing on Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

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ISRAELI NATIONAL AGREEMENT REGARDING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT WITH THE PALESTINIANS (“BEILIN-EITAN AGREEMENT”), 22 JANUARY 1997

[The following agreement was drafted by Yossi Beilin, Labor, and Michael Eitan, Likud]

The central objective of the Zionist movement, from the day of its founding, was the establishment of sovereign state in the Land of Israel. The Jewish state was established in 1948, but it was not until 1977 that the first Arab state, Egypt, recognized and later signed a peace treaty with the State of Israel.

The Camp David Agreements, the Oslo Accords, the Mutual Recognition between the Israeli government and the PLO and the projects of the settlements in the territories under Israeli control since 1967 have created a reality from which none of the involved parties can escape.
Both danger and opportunity concealed in the dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian leadership. The last two Israeli governments made the strategic decision to take on calculated risks with the goal of pursuing every possible chance for attaining peace and a relationship of good neighbors between Jews and Arabs in the Land of Israel.

Against the backdrop of a readiness to find a means of historic compromise between Jews and Arabs, a bitter controversy has developed within the Jewish nation: giving up parts of the homeland.

In addition to the prevalent ideological controversy, there are bitter differences of opinion about the degree of security risk that it is acceptable to assume given the risks and threats from the Arab side. There are those who are suspicious that a secure peace is nothing but an illusion, a deceptive vision that will lead Israel into a trap that will, in the end, exact a heavy price of blood. Opposing them are those who claim fervently that the process has potential and that a lasting peace is essential to ensure the security of the State of Israel for generations.

This grave political polarization reached its climax towards the end of 1995. In September the Israeli government signed Oslo II, which was understood to be a step towards the transfer of the territories of the West Bank to the Palestinians. Protest demonstrations intensified and many saw the signing of the accord as fundamental heresy. This climate of intense polarization lead to the political assassination, several weeks later, of Yitzhak Rabin.

Despite the fact that the murder and the murderer were condemned univocally by the high-ranking leadership in Israel, there were more than a few who identified with the nefarious act and in their identification made clear that a real risk of civil war existed. It was as if we had not learned the historical lesson of what was bound to happen in the aftermath of the use of terror as a means of internal political disagreement between Jews and other Jews in the face of an “enemy besieging the city.”

Members of Knesset from the Likud, Gesher, Tzomet factions and from the Labor faction came together with the common objective of clarifying the areas of agreement and disagreement between them regarding the future negotiations with the Palestinians on a permanent settlement. Following a series of discussions and clarifications they have arrived at the conclusion that it is necessary to reach a national consensus on the basis of the following three principles:

A. It is necessary to continue the dialogue with the Palestinian representatives and to pursue exhaustively every opportunity to achieve a permanent agreement with them. In the framework of such an agreement it is necessary to permit the establishment of a Palestinian entity whose status will be determined in negotiations between the parties and the limits on the sovereignty of which will be discussed in the following sections.

B. Under conditions of peace and following the achievement of an agreement on the issue of the permanent settlement, the State of Israel must preserve its ability to prevent every attack or risk of an attack on its territorial integrity, the safety of its citizens and their property and in its vital interests in Israel and in the world.

C. No agreement signed by the Israeli government can include a commitment to uproot Jewish settlements in the Western Land of Israel nor will any agreement compromise the rights of the residents to keep their Israeli citizenship and their ties as individuals and as a community with the State of Israel.

A. BORDERS
The position of Israel on every issue relating to the question of borders will be based on the following principles:
1. There will be no return to the 1967 borders.
2. The majority of settlers will live on their settlement under Israeli sovereignty, in order to preserve territorial continuity between the settlements and the State of Israel.
3. The residents of the Israeli settlements that will exist outside of the area that will be annexed by the State of Israel will receive special, agreed upon, arrangements within the framework of which their Israeli citizenship and their ties with the State of Israel, as individuals and as a
community, will be preserved. Thus their right of free and safe passage to the territories under full Israeli sovereignty will be preserved.

4. The Jordan Valley will be a special security zone and Israeli army forces will be posted along the Jordan. The residents of the area will be permitted to remain where they are, according to point 3, above. Another version insists upon an Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley.

B. SECURITY COMPONENTS

1. The Palestinian entity will be demilitarized and it will have no army.
2. The Jordan River will be the security border of Israel. Secure crossing conditions will be regulated by IDF forces in proportion to need and to the changing conditions within the Palestinian entity, reflecting the estimated need for the IDF on the borders.
3. The Palestinian entity will establish a strong police force to meet the needs of internal security.
4. No foreign army may be stationed within the boundaries of the Palestinian entity.
5. The security forces of Israel and the Palestinian entity will work to deter and foil acts of terrorism aimed against Jews and Arabs.
6. The Palestinian entity will not sign any military agreement or any other agreement that includes a threat to the territorial integrity of the State of Israel, the security of its citizens or the integrity of their property. It will not sign any agreement regarding boycott or any other illegal steps against the Israeli economy nor any agreement involving negative propaganda against the State of Israel or against the Jewish people.
7. The commitment of the two parties to the agreement regarding the permanent settlements will be strengthened by the fulfillment of all of their other commitments.
8. Any basic violation of the commitments presented in this section will allow the violated party to regard the whole agreement as annulled and will grant the assailed the right to act freely to right the violations and to prevent further violations.

C. STATUS OF THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY AND LIMITS ON ITS SOVEREIGNTY

If the Palestinian entity subjects itself to the limits presented in this document, its self-determination will be recognized. According to an alternative opinion it will be regarded as an enlarged autonomy, and according to another opinion, as a state.

D. JERUSALEM

1. Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, with its existing municipal borders, will be a single unified city within sovereign Israel.
2. The Palestinians will recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and Israel will recognize the governing center of the Palestinian entity which will be within the borders of the entity and outside the existing municipal borders of Jerusalem.
3. Muslim and Christian holy places in Jerusalem will be granted special status.
4. Within the framework of the municipal government the Palestinian residents of Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will receive a status that will allow them to share in the responsibility of the administration of their lives in the city.

E. REFUGEES

1. The right of the State of Israel to prevent the entry of Palestinian refugees into its sovereign territory will be recognized.
2. The administration of the entrance of refugees into the Palestinian entity and the limits to that entry will be decided upon during the negotiations of the permanent settlement, within the larger discussion of Israel’s security issues.
3. An international organization will be founded, in which Israel will play an important role, with the goal of financing and carrying out projects for compensation and rehabilitation of the refugees in their places. The organization will also address Israeli claims for reparations for Jewish refugees from Arab countries.
4. Israel and the Palestinian entity, each within its own boundaries, will rehabilitate the refugees on the basis of the disengagement of the UNRWA, the repealing of the refugee status and the ar-
rangement of housing and employment and housing with international aid. (For Israel this refers to the Shoafat and Kalandia refugee camps in Jerusalem).

5. Israel will continue its policy of family reunification on the basis of existing criteria.

F. WATER
The agreement on the issue of water usage, as it was signed in the framework of the interim agreement, will remain in effect. The water authorities of Israel and the Palestinians will establish shared control over its usage.

Any future change of anything related to the issue of division of water, modes of production or means of protection of water purity must be made with the agreement of both parties. In the absence of such an agreement the status quo will remain.

Israel and the Palestinian entity will act together in regards to everything pertaining to desalination and regional water enterprises.

G. ECONOMY AND TRADE
The economic sphere is one of the cornerstones in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian entity, with the goal of strengthening their interests in achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. The two parties will cooperate in this arena in order to create a solid economic basis for these relations, which will be grounded in the different economic spheres on the values of mutual respect of each party for the economic interests of the other, mutuality, justice and protection. The parties will invite the Kingdom of Jordan to participate in this economic cooperation.

H. EDUCATION, CULTURE AND GOOD NEIGHBORS
The Israeli leadership and the Palestinian leadership must create a fitting environment for the development of peaceful relations between Jew and Palestinians. It is necessary to encourage educational initiatives, cultural connections and to foster models of Jewish-Arab cooperation as a basis for relations as good neighbors. A true peace between Jews and Arabs in the Land of Israel will be attained when both of the populations will accept the existence of its counterpart on a basis of mutuality and equality.

I. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT
1. There will be a special effort to conclude the talks of the issue of the permanent settlement and especially to finalize the borders between Israel and the Palestinian entity before the intended date for further redeployment.

2. If the borders are not finalized before the third redeployment, Israel will redeploy so that 50% of the West Bank will be designated as territories A and B.

INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE, THE COPENHAGEN DECLARATION, COPENHAGEN, 30 JANUARY 1997

[On 30 Jan. 1997, an International Alliance for Peace (IAP) was declared in Copenhagen among a group of Arab (Egyptian, Palestinian, Jordanian), Israeli, and European intellectuals. The non-governmental initiative had been in the making since the Oslo Accords and promotes a peaceful and prosperous Middle East in which Arabs, Israelis, Turks, Kurds and Iranians co-exist and cooperate].

Egyptians, Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians and peace loving people from all over the world are gathered in Copenhagen to establish an international alliance for Arab-Israeli peace. Peace is too important to be left to governments. People-to-people contact are vital to the success of the peace efforts in the region. As long as the popular base remains weak, the peace process may falter. We are gathering in Copenhagen to contribute to a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict before the end of this century, and to commence as era of stable and just peace in which the whole Middle East should enjoy stability, security and prosperity.
We are meeting under the auspices of the government of Denmark which shares our interest in bringing about the a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects. The absence of such resolution can only adversely affect the interests of the entire international community.

We plan to hold public meetings, lobby governments, and monitor progress and setbacks in the peace process as well as discrimination, collective punishment, abuse of human rights and violence. We will mobilize public opinion behind the peace effort.

So much has been achieved in peace making between Arabs and Israelis, which has led to the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement in January 1974, the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement in May 1974, the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement in September 1975, the Camp David Accords in September 1978, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in March 1979, the Middle East Peace Process initiated in Madrid in October 1991, the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles in September 1993, the Palestinian-Israeli Cairo agreement in May 1994, the Washington Declaration between Jordan and Israel in July 1994, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty in October 1994, the Palestinian-Israeli interim agreement in September 1995, and the Declaration of the Peace Makers Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh in March 1996 and the recent Hebron agreement.

We are deeply concerned about the stalemate on the Israeli-Syrian, Israeli-Lebanese tracks, about possible deadlocks in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over the implementation of the interim agreement, and about the eruption of violence that has in the past led to the loss of Arab and Israeli lives.

We recognize that there is still a long way to go before the vision of peace is translated into reality, that the hope for the attainment of comprehensive peace, leading to regional cooperation and a better life for all peoples of the Middle East may yet be dashed and the peace process could yet be plagued with the shadow of war again engulfing the Middle East. Justice and equality are preconditions for peace. We realize that we cannot afford to watch passively resurgent dangers and the rise of new ones against the peace process. Peace is too precious and war too abhorrent for us to sit idly by while a deterioration takes place.

We are convinced that we reflect the will of the majority of the people in this region who yearn for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a prelude to establishing peaceful regional cooperation, we voice the feelings prevalent among Arabs and Israelis that we, the people, must participate effectively in charting the course of the future of the Middle East by not allowing anti-peace forces to prevail.

We aim at the achievement of lasting and comprehensive peace based on the formula of land for peace, the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects.

We consider that the foundations for peace among the Arabs and Israeli peoples should be based on equal and balanced rights for all. In addition to the implementation of resolutions 242 and 338, it is important to deal with the underlying causes of Middle East wars and conflicts and to support both Arabs and Israelis to come to mutually acceptable terms.

We reaffirm our determinations to promote peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, dignity and security among the peoples of a region that is free of all kinds of violence, and to pursue avenues for harmony that match the global transformation in the post-cold war era.

We need each other and we are determined to close ranks with all peace loving people to attain these objectives. In order to do that, the signatories to this declaration have agreed on the following:

A. The attainment of peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples will resolve the core problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We, the International Alliance for Peace, call on concerned governments to act vigorously and speed up the full implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreements in letter and spirit, faithfully and honesty, and particularly to restore full normality to and
improvement of the lives of the Palestinians. We call on the Israeli government and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to reach fair agreement on all outstanding final status issues (Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, security and water) as soon as possible, certainly no later than May 5, 1999 as stipulated in the Oslo Accords. Jerusalem in particular is deeply sensitive and central issue to all parties. Special attention, therefore, should be paid to this issue in the final status negotiations to satisfy the requirements of all the parties. The final agreement between Israel and the PLO must allow the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination, including statehood, in accordance with international laws upon reaching an agreed settlement on the final status between them. To create an atmosphere of amity for negotiations, no resort to violence or terrorism in any form should be accepted or condoned. To allay Palestinian fears, no new settlements should be built, and no Palestinian land, state or private will be expropriated.

B. We, members of the Alliance, believe that comprehensive peace must be the true goal of all political efforts from within and outside the region. Renewed efforts must be made to reach a peaceful settlement between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon based on the land-for-peace formula and on UN resolutions 242, 338, and 425. This settlement must include maximum mutual security for the parties as well as normal relations between them. Comprehensive peace should allow for a region free from weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, a Middle East in which potentials are harnessed for the prosperity of its inhabitants, and steps should be taken to achieve these goals.

C. We urge all forces in the Middle East to join hands to rebuild a region free from arms race and free from strife and poverty. In this noble endeavor, we will seize every opportunity, knock on every door, lobby every government and attempt to spread our vision to serve the interests of present and future generations. To guarantee success and continuity the members of the Alliances pledge concerted efforts to stand up to the enemies of peace.

D. In order to ensure sustainability of our drive for peace, a permanent secretariat for the Alliance will be established. Our slogan henceforth will be “Let the State of War End, Let the State of Peace Begin.”

E. In this vein, the founders of the Alliance invite regional and international groups and individuals concerned with the future of the region to adhere to our declaration, join our movement and support actively its causes and goals.

F. The founding members of the International Alliance for Arab-Israeli peace extend their deep appreciation and gratitude to the people and government of Denmark for their sincere efforts and generous hospitality, which have been instrumental in materializing our cause.

STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE, THE LOUISIANA PROCESS: AN OPEN LETTER TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU, JANUARY 1997

[The ‘Louisiana Process’ is named for the Copenhagen museum that hosted the establishment in 1995 of the International Alliance for Arab-Israeli Peace.]

We, the members of the Steering Committee of the International Alliance for Arab-Israeli Peace, are highly alarmed by new plans of the Israeli government to establish and expand settlements in East Jerusalem and the occupied territories. The future of the city, which is to be decided by final status negotiations to the satisfaction of all parties concerned, cannot be predetermined by unilateral acts such as those being planned by the Israeli government. While we denounce and reject these plans, being contrary to the letter and spirit of the Copenhagen Declaration and the Palestinian-Israeli agreements, we demand from and call on the Israeli government to withdraw them and freeze all settlement activities in all the occupied territories. Likewise, we call on all peace loving people and all concerned parties to the Arab-Israeli peace process to support our position which we believe will lead to maintaining and reinforcing the spirit of peace and reconciliation between the Arabs and the Israeli. We intend to spare no effort in order to establish genuine Arab-Israeli relations based on respect for the mutual rights, dignity and security of our peoples and to contribute towards a lasting and
comprehensive settlement to the conflict. The building and expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories can only retard that cause and increase the risk of taking us again down the path of war, violence and extremism.

The Steering Committee of the International Alliance for Arab-Israeli Peace

JOINT DECLARATION, 12TH ASEAN-EU MINISTERIAL MEETING, SINGAPORE, 13-14 FEBRUARY 1997 [EXCERPTS]

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU), met in Singapore from 13-14 February 1997 for the 12th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting under the co-chairmanship of Singapore and the Netherlands, acting also as Presidency of the Council of the EU. We had a productive and wide-ranging exchange of views on a number of political, security, economic and other issues. The discussion took place in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding, following the spirit of our previous meeting in Karlsruhe on 22-23 September 1994. We reiterated that ASEAN remains a cornerstone of the EU’s dialogue with the Asian region. […]

POLITICAL AND SECURITY

[…]

11. In addition we had a full and constructive discussion on the following: […]

(viii) We voiced support for the fundamental principles of a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement in the Middle East, notably “land for peace” and self-determination for the Palestinians, with all that this implies. We called on all parties to implement existing agreements, avoid provocative acts that would undermine the peace process, and continue or resume negotiations on all tracks and in accordance with the principles of Madrid and the Oslo Declaration;

(ix) We noted that Palestinian social and economic development is an essential element of a just and durable settlement. Consequently, we appealed to the international community to make resources available to assist in the development of the Palestinian territories. […]


• Protocol 1 on the arrangements applying to imports into the Community of agricultural products originating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• Protocol 2 on the arrangements applying to imports into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of agricultural products originating in the Community • Protocol 3 concerning the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of administrative cooperation
• Final Act
• Joint Declarations
• Declaration by the European Community

The EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Community’, of the one part, and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY OF THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Palestinian Authority’, of the other part,

Considering the importance of the existing links between the Community and the Palestinian people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the common values that they share,
Considering that the Community and the PLO wish to strengthen those links and to establish lasting relations based on partnership and reciprocity,

Considering the importance which the Parties attach to the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the observance of human rights, democratic principles and political and economic freedoms which form the very basis of their relations,

Desirous of strengthening the framework of relations between the European Community and the Middle East, and of regional economic integration of the Middle Eastern countries as an objective to be achieved as soon as conditions permit,

Considering the importance which the Parties attach to the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the observance of human rights, democratic principles and political and economic freedoms which form the very basis of their relations,

Desirous of strengthening the framework of relations between the European Community and the Middle East, and of regional economic integration of the Middle Eastern countries as an objective to be achieved as soon as conditions permit,

Desirous of establishing a cooperation, supported by a regular dialogue, on economic, cultural, scientific and educational matters with a view to improving mutual knowledge and understanding,

Desirous of establishing a cooperation, supported by a regular dialogue, on economic, cultural, scientific and educational matters with a view to improving mutual knowledge and understanding,

Considering the commitment of the Parties to free trade, and in particular to compliance with the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994,

Desirous of building on the existing autonomous trade arrangements between the Parties and placing them on a contractual and reciprocal basis,

Desirous of building on the existing autonomous trade arrangements between the Parties and placing them on a contractual and reciprocal basis,

Convinced of the need to promote the creation of a new climate for their economic relations in order to improve the environment for investment flows,

Convinced of the need to promote the creation of a new climate for their economic relations in order to improve the environment for investment flows,

Consider the rights and obligations of the parties under the international agreements which they have signed,

Convinced that the full participation of the Palestinian Authority in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched at the Barcelona Conference is an important step in the normalization of relations between the Parties, which should be reflected in an Agreement on an interim basis at the present stage,

Aware of the major political significance of the holding of Palestinian elections on 20 January 1996 for the process leading to a permanent settlement based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338,

Recognizing that this Agreement should be replaced by a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement as soon as conditions permit,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. An Interim Association on Trade and Cooperation is hereby established between the Community and the Palestinian Authority.

2. The objectives of this Agreement are:
   - to provide an appropriate framework for a comprehensive dialogue, allowing the development of close relations between the Parties,
   - to establish the conditions for the progressive liberalization of trade,
   - to foster the development of balanced economic and social relations between the Parties through dialogue and cooperation,
   - to contribute to the social and economic development of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
   - to encourage regional cooperation with a view to the consolidation of peaceful coexistence and economic and political stability,
   - to promote cooperation in other areas which are of reciprocal interest.

Article 2: Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights as set out in the universal declaration on human rights, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement.

TITLE I - FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Article 3: The Community and the Palestinian Authority shall establish progressively a free trade area over a transitional period, not extending beyond 31 December 2001, according to the modalities set
out in this Title and in conformity with the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 and of the other multilateral agreements on trade in goods annexed to the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), hereinafter referred to as the GATT.

CHAPTER 1: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS

Article 4: The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to products originating in the Community and in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip other than those listed in Annex II to the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Article 5: No new customs duty on imports, or any other charge having equivalent effect, shall be introduced on trade between the Community and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Article 6: Imports into the Community of products originating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be allowed free of customs duties and of any other charge having equivalent effect and free of quantitative restrictions and of any other measure having equivalent effect.

Article 7
1. The provisions of this Chapter do not preclude the retention by the Community of an agricultural component in respect of goods originating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and listed in Annex 1. The provisions of Chapter 2 applicable to agricultural products shall apply mutatis mutandis to the agricultural component.
2. For the products listed in Annex 2 originating in the Community, the Palestinian Authority may retain for the duration of the Agreement customs duties on import and charges having equivalent effect not higher than those in force on 1 July 1996.
3. The Joint Committee established under Article 63 may decide on further concessions which the parties grant each other on a mutual basis.

Article 8
1. Customs duties and charges having equivalent effect applicable on import into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of products originating in the Community, other than those listed in Annexes 2 and 3, shall be abolished when the Agreement enters into force.
2. From the entry into force of the Agreement, for the products originating in the Community listed in Annex 3 imported into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority may levy fiscal charges not exceeding 25 % by value. These charges shall be gradually abolished in accordance with the following schedule:
   - one year after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, each charge shall be reduced to 90 % of the basic charge;
   - two years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, each charge shall be reduced to 80 % of the basic charge;
   - three years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, each charge shall be reduced to 70 % of the basic charge;
   - four years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, each charge shall be reduced to 60 % of the basic charge;
   - five years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, each remaining charge shall be abolished.
3. In the event of serious difficulties for a given product, the schedule referred to in paragraph 2 may be reviewed by the Joint Committee by common accord, on the understanding that it may not be suspended beyond the maximum transitional period of five years. If the Joint Committee has not taken a decision within 30 days of its application to review the schedule, the Palestinian Authority may suspend the schedule provisionally for a period which may not exceed one year.
4. If the charge is reduced erga omnes, the reduced charge shall replace the basic charge described in paragraph 2 from the date on which the reduction is applied.
5. The Palestinian Authority shall notify the Community of its basic duties and charges.
Article 9: The provisions concerning the abolition of customs duties on imports shall also apply to customs duties of a fiscal nature.

Article 10:
1. By way of derogation from Articles 5 and 8, the Palestinian Authority may take exceptional measures of limited duration to introduce, increase or re-introduce customs duties.
2. Such measures may only apply to infant industries and to sectors undergoing restructuring or experiencing serious difficulties, particularly where those difficulties entail severe social problems.
3. Customs duties on imports into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of products originating in the Community that are introduced by such exceptional measures may not exceed 25% by value, and must retain a preferential margin for products originating in the Community. The total value of imports of the products subjected to such measures may not exceed 15% of total imports of industrial products originating in the Community during the last year for which statistics are available.
4. Such measures shall be applied for no longer than five years, except where a longer duration is authorized by the Joint Committee.
5. The Palestinian Authority shall inform the Joint Committee of any exceptional measures it intends to adopt and, at the Community's request, consultations shall be held on the measures and sectors concerned before they are implemented. When adopting such measures, the Palestinian Authority shall provide the Committee with a schedule for the abolition of the customs duties introduced pursuant to this Article. Such schedules shall provide for the phasing out of the duties concerned by equal annual instalments, starting no later than the end of the second year following their introduction. The Joint Committee may decide on a different schedule.

CHAPTER 2: AGRICULTURAL AND FISHERY PRODUCTS

Article 11: The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to products originating in the Community and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and listed in Annex II to the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Article 12: The Community and the Palestinian Authority shall progressively establish a greater liberalization of their trade in agricultural and fishery products of interest to both Parties.

Article 13
1. Agricultural products originating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip listed in Protocol 1 on importation into the Community shall be subject to the arrangements set out in that Protocol.
2. Agricultural products originating in the Community listed in Protocol 2 on importation into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall be subject to the arrangements set out in that Protocol.

Article 14
1. From 1 January 1999, the Community and the Palestinian Authority shall examine the situation in order to determine the measures to be applied by the Community and the Palestinian Authority from 1 January 2000, in accordance with the objective set out in Article 12.
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and taking account of the volume of trade in agricultural products between the Parties and of the particular sensitivity of such products, the Community and the Palestinian Authority shall examine in the Joint Committee, product by product and on an orderly and reciprocal basis, the possibility of granting each other further concessions.

CHAPTER 3: COMMON PROVISIONS

Article 15
1. No new quantitative restriction on imports or measures having equivalent effect shall be introduced in trade between the Community and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
2. Quantitative restrictions on imports and measures having equivalent effect in trade between the Community and the West Bank and Gaza Strip shall be abolished from the entry into force of this Agreement.
3. The Community and the Palestinian Authority shall not apply to exports between themselves either customs duties or charges having equivalent effect, or quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect.
Article 16
1. Products originating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall not, on importation into the Community, be accorded a treatment more favourable than that which the Member States apply among themselves.
2. Application of the provisions of this Agreement shall be without prejudice to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1911/91 of 26 June 1991 on the application of the provision of Community law to the Canary Islands.

Article 17
1. In the event of specific rules being introduced as a result of the implementation of its agricultural policy or of any alteration of the current rules or in the event of any alteration or extension of the provisions relating to the implementation of its agricultural policy, the Party concerned may amend the arrangements resulting from the Agreement in respect of the products concerned.
2. In such cases the Party concerned shall inform the Joint Committee. At the request of the other Party, the Joint Committee shall meet to take due account of the interests of the other Party.
3. If the Community or the Palestinian Authority, in applying paragraph 1, modifies the arrangements made by this Agreement for agricultural products, they shall accord imports originating in the other Party an advantage comparable to that provided for in this Agreement. 4. The application of this Article may be the subject of consultations in the Joint Committee.

Article 18
1. The Parties shall refrain from any measure or practice of an internal fiscal nature establishing, whether directly or indirectly, discrimination between the products of one Party and like products originating in the territory of the other Party.
2. Products exported to the territory of one of the Parties may not benefit from repayment of indirect internal taxation in excess of the amount of indirect taxation imposed on them either directly or indirectly.

Article 19
1. The Agreement shall not preclude the maintenance or establishment of customs unions, free trade areas or arrangements for frontier trade, except insofar as they alter the trade arrangements provided for in this Agreement.
2. Consultation between the Parties shall take place within the Joint Committee concerning agreements establishing customs unions or free trade areas and, where requested, on other major issues related to their respective trade policy with third countries. In particular, in the event of a third country acceding to the European Union, such consultation shall take place so as to ensure that account can be taken of the mutual interests of this Parties.

Article 20: If one of the Parties finds that dumping is taking place in trade with the other Party within the meaning of Article VI of GATT, it may take appropriate measures against this practice in accordance with the Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the GATT and with its relevant internal legislation, under the conditions and in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 23 of this Agreement.

Article 21: Where any product is being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause:
• serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the territory of one of the Parties, or
• serious disturbances in any sector of the economy, or difficulties which could bring about serious deterioration in the economic situation of a region, the Party concerned may take appropriate measures under the conditions and in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 23.

Article 22: Where compliance with the provisions of Article 15 (3) leads to:
(i) re-export towards a third country against which the exporting Party maintains, for the product concerned, quantitative export restrictions, export duties, or measures having equivalent effect, or
(ii) a serious shortage, or threat thereof, of a product essential to the exporting Party; and where the situations referred to above give rise, or are likely to give rise to major difficulties for the exporting Party, that Party may take appropriate measures under the conditions and in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 23. The measures shall be nondiscriminatory and be eliminated when conditions no longer justify their maintenance.

Article 23
1. In the event of the Community or the Palestinian Authority subjecting imports of products liable to give rise to the difficulties referred to in Article 21 to an administrative procedure, the purpose of which is to provide rapid information on the trend of trade flows, it shall inform the other Party.
2. In the cases specified in Articles 20, 21 and 22, before taking the measures provided for therein, or, as soon as possible in cases to which paragraph 3 (d) of this Article applies, the Party in question shall supply the Joint Committee with all relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties. In the selection of appropriate measures, priority must be given to those which least disturb the functioning of the Agreement. The safeguard measures shall be notified immediately to the Joint Committee and shall be the subject of periodic consultations within that Committee, particularly with a view to their abolition as soon as circumstances permit.
3. For the implementation of paragraph 2, the following provisions shall apply:
   (a) As regards Article 20, the exporting Party shall be informed of the dumping case as soon as the authorities of the importing Party have initiated an investigation. When no end has been put to the dumping within the meaning of Article VI of GATT or no other satisfactory solution has been reached within 30 days of the notification being made, the importing Party may adopt the appropriate measures.
   (b) As regards Article 21, the difficulties arising from the situation referred to in that Article shall be referred for examination to the Joint Committee, which may take any decision needed to put an end to such difficulties. If the Joint Committee or the exporting Party has not taken a decision putting an end to the difficulties or no other satisfactory solution has been reached within 30 days of the matter being referred, the importing Party may adopt the appropriate measures to remedy the problem. These measures shall not exceed the scope of what is necessary to remedy the difficulties which have arisen.
   (c) As regards Article 22, the difficulties arising from the situations referred to in that Article shall be referred for examination to the Joint Committee. The Committee may take any decision needed to put an end to the difficulties. If it has not taken such a decision within 30 days of the matter being referred to it, the exporting Party may apply appropriate measures on the exportation of the product concerned.
   (d) Where exceptional circumstances requiring immediate action make prior information or examination, as the case may be, impossible, the Party concerned may, in the situations specified in Articles 20, 21 and 22 apply forthwith such precautionary measures as are strictly necessary to remedy the situation, and shall inform the other Party immediately.

Article 24: Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security, of the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants, of the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, of the protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property or of regulations concerning gold and silver. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties.

Article 25: The concept of ‘originating products’ for the application of the provisions of the present Title and the methods of administrative cooperation relating to them are set out in Protocol 3. The Joint Committee may decide to make the necessary adaptations to this Protocol with a view to the implementation of cumulation of origin as agreed in the Declaration adopted at the Barcelona Conference.

Article 26: The combined nomenclature shall be used for the classification of goods in the trade between the Parties.
TITLE II - PAYMENTS, CAPITAL, COMPETITION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

CHAPTER 1: CURRENT PAYMENTS AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL

Article 27: Subject to the provisions of Article 29, the Parties undertake to impose no restrictions on any current payments for current transactions.

Article 28:
1. With regard to transactions on the capital account of balance of payments, the Parties undertake to impose no restrictions on the movement of capital relating to direct investments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in companies formed in accordance with current laws, nor on the liquidation and repatriation of the yield from such investments, or any profit stemming therefrom.
2. The Parties shall consult each other with a view to facilitating the movement of capital between the Community and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Article 29: Where one or more Member States of the Community or the Palestinian Authority, is in serious balance of payments difficulties, or under threat thereof, the Community or the Palestinian Authority, as the case may be, may, in accordance with the conditions established under the GATT and Articles VIII and XIV of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, adopt restrictions on current transactions which shall be of limited duration and may not go beyond what is necessary to remedy the balance of payments situation. The Community or the Palestinian Authority, as the case may be, shall inform the other Party forthwith and shall submit to it as soon as possible a timetable for the elimination of the measures concerned.

CHAPTER 2: COMPETITION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

Article 30:
1. The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, insofar as they may affect trade between the Community and the Palestinian Authority:
   (i) all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition;
   (ii) abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in the territories of the Community or the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a whole or in a substantial part thereof;
   (iii) any public aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.
2. The Parties shall, as appropriate, assess any practice contrary to this Article on the basis of the criteria resulting from the application of Community competition rules.
3. The Joint Committee shall, before 31 December 2001, adopt by decision the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2. Until these rules are adopted, the provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures shall be applied as the rules for the implementation of paragraph 1 (iii) and the relevant parts of paragraph 2.
4. As regards the implementation of paragraph 1 (iii), the Parties recognize that the Palestinian Authority may wish to use, during the period until 31 December 2001, public aid to undertakings as an instrument to tackle its specific development problems.
5. Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid, inter alia by reporting annually to the other Party on the total amount and the distribution of the aid given and by providing, upon request, information on aid schemes. Upon request by one Party, the other Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public aid.
6. With regard to products referred to in Title I, Chapter 2:-
   • paragraph 1 (iii) does not apply,
   • any practices contrary to paragraph 1 (i) shall be assessed according to the criteria established by the Community on the basis of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and in particular those established in Council Regulation No 26/62.
7. If the Community or the Palestinian Authority considers that a particular practice is incompatible with the terms of paragraph 1 of this Article, and:
   • is not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in paragraph 3, or
   • in the absence of such rules, and if such practice causes or threatens to cause serious prejudice to the interest of the other Party or material injury to its domestic industry, including its services industry, it may take appropriate measures after consultation within the Joint Committee or after 30 working days following referral for such consultation. With reference to practices incompatible with paragraph 1 (iii) of this Article, such appropriate measures, when the GATT is applicable to them, may only be adopted in accordance with the procedures and under the conditions laid down by GATT or by any other relevant instrument negotiated under its auspices and applicable between the Parties.

8. Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary adopted in accordance with paragraph 3, the Parties shall exchange information taking into account the limitations imposed by the requirements of professional and business secrecy.

Article 31: The Member States and the Palestinian Authority shall progressively adjust, without prejudice to their commitments to the GATT where appropriate, any State monopolies of a commercial character, so as to ensure that, by 31 December 2001, no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of the Member States and the Palestinian people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Joint Committee will be informed about the measures adopted to implement this objective.

Article 32: With regard to public enterprises and enterprises to which special or exclusive rights have been granted, the Joint Committee shall ensure that by 31 December 2001 there is neither enacted nor maintained any measure distorting trade between the Community and the Palestinian Authority contrary to the Parties' interests. This provision should not obstruct the performance in law or in fact of the particular tasks assigned to those undertakings.

Article 33
1. The Parties shall grant and ensure adequate and effective protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights in accordance with the highest international standards, including effective means of enforcing such rights.
2. The implementation of this Article shall be regularly reviewed by the Parties. If problems in the area of intellectual, industrial and commercial property affecting trading conditions occur, urgent consultations shall be undertaken within the framework of the Joint Committee, at the request of either Party, with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory solutions.

Article 34
1. The Parties agree on the objective of reciprocal and gradual liberalization of public procurement contracts.
2. The Joint Committee shall take the necessary measures to implement paragraph 1.

TITLE III - ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Article 35 Objectives
1. The Parties undertake to intensify economic cooperation in their mutual interest and in accordance with the overall objectives of this Agreement.
2. The aim of cooperation shall be to support the Palestinian Authority's own efforts to achieve sustainable economic and social development.

Article 36 Scope
1. Cooperation shall focus primarily on sectors suffering from internal difficulties or affected by the overall process of liberalization of the economy of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in particular by the liberalization of trade between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the Community.
2. Similarly, cooperation shall focus on areas likely to bring the economies of the Community and the West Bank and Gaza Strip closer together, particularly those which will generate sustainable growth and employment.
3. Cooperation shall encourage the implementation of measures designed to develop intraregional cooperation.

4. Conservation of the environment and ecological balance shall be taken into account in the implementation of the various sectors of economic cooperation to which it is relevant.

5. The Parties may agree to extend economic cooperation to other sectors not covered by the provisions of this Title.

**Article 37 Methods and modalities:** Economic cooperation shall be implemented in particular by:

(a) a regular economic dialogue between the Parties, which covers all areas of macroeconomic policy and in particular budgetary policy, the balance of payments and monetary policy;

(b) regular exchange of information and ideas in every sector of cooperation including meetings of officials and experts;

(c) transfer of advice, expertise and training;

(d) implementation of joint actions such as seminars and workshops;

(e) technical, administrative and regulatory assistance;

(f) encouragement of joint ventures;

(g) dissemination of information on cooperation.

**Article 38 Industrial Cooperation:** The main aim will be to:

- support the Palestinian Authority, in its efforts to modernize and diversify industry and, in particular, to create an environment favourable to private sector and industrial development,
- foster cooperation between the two Parties' economic operators,
- foster cooperation regarding industrial policy, competitiveness in an open economy and the modernization and development of industry,
- support policies to diversify production and exports and external outlets,
- promote research and development, innovation and technology transfer as far as they benefit industry,
- develop and enhance the human resources required by industry,
- facilitate access to venture and risk financing facilities for the benefit of Palestinian industry.

**Article 39 Investment promotion and investment:** The objective of cooperation will be the creation of a favourable and stable environment for investment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Cooperation will take the form of promotion of investment. This will entail the development of:

- harmonized and simplified administrative procedures,
- co-investment machinery, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) of both Parties,
- information channels and means of identifying investment opportunities,
- an environment conducive to investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Cooperation may also extend to the conception and implementation of projects demonstrating the effective acquisition and use of basic technologies, the use of standards, the development of human resources (e.g. in technologies and management) and the creation of jobs.

**Article 40 Standardization and conformity assessment:** The objective of cooperation will be to narrow the gap in standards and certification. In practical terms cooperation will take the form of:

- the promotion of the use of Community technical regulations and European standards and conformity assessment procedures,
- raising the level of conformity assessment by Palestinian certification and accreditation bodies,
- discussing mutual recognition arrangements, where appropriate,
- cooperating in the field of quality management,
- developing structures for the protection of intellectual, individual and commercial property, for standardization and for setting quality standards.

**Article 41 Approximation of laws:** The objective of cooperation will be to approximate Palestinian Council legislation to that of the Community, in the areas covered by the Agreement.

**Article 42 Small and medium-sized enterprises:** The objective of cooperation will be the creation of an environment propitious to the development of SMEs on local and export markets through, *inter alia:*
• promotion of contacts between enterprises, in particular through recourse to the Community’s networks and instruments for the promotion of industrial cooperation and partnership,
• easier access to investment finance,
• information and support services,
• enhancement of human resources with the aim of stimulating innovation and the setting-up of projects and business ventures.

Article 43 Financial Services: The objective of cooperation will be the improvement and development of financial services. It will take the form of:
• encouraging the strengthening and restructuring of the Palestinian financial sector,
• improving Palestinian accounting, supervisory and regulatory systems of banking, insurance and other parts of the financial sector.

Article 44 Agriculture and fisheries: The objective of cooperation under this heading will mainly be the modernization and restructuring, where necessary, of agriculture and fisheries. This includes modernization of infrastructures and of equipment; the development of packaging, storage and marketing techniques; and the improvement of distribution channels. It will be geared more especially to:
• the development of stable markets,
• support for policies to diversify production and exports and external outlets,
• reduction of food dependency,
• promotion of environment-friendly agriculture and fisheries, taking particular account of the need for conservation and rational management of fisheries,
• closer relations on a voluntary basis between business groups and organizations representing trades and professions,
• technical assistance and training,
• harmonization of phytosanitary and veterinary standards,
• integrated rural development including improvement of basic services and the development of associated economic activities, and
• cooperation among rural regions and exchange of experience and know-how concerning rural development.

Article 45 Social development: The Parties acknowledge the importance of social development which should go hand-in-hand with any economic development. They give particular priority to respect for basic social rights. The Parties will give priority to measures aimed at:
• the promotion of the equality of women and a balanced participation in the decision-making process in the economic and social sphere, notably through education and the media,
• the development of family planning and the protection of mothers and children,
• improving the social protection system,
• improving the response to health requirements,
• improving the living conditions in densely populated areas in less-favoured regions,
• promoting respect for human rights and democracy, inter alia through socio-professional dialogue.

Article 46 Transport: The objectives of cooperation will be:
• aid for restructuring and modernizing roads, ports and airports,
• improved passenger and freight services both at bilateral and regional level, and
• the establishment and enforcement of operating standards comparable to those prevailing in the Community.

The priority areas of cooperation will be:
• road transport including a gradual easing of transit requirements,
• management of railways, ports and airports including navigation systems and cooperation between the relevant national bodies,
• modernization of road, rail, port and airport infrastructure on major routes of common interest,
• trans-European links and routes of regional interest, and
• upgrading of technical equipment to bring it up to Community standards for road/rail transport, container traffic and transhipment.
Article 47 Information infrastructure and telecommunications: Cooperation shall aim at stimulating economic and social development as well as developing an information society. The priority areas of cooperation will be:

- to facilitate collaboration in the field of telecommunications policy, network development and infrastructures for an information society,
- to develop a dialogue on issues related to the information society and to promote the exchange of information and the organization of seminars and conferences in this area,
- to promote and implement joint projects aimed at the introduction of new telecommunications services and applications related to the information society,
- to allow for information exchange on standardization, conformance testing, and certification in information and communications technologies,
- interconnection and interoperability of networks and telematics services.

Article 48 Energy: The objective of cooperation on energy will be to help the West Bank and Gaza Strip acquire the technologies and infrastructures essential to its development, particularly with a view to facilitating links between its economy and that of the Community. The priority areas of cooperation will be:

- the promotion of renewable energies,
- the promotion of energy-saving and energy efficiency,
- support to operations designed to facilitate the transit of gas, oil and electricity, and applied research into data bank networks in the economic and social sectors linking Community and Palestinian operators in particular, and
- support for the modernization and development of energy networks and for their linkup to Community networks.

Article 49 Scientific and technological cooperation: The Parties will endeavour to promote cooperation on scientific and technological development. The aim of cooperation shall be to:

(a) encourage the establishment of permanent links between the Parties' scientific communities, notably by means of:

- providing Palestinian institutions with access to Community research and technological development programmes in accordance with Community rules governing non-Community countries' involvement in such programmes,
- Palestinian participation in networks of decentralized cooperation,
- promoting synergy in training and research;

(b) improve Palestinian research capabilities;

(c) stimulate technological innovation and the transfer of new technology and know-how;

(d) encourage all activities aimed at establishing synergy at regional level.

Article 50 Environment: The objectives of cooperation will be to prevent deterioration of the environment, to control pollution, to protect human health and to ensure the rational use of natural resources with a view to promoting sustainable development. It will place priority on matters relating to: desertification, water resource management, salinization, the impact of agriculture on soil and water quality, the appropriate use of energy, the impact of industrial development in general and the safety of industrial plant in particular, waste management, the integrated management of sensitive areas, the quality of sea water and the control and prevention of marine pollution, and environmental education and awareness. Cooperation shall be fostered by the use of advanced tools of environmental management, environmental monitoring methods, and surveillance, including the use of environmental information systems (EIS) and environmental impact assessment (EIA).

Article 51 Tourism: Priorities for cooperation shall be:

- promoting investments in tourism,
- improving the knowledge of the tourist industry and ensuring greater consistency of policies affecting tourism,
- promoting a good seasonal spread of tourism,
- promoting cooperation between regions and cities of neighbouring countries,
- highlighting the importance of the cultural heritage for tourism,
• making tourism more competitive through support for increased professionalism ensuring the balanced and sustainable development of tourism.

Article 52 Customs cooperation: Customs cooperation is intended to ensure that the provisions on trade are observed and to guarantee fair trading. It could give rise to the following types of cooperation:

• various forms of exchange of information and training schemes,
• simplification of controls and procedures concerning the customs clearance of goods,
• introduction of the single administrative document and a system to link up the Community's and the Palestinian Authority's transit arrangements, and
• technical assistance provided by experts from the Community.

Without prejudice to other forms of cooperation provided for in this Agreement, the administrative authorities of the Parties will provide each other with mutual assistance on customs matters.

Article 53 Cooperation on statistics: The main objective of cooperation in this domain should aim to ensure the comparability and usefulness of statistics on foreign trade, finance and balance of payments, population, migration, transport and communications, and generally all the fields which are covered by this Agreement and lend themselves to the establishment of statistics.

Article 54 Cooperation on economic policy: Cooperation is aimed at:

• the exchange of information on the macro-economic situation and prospects and development strategies,
• joint analysis of economic issues of mutual interest, and
• the encouragement of cooperation between economists and policy makers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and in the Community.

Article 55 Regional cooperation: As part of the implementation of economic cooperation in the various spheres, the Parties will encourage operations designed to develop cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and other Mediterranean partners, through technical support. This cooperation will be an important element of the Community's support for the development of the region as a whole. Priority will be given to operations aimed at:

• promoting intra-regional trade,
• developing regional cooperation on the environment,
• encouraging the development of the communications infrastructure required for the economic development of the region,
• strengthening the development of youth cooperation with neighbouring countries.
• In addition the Parties will strengthen cooperation between them on regional development and land-use planning. To this end the following measures may be taken:

• joint action by regional and local authorities in the area of economic development, and
• the establishment of mechanisms for the exchange of information and experience.

TITLE IV - COOPERATION ON AUDIO-VISUAL AND CULTURAL MATTERS, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION

Article 56: The Parties shall promote cooperation in the audio-visual sector to their mutual benefit. The Parties shall seek ways of associating the Palestinian Authority with Community initiatives in this sector, thus enabling cooperation in areas such as co-production, training, development and distribution.

Article 57: The Parties shall promote cultural cooperation. The area of cooperation may include Community activities concerning, in particular, translation, exchange of works of art and artists, conservation and restoration of historic and cultural monuments and sites, training of persons working in the cultural field, the organization of European-oriented cultural events, raising mutual awareness and contributing to the dissemination of information on outstanding cultural events.

Article 58: The Parties will undertake to determine how to improve significantly the education and vocational training situation. To this end, the access of women to education, including technical courses, higher education and vocational training, will receive special attention. In order to develop the level of expertise of senior staff in the public and private sectors, the Parties will step up their
cooperation on education and vocational training and cooperation between universities and firms. Preparing young people to become active citizens in democratic civil society should be actively promoted. Youth cooperation, including training of youth workers and youth leaders, youth exchanges and voluntary service activities, could therefore be supported and developed.

Special attention will be paid to operations and programmes which will enable permanent links (MED-CAMPUS, for instance) to be established between specialized bodies in the Community and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, such as will encourage the pooling and exchange of experience and technical resources.

Article 59: The Parties shall promote activities of mutual interest in the field of information and communication.

Article 60: Cooperation shall be implemented in particular through:
(a) a regular dialogue between the Parties;
(b) regular exchange of information and ideas in every sector of cooperation including meetings of officials and experts;
(c) transfer of advice and experience and training of young Palestinian graduates;
(d) implementation of joint actions such as seminars and workshops;
(e) technical, administrative and regulatory assistance;
(f) the dissemination of information on cooperation activities.

TITLE V - FINANCIAL COOPERATION

Article 61: In order to achieve the objectives of this Agreement, a financial cooperation package shall be made available to the Palestinian Authority in accordance with the appropriate procedures and the financial resources required. These procedures shall be agreed by both Parties using the most appropriate instruments after this Agreement has entered into force. Financial cooperation shall focus on:
• responding to the economic repercussions for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of the gradual introduction of a free trade area, notably by upgrading and restructuring industry,
• trade institutions which promote trading links with foreign markets,
• accompanying measures for policies implemented in the social sector,
• upgrading economic and social infrastructure,
• promoting private investment and job-creating activities in the productive sectors,
• promoting reforms designed to modernize the economy,
• services,
• urban and rural development,
• the environment,
• the setting-up and improvement of institutions necessary for the proper working of the Palestinian public administration and the advancement of democracy and human rights.

Article 62: In order to ensure that a coordinated approach is adopted to any exceptional macroeconomic and financial problems that might arise as a result of the implementation of this Agreement, the Parties shall use the regular economic dialogue provided for in Title III to give particular attention to monitoring trade and financial flows in relations between them.

TITLE VI - INSTITUTIONAL, GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 63
1. A Joint Committee for European Community-Palestinian Authority trade and cooperation, referred to in this Agreement as 'the Joint Committee', is hereby established. It shall have the power to take decisions in the cases provided for in the Agreement as well as in other cases necessary for the purpose of attaining the objectives set out in the Agreement. The decisions taken shall be binding on the Parties, which shall take such measures as are required to implement them.
2. The Joint Committee may also formulate any resolutions, recommendations or opinions which it considers desirable for the attainment of the common objectives and the smooth functioning of the Agreement.
3. The Joint Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
Article 64
1. The Joint Committee shall be composed of representatives of the Community and of the Palestinian Authority.
2. The Joint Committee shall act by mutual agreement between the Community and the Palestinian Authority.

Article 65
1. The office of Chairman of the Joint Committee shall be held alternately by the Community and the Palestinian Authority in accordance with the conditions laid down in the rules of procedure.
2. The Joint Committee shall meet once a year and when circumstances require, on the initiative of its Chairman.

Article 66
1. The Joint Committee may decide to set up any other committee that can assist it in carrying out its duties.
2. The Joint Committee shall determine the composition and duties of such committees and how they shall function.

Article 67
1. Either Party may refer to the Joint Committee any dispute relating to the application or interpretation of this Agreement.
2. The Joint Committee may settle the dispute by means of a decision.
3. Each Party shall be bound to take measures involved in carrying out the decision referred to in paragraph 2.
4. In the event of it not being possible to settle the dispute in accordance with paragraph 2, either Party may notify the other of the appointment of an arbitrator; the other Party must then appoint a second arbitrator within two months. The Joint Committee shall appoint a third arbitrator. The arbitrators' decisions shall be taken by majority vote. Each Party to the dispute must take the steps required to implement the decision of the arbitrator.

Article 68: Nothing in the Agreement shall prevent a Party from taking any measures:
(a) which it considers necessary to prevent the disclosure of information contrary to its essential security interests;
(b) which relate to the production of, or trade in, arms, munitions or war materials or to research, development or production indispensable for defence purposes, provided that such measures do not impair the conditions of competition in respect of products not intended for specifically military purposes;
(c) which it considers essential to its own security in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in time of war or serious international tension constituting threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security.

Article 69: In the fields covered by this Agreement and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein:
- the arrangements applied by the Palestinian Authority in respect of the Community shall not give rise to any discrimination between the Member States, their nationals or their companies or firms,
- the arrangements applied by the Community in respect of the Palestinian Authority shall not give rise to discrimination between members of the Palestinian population,
- companies or firms of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Article 70
1. The Parties shall take any general or specific measures required to fulfil their obligations under the Agreement. They shall see to it that the objectives set out in the Agreement are attained.
2. If either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before so doing, except in cases of special urgency, it shall supply the Joint Committee with all relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties.
In the selection of measures, priority must be given to those which least disturb the functioning of the Agreement. These measures shall be notified immediately to the Joint Committee and shall be the subject of consultations within the Joint Committee if the other Party so requests.

Article 71: Annexes 1 to 3 and Protocols 1 to 3 shall form an integral part of this Agreement. Declarations shall appear in the Final Act, which shall form an integral part of this Agreement.

Article 72: For the purpose of this Agreement the term ‘Parties’ shall mean the PLO for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority and the Community, which shall each act in accordance with their respective powers.

Article 73: This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories in which the Treaty establishing the European Community is applied and under the conditions laid down in that Treaty and, on the other hand, to the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Article 74: This Agreement, drawn up in duplicate in the Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish, and Arabic languages, each of these texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.

Article 75:
1. This Agreement will be approved by the Parties in accordance with their own procedures. This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the date on which the Parties notify each other that the procedures referred to in the first paragraph have been completed.
2. No later than 4 May 1999 negotiations shall commence with a view to concluding a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement. Until such an Agreement is concluded, this Agreement shall remain in force, subject to any amendments agreed between the Parties.
3. Each of the Parties may denounce this Agreement by notifying the other Party. The Agreement shall cease to apply six months after the date of such notification.

Done at Brussels on the twenty-fourth day of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven.

Israeli Ministerial Committee, Decision on Building in Har Homa, Jerusalem, 26 February 1997

[The Committee was headed by the Prime Minister. The new Har Homa settlement was planned on the forested Jabel Abu Ghneim in southeast Jerusalem.]

1. The Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem Affairs decided today unanimously, to approve construction of the Har Homa neighborhood and also decided to approve construction for the Arab population in Jerusalem, subject to the directives and procedures required by law.
2. The Har Homa neighborhood is to encompass some 6,500 housing units, with 2,500 to be built in the first stage. The first stage of building for the Arab population will comprise about 3,000 housing units in ten different Jerusalem neighborhoods.
3. Infrastructure work on the Har Homa site and the building sites for the Arab population will commence after the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, who is authorized to sign the Har Homa plans, does so.

UN General Assembly, European Draft Resolution on Jerusalem, New York, 7 March 1997

Expressing deep concern at the decision of the Government of Israel to initiate new settlement activities in the Jebel Abu Ghneim area in East Jerusalem,

Expressing concern about other recent measures that encourage or facilitate new settlement activities,

Stressing that such settlements are illegal and a major obstacle to peace,

Recalling its resolutions on Jerusalem and other relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions,

Confirming that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, are invalid and cannot change that status,

Reaffirming its support for the Middle East Peace Process and all its achievements, including the recent Agreement on Hebron,

Concerned about the difficulties facing the Middle East Peace Process, including the impact these have on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, and urging the parties to fulfill their obligations, including under the agreements already reached,

Having discussed the situation at its 91st and 92nd plenary meetings on 12 March 1997,

1. Calls upon the Israeli authorities to refrain from all actions or measures, including settlements activities, which alter the facts on the ground, preempting the final status negotiations, and have negative implications for the Middle East Peace Process;

2. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, which is applicable to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967;

3. Calls upon all parties to continue, in the interests of peace and security, their negotiations within the Middle East Peace Process on its agreed basis and the timely implementation of the agreements reached;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Government of Israel the provisions of this resolution.

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, LETTER TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER
NETANYAHU ON THE PEACE PROCESS, AMMAN, 9 MARCH 1997

[The letter was written in response to Israel’s decision to build Har Homa settlement on Jabel Abu Ghneim and of the minimal scope of Israeli redeployments in the West Bank announced on 6 March].

Prime Minister,

My distress is genuine and deep over the accumulating tragic actions which you have initiated at the head of the government of Israel, making peace - the worthiest objective of my life - appear more and more like a distant, elusive mirage. I could remain aloof if the very lives of all Arabs and Israelis and their future were not fast sliding toward an abyss of bloodshed and disaster, brought about by fear and despair. I frankly cannot accept your repeated excuse of having to act the way you do under great duress and pressure. I cannot believe that the people of Israel seek bloodshed and disaster and oppose peace. Nor can I believe that the most constitutionally powerful prime minister in Israeli history would act on other than his total convictions.

The saddest reality that has been dawning on me is that I do not find you by my side in working to fulfill God’s will for the final reconciliation of all the descendants of the children of Abraham. Your course of actions seems bent on destroying all I believe in or have striven to achieve with the Hashemite family since Faisal the First and Abdullah to the present times. You cannot send me assurances that you would not sanction any further construction of settlements and tell me of your decision to construct two roads to help all concerned Israelis and Palestinians alike and then renege on your commitment.

In pushing matters to the point of securing a US veto at the Security Council, you have ill served the image and interest of your major ally and benefactor and our partner in peace making as the honest balanced peace broker.
Documents on Palestine – Vol. V: 10. Middle East Peace Negotiations (III)

Mr. Prime Minister, if it is your intention to maneuver our Palestinian brethren into inevitable violent resistance, then order your bulldozers into the proposed settlement site without doing much which is needed in recognition of Palestinian and Arab sensitivity, anger and despair and ameliorating the situation, then order the young Israeli members of your powerful armed forces surrounding Palestinian towns to commit wanton murder and mayhem, possibly resulting in creating yet a fresh exodus of hapless Palestinians from theirs, and their ancestors, homeland and bury the peace process for all times.

On the question of your withdrawal from territories you have committed Israel, before the US, Jordan, and the world, to complete the process by mid-1998, what good did it serve to offer such an insignificant first phase withdrawal? Why the apparent continued deliberate humiliation of your so-called Palestinian partners? Can any worthwhile relationship thrive in the absence of mutual respect and trust? Why are Palestinians still confirming that their agricultural products still rot awaiting entry into Israel and export? Why the delay when it is known that unless work is authorized to commence on the Gaza port before the end of this month, the complete project would suffer a year’s delay? Finally, the Gaza airport - all of us have addressed the subject numerous times with a view to having a legitimate Palestinian need met and to give their leaders and people their own free access to the world rather than their present confinement and need to exit and return through other sovereign territories. I had requested permission and intended to fly President Arafat myself, in Jordan’s official State Tristar, to the Palestinian airport of Gaza as I had requested earlier, during my Hebron intervention, to fly by a fixed-wing aircraft accepting your refusal then only because there were far more important issues at hand.

I anticipated your positive response this time. I believe it would have helped improve the atmosphere considerably but, alas, it was not to be. Now, suppose I had taken off nonetheless for Gaza, in the full right of a friend, then would you have ordered my fellow pilots in the Israeli air force - those who escorted me on the same aircraft over Israel in what became known as the “First Flight of Peace” - to prevent me forcibly from landing or worse? You will never know how close you came to having to make a decision on the subject had I, on this occasion, not planned to carry guests back home. How can I work with you as a partner and true friend in this confused and confusing atmosphere when I sense an intent to destroy all I worked to build between our peoples and states. Stubbornness over real issues is one thing, but for its own sake, I wonder. In any event I have discovered that you have your own mind set and appear in no need for any advice from a friend.

I deeply regret having to write you this personal message but it is my sense of responsibility and concern which has prompted me for posterity to do so in the face of the unknown.

 ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU, REPLY TO KING HUSSEIN’S LETTER, JERUSALEM, 10 MARCH 1997

Your Majesty,

I read your letter with deep concern. The last thing I want is to cause you anguish and disappointment. But your thorough knowledge of recent events must surely make you aware that the difficulties we face in the peace process did not begin with my government. Had there been a successful and vibrant peace process in May 1996, I would not have been elected by the Israeli public. I was chosen to lead Israel because of the bitter dissatisfaction of the Israeli people with the way the peace process was progressing.

I inherited a process that was failing. The country was suffering its worst terrorist wave in its history, with bus bombs going off in the heart of Israeli cities and a devastating mini-war taking a heavy toll in Lebanon. By election time, the peace process was in its death throes.

But rather than let the Oslo process die after the elections, I sought to revive it. I have taken decisions that even my predecessors were extremely reluctant to attempt: the redeployment in Hebron, the re-
lease of female terrorists who had killed Israelis, the easing of the closure, and the transfer of VAT funds to the Palestinian Authority ([PA] despite PA debts to Israel).

The release of the prisoners, in particular, was for me an excruciating decision. In recent decades our finest soldiers had given their lives to prevent the release of convicted terrorists, even when Israeli hostages were taken.

Nor was the further redeployment (FRD) that we undertook at the end of last week insignificant. I know there are those around Chairman Arafat who built up his expectations about its dimensions. But the fact is that the Oslo II interim agreement says nothing about the size of the FRD: It leaves this decision wholly to Israel’s discretion. This may not be what Mr. Arafat wants, but it is the reality of the agreement that he signed.

My predecessors Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres only turned over 2.8 percent of the West Bank to area A status - to complete Palestinian control. After our FRD, 10.1 percent of the West Bank will have this status. This is an increase by more than a factor of three. And this is only the first of three FRDs. As you know, nearly all Palestinians in the territories now live under Palestinian rule. Washington clearly understood that Israel had provided a credible FRD when it announced that the redeployment was a “demonstration of Israel’s commitment to the peace process and a positive first step.”

What made the FRD particularly difficult for my government was the lack of Palestinian reciprocity. As you recall, the post-Hebron “Note for the Record” listed the obligations of both parties to the continuation of the Oslo process. Since Hebron, we explained to the Palestinian Authority that they had violated their obligation by releasing Hamas and Islamic Jihad hard-core terrorists - many of whom were involved in the 1996 bus bombings. The Palestinian Authority failed to respond to our presentations. We informed them that at least four of the twenty or so PA institutions in Jerusalem had unquestionably violated the Palestinian undertaking to restrict PA activities to areas under its jurisdiction. Again the PA failed to respond.

For the peace process to work in Israel, it must produce a “peace of consensus” - not a peace which rests on a fragile and questionable parliamentary majority. I delivered such a peace when eighty-seven Knesset members voted for the Hebron agreement as opposed to the sixty-one members who supported the 1995 Oslo II interim agreement. The narrowly-supported peace of Oslo II could not have lasted - it was already leading to a dangerous polarization of Israeli society. Only my government can deliver the more stable “peace of consensus.” But it cannot do so if it is forced to ignore more than half of the Israeli electorate.

The Oslo process has not left us an easy legacy. It put off the greatest differences between Israel and the Palestinians to later stages. The process began with Gaza-Jericho, then turned to the cities of the West Bank, and finally the countryside surrounding the cities. Each stage represented a higher level of sensitivity and risk for Israel. Moreover, as we turn from these interim issues to final status questions, the degree of difficulty in the process naturally increases. We cannot make the Jordanian-Israeli relationship hostage to the Palestinian-Israeli negotiating track. We cannot give every Palestinian-Israeli impasse the power to hurt our own relationship. Nor can I understand how the building inside Jerusalem’s municipal borders of 2,500 housing units for Jews and 3,015 housing units for Arabs can be construed as “further construction of settlements.”

I believe my record speaks for itself. Despite tremendous resistance from some in my own constituency, I have chosen the path of the Oslo process. But I believe that once a decision to take this path is made, both sides much decide that the option of violence has ceased to exist.

Let me assure you that I have always appreciated the courage and resolve with which you have helped keep the peace process alive. I hold you in the highest esteem and I value our friendship and understanding. That is why I must confess that I am baffled by the personal level of the attacks against me. In all my
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER DAVID LEVY, STATEMENT IN THE KNESSET
ON THE PEACE PROCESS, JERUSALEM, 12 MARCH 1997

Mr. Speaker, Members of Knesset,

From this rostrum, in my first address to the Knesset upon my entry into office, I said as follows:

"The government, by virtue of its guidelines, accepts the binding democratic principle of continuity in the government’s commitment to the agreements signed by the previous government. It accepts a process to which it was previously opposed, and this is a clear expression, to the whole world, of our adherence to democratic values. At the same time, the fate of this agreement, of this process, will be determined by reciprocity. It must be upheld not by one side, but by both."

I said that this process will be difficult. We have much hard work before us. There will be ups and downs; there will undoubtedly be crises, as the two sides do not see eye to eye on the final outcome of this process the permanent status arrangements. However, if there will not be a strict rejection of incitement and violence, this process will wither of its own accord. Because peace cannot be achieved under threat, there can be no progress towards reconciliation under incitement, and there can be no confidence in peace along a mine-strewn path of fear.

Peace is a matter of free choice. The supreme value which we attach to peace dictates this choice. With all the questions and evident dangers, the government decided to adopt this path, accepting the democratic principle behind this decision a path which constitutes the best hope for both peoples and was attacked by right and left, just one week after taking office.

Just one week and already it had enemies, to a certain degree, in Cairo, where harsh statements were made. It is in Cairo that the anti-Israeli line was defined, it is from there that threats were issued, saying: If Israel will not act in accordance with the expectations of certain elements, we will take action against Israel everywhere, on the international arena. We will put a halt to normalization and cause unrest within Israel as well.

What kind of reception is this for a government which announces that it accepts the course of peace, that it will honor the agreements? What kind of message is this? What kind of encouragement?

We understood then that an anti-Israeli strategy had been adopted, regardless of what action was taken. This was subsequently confirmed from every international podium in the adoption of anti-Israeli resolutions, anti-Israeli actions, pressure on those states which had begun to normalize relations with us, to halt this normalization.

On the Palestinian side, from the first meetings, we discerned a strong desire to engage in dialogue. I was the first Israeli minister of this government to meet with Yasser Arafat, and the conversation which be-
gan with a certain tension not of words, but of feelings soon thawed, and we had a serious talk, placing matters on the table. We rejected violence. Violence will solve nothing; violence and incitement must not be viewed as a means to resolve any issue. We agreed that any future disagreements would be resolved in face-to-face negotiations. We have the agreement before us; both sides must rigorously uphold it.

Since that time, and despite unwelcome developments, we succeeded in establishing a mechanism to work together in an orderly manner. We achieved the agreement on Hebron. We set up two delegations one headed by Abu Mazen and the other by myself. We held an orderly working meeting of the plenum, we adopted decisions, and we are fulfilling them. The two chairmen meet and discuss every issue. They do not need the approval or decision of any higher authority. They contact one another and set meetings to discuss specific issues.

We set up nine committees, each of which, with the agreement of the respective chairmen, is to deal with a specific issue. For example, we have a security committee to deal with issues which arise on a day-to-day basis. Among the other committees are a committee to discuss the Gaza port; a committee to discuss the airport in Dahania; a committee to resolve the issue of safe passage for goods and persons; a committee to discuss economic issues, which has already convened and resolved all outstanding issues and claims.

We decided that the plenum would convene once a month to receive reports from the committee heads, and if needed, call on the two chairmen to resolve unsettled matters. If they, too, should fail to resolve the issue, both sides agreed that it would be brought before the Israeli Prime Minister and the head of the Palestinian Authority for decision. This was the modus operandi agreed upon.

What has happened now? Why the panic? Why this international drama? Who has created it? For what reason? All attempts to present Israel as failing to abide by the agreement, ostensibly ignoring its partner, not fulfilling its commitment, are unfounded. To the contrary, let us examine these issues. I can tell you that in no article of any agreement, in no meeting, was there even a hint as to the scope of the further redeployment. Moreover, with the signing of the Hebron Protocol, there was an unequivocal statement by the United States, conveyed to the head of the Palestinian Authority, stating that under the terms of the agreement it is understood that it is Israel and Israel alone which will determine the scope of the further redeployment. Thus, no further discussion of this issue is required.

This is Israel’s authority under the agreement, and we acted in accordance with this authority.

True, the Americans expected a redeployment of 10 percent they said so. The government, following a prolonged, careful and serious discussion, based on its consideration and responsibility for security and other issues, decided on a figure of 9.1 percent. This is an area larger than the entire Gaza Strip 200,000 Palestinians being transferred to their own self-government. This should not be underestimated.

This decision adopted by the government was very favorably received by the U.S. government, as well as by many European states. The decision was within Israel’s authority. There is no deviation from the agreement here. In a meeting I had with Mr. Abu Mazen as head of the Palestinian delegation, I asked: What did you expect? While he did not say so, some of his colleagues expected that the first phase of further redeployment would be 30 percent, and likewise the second and third phases, so that the final negotiation would be over the remaining 10 percent. I asked: On what basis? On the basis of expectations; that is what they want. I asked: Does our decision constitute a violation of any promise made to you? He admitted: No promise was given and I quote.

Failing to find a violation here, they go on to the issue of Har Homa. As I have said from every rostrum, including this one not to arouse anger, not as justification, but as a direct statement: Israel’s right to build in Jerusalem is not subject to question or to appeal. There is no Israeli commitment to refrain from building in Jerusalem. This has been verified by the best jurists and legal advisers. Where authority is vested in Israel under the agreement, Israel is entitled to build.

Moreover, there was no commitment, even orally, by the previous government not to build in Jerusalem. This decision derives from Israel’s unassailable right to build in its capital, and is also reflected in the agreement itself. Let no one be misled, and say: In order to prevent violence and unrest, refrain
from building in Jerusalem or change the government decision. I wish to state the one and only truth, even if there are those who may find it unpleasant: Israel has the right to build in Jerusalem. The government decision is firm and abiding, and will not be altered even in the face of daily threats. Progress towards peace will not be achieved with threats; to the contrary.

We will, of course, build for Arabs as well. I am glad to have been one of those who initiated the government decision to build in Jerusalem for Arabs as well. Is this a good decision? I say that to build for the Arab population in Jerusalem is a good decision, a necessary decision. The government will carry out the decision on both levels, building in Har Homa and for the Arab population of Jerusalem.

We now hear about a decision to convene what some are calling an international forum, others an international conference, and yet others a briefing, in Gaza. When we chose the course of peace, we accepted the obligation of resolving our differences. If an outside party should try to introduce itself into this process, it will become deadlocked. The appeal to international forums runs counter to the letter of commitment given by Chairman Yasser Arafat to the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on September 9, 1993, that in choosing this course, every problem or difference that arises in the future will be resolved directly by us, without recourse to international fora. This is contrary to the agreement itself.

There is therefore no reason for such a gathering. What will such a gathering achieve? What is it, a tribunal? Does anyone believe that Israel, which has chosen the course of peace, will agree to stand accused? Will this serve as an encouragement to pursue the course of peace? Will it have a positive effect on the prevailing atmosphere, or rather a negative, deleterious and dangerous effect?

Once we have chosen the course of peace, there is no need for pressure. Any pressure will only bring the Israeli government and many others in Israel to say: “We will not pursue peace on account of pressure. We will not accept anything that others want, in their own interests, and abandon our own interests, only because of pressure. Pressure is not an incentive for peace.”

There is yet another area of activity, of which we are aware, which poses a serious danger. The Palestinian Authority is now coopting to its discussions organizations which only yesterday it itself pointed to as a dangerous opposition seeking to undermine the peace process. They are now partners in the talks. There is today also encouragement to begin to foment unrest not yet violence, against which we admonish, but unrest which is liable to deteriorate into violence, to which Hamas is a party. Yes, Hamas is involved in this too. And if it is given a green light, it will destroy this process with its own hands.

I would like to believe that there is still a sense of responsibility, and that reason will determine whether such a breach will be created, and whether it will be exploited by those elements which seek to destroy the peace process. The situation will then be very grave; this will deal a mortal blow to hope.

This is why I call for responsibility, not extremism neither on the right nor on the left. Responsibility obliges us to take the middle course, the responsible and courageous course, and to make every effort to prevent violence, to uphold agreements, to advance the peace process and to make it succeed.

From this rostrum, I call upon the Palestinian Authority and its head: Look at the course this government has chosen and, though you have not received all that you hoped, this government is following a courageous and correct course, fulfilling its commitments, and moving forward to resolve all issues on the agenda until we achieve the longed-for peace. Violence, incitement and ferment will meet with the severest response, because this is not the course that will advance us to our desired goal: peace.

This is a time for maturity, a time for responsibility, a time for reason. It is a time to return to negotiations, not to seek solutions outside the region and outside the committees we have established. It is a time to return to the negotiating table, which is the only place and the only way to advance peace and to remove dangers.

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UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 51/223 REGARDING ISRAELI SETTLEMENT
ACTIVITIES IN EAST JERUSALEM, NEW YORK, 13 MARCH 1997

[The Palestinian Permanent Observer at the UN asked for a UNGA action on Israel’s decision to
build Har Homa. UNGA voted 130:2, with 2 abstentions, to call on Israel to refrain from all settle-
ment actions which create facts on the ground pre-empting final status negotiations.]

The General Assembly,

Having considered
the letters dated 21, 25 and 27 February 1997 from the Permanent Observer of
Palestine on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States,

Expressing deep concern
at the decision of the Government of Israel to initiate new settlement ac-
tivities in the Jebel Abu Ghneim area in East Jerusalem,

Expressing concern
about other recent measures that encourage or facilitate new settlement activities,

Stressing
that such settlements are illegal and a major obstacle to peace,

Recalling
its resolutions on Jerusalem and other relevant General Assembly and Security Council
resolutions,

Confirming
that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which
purport to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, are
invalid and cannot change that status,

Reaffirming
its support
for the Middle East peace process and all its achievements, including the
recent agreement on Hebron,

Concerned
about the difficulties facing the Middle East peace process, including the impact these
have on the living conditions of the Palestinian people, and urging the parties to fulfill their obliga-
tions, including under the agreements already reached,

Having discussed
the situation at its 91st, 92nd and 93rd plenary meetings on 12 and 13 March 1997,

1. Calls upon the Israeli authorities to refrain from all actions or measures, including settlement
activities, which alter the facts on the ground, pre-empting the final status negotiations, and
have negative implications for the Middle East peace process;

2. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and re-
sponsibilities under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of war of 12 August 1949, which is applicable to all the territories occupied by Israel
since 1967;

3. Calls upon all parties to continue, in the interests of peace and security, their negotiations
within the Middle East peace process on its agreed basis and the timely implementation of the
agreements reached;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Government of Israel the pro-
visions of the present resolution.

PRESIDENT YASSER ARAFAT, ADDRESS TO THE CONFERENCE ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OSLO ACCORDS, GAZA, 15 MARCH 1997 [EXCERPTS]

[The mini-summit - called for by Pres. Arafat to push the implementation of the Oslo Accords and "save
the peace process." – was attended by representatives from the US, EU, Japan, Egypt and Jordan.]

The signing of the Hebron Protocol was an important event which could not have been so important if
it hadn't been for the tremendous efforts made personally by US President Bill Clinton and his decision
to send a senior delegation to attend the negotiations. Besides, the great efforts made by President Hosni
Mubarak, King Hussein, the European Community, Russia, Norway and the United Nations.

We believed the peace process was back on track and as we started to gain hope we were surprised by
the decisions of the Israeli government to Judaize the city of Jerusalem, to build new settlements and
to enlarge the existing ones in an attempt to pre-empt the final status talks that are due to start in two days. Later followed the decision of the further re-deployment which was a shock for us. This decision came as a shock since the redeployment in Area B had been done by 28 December 1995 and as such the Israeli government had declared that it would re-deploy its troops in less than 2 percent of Area C. In this respect, I would like to state that 34 articles of the agreement are still pending and the Israeli government has not fulfilled them. These infringements are related to dozens of outstanding issues that are yet to be implemented.

When we agreed to postpone issues of Jerusalem, borders, settlements and refugees until the final status negotiations, we also agreed that neither party should carry out unilateral steps that would affect those talks. The Agreements have stated that our Palestinian People in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza Strip would elect their leader and their representatives in the Palestinian Council. Then it was Israel that came and claimed that the measures it is taking in Jerusalem are part of its sovereign rights in Jerusalem. How can this be accepted?

The US letter of assurances, dated 18 October 1991, stressed that the issue of Jerusalem would be discussed in the final status talks and that Israel has no right to unilaterally take measures that would change the demographic status of the city and in the occupied Palestinian territories. The world has confronted Israel's annexation of Jerusalem as was stated in UN Resolutions 252 of 1986, 267 of 1969, 271 of 1969, 298 of 1971, 446 and 452 of 1979, 465, 471, 476 and 478 of 1980, 672 of 1990 and many other resolutions that were adopted by the UN General Assembly, including the resolution of two days ago.

The decision to build the new settlement in Jabal Abu Ghaneim is an old decision that was frozen by the government of Mr. Yitzhak Rabin and its successor, the government of Shimon Peres, because both of them realized how serious the implementation of such a decision would be too the peace process. Now Mr. Netanyahu comes to implement a plan to isolate Jerusalem from the West Bank and to sever the northern parts of the West Bank from the southern parts. We have plans and maps that indicates hotels are to be built in this area in preparations for Bethlehem 2000 events. Such a plan aims at replacing the town of Bethlehem with the new settlements. The situation is very serious and all the settlement projects in Jerusalem and the surrounding areas as well as in the rest of the Palestinian lands are not but a plan very detrimental to the peace process. In this respect I would like to present to you what the government of Yitzhak Rabin had committed itself to with regard to the settlements. Those commitments have become an official decision of the Israeli cabinet which was rescinded by the Netanyahu government once he came to power:

- No to new settlements.
- No works to enlarge existing Jewish settlements.
- No government money will be funneled for settlement activities.

Fences are to be setup at a distance of 50 meters way from the last house of every settlement (borders of the existing Jewish settlements).

Settlements and confiscation of lands have continued in an unprecedented pace not only in Jerusalem but also in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Nablus, Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Jenin, Jericho, Toubas, Salfit and even in the Gaza Strip.

We endeavor to save the peace process, to protect it and to put it back on track. To achieve this, terms of reference of the peace process and the signed agreements should be honored. Israel has tried to transfer negotiations into dictation in order to dedicate accomplished facts on the ground by means of settlement activities, land expropriation, by-pass roads, house demolition, transfer of population, confiscation of identity cards of our people in Jerusalem in a serious ethnic cleansing campaign.

The Israeli government has forgotten or pretended to forget, its commitment to safeguard the holy shrines in Christianity and Islam as well as the Palestinian Institutions operating in Jerusalem, according to the letter of Mr. Shimon Peres to late Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Holst. The Israeli
Government has also ignored its commitments vis-à-vis the agreement on refugees. The differences on this issue have continued and there has not been any progress in the four-way committee talks of Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

I have called for this meeting to save the peace process. Responsibility in this respect is collective. We need to find a mechanism efficient to face Israel's refusal to fulfill what has been agreed upon. We seek your support and aid to find the mechanism which can guarantee the accurate implementation of the signed agreements, and a mechanism that would guarantee that neither party carries out unilateral steps that might affect or harm the final status agenda.

I would like to reiterate our commitment to peace. And in the same time I call upon the government of Israel to express equal commitment and to stop those unilateral measures that are liable to destroy the whole peace process. As we stated before the peace and terrorism cannot go hand in hand, so do peace and settlements. They cannot go hand in glove. I call upon the government of Israel to rescind its settlement plans to stop manipulation of the agreements as it did with regard to the first phase of the further re-deployment. We have no choice but to adhere to reason, wisdom and courage as well as to the option of peace, based on comprehensiveness, durability and justice.

I again call for your assistance and support to protect the peace process and to put it back on track, far from the language of arrogance, de-facto policy or sense of superiority. Our people suffer from closure, siege and intransigence in not opening the safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza, or in opening the airport or the Gaza port.

The responsibility is collective and joint. Out of this conference, we should walk towards new horizons in order to safeguard a new future, clear of violence, suppression and bloodshed, not only for the Palestinian and Israeli peoples but to the peoples of the whole region.

Council of the League of Arab States, Resolutions on Palestinian Refugees and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Cairo, 31 March 1997

Resolution No. 5628

Palestinian Refugees

The Arab League's Council,

Taking note of the General Secretariat's memorandum, and the recommendation of the Conference of Advisors on Palestinian Affairs, in its fifty-seventh session, and the recommendation of the Committee on Political Affairs,

Recalling General Assembly Resolution number 194 of 1948, and Security Council Resolution number 237 of 1967,

Taking into account the provisions of the International Convention on Political and Social Rights, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,

Resolves:

1. To affirm the need for the implementation of the Arab League Council's resolution number 5414 of 15/9/1994, to entrust the UN Reconciliation Committee, set up in accordance with the General Assembly resolution number 194 and in cooperation with the Arab states and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), with the task of preparing a comprehensive census of Palestinian refugees and their properties, and of drawing up a comprehensive proposal for resolving their issue on the basis of resolution number 194.

2. To reject attempts aimed at considering the refugee problem as a mere humanitarian issue, whilst severing it from its political and legal dimensions.
3. To affirm the importance of convening an international symposium and to lay down mechanisms and proposals for reaching a just solution to the refugee issue on the basis of resolution number 194 of 1948, and to call upon the Secretariat General to exert the necessary efforts to convene such a symposium.


RESOLUTION NO. 5629

The Arab-Israeli Conflict and The Shattering, by Israel, of the Current Peace Process

The Council of the League of Arab States,

Having considered the latest developments and encroaching dangers, as well as the obstacles laid by Israel to shatter the current peace process, and

In commitment by the Arab states to the realization of just and comprehensive peace in the region, and in keenness on salvaging the peace process;

Recommends:

1. Halting the steps that have been taken for normalization with Israel within the framework of the current peace process, and halting the dealing with Israel, including the closure of offices and missions, until Israel complies with the Madrid Conference frame of reference and the land-for-peace principle, and also until the implementation of the agreements, obligations, and commitments that the parties concerned have reached along all tracks through peace talks.

2. Suspension of Arab participation in multilateral negotiations, the continuation of commitment to primary degree Arab boycott of Israel, and the activation of such boycott, until the realization of just and comprehensive peace in the region.

ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, POSITION ON THE ARAB LEAGUE MEETING DECISIONS, JERUSALEM, 2 APRIL 1997

{The Arab League meeting in Cairo on 30-31 March (see above) recommended a freeze in the relations between Arab states and Israel, i.e., an end of the normalization process.}

With the convening of the Madrid Conference in 1991, followed by the Declaration of Principles, the signing of the Interim Agreement and just recently the signing of the Protocol on Hebron, a quantum shift occurred in the relations between Israel and the Arab world. After more than a generation of war and bloodshed, frameworks for negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, were established in order for the parties to the conflict to engage in constructive dialogue leading to peace in the Middle East. This process has been held under the co-sponsorship of the United States and Russia, while many other countries have played important roles as gavel holders of one of the five multilateral working groups, or by giving political, economic or moral support to these endeavors.

The recent recommendations of the League of Arab States calling for a “freeze” in relations between the Arab world and Israel, an end to steps which have been taken to normalize relations between Israel and various Arab states, a return to the Arab boycott of Israel and the suspension of the multilateral talks in the region stand in total and complete contradiction to the peace process as it has developed over the past six years. These recommendations strike at the very foundations of the peace process and call into question the proclaimed readiness of the Arab side to advance along the road to peace.

Should the above-mentioned recommendations, which in their entirety call for a freezing of relations with Israel, actually be implemented, then the peace process may well be stopped in its tracks and we will then revert to the period prior to the Madrid Conference; a period which was, to an extent, characterized by both diplomatic and economic warfare along with the inflamed rhetoric which we had hoped would be relegated to the past.
These recommendations, which may have grave consequences for Israel, the region and the peace process, are the culmination of a number of meetings which were held by the Islamic Conference in Islamabad (March 23), the Jerusalem Committee in Rabat (March 23-24), as well as the meeting of foreign ministers of the League of Arab States in Cairo (March 30-31). These meetings have produced a regional and pan-Islamic dynamic which feeds on itself while casting its fallout over international bodies such as the United Nations. This situation has deterred those states in the Arab camp who truly wish to move forward with the peace process while at the same time justifying and rewarding those elements for whom intransigence is a favored motif.

The main elements in these disturbing recommendations are:

1. The resumption of the boycott, which is legally defined as a casus belli and returns the region to the situation it was in during the 50s and 60s.
2. The freezing of the normalization between states and peoples, a process which is the foundation for different future relations between the people of Israel and their neighbors and which should lay the basis for new and better relations in the realms of trade, economics, culture and interpersonal contacts.
3. The suspension of the multilateral talks which themselves are a formal part of the Madrid Conference and take place under the auspices of the states which convened the Madrid Conference.

While one side may, at times, be disappointed with the others positions, actions or even mistakes, the way to remedy such differences is via the framework provided by the agreements. The resort to inflammatory rhetoric, calls for violent action and terrorism coupled with the use of international force to pressure one side or the other are all unacceptable. Especially disturbing has been the use of religious elements by the PLO in order to inflame the atmosphere.

Israel views the above-mentioned actions as a major breach of the peace process in its entirety and of the various agreements which have been signed by the parties.

Israel believes that the following steps need to be taken:

1. Comprehensive and systematic action by the Palestinian Authority to prevent terrorist attacks must be implemented. This includes renewing cooperation and coordination between the security forces of both sides.
2. A renewed understanding that negotiations cannot take place in an atmosphere of violence and threats.
3. The curbing of inflammatory rhetoric.
4. Maintaining reciprocity as the basis for honoring agreements.
5. A resumption of the negotiations which will take place continuously until an agreement is reached between the two sides.

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US SPECIAL MIDDLE EAST COORDINATOR DENNIS ROSS, REMARKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, AIPAC CONFERENCE, 7 APRIL 1997

Thank you. I, unfortunately, have to apologize at the beginning of this because this was billed as a town meeting and we were going to have an hour's time to engage in what I actually enjoy the most, which is not hearing me speak, because I can hear me speak anytime, but to have a chance to have a give-and-take. And we're not going to have a chance to do that this morning because we have a very full day.

Dore and I just came from a meeting. As I said, I was surprised that Dore actually got here first since he left after me and got here before me. But I'm going to have to leave right after this to go in terms of today's meetings. So I apologize up-front. And I hope, Howard, that we'll be able to do it again and I'll be able to spend the full amount of time that is required. Let me offer some observations on this
session. This session was billed as "The Process of Making Peace." And, obviously, that's something that I spend a lot of time engaged in, in trying to do.

I know the vice president spoke to you last night, and the vice president emphasized our basic approach, not only to relations with Israel, but also he outlined some key principles as they relate to what guides the US as we approach the process of making peace. There were three in particular that I know he highlighted. One is that as we pursue this process, that there's not going go be a wedge driven between the United States and Israel; that we work together; that even if there are differences, which are inevitable even among the best of friends, that no one should have any illusions, that there will be no wedge driven between the United States and Israel as we pursue this process. (Applause.)

A second basic principle is that the only way you solve problems is at the table, and you do it directly through negotiations (Applause.) Violence isn't an answer. Different forms are not an answer. Unilateralism isn't an answer. Bilateral negotiations is the way to solve problems. And that really leads to the third principle. There is no imposition of an outcome here. Neither the US nor anyone else is going to impose a settlement. Any agreement - (applause). Any agreement that emerges is going to emerge from what the two parties do together. Obviously we have a role to play to help, but we can't impose an outcome, no one else can impose an outcome. The only outcome that is going to emerge is going to emerge from what occurs between the parties, because as something I've said on many, many times at different occasions, the two parties have to own the agreements that emerge. They have to defend them. They're responsible for them. And only if they have negotiated them and only if they're in the position to defend every detail in them is it an agreement that has any chance of enduring.

So those are the three key principles that guide us as we approach the process of making peace: no wedge being driven between the United States and Israel; negotiations are the only way to solve the problem; nothing can be imposed from the outside. Now, with that as a kind of backdrop, let me offer a few observations on the process and some perspective on it.

Clearly, we are dealing with trying to bring to an end one of the most intractable conflicts of the century. It is a conflict that has a legacy: a legacy of grievance, a legacy of pain, a legacy of fear, suspicion, violence. When you have that kind of a legacy, obviously it's not such a simple thing to do to end such a conflict. And yet if you look at the last few years we've obviously made remarkable strides. There have been four agreements between the Israelis and the Palestinians. There has been a treaty of peace and cooperation between Israel and Jordan. Indeed, the prime minister flew to Minnesota last night to see King Hussein. We have had three economic conferences that brought the private sector of the Arab world and the public sector of the Arab world together with the Israelis. They began in Casablanca. And maybe the most interesting one of the conferences was the one held in Cairo, because it took place in a certain context. It took place in a context where there was perceived stalemate in the political process, and yet we had a very large turnout internationally and also from the region because it reflected something about the desire to move forward and also the need to move forward economically. And there is an important new constituency that favors the pursuit of peace, and that is the private sector in the region. And that's something to be cultivated and developed.

Now I would like to be able to paint for you today an upbeat picture of where are and how we go. And that's not such a simple thing to do, because in fact we are in a very difficult period. It's one of the most difficult periods of this process. It's not the first time we've faced a difficult period; we've faced difficult periods before. This is a process - perhaps because of the legacy that I described, perhaps because of some of the shocks and the traumas that we have endured in this process - it is a process that has been marked by ups and downs. It is a process that has been marked by setbacks. And it is not surprising that there have been setbacks, given the nature of the conflict that we're trying to end.

What in some ways is more surprising is that there's been a resiliency to the process, to the pursuit of peace. There's been a capacity to endure even in the face of shocks and challenges and traumas. And
one of the reasons, I think, that's the case is because there has been an existing fundamental, and that existing fundamental has been that the vast majorities of peoples in the region want to see an end to war, an end to conflict, an end to violence. They want what President Clinton once described as "the quiet miracle of a normal life." That's something they desire, and they understand fundamentally that there's no acceptable alternative to the pursuit of peace. There may be alternatives, but none are acceptable. And I believe that's one of the reasons that we have seen this endure even in the face of great challenges.

Now today I still see that desire existing - the hope for peace, the desire for peace, the recognition that there's not an acceptable alternative to it. Now that's commingled with doubts that exist on both sides, especially between Israelis and Palestinians. There are doubts that each side has about the conviction of the other, in terms of the pursuit of this process. And there has been between Israelis and Palestinians a core understanding built into the Oslo process, which was that Israelis got security, and Palestinians got to govern themselves and have a process to negotiate in the pursuit of their aspirations.

We have to find a way, as we move forward now, to reinvigorate that basic core understanding. There's no question that there's a fundamental premise, and the fundamental premise is: Terror is never justified. There are - (applause). There is no circumstance, there is no environment, there is no justification, there is no rationalization for terror. That simply has to be understood as an unalterable premise of how this process can proceed and what it must be built on. (Applause.). Beyond that, the negotiating process itself has to be credible. The real issues that are to be negotiated have got to be put on the table and they have to be addressed at the table. There can't be an approach that basically preempts the discussion of those issues. If the negotiating process is to work, it has to have credibility, and that has to also be part of what gets us in the position where we put things back on track.

Now, the president and the secretary of State are making a major effort to put this process back on track. They will be meeting with the prime minister today. We will be talking with him about how best to move forward. And we will look for the ways to do that. But again, I think we have to come back to some of the fundamentals. We will make the effort, we will build on the effort that we are now making because we believe in it, because it's a national interest of the United States to pursue peace in the Middle East.

Ultimately, the parties have to make these decisions. As I said, if they are the ones who are going to negotiate peace, they are the ones who have to make the key decisions. Similarly, just as we can't impose an outcome, we can't also wave a magic wand and suddenly put things back on track. The parties will have to make the key decisions, with our help.

One thing is very clear, and this emerges, I think, from the Hebron process. When there is a gap in trust, obviously we can come in and play the kind of role that helps to create a bridge between the parties to try to build some of the essentials or crucibles of trust so that you can put this process back on track. We will make that effort. We will continue to make that effort. We will work with both sides as we try to do that. Ultimately, success depends upon what the parties themselves can do.

As I said, they are the ones who are the arbiters of the process ultimately. We are there to help. We are committed to continuing to help. And the president and the secretary will do all they can in the service of pursuing peace. I hate to cut it short, but I do have to leave. And as I said, Howard, I promise to come back when we have more time.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)
FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT,
12TH MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE, NEW DELHI, 7-8 APRIL 1997 [EXCERPTS]

CHAPTER 2: ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
A. MIDDLE EAST

Palestine

98. Recalling the Cartagena Declaration, the Ministers reaffirmed their full support for the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people to secure their inalienable rights, including the right to return to their homes and property and to self-determination and the establishment of their independent State on their national soil. They reiterated their demand for the withdrawal of Israel from all Palestinian and other Arab lands, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967. The Ministers reaffirmed all Security Council and General Assembly resolutions relating to Jerusalem as an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territories and demanded their implementation, especially Security Council resolutions No 252 (1968), 465 (1980), 478 (1980), 1073 (1996) and General Assembly resolution 223/51, and considered the Israeli measures aimed at altering the legal, geographic and demographic character of Jerusalem and other actions, contrary to these resolutions, as null and void.

99. The Ministers welcomed the elections, last year, in the West Bank and Gaza and the ensuing constitution of the Palestine Legislative Council in January 1996 and President Arafat's assumption of the office of President the Palestinian National Authority. The Ministers called upon States to support the efforts of the Palestinian people and the PNA to rebuild their economy and national institutions.

100. They considered the persistence of the Government of Israel in its policies of establishing and enlarging existing Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, particularly in and around Jerusalem, such as the recent decision to confiscate Palestinian land and establish a Jewish settlement in Jabal Abu Ghnaim, as illegal and constituting a violation of the relevant international resolutions and a breach of contractual binding agreements, commitments and guarantees between the parties concerned. They, furthermore, considered that such violations by Israel constitute a threat to peace and to the ongoing peace process in the Middle East. They recalled that the current peace process is based on the principles and terms of reference of the Madrid Conference of 1991, namely; the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of "land for peace". While they supported the ongoing peace process, they expressed their grave concern that the Government of Israel has failed to abide by its obligations and its commitments to implement the terms of the agreements on the agreed scheduled time, and that Israel has failed to respect and carry out the relevant decisions of the Security Council.

101. [Continued...]

102. They requested the UN Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to convene such an Emergency Special Session. They decided to communicate to the UN Secretary-General their concurrence to convene such an Emergency Special Session.

103. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law in all circumstances. In this context they affirmed their obligation to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying Power, for the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied by Israel since 1967.

Lebanon

104. The Ministers expressed full support and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. They expressed again their condemnation of the continued occupation by Israel of parts of South Lebanon and the Western Bekaa, and reaffirmed their full support for Leba-
non's efforts directed towards the liberation of these territories. They expressed their deep concern with regard to the repeated Israeli aggressions against Lebanon and its citizens, as well as the hardships and sufferings inflicted on Lebanese citizens detained in Israel's jails and prison camps. They reaffirmed the need for a speedy and unconditional implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) as a prerequisite for peace and security in the region, and for the release of all Lebanese detainees held by Israel.

Syrian Golan
105. The Ministers affirmed that all measures and actions taken, or to be taken by Israel, the occupying power, such as its decision of 14 December 1981, that purport to alter the status of the occupied Syrian Golan, are null and void; constitute a flagrant violation of international law, the fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and the United Nations resolutions, and have no legal effect. They called upon Israel to comply with Security Council resolution 497 (1981) and to fully withdraw from the occupied Syrian Golan, to the lines of 4 June 1967, in implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

The Peace Process
106. The Ministers affirmed their support for the Middle East peace process, and the implementation of all agreements signed within its framework between the concerned parties, as well as the commitments and pledges made in accordance with the basis and terms of reference of the Madrid Conference, and United Nations resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 425 and the principle of "land for peace", which guarantees Israel's total withdrawal from all occupied Palestine and the Arab territories to the lines of 4 June 1967, including the city of Jerusalem, the Syrian Golan, as well as the south of Lebanon and the Western Bekaa, occupied since 14 March 1978; they called upon Israel to reaffirm its adherence to its commitments given during the negotiations, and resume the talks on the Syrian track from the point they stopped at. They also called for the restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people; including their right to return, to self-determination, and to the establishment of their independent State on their national soil, with Jerusalem as its capital.

107. The Ministers considered the Israeli persistence in its settlement policies in Jerusalem and the test of the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, to be inconsistent with all international treaties, conventions and resolutions, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and to constitute a serious threat to the peace process.

108. The Ministers noted with appreciation the commendable efforts exerted by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, in order to open up possibilities for achieving progress in their full commitments to peace in the Middle East, and to resume the talks from the point they stopped at; and demanded that Israel totally withdraw from the occupied Syrian Golan and Lebanese territories, in implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, and in accordance with international law, and the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, UNILATERAL MEASURES TAKEN BY THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY IN VIOLATION OF THE OSLO ACCORDS, 14 APRIL 1997

The Oslo Accords contain specific obligations which include prior coordination and consultation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), many of which relate to security issues. Despite these provisions, the PA has repeatedly taken unilateral steps in key spheres, ignoring its commitment to coordinate with Israel. Following are examples of such steps. The list is not comprehensive, but it identifies instances of glaring violations of the agreement.

1. Unilaterally Halting Security Cooperation with Israel
The agreement: According to Article II (2) of Annex I to the Oslo 2 Accords, "Both sides will, in accordance with this Agreement, act to ensure the immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Is-
raels. To this end, they will cooperate in the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities.” In the Note for the Record attached to the January 15, 1997 Hebron Protocol, the Palestinians reaffirmed their commitment to “strengthening security cooperation.” The violation: Contrary to their obligation, PA security officials broke off security cooperation with Israel in recent weeks, despite clear warnings of impending terrorist activity. Palestinian security officials refused to meet with their Israeli counterparts and refrained from exchanging intelligence or security-related information. One noteworthy exception was the PA’s cooperation in the search for the body of abducted Israeli soldier Sharon Edri.

2. Exceeding the Overall Limit on the Number of Palestinian Police
The agreement: Under Article IV (3) of Annex I to the Oslo 2 Accords, the PA is currently permitted to deploy no more than 24,000 policemen in the West Bank and Gaza. Eventually, an additional 6,000 policemen may be deployed in the West Bank “according to the phases of the further redeployments or as needed, as agreed upon by the parties.” In the Note for the Record attached to the Hebron Protocol of January 15, 1997, the PA reaffirmed its commitment that the “size of the Palestinian Police will be pursuant to the Interim Agreement.” The violation: The PA has unilaterally deployed more than 30,000 policemen in the West Bank and Gaza, exceeding the agreed upon limit by over 6,000. This step was taken without Israeli consent.

3. Exceeding the Limit on the Number of Palestinian Police in Hebron
The agreement: The Hebron Protocol of January 15, 1997 states (par. 5a) that the Palestinians may have “a total of up to 400 policemen, equipped with 20 vehicles and armed with 200 pistols, and 100 rifles for the protection of the police stations.” The violation: Without Israeli consent, the PA has deployed over 1,500 policemen in Hebron, which is nearly four times the number permitted under the agreement. The number of long-range weapons in their possession also exceeds that allowed under the accord.

4. Failure to Notify Israel Concerning Palestinian Police Recruits
The agreement: Under Annex I, Article IV (4) of Oslo 2, the PA is required to submit a list of all potential police recruits to Israel for approval to prevent known terrorists from joining the PA security services. The agreement states that, “Should Israel object to the recruitment of any such candidate, that person shall not be recruited.” The violation: The PA has consistently failed to provide comprehensive listings of potential recruits to Israel and has proceeded to unilaterally recruit policemen without prior Israeli consent. The PA has submitted for Israeli approval only 18,000 of the 30,000 names of Palestinian policemen currently on active duty. As a result, at least 19 wanted terrorists are known to be serving in the Palestinian security forces or are in the process of joining its ranks.

5. Failure to Coordinate Movement of Palestinian Police
The agreement: Under Article V (6) of Annex I to Oslo 2, the movement of Palestinian policemen between Area A and Area B, or in Area C, must be coordinated in advance with Israeli security officials and receive their approval. The violation: Palestinian policemen frequently move from area to area without coordinating in advance with Israel. In the first three months of 1997, there were over 100 instances of unauthorized police activity and movement outside of Area A.

6. Detention of Israeli Citizens
The agreement: According to Article XI (4d) of Annex I to the Oslo 2 Accord, “Israelis shall under no circumstances be apprehended or placed in custody or prison by Palestinian authorities.” In a case where an Israeli is suspected of having committed an offense, the Palestinian police may detain him on the spot “until the arrival of a Joint Patrol, called immediately by the Palestinian police, or of other Israeli representatives dispatched by the relevant DCO.” The violation: The Palestinian police frequently arrest and interrogate Israelis without notifying Israeli authorities. In 1996, over 100 Israeli citizens were arrested improperly by the Palestinian police.

7. Failure to Enforce Restrictions on Visitors Permits
The agreement: Under Article 28 (13b) of Annex III to the Oslo 2 Accords, visitors to PA-controlled areas are permitted to stay for a period of up to 3 months, and the PA may grant them an extension of an additional four months. The agreement requires that, “The Palestinian side will notify Israel of this
extension. Any further extensions require the approval of Israel.” This clause is intended to prevent an uncontrolled influx of masses of people. The violation: The PA has unilaterally allowed some 31,000 individuals to remain in the territories beyond their permitted stay, and has refrained from taking measures to expel them.

8. Unauthorized Construction of Gaza Strip Sea Port
The agreement: Under Article XIV (4) of Annex I to the Oslo 2 Accords, all matters relating to the establishment of the Gaza Strip sea port “will be discussed and agreed upon between Israel and the Council,” thereby ensuring that Israel’s security is not compromised. The violation: Without prior notice, the PA proceeded with construction work on an old wharf in the Gaza Strip with the declared intention of transforming it into an active sea port. Only after Israel barred the entry of the requisite construction materials to the area did the work stop.

9. Unauthorized Construction of Dahaniye Airport
The agreement: Under Article XIII(3) of Annex I to the Oslo 2 Accords, the PA may establish provisional airstrips in the West Bank and Gaza “in accordance with arrangements and modalities to be discussed and agreed upon” by the two sides. This is intended to ensure that the airport meets Israel’s security requirements. The violation: The PA ignored the accords requirement for mutually agreed upon modalities and proceeded to construct an airport at Dahaniye which can accommodate the largest aircraft in use.

10. Failure to Notify Israel Concerning Passage of Legislation
The agreement: Under Article XVIII of Oslo 2, any legislation passed by the elected Palestinian council “shall be communicated to the Israeli side of the Legal Committee” so that Israel may raise issues of concern should the legislation conflict with existing laws or the terms of the agreement. The violation: The PA has failed to notify Israel regarding the passage of legislation or its contents, thereby impeding Israel’s ability to express its potential concerns.

11. Circumventing Mechanisms for Resolution of Disputes
The agreement: Under the Oslo 2 Accords, Israel and the Palestinians undertook to resolve their disputes directly and, failing to do so, may resort to other frameworks only via a mutually agreed upon mechanism. Article XXI of Oslo 2, entitled “Settlement of Differences and Disputes,” states, “Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement.” The violation: The PA has repeatedly sought to circumvent the mechanisms spelled out in the agreement when issues of dispute have arisen between the two sides. On March 15, 1997, the PA unilaterally convened an international conference in Gaza, and it has turned to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly on several occasions regarding matters relating to the peace process.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION (ES-10/2) ON ILLEGAL ISRAELI ACTIONS IN OCCUPIED EAST JERUSALEM AND THE REST OF THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION, NEW YORK, 25 APRIL 1997

The General Assembly,

Aware of the commencement, after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 51/223, of construction by Israel, the occupying Power, of a new settlement in Jabal Abu Ghneim to the south of East Jerusalem, on 18 March 1997, and of other illegal Israeli actions in Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

Noting with regret that the Security Council, at its 3747th meeting, on 7 March 1997, and at its 3756th meeting, on 21 March 1997, twice failed to adopt a resolution on the actions referred to above, as a result of the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council,

Reaffirming the permanent responsibility of the United Nations with regard to the question of Palestine until it is solved in all its aspects,
Reaffirming also the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force,

Having considered the serious deterioration of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and in the Middle East in general, including the serious difficulties facing the Middle East Peace Process, as a result of recent Israeli actions and measures,

Affirming its support for the Middle East peace process, started at Madrid in 1991, on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, for the principle of land for peace and for the full and timely implementation of the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, and of all commitments reached between the parties,


Reaffirming that the international community, through the United Nations, has a legitimate interest in the question of the city of Jerusalem, and the protection of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the city, as foreseen in relevant United Nations resolutions on this matter,

Reaffirming also the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, and the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and all other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967,

Recalling the obligation of the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to respect and ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances, in accordance with Article 1 of the Convention,

Conscious of the serious dangers arising from persistent violation and grave breaches of the Convention and the responsibilities arising therefrom,

Convinced that ensuring respect for treaties and other sources of international law is essential for the security, and determined, in accordance with the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, to establish conditions under which justice and respect of the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained,

Also Convinced, in this context, that the repeated violation by Israel, the occupying Power, of international law and its failure to comply with relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and the agreements reached between the parties undermine the Middle East peace process and constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Increasingly concerned about the actions of armed Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem,

Aware that, in the circumstances, it should consider the situation with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the States Members of the United Nations, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 337 A (V) of 3 November 1950,

1. Condemns the construction by Israel, the occupying Power, of a new settlement in Jabal Abu Ghneim to the south of Occupied East Jerusalem and all other illegal Israeli actions in all the occupied territories;
2. Reaffirms that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purported to alter the character, legal status and demographic composition of Jerusalem are null and void and have no validity whatsoever;
3. Reaffirms also that Israeli settlements in all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 are illegal and an obstacle to peace;
4. Demands immediate and full cessation of the construction in Jabal Abu Ghneim and of all other Israeli settlement activities, as well as of all illegal measures and actions in Jerusalem;
5. Demands also that Israel accept the de jure applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 to all the territories occupied since 1967, and that it comply with relevant Security Council resolutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
6. **Stresses** the need to preserve the territorial integrity of all the Occupied Palestinian Territory and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods in the territory, including the removal of restrictions into and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to and from the outside world;

7. **Calls for** the cessation of all forms of assistance and support for illegal Israeli activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, in particular settlements activities;

8. **Recommends** to the states who are High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian persons in Time of War to take measures, on a national or regional level, in fulfilment of their obligations under Article 1 of the Convention, to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying Power, of the Convention;

9. **Requests** the Secretary-General to monitor the situation and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution, within two months of its adoption, in particular on the cessation of the construction of the new settlement in Jabal Abu Ghneim and of all other illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory;

10. **Expresses** the need for scrupulous implementation of the agreements reached between the parties, and urges the sponsors of the peace process, the interested parties, and the entire international community to exert all the necessary efforts to revive the peace process and ensure its success;

11. **Recommends** that a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the question of the city of Jerusalem, which should be reached in permanent status negotiations between the parties, should include internationally guaranteed provisions to ensure the freedom of religion and of conscience of its inhabitants, as well as permanent, free and unhindered access to the Holy Places by the faithful of all religions and nationalities;

12. **Rejects** terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, in accordance with all relevant United Nations resolutions and declarations;

13. **Decides** to adjourn the Tenth Emergency Special Session temporarily and to authorize the President of the General Assembly to resume its meetings upon request from Member States.

[Adopted by a vote of 134:3 (Israel, US and Micronesia) and 11 abstentions.]

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PALESTINIAN CHIEF NEGOTIATOR SA'EB EREKAT, LETTER TO US, EU AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES REGARDING ISRAELI SETTLEMENT EXPANSION IN THE GAZA STRIP, 25 APRIL 1997

[The letter was sent by Sa'eb Erekat to Dennis Ross, Mr. Moratinos and representatives of Canada, Australia and other European, Asian, African, and Latin countries].

Your Excellency:

In its continued flagrant violations and grave breaches of the Interim Agreement, the Israeli Government began a major expansion of settlements and confiscation of land in Mawasi Area in the Gaza Strip. These violations include:

1. Moving the barbed wire along the area between Rafah and Deir El-Ballah; and erecting a sand barrier;
2. Preventing the normal movement of Palestinians in and out of the Mawasi area by placing major checkpoint and operating them similar to the procedures applied in Erez checkpoint;
3. Preventing the entry of construction materials to the area including the Mawasi beach area identified in the Interim Agreement as the area extending to the cost up to the coast road totaling together with Rafah and Khan Yunis Wharves, five (5) kilometers - Article VI provision 5.c., Annex 1, Interim Agreement.
4. Closure of three access roads to the Mawasi area specified in the Interim Agreement: - (1) Rafah-Tel Sultan-Mawasi; (2) Khan Yunis-El Bahr village; and (3) Deir El Ballah - along the Beach to the Mawasi.
Article V, Provision 5.b, Annex I Interim Agreement.
1. Suspension of the Joint patrols operations in the Mawasi area; provided for in Article VI, provision 5.a, Annex 1, Interim Agreement.

It should be noted that the Israeli army attacked Palestinian peaceful protests which resulted in the injury of tens of Palestinians including the mayor of Rafah, and damaged municipality vehicles.

Article VI, provision 4.c, Annex I of the Interim Agreement specified:-
“The Mawasi area shall be treated as Area B throughout the Interim period” which means that the Palestinian Authority will have all civil powers and responsibilities including planning and zoning and will be also responsible for Palestinian public order.

The same article, provision 5.c specified that: the Palestinian Authority in exercising its civil authority will be able to grant licenses for business, collect fees and taxes, set and enforce public health standards and manage and develop the tourist sector, and in each of the fishermen's wharves to have an office that will be protected by Palestinian police.

The Article gave the Palestinian Authority the right to enlarge the Wharves; operate food establishments and sport and recreation including boat hire facilities, in addition, the Interim Agreement stated that: “there will not be any construction by Israelis of new sites along the beach”.

The above mentioned violations, and the continuation of the Israeli unilateral acts, of settlements activities throughout the West-Bank, East Jerusalem, including the new settlement on Jabel Abu Ghneim, Massive confiscation of land, homes demolition, the closure, eviction of people, constitute not only a major threat to all efforts being exerted to put the peace process back on track, but an all out war against the peace process.

Once again, we call upon your Government to participate with us in our efforts to stop these Israeli violations and above all the settlements activities. Failure to do so will speed the return of the region and its people back to the squares of violent confrontations and disasters, an outcome that will be the sole responsibility of the Government of Israel.

Sincerely Yours,

(Signed:) Sa'eb Erekat
Head of the Palestinian Side of the Steering and Monitoring Committee

US AMBASSADOR TO THE UN BILL RICHARDSON, REMARKS ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, 25 APRIL 1997 [EXCERPTS]

Mr. President,

Twice in the Security Council and once in this Assembly, I have made clear my Government's view of Israel's decision to begin construction at Har Homa/Jebel Abu Ghneim: it is unhelpful to the peace process. On those occasions, I voted against the resolutions tabled because the United States did not believe that they would have advanced the peace process. Today, as a co-sponsor of that process, the United States urges members of this Assembly to vote against the resolution before us, which we believe will actually make harder the difficult task before us: rebuilding confidence between the parties and reactivating a productive negotiation process.

Let me repeat at the outset that my government shares the concerns expressed here and in the Security Council about the decision of the Israeli Government to begin construction at this site. As President Clinton said last month, we would have preferred that this decision had not been made. It undermines the trust and confidence so badly needed in creating the appropriate environment for successful negotiations, especially on the difficult issues involved in the permanent status talks.

The achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East requires an honest negotiating process. The parties must take special care to avoid preemptive actions that can be seen to
prejudge the outcome of negotiations, while working hard to nurture an atmosphere of trust and confidence that will make productive negotiations possible.

The decision on Har Homa/Jebel Abu Ghneim did just the opposite. We regret that it was taken. However, our responsibility as a co-sponsor of the peace process requires us to tell our friends in the United Nations frankly: the Security Council and the General Assembly should not insert themselves into issues that the negotiating partners have decided will be addressed in their permanent status talks. This can only harden the positions of both sides, and make their work even more difficult. It will add to existing tensions in the region, complicate the efforts of all parties to get the negotiations back on a productive track, and distract attention from the main objective: making progress toward a peaceful, prosperous Middle East. Such progress is the shared goal of most of us in this chamber. However, the resolution now before the General Assembly will fail to help achieve that goal. It is harmful to the prospects for revitalizing the Middle East peace process. The call made by some speakers yesterday for collective action against a member state is inconsistent with the responsibilities of this Assembly and dangerous for the credibility of the United Nations.

In addition, the resolution contains language that tends to prejudge certain permanent status issues, such as Jerusalem. We believe such phrases are inappropriate, argumentative, and unhelpful to the peace process. We will continue to oppose inclusion of such language in resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Finally, we believe this resolution presents a problem that goes beyond the threat it poses to the Middle East peace process, and that is the threat it poses to the orderly conduct of the business of the United Nations. We believe that this resolution clearly infringes on the authority of the Security Council. By moving in the direction of endorsement of collective action directed against one of its member states, it sets a dangerous precedent, which could in the future be turned against any member state.

Mr. President, the United Nations can and has played an important part in supporting the Middle East peace process. This is the right and proper role for the UN to play. It requires creative thinking about what we can all do to move the process forward, especially at times of crisis. Certainly, it requires at the very least that we do nothing to place new obstacles in the path to peace; this means, in particular, that we must make every effort to avoid falling back on the punitive, accusatory, backward-looking formulations of resolutions past. Regrettably, the resolution now before us fails to do this, at great cost not only to the parties involved in the talks, but to the credibility of the United Nations itself as a supporter of peace in the Middle East.

It is clear to us that this resolution would have the opposite effect of its advertised intent. Threats of economic boycott, condemnation and harsh rhetoric will only serve to erode the vital trust, confidence and quiet diplomatic efforts that are needed if the peace process is to begin moving forward again. That is why the United States will vote against this resolution. Each vote in favor of this resolution adds to the difficulty of reaching a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Thank you, Mr. President.

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PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, CABINET DECISION REGARDING LAND SALES TO JEWS, RAMALLAH, 3 MAY 1997

The Palestinian leadership listened to a report regarding the fact that a number of land speculators have sold, via foreign intermediaries, Palestinian land to foreign companies, which are in fact Israeli companies working in the framework of the settlement plans being carried out by the Israeli government. The Palestinian leadership has decided to forbid the sale of land anywhere in Palestine either directly or via intermediaries. The leadership has empowered the legal authorities and security forces to implement the decision on this matter and to punish anyone who has sold land directly or has as-
sisted in its sale. The sale of land constitutes the gravest danger concerning the Judaization of the Palestinian lands.

UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SPECIAL REPORT OF ISRAEL, 7 MAY 1997

The committee considered the special report of Israel (CAT/C/33/Add.2/Rev.1) at its 295th and 296th meetings, on 7 May 1997 (CAT/C/SR.295 and 296) and adopted the following conclusions and recommendations:

INTRODUCTION

The special report of Israel was submitted on 17 February 1997, pursuant to the request contained in the letter to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Office in Geneva, dated 22 November 1996. It responded to a number of concerns of the committee contained in its conclusions on the first periodic report of Israel and the committee's reaction to certain decisions of the Supreme Court of Israel. The committee thanks the Israeli delegation for its informative opening statement and its frank and open responses to the committee's questions.

CONCLUSIONS

The information provided by Israel in its special report and in the opening statement of its representatives was essentially a reiteration of its position described in the initial report, namely that interrogation, including the use of "moderate physical pressure" where it is thought that interrogatees have information of imminent attacks against the state which may involve deaths of innocent citizens, is lawful if conducted in accordance with the "Landau rules." These rules permit "moderate physical pressure" to be used in strictly defined interrogation circumstances.

It is the position of Israel that interrogations pursuant to the "Landau rules" do not breach prohibitions against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment as contained in article 16 of the Convention against Torture and do not amount to torture as contained in article 1 of the convention.

However, the methods of interrogation, described by nongovernmental organizations on the basis of accounts given to them by interrogatees, which appear to be applied systematically, were neither confirmed nor denied by Israel. The committee, therefore, must assume them to be accurate. These methods include: (1) restraining in very painful conditions, (2) hooding under special conditions, (3) sounding of loud music for prolonged periods, (4) sleep deprivation for prolonged periods, (5) threats, including death threats, (6) violent shaking, and (7) using cold air to chill; and are in the committee's view breaches of article 16 and also constitute torture as defined in article 1 of the convention. This conclusion is particularly evident where such methods of interrogation are used in combination, which appears to be the standard case.

The committee acknowledges the terrible dilemma that Israel confronts in dealing with terrorist threats to its security, but as a state party to the Convention Against Torture Israel is precluded from raising before this committee exceptional circumstances as justification for acts prohibited by article 1 of the convention. This is plainly expressed in article 2 of the convention.

The committee is also concerned that the effect of the Hamdan decision by the Israeli Supreme Court dissolving the interim injunction was to allow some of the interrogation practices, referred to above, to continue and to legitimize them for domestic purposes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee recommends that:
a) Interrogations applying the methods referred to above and any other methods that are in conflict with the provisions of articles 1 and 16 of the convention cease immediately.

b) The provisions of the Convention against Torture be incorporated by legislation into Israeli law, particularly the definition of torture contained in article 1 of the convention, as is currently under consideration by the Expert Committee of the Ministerial Committee for Legislation.

c) Israel consider making the declarations provided for under articles 21 and 22 and withdrawing its reservation to article 20 of the convention.

d) Interrogation procedures pursuant to the "Landau rules" in any event be published in full.

e) Israel includes information on the measures taken in response to these conclusions and recommendations in its second periodic report which was due on 1 November 1996. That report should be submitted as soon as possible and in any event no later than 1 September 1997, in order to allow the committee to consider it at its next session.

** SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL, RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, MEETING OF THE MIDDLE EAST COMMITTEE, RAMALLAH AND TEL AVIV, 15 MAY 1997 **

The Socialist International Middle East Committee, SIMEC, having met in Ramallah and Tel-Aviv on 14-15 May 1997, declares:

- SIMEC deeply regrets the stalemate in the Middle East peace process. Lack of progress entails a clear risk of further escalation of violence in the region and undermining of the forces of peace. Every effort must now be made to revitalize that process.
- The Oslo Accords must be respected and fully implemented by both parties.
- Israel has a special responsibility to bring the peace process back on track by not continuing with the construction of Har Homa. SIMEC condemns the settlement policies of the present Israeli government which endangers the peace process Israel must also undertake to fulfill its obligations regarding the safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, the operation of Gaza airport, the construction of the Gaza port, the release of prisoners and further redeployment.
- A serious and constructive beginning of permanent status negotiations to achieve a durable and mutually acceptable peace between the Israeli and Palestinian people on the basis of the implementation of security council resolutions 242 and 338 which embody the principle of land for peace must be initiated. The committee emphasizes the need to engage serious dialogue on all outstanding issues.
- Palestinians and Israeli security cooperation must be resumed under any circumstances security is a common concern for all.
- Suitable confidence-building measures must be devised so that the parties can gradually begin to develop a minimum of confidence necessary to re-launch the negotiations.
- The international community has a vital stake in the future development of the Middle East the United States and the European Union and all interested parties are urged to redouble their efforts to bring the parties back to the negotiating table and to ensure momentum in the negotiation.
- The Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese negotiations on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 425 have to be resumed.
- International economic assistance in support of the Palestinian Authority must be continued and increased as a vital contribution to the construction of a viable and democratic society respectful of fundamental human rights in the Palestinian areas.
- SIMEC congratulates the Congress of the Israel Labor Party which decided to recognize the proposition of the creation of a Palestinian state. SIMEC also refers to the long standing decision of Mapam / Meretz in this respect.
- The Socialist International Middle East Committee, having met these two days in Ramallah and Tel Aviv recalling its long-standing commitment to and historic role in bringing together the parties in the peace process, renews, at this critical stage, its firm intention to continue working for a just and lasting peace in the region.

** SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL, RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, MEETING OF THE MIDDLE EAST COMMITTEE, RAMALLAH AND TEL AVIV, 15 MAY 1997 **
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY, RESPONSE TO THE PALESTINIAN BAN ON SALE OF LAND TO ISRAELIS, JERUSALEM, 20 MAY 1997

The recently reported decision by the Palestinian Council to forbid the sale of land to Israelis runs counter to both the spirit and letter of the various agreements signed between Israel and the Palestinians.

Statements attributed to Palestinian spokesmen, terming the sale of land to Israelis as "terrorism" against the Palestinian People, and even justifying a "death penalty" for those who are involved in these activities, are deplorable and have no place in the current peace process. This incitement on the part of Palestinian officials may well have led to the murder of Palestinian real estate agent Farid Bashiti. Over the past weekend another Palestinian who was involved in land transactions with Israelis was also found murdered.

The reactions by certain Palestinian spokesmen to the murder of Bashiti, including its justification by Freih Abu-Medein, who is responsible for the administration of justice and law under the Palestinian Council, call into question the very commitment of these officials to the negotiation of a settlement in an atmosphere free of threats, intimidation and violence. The continued incitement on the part of Palestinian officials, in the face of the two recent murders, can only be viewed as the encouragement on their part of grievous violations of human rights.

As to the formal elements of the Interim Agreement; The West Bank is divided into three (3) areas. Area "A" is comprised, mainly, of the seven cities located in the West Bank. In this area the Palestinian Council has full authority, including the responsibility for the maintenance of security and the fight against terrorism. Area "B" comprises villages wherein the Palestinian Authority has full civil responsibility, and is charged with the maintenance of public order, and where Israel is responsible for the maintenance of security. Finally, Area "C" contains little of the Palestinian population, and comprises rural areas, Israeli settlements and Israeli military installations.

The Palestinian Council does not have any authority over land registration or transfer in Area "C", which at this point comprises the bulk of the West Bank. If the intention of the Council was for this decision to apply to Area "C", then this is another example of the PA's attempt to assert its authority in locations in which it has no authority under the Interim Agreement. As such, it may also be construed as a violation of this agreement.

ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAM, LETTER TO PALESTINIAN CHIEF NEGOTIATOR SA'EB EREKAT REGARDING STATEMENTS AND ACTION ON SALE OF LAND TO ISRAELIS, 3 JUNE 1997

We have followed, with increasing concern, the recent statements and acts emanating from members of the Executive Authority of the Palestinian Council regarding the sale of land by Palestinians to Israelis and, as such, feel the necessity to respond in a clear and forthright manner.

The above mentioned statements have included reference to the prohibitions and restrictions which will be imposed upon such sales in addition to the various punishments and penalties that will be incurred by Palestinians engaging in the sale of land to Israelis. In certain cases it has even been stated by high-ranking Palestinian officials that the death penalty would be imposed on the perpetrators of such "offenses", which have been deemed "treasonous."

Furthermore, as you are no doubt well aware, land dealers from Jerusalem and Ramallah have been recently assassinated. These callous murders have not been condemned by officials on the Palestinian side. On the contrary, statements made by such officials, both before and after the execution of these heinous acts, have conveyed the message that such crimes are to be commended.
We regard such statements and acts, as well as the underlying policy that they reveal, as totally unacceptable. It is particularly grave and serious that such statements have been made by the very individuals entrusted with the implementation of law and justice. Such statements and acts represent a flagrant violation of both the spirit and the letter of the Interim Agreement and stand in blatant contradiction to the principles of peace, trust and cooperation which underlie the entire peace process.

We emphatically demand that the Palestinian Council and its Executive Authority fulfill their obligation and undertaking under the peace agreements to immediately and effectively cease all such acts of incitement and call upon you to take all appropriate steps against anyone involved in the perpetration of such hostile acts, in accordance with the principle of the rule of law.

It is in the mutual interest of both parties to contribute to the calming of the current climate. We should accordingly invest all our efforts in the avoidance of any acts that may result in the deterioration of the already sensitive situation.

(Signed) Dan Naveh and Jacob Bardugo
Coordinators of the Israeli Negotiating Team

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONCURRENT RESOLUTION RELATING TO THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REUNIFICATION OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM (H. CON. RES. 60), WASHINGTON, DC, 10 JUNE 1997

[The resolution had 185 cosponsors and was passed by a vote of 406:17; it sparked riots in the Occupied Territories and was deplored across the Middle East.]

Whereas for 5,000 years Jerusalem has been the focal point of Jewish religious devotion;
Whereas Jerusalem today is also considered a holy city by members of the Christian and Muslim faiths;
Whereas there has been a continuous Jewish presence in Jerusalem for three millennia and a Jewish majority in the city since the 1840s;
Whereas the once thriving Jewish majority of the historic Old City of Jerusalem was driven out by force during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War;
Whereas from 1948 to 1967 Jerusalem was a divided city and Israeli citizens of all faiths as well as Jewish citizens of all states were denied access to holy sites in the area controlled by Jordan;
Whereas in 1967 Jerusalem was reunited by Israel during the conflict known as the Six Day War;
Whereas since 1967 Jerusalem has been a united city, and persons of all religious faiths have been guaranteed full access to holy sites within the city;
Whereas this year marks the 30th year that Jerusalem has been administered as a unified city in which the rights of all faiths have been respected and protected;
Whereas in 1990 the United States Senate and House of Representatives overwhelmingly adopted Senate Concurrent Resolution 106 and House Concurrent Resolution 290 declaring that Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, must remain an undivided city and calling on Israel and the Palestinians to undertake negotiations to resolve their differences;
Whereas Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel later cited Senate Concurrent Resolution 106 as having helped our neighbors reach the negotiating table to produce the historic Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, signed in Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993; and
Whereas the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-45), which became law on November 8, 1995, states as a matter of United States policy that Jerusalem should remain the undivided capital of Israel: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring).

That the Congress -

(1) congratulates the residents of Jerusalem and the people of Israel on the 30th anniversary of the reunification of that historic city;
(2) strongly believes that Jerusalem must remain an undivided city in which the rights of every ethnic and religious group are protected as they have been by Israel during the past 30 years;
(3) calls upon the President and the Secretary of State to affirm publicly as a matter of United States policy that Jerusalem must remain the undivided capital of the State of Israel; and
(4) urges United States officials to refrain from any actions that contradict this policy.

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JERUSALEM AMENDMENT (SEC. 1709)
TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT (H.R. 1757), WASHINGTON, DC, 11 JUNE 1997

SEC. 1709. UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO JERUSALEM AS THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL

(A) LIMITATION.
Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by section 1101(4) for "Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad" $25,000,000 for the fiscal year 1998 and $75,000,000 for the fiscal year 1999 is authorized to be appropriated for the construction of a United States Embassy in Jerusalem, Israel.

(B) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CONSULATE IN JERUSALEM.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this division may be expended for the operation of a United States consulate or diplomatic facility in Jerusalem unless such consulate or diplomatic facility is under the supervision of the United States Ambassador to Israel.

(C) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR PUBLICATIONS.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this division may be available for the publication of any official document which lists countries and their capital cities unless the publication identifies Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

(D) RECORD OF PLACE OF BIRTH.
For purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, upon request, the Secretary of State shall permit the place of birth to be recorded as Jerusalem, Israel.

EUROPEAN UNION PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS, ANNEX III - AMSTERDAM DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, AMSTERDAM, 16-17 JUNE 1997

[The declaration was largely the result of Franco-British cooperation urging the EU to deliver a clear message of concern at the continued deadlock of the Palestinian track and support for both Palestinian self-determination and Egyptian mediation efforts].

EUROPEAN UNION CALL FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Heads of State or Government of the European Union call on the peoples and governments of the Middle East to renew the spirit of mutual confidence which, in Madrid in 1991 and in Oslo in 1993, raised hopes of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. The peoples of Europe and the Middle East are linked by a common destiny, which was affirmed in 1995 at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona. In the knowledge of our common history, we invite the peoples of the Middle East to join the peoples of Europe in building a future of harmony, founded on shared principles. Peace is
possible, necessary and a matter of urgency in the Middle East. Stagnation on the Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese Tracks is a permanent threat to the security of all.

The foundations of peace are widely known: the right of all States and peoples in the region to live in peace without safe, recognized borders; respect for the legitimate aspiration of the Palestinian people to decide their own future; the exchange of land for peace; the non-acceptability of the annexation of territory by forces; respect for human rights; the rejection of terrorism of all kinds; good relations between neighbours; and compliance with existing agreements and the rejection of counterproductive unilateral initiatives. In this context the Union recalls its opposition to settlements and attachment to security cooperation.

Four years ago, the mutual recognition of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples in Oslo opened up the path to their peaceful coexistence on the land they share. It is time to take concerted steps towards a lasting peace. We call upon the Israeli and Palestinian leadership to continue the negotiations to further the implementation of the Interim and Hebron Agreements and to resume talks on the Permanent Status. It is vital to abstain from unilateral actions prejudging the Permanent Status issues and to resume and maintain full security cooperation with the aim of fighting terrorism.

We call on the people of Israel to recognize the right of the Palestinians to exercise self-determination, without excluding the option of a State. The creation of a viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian entity is the best guarantee of Israel’s security. At the same time we call upon the Palestinian people to reaffirm their commitment to the legitimate right of Israel to live within safe, recognized borders.

The Union stresses its commitment to human rights, democracy and the fostering of civil society in the Arab-Israeli context. It condemns all breaches of those rights, whether it be abuses by security authorities, torture, suppression of freedom of speech and media, land-confiscations, extra-judicial killings, the deprivation of the right of residence or incitement to violence.

The European Union will continue through the efforts of its Special Envoy for the Middle East Peace Process, through its diplomatic relations and economic involvement, and through its relations of friendship and trust with the various parties, to work together with the United States, Russia and the relevant parties in the region and to ensure that the work of the peace builders is completed. The European Council asks the Council to continue its efforts together with the Special Envoy to move forward the Peace Process. It calls upon all the participants in the Peace Process to renew their efforts towards this end, specifically by supporting the recent initiative launched by President Mubarak.

G-8 SUMMIT, FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ, DENVER, 22 JUNE 1997 [EXCERPTS]

[...] POLITICAL ISSUES
[...]
MIDDLE EAST
84. The Peace Process faces a crisis, and we are determined to reinject momentum into it. Restoring the sense of security and confidence among Israelis and Palestinians is essential. We shall do our utmost to reinvigorate implementation of the Oslo Accords and to uphold the principles of Madrid, including the exchange of land for peace. All the problems need to be addressed peacefully through serious and credible negotiations. Both sides must refrain from actions that impede the peace process by preempting permanent status negotiations. We believe strongly in the importance of working with Israel, Syria and Lebanon to resume direct talks in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement in the region. We welcome the important role the Monitoring Group has played in strengthening the Understanding of April 26, 1996 and in reducing risks to civilians in southern Lebanon and in Israel. We affirm the importance of the activities within the multilateral framework of the peace process.
85. Economic growth and prosperity are critical to peace. We urge regional parties to pursue economic cooperation among themselves and integration into the global economy. We welcome all efforts to promote the region's development of viable and sustainable economies, including assistance to the Palestinians, and urge donors to fulfill pledges made.

86. We have noted with interest the results of the recent elections in Iran and renew our call upon the Government of Iran to play a constructive role in regional and world affairs. In this regard, while noting the role Iran played in inter-Tajik talks in conjunction with the United Nations and other regional parties, we call upon the Government of Iran to respect the human rights of all Iranian citizens and to renounce the use of terrorism, including against Iranian citizens living abroad, and, in that connection, to desist from endorsing the continued threat to the life of Mr. Salman Rushdie and other people associated with his work. We call on all States to avoid cooperation with Iran that might contribute to efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities, or to enhance chemical, biological, or missile capabilities in violation of international conventions or arrangements.

87. We confirm our determination to obtain full compliance with all UN Security Council resolutions related to Iraq and Libya. Only full compliance with these resolutions could result in the lifting of sanctions. We are pleased to note that the distribution of food and medicine under UNSCR 986 is providing some humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people. […]

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS FY98 APPROPRIATIONS BILL (H.R. 2159) RESTRICTING FUNDS FOR THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY IN JERUSALEM (SECS. 557 AND 572), WASHINGTON, DC, 15 JULY 1997

[The Bill included over $3 billion in aid to Israel and mandated that the economic aid portion ($1.2 billion) be provided “as a cash grant within thirty days of the signing of this act” rather than - as in all other cases of US aid - held by the US until formal proposals in specific dollar amounts are submitted by the recipient country. This new provision enabled Israel to collect interest on the cash grant until use and released it from the normal accounting procedures vis-à-vis the Agency for International Development (AID) and the General Accounting Office (GAO). The Bill also provided $75 million for the PA and the following two amendments containing restrictions on the expenditure of funds to the PA in Jerusalem and on PA actions to qualify for the assistance.]

Restrictions Concerning the Palestinian Authority

Sec. 557. None of the funds appropriated by this act may be obligated or expended to create in any part of Jerusalem a new office of any department or agency of the United States Government for the purpose of conducting official United States Government business with the Palestinian Authority over Gaza and Jericho or any successor Palestinian governing entity provided for in the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles: Provided, that this restriction shall not apply to the acquisition of additional space for the existing Consulate General in Jerusalem: Provided further, that meetings between officers and employees of the United States and officials of the Palestinian Authority, or any successor Palestinian governing entity provided for in the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, for the purpose of conducting official United States Government business with such authority should continue to take place in locations other than Jerusalem. As has been true in the past, officers and employees of the United States Government may continue to meet in Jerusalem on other subjects with Palestinians (including those who now occupy positions in the Palestinian Authority), have social contacts, and have incidental discussions.

Limitation on Assistance to the PLO and the Palestinian Authority

Sec. 572. (a) Sense of the Congress— It is the sense of the Congress that the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter the PLO) should do far more to demonstrate an irrevocable denunciation of terrorism and to ensure a peaceful settlement of the Middle East dispute, and in particular it should—
(1) submit to the Palestinian Council for formal approval the necessary changes to those specific articles of the Palestinian National Charter which deny Israel's right to exist or support the use of violence;

(2) to the maximum extent possible, preempt acts of terror, discipline violators, publicly condemn all terrorist acts, actively work to dismantle other terrorist organizations, and contribute to stemming the violence that has resulted in the deaths of over 230 Israeli and United States citizens since the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (hereinafter the Declaration of Principles) on September 13, 1993, at the White House;

(3) prohibit participation in the PLO or the Palestinian Authority or its successors of any groups or individuals which promote or commit acts of terrorism;

(4) cease all anti-Israel rhetoric, which potentially undermines the peace process;

(5) confiscate all unlicensed weapons and restrict the issuance of licenses to those with legitimate need;

(6) transfer and cooperate in transfer proceedings relating to any person accused by Israel or the United States of having committed acts of terrorism against Israeli or United States nationals; and

(7) respect civil liberties, human rights, and democratic norms as applied equally to all persons regardless of ethnic, religious, or national origin.

(b) Limitation on Assistance:

(1) In general—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this act may be obligated for assistance to the PLO or the Palestinian Authority only for the period beginning 3 months after the date of the enactment of this act and for 6 months thereafter, and only if—

(A) the President has exercised the authority under section 604(a) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995 (title VI of Public Law 104-107) or any other legislation to suspend or make inapplicable section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and that suspension is still in effect; and

(B) in addition to the requirements contained in such act or other legislation, the President prepares and transmits to the Congress a report described in paragraph two

(2) Report—A report described in this paragraph is a report containing the following:

(A) A description of all efforts being made to apprehend, prosecute, or have extradited to the United States Mohammad Dayif (allegedly responsible for the death of Nachshon Wachsman, a United States citizen), Amjad Hinawi (allegedly responsible for the death of David Boim, a United States citizen), Abu Abbas (responsible for the death of Leon Klinghoffer, a United States citizen), Amid al-Iindi (allegedly responsible for the death of David Berger, a United States citizen), and Nafez Mahmoud Sabih (who helped plan the February 1996 attack on a Jerusalem bus in which Jewish Theological Seminary students Sara Duker and Matthew Eisenfeld, both United States citizens, were murdered).

(B) An official updated, and revised copy of the Palestinian National Charter (Covenant) showing which specific articles have been rescinded by the decision taken on April 24, 1996 by the PLO Executive Committee.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION ES-10/3 ON ILLEGAL ISRAELI ACTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES, NEW YORK, 15 JULY 1997

The General Assembly,

Having received with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General,

Recalling all relevant United Nations resolutions,

Reaffirming its resolution ES-10/2 of 25 April 1997,

Having been informed in the report of the Secretary-General that, inter alia, the Government of Israel, as of 20 June 1997, has not abandoned its construction of the new Israeli settlement at Jabal Abu Gheimeh and that settlement activity, including the expansion of existing settlements, the construction of bypass roads, the confiscation of lands adjacent to settlements and related activities, in
violation of Security Council resolutions on the matter, continues unabated throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and also that the Israeli Prime Minister and other representatives of the Government continue to reject the terms of resolution ES-10/2 requiring the cessation of those activities,

Aware that, in the light of the position of the Government of Israel, as indicated in the report of the Secretary-General, the General Assembly should once more consider the situation with a view to making additional appropriate recommendations to States Members of the United Nations, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950,

1. **Condemns** the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with the demands made by the General Assembly at its tenth emergency special session in resolution ES-10/2;

2. **Strongly deplores** the lack of cooperation of the Government of Israel and its attempts to impose restrictions upon the intended mission of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem;

3. **Reaffirms** that all illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially settlement activity, and the practical results thereof cannot be recognized, irrespective of the passage of time;

4. **Reiterates** the demands made in resolution ES-10/2, in particular for the immediate and full cessation of the construction of a new settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim, to the south of Occupied East Jerusalem, and of all other Israeli settlement activities, as well as of all illegal measures and actions in Jerusalem;

5. **Demands** that Israel, the occupying Power, immediately cease and reverse all actions taken illegally, in contravention of international law, against Palestinian Jerusalemites;

6. **Recommends** to Member States that they actively discourage activities which directly contribute to any construction or development of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, as these activities contravene international law;

7. **Demands** that Israel, the occupying Power, make available to Member States the necessary information about goods produced or manufactured in the illegal settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem;

8. **Stresses** that all Member States, in order to ensure their rights and benefits resulting from membership, should fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations;

9. **Emphasizes** the responsibilities, including personal ones, arising from persistent violations and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;

10. **Recommends** that the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War convene a conference on measures to enforce the Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and to ensure its respect, in accordance with common article 1, and requests the Secretary-General to present a report on the matter within three months;

11. **Calls** for the reinjection of momentum into the stalled Middle East peace process and for the implementation of the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as for the upholding of the principles of the process, including the exchange of land for peace, and calls upon the two sides to refrain from actions that impede the peace process by pre-empting permanent status negotiations;

12. **Stresses** the need for actions in accordance with the Charter, to continue to ensure respect for international law and relevant United Nations resolutions;

13. **Decides** to adjourn the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly temporarily and to authorize the President of the most recent General Assembly to resume its meetings upon request from Member States.
JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, 30TH ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING, SUBANG JAYA, MALAYSIA, 24-25 JULY 1997 [EXCERPTS]

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

[...] 20. The Foreign Ministers viewed with deep concern the current deadlock in the peace process in the Middle East. Emphasizing the importance of maintaining the momentum of the peace process, they reaffirmed their support for the implementation of all agreements signed and all pledges and commitments made by parties following the Madrid Conference and, in particular the principle of land for peace, in due compliance with relevant United Nations Resolutions. These, they stressed, represented the only basis for a comprehensive settlement of the situation in Middle East which would ensure the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinians, the final settlement of the status of Jerusalem and the return of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The Foreign Ministers demanded that Israel take steps for the immediate and full cessation of the construction of a new settlement at Jabel Abu Ghneim, to the South of occupied East Jerusalem, and of all other Israel settlement activities, as well as of all illegal measures and actions in Jerusalem. [...]
Reaffirming the resolutions and communiqués adopted by the Arab Summit Conferences, in particular the Final Communiqué of the Cairo Summit Conference, adopted on 23 June 1996, and also the resolutions of the Council of the League of Arab States concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine problem,

Having discussed the grave developments being faced by the Palestinian people, bearing in mind the contents of the letter sent by Yasser Arafat, President of the State of Palestine, to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, and also the statement by the Palestinian political leadership concerning the policy of collective punishment adopted by the Israeli Government whereby a blockade has been imposed on towns and villages, international crossing points to Egypt and Jordan have been closed, and the movement of workers and goods between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is being prevented, and the declared intention of the Israeli forces to operate in the area of the Palestinian Authority and to mobilize tanks, troops and rocket launchers in confrontation with Palestinian towns,

Affirms that this explosive situation and the acts of violence that are occurring in the region, of whose consequences it has persistently warned, is a result of the halting of the peace process stemming from Israel's actions and its failure to abide by signed agreements, and that it is a direct product of the following factors:

1. The continuation of the expansionist policy of the Israeli Government in building colonialist settlements, particularly in the Holy City of Jerusalem, seizing land, changing the demographic and geographical situation, violating all the resolutions and principles on which the peace process is founded, particularly Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and the agreements signed by the Israeli Government with the Palestine Liberation Organization;

2. Action by the Israeli Government to impede and bring to a halt the various tracks within the peace process, and the consequential tension in the region;

3. The atmosphere of heightened tension resulting from incidents in which the colonialist settlers profaned moral and human values and desecrated Islamic and Christian religious beliefs and symbols, thereby inflaming religious feelings and bringing Arab, Islamic and Christian public opinion to fever pitch;

Holds Israel, therefore, fully responsible for poisoning the atmosphere and for the upsurge of violence, strongly condemns the Israeli decisions and actions which are incompatible with all the principles and resolutions on which the peace process was founded, and which offend against all international laws, particularly those relating to human rights, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and considers those decisions and actions as tantamount to a declaration of war on the Palestinian people, and on its political leadership, and demands that they be reversed immediately;

Considers that the way to ensure the return of security to the region, and to break out of the state of deadlock and tension, is to expedite the resumption of all tracks within the peace process, to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace through the total withdrawal of Israel from the Arab lands that it occupied in 1967, and subsequently, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978);

Commends the stand adopted by the Members of the United Nations which voted for the two draft resolutions at the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly and requests the two co-sponsors of the peace process, the States of the European Union, the permanent members of the Security Council, Japan, the States of the non-aligned group and other States involved, the United Nations and international organizations and institutions to take urgent action with a view to lifting the blockade that has been imposed on the Palestinian people, which has become a grave threat to the lives of Palestinian citizens, and also to take action to bring about a resumption of the process of negotiation on all tracks so as to build on what has been achieved in that connection, and to give an impetus to the peace process so as to enable the region to avoid further violence, bloodshed, the worsening of hostility and loss of confidence, a result that will come about only if the process of colonialist settlement is brought to an end in all the Arab lands, particularly the Holy City of Jerusalem, and if the Israeli Government scrupulously implements the agreements it has reached with the Palestine Liberation Organization;

Categorically rejects the Israeli allegations to the effect that it is the Palestine National Authority that is responsible for acts of violence which were instigated by the obduracy of the Israeli Government and by its failure to honour the binding agreements which it had signed, while the Palestine National Authority respects its own obligations;
Reaffirms that the resumption of negotiations on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, from the point at which the previous negotiations with the Israeli side stopped, will have a positive impact on the peace process as a whole;

Reaffirms its support and backing for the Palestinian people and for its leadership in confronting all these challenges, and calls on the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to expedite action at all levels, both regional and international, to lift the blockade on the Palestinian people;

Regards the present session as remaining open for the purpose of monitoring the grave developments that are taking place.

US SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, REMARKS ON THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS, WASHINGTON, DC, 6 AUGUST 1997 [EXCERPTS]

Overall, this has been a remarkable period. Unfortunately, progress achieved between Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East, an area vital to our interests, is now threatened.

Today, I would like to discuss the reasons why progress towards peace in this region has stalled and offer some suggestions for restoring positive momentum. The urgency of that goal was underlined one week ago, when bombs exploded in the Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem, killing 13 Israelis - one of whom was also an American citizen - and wounding 168. Behind those numbers are the faces of mothers, fathers, grandparents and children killed not for anything they had done, but simply for who and where they were. Sadly and tragically, the Israeli people - almost fifty years into the history of their state - are still the targets of a murderous campaign of terror.

No people should have to live this way. At the same time, it says something very good and very right about the Israeli people that they will never grow used to such events; they will never fail to respond with outrage and grief, never fail to mourn the individual lives that have been cut short, never cease to comfort the families, never cease to demand an end to terrorist attacks - and never give in to them.

It also says something hopeful about the future of the Middle East that, as we speak, 162 Arab, Israeli and Palestinian teenagers are in a summer camp in the woods of Maine, a camp sponsored by the Seeds of Peace program, and that this tragic bombing has brought those young people closer together in shock, sorrow and determination to end the cycle of violence in their region.

Americans share each of these feelings and reactions. Our thoughts are with those who knew and loved the persons killed or injured last week. We stand by Israel in its fight against terror. We maintain our unshakable commitment to Israeli security. And we join governments and peoples from every part of the globe who have condemned last week's savage attack.

Our convictions are clear. Terrorism is evil. It can never be justified. It is the instrument of cowards. It kills the innocent not by accident, but by design. And its design in the Middle East is to murder the peace process by shredding security and destroying the hope for peace.

We do not yet know the identity of the bombers at Mahane Yehuda.

But we can be sure this crime was not a random event. Terrorists often strike when they believe the parties are poised to make progress. It may be more than coincidence that this latest attack occurred shortly after the announcement that negotiations of the interim committees set up by the Hebron agreement would resume, and on the eve of an American effort to share ideas on how to break the current impasse.

We have come too far in the process of Arab-Israeli peacemaking to allow the vultures of violence to shape the region's future. The stakes are too high. Past sacrifices have been too great. And the peoples of the region have been burdened for too long by bloodshed and strife.
We must respond to those who have declared war on peace by waging war on terror, understanding that forging peace and fighting terrorism are not separate struggles, but rather two halves of the same struggle. We cannot succeed in one if we do not prevail in both. The path ahead is difficult, but so was the journey already made.

Over the years, the quest for peace in the Middle East has suffered multiple shocks, setbacks and traumas. We have watched in horror as busses and markets have been bombed, schoolchildren attacked, great leaders such as President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin assassinated and innocent people gunned down even while in a house of worship.

Nevertheless, in Madrid, Oslo, Washington, Cairo and in the Arava, we have seen historic enemies come together, speaking the language of peace. We have seen ties between Arabs and Israelis expand and a process of regional cooperation begin to tackle tough issues such as water, the environment and refugees.

We have seen a series of economic summits bring Arab and Israeli business people together to lay the groundwork for increased trade, investment and prosperity. We have seen extensive progress towards ending the secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel, thereby opening Israel's products to the world and the world's products to Israel. We have seen substantive negotiations aimed at a comprehensive settlement between Israel and all her Arab neighbors.

And we have seen many nations that are outside the region but affected by it - nations such as Russia, Norway, Japan and members of the EU - lend their diplomatic, political and financial support to peace. We must ask ourselves why this process has survived all the traumas and how it has endured despite bitterness, sorrow, suffering and anger.

The answer is that the vast majority of the people of the region, Israelis, Arabs and Palestinians, have come to believe that the status quo is unacceptable, that the costs of conflict are too high, and that the effort to achieve peace holds at least the promise of a better future.

They understand that, without peace, their societies will remain shackled by the pre-occupations of the past; their region will fall further behind in the global marketplace; and their children will grow up in an environment of uncertainty, danger and fear. The popular desire for peace is durable, resilient and strong.

This is what extremists and terrorists fear most. And this is why, despite the bombing this past week, and despite threats of further violence, the process of peacemaking has survived and will continue to survive.

When the Israelis and Palestinians came together in Oslo in 1993, the effort to achieve peace entered a new phase. The parties agreed for the first time on mutual recognition. And they agreed on a road map for transforming what had been an irresolvable confrontation based on clashing ideologies and violence into a solvable political negotiation based on shared interests. The leaders were able to agree to this because the Israeli and Palestinian people understood the need to recognize and deal with one another directly and to accept each other's political identity.

Now that the threshold of mutual recognition has been crossed, there can be no going back to mutual rejection, no going back to mutual denial. Neither party can return to an earlier time. By agreeing to accept one another as partners, the Israelis and Palestinians took an irreversible step towards ending their conflict.

The question today is not whether the Israelis and Palestinians will reach a mutually acceptable agreement, but when. This question of time is an important one. With our help, Israelis and Palestinians can move steadily towards a better future or they can remain bogged down in mutual suspicion and recriminations.

The longer decisions are postponed, the more conflict and suffering will ensue. Prime Minister Netanyahu said recently that leading Israel was like a "bed of roses," but with "a lot of thorns."

I suspect that Chairman Arafat might describe his job in a similar way. One cannot talk fairly about the Middle East without recognizing the difficulty of the challenges the leaders face. But one cannot talk accurately about the region without recognizing how important peace is to both the Israeli and Palestinian people and without acknowledging that they have made the choice for peace.
It is important in each society that the center work hard to make its influence felt over that of the extremes. And it is vital that the message be conveyed that it is no longer acceptable to avoid the tough choices required to move forward the quest for peace. Unfortunately, in recent months, since the promising agreement over Hebron, progress has stalled. We now face a crisis of confidence that has put at risk past gains, rekindled old animosities, and left Israelis and Palestinians alike fearful about what the future may bring.

In order to break the current deadlock, Israelis and Palestinians must return to basic principles. These principles do not focus on the substance of negotiations, which the parties must resolve between themselves at the bargaining table, but rather on the even more fundamental question of how the parties should approach negotiations in order to create the best possible environment for success.

What are these principles? First, the sine qua non for progress is a mutual commitment to security and against violence. This is basic. This is common sense. There is no place in the peace process for violence or terror and there is no room for using security cooperation as leverage in a negotiation. That approach destroys confidence, fuels extremism and undermines prospects for peace.

In recent months, many Israelis have come to believe that the Palestinian Authority is not taking seriously its vow to combat terror; that Palestinian words are not followed by action; and that the words, themselves, are not consistent or clear. They are concerned that violence in the streets may be orchestrated. And they wonder whether the Palestinian Authority is doing all it can to prevent incitement to violence and terrorist attacks.

They fear that violence is being given a green light, or a yellow light, or a blinking light - when what is called for in Oslo and what is essential for peace is an unceasing red. We do not ask the impossible. With suicide terrorists, there can be no perfect system for guaranteeing security. We cannot expect 100 percent success. But there must be 100 percent effort both with regard to unilateral Palestinian Authority measures against terror and in Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation.

What does this mean specifically? It means sharing information and coordinating law enforcement actions. It means an unrelenting effort to detect and deter potential terrorist acts. It means identifying and seizing arms caches such as the one raided successfully by Palestinian police in Beit Sahour two weeks ago.

It means arresting and prosecuting those involved in planning, financing, supplying or abetting terrorism. And it means doing everything possible to create a moral atmosphere in which advocacy of violence and terror withers away. The terrorists are unrelenting, and so must we be unrelenting in our struggle against them. On this issue, there can be no winks, no double meanings, no double standards and with respect to the imprisonment of terrorists - no revolving doors.

Nor can the level of security cooperation ebb and flow with the ups and downs of negotiation. The Palestinian commitment to fight terror must be constant and absolute. This is essential to move the peace process forward. It is necessary, obviously, to create a climate of greater security and confidence within Israel. But it is also essential to Palestinians. Extremist violence is a grave threat to Palestinian society. Palestinians are sometimes the direct targets of this violence. And they are the ones who suffer economic and humanitarian hardships when Israel clamps down on access.

While Israelis have too often been the victims of terror, it is fair to say that attacks by Islamic Jihad and Hamas have made ordinary Palestinians pay a terrible price not only in their day to day well-being, but also in their long-range hopes and possibilities. Israelis and Palestinians must unite to defeat terrorism, which is their common enemy. They must unite to end violence, apprehend perpetrators and create an environment in which it is possible for all not simply to survive, but to thrive - to go about the business of building secure and productive lives. This is the first principle of Oslo and it is the cornerstone of an enduring peace.
The second principle is that both sides agreed to settle their differences over the subjects of negotiation at the bargaining table, and not somewhere else. It is in the interests of each party to avoid steps that undermine the other's confidence and trust in the process. In practice, this means forgoing unilateral acts which pre-judge or pre-determine issues reserved for permanent status negotiations.

Let me be clear. There is no moral equivalency between suicide bombers and bulldozers, between killing innocent people and building houses. It is simply not possible to address political issues seriously in a climate of intimidation and terror.

But the principle of refraining from unhelpful unilateral acts is central to maintaining mutual confidence. Especially as we look ahead to permanent status negotiations, it is essential that the parties think through how their actions will affect the environment for those negotiations.

Palestinians argue that Israel has taken some actions in recent months that pre-judge issues reserved for permanent status negotiations. These include settlement activity, construction at Har Homa and the confiscation of land. These actions have generated uncertainty among many Palestinians about Israeli intentions, undermined for them the very logic of negotiations and caused a crisis of confidence in their Israeli partner. It is fair to ask: how can you create a credible environment for negotiation when actions are being taken that seem to predetermine the outcome?

To restore confidence, both sides must think seriously and in advance about the potential impact of what they do and say. They must do more than ask whether an action is technically legal; they must ask whether it is wise, whether it is consistent with the spirit of their partnership, and whether it brings them closer to the goals of their agreements.

The third rule of the road for the negotiating process is that both parties must demonstrate, in word and deed, their understanding of peace not as one option among many, but as the only option that will provide for the security and well-being of their people.

It was this mutual recognition that made Israel and the Palestinians partners in pursuing peace. And it is the logic of this partnership that has made it possible to overcome past obstacles and setbacks, as demonstrated by the Hebron agreement earlier this year.

Both Israeli and Palestinian leaders have been consistent in stating their commitment to peace. But the success of the negotiating process requires more. They must reaffirm their commitment to partnership and to working together to solve problems.

They must re-iterate their understanding that the future of their two peoples is not a zero-sum game in which one party will win and the other will lose; or in which one will get up from the bargaining table with an advantage over the other. If two people are in a boat heading for the rapids, they should not be arguing about how they got there; they should be rowing together in the direction of security and shore.

Israelis and Palestinians will continue to have substantive differences in their negotiations, especially given the issues of permanent status that are yet to be addressed. The depth of these differences makes it all the more vital that the parties search for ways to rebuild mutual confidence and restore the momentum towards peace.

A spirit of partnership must motivate each side. And a recognition of their partner’s legitimate needs must influence behavior. Indeed, the new mindset must be that “there is no problem too big that we cannot resolve it together.”

As Israelis and Palestinians move to re-energize their negotiations, it is imperative that the international community do its share to support this effort and to recognize that prosperity is a parent to peace. Every nation with an interest in the region - especially Israel - has a stake in the social and economic progress of the Palestinian Authority and should contribute appropriately to it.
And Arab states have a responsibility to build peace through a normalization of relations throughout their region. Dialogue, business contracts and personal contacts should take the place of boycotts and hostility. This is the logic of the Middle East Economic Summit planned for Doha this November. Countries in the region will only hurt the peace process and their own economic future if they fail to attend that summit.

In this regard, I salute King Hussein of Jordan both for his direct contributions to the peace process, and for the effort he has made to persuade Arabs and Israelis alike of the economic and political benefits of peace.

For decades, the United States has been deeply engaged in the pursuit of a comprehensive Middle East peace. President Clinton - like his predecessors - has considered this to be a top priority and has worked hard to support the efforts of the parties to reach that goal. Over the years, US policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process has been based on key elements which have underlined our approach. These core elements remain valid today. Let me reaffirm them:

We seek a just and lasting peace achieved through direct negotiations based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including the principle upon which every Arab-Israeli agreement has been built - land for peace. We believe that peace must be accompanied by real security for Israel and her Arab neighbors both from external threats and from terror.

We believe peace must be just, lasting and comprehensive, leading to treaties based on normal relations and genuine peace between peoples, including between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon, and we believe that peace must address the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. Principles, however, cannot produce agreements; the hard work of negotiation does. And the United States has tried through a variety of ways to promote that process.

We have worked at times to insulate and protect negotiations; we have moved to de-fuse crises both on the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Lebanon fronts; we have marshaled economic and political support; and, as was the case during the Israeli-Syrian talks at the Wye Plantation and during the Hebron negotiations, we have at times even gone beyond the traditional role of facilitator and played the role of mediator.

At the same time, the United States is not a party to the Arab-Israeli conflict. We do not assume the same risks and responsibilities as parties struggling with the issues of political identity and physical survival. As a consequence, we cannot, should not, and will not impose solutions.

Nor can we create the political will required for Arabs and Israelis to make the tough decisions for peace. These are their decisions - not ours. But given our indispensable role and the trust and confidence we have gained, we do have a responsibility during good times and bad to work with them in the pursuit of peace. Indeed, they want us to play this role. And we will continue to do so.

In the past several months, as the negotiations floundered, and Israeli-Palestinian recriminations intensified, we sought in several ways to put the process back on track. Working closely with President Mubarak of Egypt, our strategic partner in peace, we tried to define a basis on which the parties could re-engage. We promoted direct contacts to restore a practical working relationship between Israelis and Palestinians.

We focused on parallel steps each side could take to address the concerns of the other. We built on these contacts to renew discussions on the interim agreement issues and were developing ideas to overcome the differences that had prevented the permanent status talks from convening.

Indeed, on the eve of the July 30 attack in Jerusalem, the President and I felt it was time to send Dennis Ross to the region to convey US ideas. That trip will now go forward at the end of this week.

The primary focus of Ambassador Ross's visit will be to deal with the security dimension of the current crisis. If the right kind of steps are being taken to improve the security environment, we will have a basis for going forward - as we must - with consideration of political issues, beginning with the need to restore trust and make progress towards fulfilling the terms of the interim agreement.
We must also, however, prepare to do more. The Israeli-Palestinian crisis of confidence has cost the peace process six months. Suspicions and mistrust are running high. The logic of Oslo, based on mutual recognition, is sound, but the incremental approach of the interim agreement needs to be married to an accelerated approach to permanent status.

To restore momentum, we have to increase confidence on both sides about where the negotiating process is leading and what the outcome of permanent status talks might be. If the parties have a clear, mutual and favorable sense of the ultimate direction of negotiation, it will be easier for them to overcome setbacks and avoid distractions along the way. This will require accelerating permanent status negotiations.

Today, this step is urgent and important. Accordingly, provided there is some progress on security issues, I am prepared to travel to the Middle East at the end of this month. I will consult closely with the leaders of the region and especially with Israeli and Palestinian leaders, to improve the climate for negotiations, and to discuss the procedural and substantive aspects of the permanent status issues.

Re-energizing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process will not happen overnight. It will take time. But President Clinton and I remain committed to doing everything possible to help the parties succeed.

We will continue to play our role as a full partner. In this partnership, only the parties must make the decisions, but we can support them. In this partnership, only the parties must conduct the negotiations, but we can be with them at the table. In this partnership, only the parties must determine the shape of peace, but we can work with them to facilitate, protect and broaden that peace.

Let there be no doubt, the United States will continue to do all it can to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians and throughout the Middle East. We will do so because progress towards peace serves our vital interests, helps protect our friends, reflects our values and because it is right.

No region of the world has seen greater suffering or more persistent conflict than the Middle East. No generation has a better chance than the current one to replace the downward cycle of conflict with an upward ladder of opportunity.

As we approach the new century, there are no Cold War divisions fueling a regional rivalry. And the way to peace - once obscure - has been laid out first at Madrid, then more clearly at Oslo and in the agreements since. So now the choice for Israelis and Palestinians alike is between two futures. They can shy from the risks of peace and ensure a future of more uncertainty, hardship and fighting or they can come together to renew their partnership and fulfill the promise of peace.

For Israelis, that is the promise of a bustling economy with Pacific Rim potential. It is assurance of a common front in the fight against terror, a steady growth in regional cooperation and the ability to raise children in security and peace. For Palestinians, it is the promise of an end to decades of strife.

It is the chance, as full participants in a growing regional economy, to use their energy and skills to create a future for themselves of steadily increasing prosperity, dignity and hope.

And for all the people of the region, it is the promise, as President Clinton has said, of "building a land that is as bountiful and peaceful as it is holy", and of offering to Israelis and Palestinians alike the "miracle of a normal life."

The United States cannot choose this future for Israel or for the Palestinians. That is their choice and their challenge. We do not underestimate the difficulties. We are cognizant of the dangers. But America was built on optimism and on the faith that the future can be made better than the past, not only within our own borders but within all the borders of the Earth.

It is in that spirit, and with that faith, that we ask of ourselves and of our partners a renewed and determined effort to transform from hope to reality the elusive dream of a Middle East peace. - Thank you very much.

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Thank you for inviting me to speak here. I view this opportunity to address you as one of the special privileges afforded a Prime Minister.

This is the 24th graduating class of the National Defense College, and as we approach Israel's 50th Anniversary we must ask ourselves, "Must the sword consume forever?" Are we doomed never to fulfill Isaiah's prophecy, "nation shall not lift up sword against nation and neither shall they learn war any more"?

I believe we can achieve peace, provided we define for ourselves the kind of peace that can be reached in our region. The Middle East is unstable, filled with danger and, with the exception of Israel, sorely lacking democratic regimes.

In this region, peace is not anchored in the will of the people. In the countries surrounding us, decisions on all issues - including the cardinal ones of war and peace - are not in the hands of the citizens. The Iraqi people did not decide to declare war, Saddam Hussein did. And it was not the popular will but the defeat of Saddam's army which ended the war.

Moreover, leaders of this region exercise great - and in some cases absolute - control over the media and the vehicles of propaganda and communication which influence the people's will and shape their opinions. None of the Arab-Israeli wars was initiated by the will of the people, but rather by the will of their leaders. In the absence of internal restraints, namely the people's resistance to their leaders' military adventurism, the true guarantee for a lasting peace in our region must come from the creation of external restraints to such adventurism.

These restraints find their expression in the balance of power, the deterrent effect of a decisive military edge, of security arrangements and security zones. In the absence of true democratic regimes around us, the normalization process, while desirable and important, cannot substitute for the balance of power as a guarantor of peace. This is true, not only in our relations with our neighbors, but in their relations with each other.

The Middle East is saturated with inter-Arab peace treaties and declarations of friendship and fraternity which can last for many years and then disappear overnight. We cannot expect that the peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors will be of a higher quality than that which exists among the Arabs themselves.

Normalization, communication, trade relations, and cultural exchange are important and desirable. But they cannot substitute for Israel's clear military advantage as a guarantee for the achievement and maintenance of peace. I also wish to clarify that normalization is conditional, partial, vulnerable and reversible. If the political process weakens Israel, normalization itself will be endangered.

To achieve peace in our region we must preserve and increase our strength. This is not a new concept. For 50 years the United States maintained a de facto peace with the Soviet Union, the strongest non-democratic region in history. The US moved toward normalization and gradually thawed the relationship. There were obstacles, ups and downs, and confrontations, but the US proceeded slowly, while consistently preserving the military edge of the NATO peace over the Warsaw Pact. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of a new kind of government did the need for a military edge change. The military layout is different now. Today the Warsaw Pact is being absorbed by the NATO pact, and everything has been reshaped, because the current peace between Russia and the US is no longer based on deterrence and military advantage, but on a gradual transition to shared values of democracy, openness and pluralism.

As long as this change has not yet occurred in our region - and I cannot predict when it will occur - the type of peace that is possible in the Middle East is a peace based on power. We must nurture our strength.
and capabilities if we wish to achieve and preserve peace and prevent the violation of its provisions. The prevention of such violations must be an integral part of the foundation of peace agreements.

The core of the initial Oslo Agreement was the Palestinian Authority's commitment to act against terror organizations from areas under its jurisdiction. In all honesty, we must state that during the four years since the agreement was signed, the PA has not acted against these organizations. From the very beginning, movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad have systematically gained strength and amassed power - their armed people moving freely and stockpiling ammunition and explosives. They attend mass rallies, enlist new recruits, and operate practically unhindered. They continued to gains strength.

The Oslo Agreements have created bases and havens for terror organizations in our immediate vicinity. Our policy since the establishment of the State of Israel has been to distance such bases from our borders. But the PA's violation of the agreement creates an untenable situation. No country can exist with terrorist bases and havens five minutes from its main urban centers. No nation can tolerate this, and no peace can withstand such conditions.

And so, if the PA wants to save the peace, its immediate task is to gain control over terrorism. That is why we insist that implementation of this fundamental component of the agreement must be the first step in the continuing process. The late Yitzhak Rabin made it clear, even before signing the Oslo Agreements, that the Palestinians must vigorously battle terrorism and amend the Palestinian Charter, before Israel can undertake withdrawals from territories. For the past four years, our partners have completely ignored these commitments.

I, together with the Minister of Defense and the entire Cabinet, wish to continue the process. But we are unable to do so unless the PA fulfills its commitments under the Oslo Accords - to dismantle the terror infrastructure, disarm the organizations, extradite terrorists wanted for the murder of Israelis, stop the daily incitement and the demonstrations involving the burning of the Israeli flag, cease the official glorification of murderers, and educate for peace and the acceptance of Israel's legitimacy. Children who learn from maps in which the word "Israel" never appears, will never learn to live peacefully with Israel; and this is but one small example.

It is equally important that we do not allow wishful thinking to undermine our view of reality - the reality being that as long as the surrounding regimes are not by nature democratic and peace-seeking, we cannot afford agreements in which the security component is not dominant. No agreement will last unless we preserve security and defense zones. We must keep the Jordan Valley as the strategic border, as our strategic buffer. We must guarantee free and safe access to the Jordan Valley, widen the demarcation lines in our coastal areas and prevent our return to the 1949 cease-fire borders.

Under the present conditions, no arrangement is possible which does not guarantee our control over the type and quantity of arms entering the territories under PA jurisdiction. It is clear that we cannot tolerate an entity with a large army equipped with heavy artillery or non-conventional weapons, abutting our population centers. We also cannot allow the existence of an entity able to form alliances with regimes such as Iran, Iraq and Syria. Under no circumstances can we permit a hostile entity to control our airspace and water resources.

These are minimal - not maximum - requirements. These are realistic requirements for a realistic peace with the Palestinians. If we want a lasting peace, we must insist on the battle against terrorism as a precondition, and we must have provisions in the final status agreement that will guarantee the permanence of this peace. I do not promise the peace which exists in Western Europe. We are not in Western Europe. Ours will not be the peace which exists between the United States and Canada, or the Netherlands and Belgium. But it will be a peace with which we can live, and through which we can gradually alter reality until we reach - so we hope - better relations with the Palestinians and our other neighbors.

As long as our region is characterized by non-democratic regimes, we must pursue a policy which will enable us to maintain our deterrent ability, and not surrender vital and strategic security assets. I believe that these principles can also guide us in our quest for peace with Syria and, consequently,
with Lebanon: principles which place security as the primary and most important foundation for the achievement and maintenance of peace.

But, I must stress, even as we progress, despite many obstacles, towards peace with the most immediate circle of neighboring countries and regimes, we are witnessing a deterioration in the outer circle. The arming of the Islamic states continues to grow, and today it includes both accurate, long-range surface-to-surface missiles and non-conventional weapons. Our qualitative edge over our neighbors has diminished in certain spheres, and a number of regional entities have remained outside the process and continue to seek Israel's destruction. In the past, our primary concern was conventional, frontal warfare. Our victory in the Six Day War substantially reduced this risk, although not eliminating it completely.

But in recent years the threat has changed and grown. Iran, a one-time ally of Israel, currently poses the greatest threat to peace in our neighborhood. The possibility that Iran could obtain non-conventional weapons, in addition to its long-range missiles, should be of great concern not only to us but to all those responsible for world security. The Iranian threat is not confined to Israel, nor to this region. It is a global threat.

These are the negative developments. But we can also point to no less significant positive developments.

In recent years our economy has undergone dramatic changes. Today, Israel's economy has much greater potential due to its transition to how industries. Such industries and a free economy make a very powerful combination. We must nurture knowledge as well as economic freedom. The two will merge spontaneously. Our economic strength is greater than that of our neighbors, and the gap will widen. Of this there is no doubt. Israel's technological capabilities and military power are also on the rise.

In the area of security, Israel enjoys American backing and assistance as an integral part of US policy. I have mentioned the collapse of the Soviet empire and, although there is no doubt that Russia is a global power whose strength and influence will be evident in our region, the danger of a flare-up between Eastern and Western blocs has virtually disappeared.

This is a welcome development, as the Soviet Union was a major contributor to the fostering of our neighbors' military capabilities. In effect, it delivered them from the price of defeat. Each time they would wage war against us and after each defeat the Soviet Union would rush to their rescue, rebuild their potential, grant them unconditional backing and give them hope for another round. Even though our neighbors and several of the states with which we have not yet made peace can find new suppliers, none will replace the Soviet Union's strategic backing and battlefield support.

Our current task is to strengthen our defenses against both the immediate and the outer circles. In the former we must do so to complete the circle of peace; and in the latter to at least prevent the deterioration toward war. We must do this with confidence, and not be seduced by wishful thinking. Our need for preparedness and deterrent ability has not passed, nor is it likely to disappear in the foreseeable future.

We all know the necessary components. They include preservation of our conventional capabilities and readiness to face non-conventional threats. The security services must adapt to new needs and increase efficiency, and they have been doing both. This is a hard and painful process. It is important that the fat be trimmed without causing damage to the muscle, for if we cut too deep, the muscle tissue may be impaired.

In the discussions on increasing efficiency in the face of threats, it is crucial that the Minister of Defense, the Chief-of-Staff and the IDF generals deliver their assessments honestly, based on their vast experience, and with the professionalism for which they are known. Their presentation to the political echelon must be direct, blunt and confidential. These discussions do not belong in the public arena. It is crucial that they remain restricted to the highest decision-making levels.

We must maintain our military intelligence abilities and regain what was lost in recent years. We must remain determined and call on our inner strength. Openness, media exposure and the interven-
tion of the courts are basically positive factors, but we must not allow them to undermine the consensus on security matters and weaken public backing for steps vital to our defense.

A major component of our inner strength is the relationship with our minorities. The Druze, Circassians and Bedouins play an important role in national defense. We must expand this circle. We should not abandon the field to those who deny their Israeli identity and incite Israeli Arabs to adopt Palestinian or Syrian loyalties.

We will continue to nurture our relations with the major powers, particularly the US, where we have found an encouragingly receptive ear for our position on terrorism and the primacy of the security issue in the promotion of peace. Only yesterday, Secretary of State Albright stated that the PA must demonstrate 100% effort in the fight not only against the manifestations of terrorism, but also its infrastructure.

We will continue our pursuit of peace with our neighbors. Despite disappointments and risks, there can be no doubt that dialogue is better than no dialogue, and that only negotiations can lead to a satisfactory solution and peaceful coexistence.

Obviously we would prefer democratic partners who share our concept of peace, but we must accept the reality of what we have. It is not our intention to intervene in the way our partners order their political affairs. We can only hope that the values of peace and freedom which have brought magnificent prosperity and growth worldwide will affect them, and they, like us, will aspire to a true and lasting peace.

Between "rose garden" dreams on the one hand, and paranoia and isolation on the other, there is a golden path of realism, of real politik. This is the path that Israel chose beginning in the Ben-Gurion era, and this must be our choice today. If we know when to compromise, when to grasp opportunities and when to display determination and decisiveness, we can bring peace with security to our country and our people.

ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU AND US SECRETARY OF STATE ALBRIGHT, JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE, JERUSALEM, 10 SEPTEMBER 1997

PM NETANYAHU: I am pleased to welcome Madeleine Albright on her first visit to Israel as Secretary of State. Secretary Albright is a distinguished world leader, and she represents the abiding kinship between our two peoples and our two countries. It is a bond of deeply shared values - freedom and democracy - and of friendship. This is also the first visit of Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State here, and there are so many issues that we have to talk about. But we have devoted our time to the most pressing discussion vis-à-vis the Palestinian-Israeli talks. I think that our meeting was truly most cordial and most productive. I was deeply touched by your words this morning - I am sure they touched the hearts of all Israelis. They certainly touched mine. They reflected an understanding of our history, and I think a real understanding of our concerns and our desires and our hopes.

I want to emphasize again that we want the peace process to succeed. In fact, I am convinced that my government is the only government which can bring this process to a successful conclusion. This government is determined to achieve peace - real peace, peace with security, a peace that will last, a peace that will benefit all the peoples of our region. But obviously no agreement will work unless both sides live up to their obligations.

The central, essential premise of this agreement that was signed by Israel and the Palestinians exactly four years ago was based on a Palestinian commitment to wage an unrelenting war against terrorism. Unfortunately, in the four years that have passed, the Palestinian Authority has done virtually nothing to keep up this central commitment. The result, terrorism, grew by leaps and bounds under my predecessors, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres; it continues to grow in the absence of firm Palestinian Authority action against terrorism.
We must make it clear to everyone who wants to see peace prevail: Terrorism must not be used as an instrument of negotiations, and violence is not an option in such negotiations. I know it is unacceptable to us and to the United States, and it should be unacceptable to every peace-loving government in the world. The only way to fight terrorism is to do what was explicitly undertaken by the Palestinian Authority and was articulated so well by Secretary Albright, that is: fighting the terrorists and dismantling their infrastructure. These are the critical components of security and waging war on terrorism.

All this is not an item for bargaining, it is not an option. It is, as Secretary Albright has put it, the sine qua non of the Oslo agreements. We believe the Palestinian Authority must keep its part. It must fight terrorism with no ifs and buts, and it must do so soon if this process is to survive. It must choose sides - if they want peace with HAMAS or peace with Israel, but it cannot have both. I want to assure you, Madame Secretary, that we will do everything to make your visit successful, because your success is the success of the entire peace process which we so fervently desire. If you are able to persuade the Palestinian Authority to wage war against the terrorists, I believe the road will be open to the continuation of the peace process to its successful conclusion.

I hope that the Palestinian Authority also desires this peace, with the same fervor, and will prove it, soon, by fighting terrorism. We can achieve a good life for both our peoples in this small land. And if peace is to win, both sides must want it to win. We certainly do.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you very much. Mr. Prime Minister, it is a great pleasure to be here with you, and I very much appreciate your characterization of our discussions. I do believe that we had very good discussions and reviewed a variety of issues relating to the pursuit of Israeli-Arab peace.

Israel and the United States have long been partners in that historic endeavor, and it is important that the partnership continue. Clearly, we are at a very difficult moment. Negotiations have stalled, and Israelis and Palestinians are locked in a crisis of confidence which has threatened the historic gains achieved in recent years. We must move forward, Israelis and Palestinians, to restore the confidence and the reciprocity that produced those achievements. The terrorist war being waged against Israel and peace itself has created a severe challenge. This security is at the center of my agenda.

Let me be clear. The enemies of peace are purposefully and relentlessly attacking Israelis. So that war against terror being waged by those who support the path of peace must also be purposeful and relentless. There is no way to completely protect any society from the threat of terror, but partners in the pursuits of peace have a right to expect a total, sustained and comprehensive effort to pre-empt terror, to combat it, and to delegitimize those in their midst who associate themselves with it. There can be no room in this process for those groups who would tolerate or advocate terror and violence.

I will be seeing Chairman Arafat tomorrow, and my message will be clear. It is essential that Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation be serious, sustained and effective. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority must take unilateral steps and actions to root out terrorist infrastructure. If we are to create and sustain an invigorated and accelerated negotiating process, there is simply no other way.

The Prime Minister has talked about the importance of reciprocity. Both Israelis and Palestinians must shoulder their responsibilities if we are to emerge from the current crisis. This process cannot succeed without reciprocity. Let me be clear. There is no moral equivalence between killing people and building houses. It is simply not possible to address political issues seriously in a climate of intimidation and terror. At the same time, real security depends ultimately on real peace.

Achieving this peace turns fundamentally on a political process which meets through a genuine process of give and take the needs of both sides. Clearly Israel also has a responsibility to shape an environment which will give that process a chance to succeed. This means that Israel should be taking
steps that build confidence and to refrain from actions that undermine confidence and trust. As I said in my speech last month, it is very difficult to create a serious environment for negotiations when unilateral actions are taken that pre-empt or pre-empt issues reserved for permanent status negotiations.

Restoring a sense of partnership will not be accomplished quickly or easily, certainly not on a single visit. At the same time, I firmly believe that there is no alternative to the political pathway Israelis and Palestinians have chosen. The people of this region have seen too much violence, there have been too many victims. They do not deserve and will not accept a future that promises only more of the same. The United States will do all it can to help the parties rediscover the path to a brighter future with real security and real peace. The President of the United States and I are committed to that. And in that effort, as in our deep and abiding friendship with the people of Israel, the United States may be counted upon to persevere.

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US SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, REMARKS ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS, ISRAEL ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCE, JERUSALEM, 11 SEPTEMBER 1997 [EXCERPTS]

[...] The terrorist strategy is to drive decent people within both the Israeli and Palestinian populations to conclude that peace is not possible. Our strategy must be to unite the decent people in both and demonstrate to the terrorists that their strategy will never succeed.

That requires leadership from both parties. But it requires, in particular, that the Palestinian Authority display an unceasing red light to terrorists. Against suicide bombers, there can be no guarantee of 100 percent success, but there must be 100 percent effort to deter, prevent, and punish terrorist acts. In recent days, the Palestinian Authority has taken some welcome steps. But I must emphasize that fighting terror is not a part-time job. Fighting terror is not something you do only when it is convenient. Fighting terror is a 24-hour-a-day, 365-day-a-year responsibility, and for any partner in peace, fighting terror is a sacred obligation. Fulfilling that obligation means identifying and seizing terrorist weapons and supplies. It means arresting and prosecuting those involved in planning, financing, supplying, or abetting terrorism. It means sharing information and coordinating law enforcement actions.

And it means getting out the message over and over again that those who commit terrorism in the name of the Palestinian cause are committing terrorism against the Palestinian cause. The ear-splitting sirens of terror make it harder to hear the urgent and just call by Palestinians for the life of dignity and opportunity they deserve. And terrorist acts cause your government to respond with closures and other restrictive measures. In this way, the forces of terror simultaneously deny Palestinians their future dream while increasing their present suffering. That is why the average Palestinian has no greater enemy than Hamas or the Islamic Jihad. Defeating terror is paramount, but if mutual confidence is to be restored, both sides must also renew and reinforce their commitment to the Oslo process. There can be no backing off from Oslo commitments or from the principle of reciprocity that is inherent in them. This means that Israel should refrain from unilateral acts - including what Palestinians perceive as the provocative expansion of settlements, land confiscations, home demolitions, and confiscation of IDs. Such actions appear designed to pre-empt the outcome of negotiations, and they undermine Palestinian confidence in Israeli intentions.

This is especially important at a time when the parties are considering the idea of complementing the implementation of the Oslo Interim Agreement with an accelerated approach to permanent status negotiations. We believe that a “time-out” from these kinds of unilateral actions will create a climate in which such an accelerated approach can succeed in achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.

While safeguarding her security, Israel should also do all she can to avoid harming the economic well-being of the Palestinian people - bearing in mind that no nation has a greater interest than Israel in making tangible for Palestinians the benefits of peace.
For their part, the Palestinians must also be clear about their intentions. The language of jihad must cease. The education of their people, whether in the schoolroom or the broadcast studio, must reflect a commitment to peace, not a call to confrontation. And Palestinian leaders must make clear that Oslo does not represent merely another phase in their struggle with Israel; it must be the end of their struggle with Israel.

It is not enough for either side to say it is committed to peace. Both must act in the spirit of peace. And both must contribute to an atmosphere in which the violent extremes are marginalized and the roots of trust may grow.

Finally, both parties must demonstrate their understanding of peace not as one option among many, but as the only option that will provide for the security and well-being of their people. It was this mutual and irreversible recognition that made Israel and the Palestinians partners in pursuing peace. And it is the logic of this partnership that has made it possible to overcome past obstacles to peace.
repeated Israeli aggression against Lebanon, they called for Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon and the West Bekaa in accordance with Security Council resolution 425, and to fully respect the independence, sovereignty and integrity of Lebanon.

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PALESTINIAN PERSONALITIES FROM JERUSALEM, STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES’ RECOGNITION OF JERUSALEM AS CAPITAL OF ISRAEL, SEPTEMBER 1997

[The statement was signed by 100 Palestinian Jerusalemite personalities, including dignitaries from the Mosque and the Church, and Heads of Palestinian institutions].

In the Name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate

The signatories of this appeal, representing Palestinian national and religious institutions and personalities, declare their strongest possible rejection and condemnation of the US House of Representatives vote in favor (406 to 17) of the recognition of Jerusalem as the “unified capital of the State of Israel” and of the decision to allocate millions of US$ for the transfer of the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

The preemptive US vote not only gives legitimacy to unilateral Israeli Judaization policies in occupied East Jerusalem, but also derides the hope for a just and lasting peace in the region. The US decision displays blatant disregard not only for UN resolutions, international law and conventions but also for the principles set forth in the US letter of assurances to the Palestinians of 18 October 1991 stating that the US understands the importance Palestinians attach to the question of Jerusalem, that it does not recognize Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and that no party should take unilateral actions that would predetermine issues and preempt the final outcome of future negotiations.

The US vote is furthermore a clear violation of the Oslo Accords, in which the Palestinian side, recognizing the sensitivity of the Jerusalem question, accepted to postpone discussions on its fate for the final status talks. This in no way means that we have given up our right to Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state. The biased US vote, in support of the interests and unjust practices of the Israeli occupiers, comes in blatant contravention of the spirit of the interim agreements and nullifies the US’ credibility as a co-sponsor of the peace process.

In view of all this, we confirm here that Jerusalem is an indivisible part and the center of the Palestinian Territories and that no power in the world has the right to deprive Jerusalem of its Arab Christian-Muslim character, nor deny it, and that any decision to this effect is void and illegitimate.

We strongly condemn all attempts to portray Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and appeal to the international community and all governments, the United Nations, and all international organizations to take a clear, just position regarding the rights of the Palestinian people and the status of Jerusalem, as stipulated in UN Security Council resolutions 476 and 478 (1980).

We call upon the Islamic and international community as well as the Vatican to intervene and exert pressure to the US to immediately and permanently rescind its decision which is a flagrant aggression against the religious significance and sensitivity all Muslim and Christians attach to the holy city of Jerusalem.

We urge the Islamic, Arab and international community to reaffirm that justice and peace in the Middle East can only be established on the basis of the safeguarding of Palestinian rights in the city of Jerusalem.

We urge all Arab states to take immediate action in compliance with the resolution of the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference on Jerusalem (Casablanca, 16-19 January 1984) that stressed the “need for all capitals, major and historical cities of Islamic states to announce their twinning with the city of Jerusalem.”
Al-Quds ash-Sharif, the capital of Palestine, as a symbol of solidarity with the people of Palestine, particularly the Palestinian citizens living in the city of Al-Quds ash-Sharif, as a tribute to their steadfastness, firmness and resistance to the abhorrent Zionist occupation.”

We appeal to His Majesty King Hassan of Morocco, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Jerusalem Committee, and to His Excellency Esmat Abed Al-Majid, in his capacity as the General Secretary of the Arab League, to take immediate measures and to call on all Arab and Muslim parliaments, governments, and heads of state urging them to declare and formally recognize Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian people and their state, to which they have an eternal right.

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ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER DAVID LEVY, PA DEPUTY CHAIRMAN MAHMOUD ABBAS, AND US AMBASSADOR DENNIS ROSS, OPENING REMARKS OF ISRAEL-PA TALKS AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL, JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, DC, 6 OCTOBER 1997

[The Israel-PA talks at FM level were agreed upon during the Sept. visit to the Middle East of Sec. of State Albright. They were opened in Washington in the presence of the Amb. Dennis Ross.]

ISRAELI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DAVID LEVY:

The meeting here this evening was in accordance with the agreements already reached between the sides to renew our negotiations and is an expression of the desire of both sides, the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, to continue in our efforts to make progress to our mutual goal, the goal of reaching peace between us. We are not beginning anew here. We are continuing the significant work and the great effort that have already been put in by both sides until the breach of contact occurred, and this out of our determined decision to extract ourselves from the breach of contract that had existed.

What we are doing in this meeting, what we have done and what we will continue to do in our work, is what is incumbent upon us by virtue of what we have undertaken between us to advance the issues between us and to reach agreement. Our determination to advance these issues and to proceed is also intended to create the necessary atmosphere which stands in complete opposition to violence, to terror, and in our work together we are giving expression to that strong position against terror and to creating the atmosphere needed for making peace between us.

I wish also to take this opportunity to note the great will and strong sense of partnership that my colleague, Abu Mazen, has given expression to this evening, and also to thank the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for her efforts to bring the parties together; and in particular, as well, to Dennis Ross for his actions and for his efforts, his commitment to finding solutions and to advancing our common goal, a goal which we have each taken upon ourselves, both individually and as partners, to reach peace. The United States is the world’s great power and our great friend, and its involvement and its standing firm beside the parties as they try and make peace is something which we appreciate and value greatly. Especially on a day when some may feel that there are dark clouds passing over us, this strong, firm stand taken by the parties, the expression that they have given to their mutual desire to advance towards peace is like a ray of light, and we are hopeful that this ray of light will continue to shine upon us and upon our efforts today, tomorrow and in the days to come. Thank you.

PA DEPUTY CHAIRMAN MAHMOUD ABBAS (ABU MAZEN):

I would like to express the appreciation of President Yasser Arafat to all efforts being exerted by the American administration in the hope of reviving the peace process, with special thanks to President Clinton, Mme. Albright and Ambassador Ross.
The peace process has been off track for a long time, and I say now, its time to revive it. In this regard, I would reiterate our commitment to activate our coordination and cooperation in all spheres, including the security sphere, and our efforts to combat violence and terror whether committed by Israelis or Palestinians.

As of next week, we will start crucial talks and negotiations in Washington with a specified agenda, that will include the unilateral steps, especially in the field of settlement activities, confiscation of land, demolition of homes, and the confiscation of identity cards from Palestinians in Jerusalem. Also what will be discussed in Washington is the further redeployments and the permanent status negotiations and the security council. These issues constitute the basic principles and fundamental basis to revive the peace process and to give the peace process the chance it deserves.

We are not starting from scratch. Our peace process has clear-cut terms of reference, whether it’s the Madrid formula, the Oslo accords, the DOP, which will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The committees concerning the implementation of the outstanding commitments of the Interim Agreement will resume tomorrow. These committees have an objective of institutionalizing mechanisms of implementation of all these outstanding commitments. What we need is the implementation on the ground. We don’t think that negotiations are an end by itself. The implementation on the ground will be the only way to revive and to restore confidence and credibility to the peace process.

The Palestinian people and the Israeli people deserve a better future. This is why I really wish real success for our endeavor to revive the peace process so the future generation can enjoy peace. And my special appreciation also to all efforts also being exerted by Minister Levy. Thank you.

US AMBASSADOR DENNIS ROSS:
I think what was most important about this evenings meeting is that after almost a seven-month break in direct formal negotiations between the two sides, we brought them back together again. We are not going to solve the problems that separate the parties away from the table. There has to be a negotiating process that involves give and take, that has each side approaching the other as a partner, and that recognizes that while there are differences, they can be overcome through this kind of process.

Tonight’s meeting, I think, was conducted in a spirit that reflected both sides wanting to see the situation transformed. Both side want to see a new page turned. I think both sides recognize that there are difficulties; the difficulties will have to be overcome.

But we certainly heard a commitment tonight that there will be every effort made to overcome those differences.

The Secretary of State sent me out here to help launch the resumption of the interim committees. We look at the interim committees as an important part of the political process. They will resume now. We have in a sense launched them tonight. We do not look at them as an end in themselves. We look at them as committees that should do work. We look at them as committees not only that should do work, but in a sense they themselves can help to reestablish some of the trust and confidence that has been lost. It is very important for the parties to be able to begin to work together again, and see that when they do, they produce results. Thats what I think we have launched tonight.

The U.S. will work with both sides in a spirit of partnership to try to move us towards that end. What we heard tonight was a mutual intention and a mutual desire to move from where we are today back on a pathway that will yield the results that are promising to both.

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SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE SAUD AL-FAISAL, STATEMENT TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 52ND SESSION, NEW YORK, 8 OCTOBER 1997 [EXCERPTS]

In the name of Allah, Most Compassionate, Most Merciful.
Blessings and peace be upon the most noble of prophets.

[...] Mr. President:
The Middle East peace process is passing through a critical stage as a result of the stalemates of the past year. These seemingly insurmountable challenges and difficulties threaten its very existence. What is more discouraging is that the relative progress achieved since the peace process was launched in Madrid in October of 1991, has now been replaced with a situation of virtual paralysis as a result of the policies of the present Israeli Government. These policies are diametrically opposed to the requirements of peace, which were agreed to at Madrid and which had been enshrined in the agreements reached on the Israeli-Palestinian track.

The unfortunate violent incidents which occurred in Jerusalem recently, resulting in many innocent victims, are the consequence of the excesses and provocations carried out by the Israeli authorities. These actions are likely to escalate unless the two sponsors of the peace process, and indeed the entire world community, carry out the task of restoring the peace process to its proper path based on international legality and the principle of land for peace.

Mr. President:
The task of saving the peace process requires commitment to and compliance with these principles. In this respect, the Arab leaders meeting at the Cairo Summit last year, expressed their eagerness to move forward with the peace process. Peace, they maintained, is a strategic option which cannot be reversed. This position was reiterated at the conclusion of the meeting of the Council of the League of the Arab States during its last session. The Arab ministers re-affirmed their commitment to the peace process, provided the other side also remains committed to its principles. Unfortunately, what we have witnessed recently is Israeli intransigence and insistence on ignoring the principles of peace as well as a complete reversal of the contractual commitments Israel signed with the Palestinians.

As an example, the settlement policies pursued by the Israeli Government in the Occupied Territories, aside from being in contravention of the Geneva Conventions, are contrary to United Nations resolutions and the principles of Madrid.

To subject the autonomous regions in the Occupied Territories to deprivation, hunger, and collective punishment through closure and other means of oppression is contrary to the logic of peaceful co-existence and conciliation. Furthermore, the practices of the Netanyahu government aimed at changing the demography of the City of Jerusalem and imposing a new fait accompli without paying the slightest attention to the legitimate rights, not only of the Palestinian people, but also of Muslims and Christians throughout the world, cannot in any way create an atmosphere of confidence or enhance the peace process.

The so-called security which Israel is hoping to attain can only be achieved through a just and comprehensive peace in the region in accordance with international legality and UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 425, as well as the principle of land for peace. To focus only on the issue of security to the exclusion of other issues, can only be construed as a total negation of all other commitments and a departure from logic.

We believe that the ideal means to achieve Israeli security within the framework of its relationship with the Palestinian Authority, lies in the resumption of negotiations between the two parties in order to solve all outstanding issues, as well as honoring agreements already made, rather than pursuing a policy of subjugation and humiliation. For Israel to achieve security vis-à-vis Syria requires the resumption of negotiations from the point where they were suspended. As for the state of tension and instability prevailing in southern Lebanon, this state of affairs can never be settled through revenge, but only through the prompt implementation of Security Council Resolution 425.
Peace based on international legality and the principles of Madrid is the means for achieving security for Israel and its neighbors. It is also the means for creating the proper circumstances for regional cooperation. Thus, in the absence of these circumstances, we see no incentive to explore new horizons for regional economic cooperation.

We do not see an alternative for the role of the United States, in its capacity as the main sponsor of the peace process, to exerting all its efforts to secure progress on all the Arab-Israeli tracks. It is true that negotiations remain the responsibility of the parties to the conflict; however, it has to be noted that any progress achieved through negotiations in the past came as a result of efforts exerted by the United States to remove obstacles that were placed in the way of these negotiations.

The recent visit by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the region presented a good opportunity to witness the dangers currently confronting the peace process and the collective Arab desire to extricate this process from its pitfalls and place it on its proper path. Despite the modest results of this visit, it is, however, encouraging to recall that the Secretary of State reiterated the validity of the aforementioned resolutions and the principle of land for peace as well as the illegality of unilateral actions, which harm the final stages of negotiations.

This signals the beginning of an appropriate approach to put matters where they belong. We urge the United States Government to continue its efforts and take concrete steps to move the peace process in accordance with its basic principles.

Mr. President:

If the Palestinian problem represents the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the issue of the Holy City of Jerusalem - al-Quds al-Shareef - is its core. It is also the source of high emotions and serious repercussions which represent the utmost concern for the Arab and Muslim worlds. Consequently, Israeli practices and violations in this Holy City will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the peace process as a whole, and on the future of security and stability in the entire region. Nothing is more revealing about Israeli intentions than its insistence on establishing and expanding settlements, demolishing Palestinian homes and confiscating their properties and identity. This is part of countless other practices aimed at the Judaization of the City of Jerusalem and changing its historical features. The intransigence of the Israeli Government has recently reached the level of facilitating the settlement of a Jewish family in a building located in the Ras Al-Amoud area to the detriment of the original owners, in unabashed display of alliance with Jewish extremists. This was immediately followed by the Israeli Prime Minister’s announcement to expand settlements by constructing 300 new housing units. This announcement was a severe blow to all that Mrs. Albright has called for during her recent visit to the region with respect to the inadmissibility of unilateral actions. Accordingly, we call upon the international community, and the United States in particular, to put an end to Israeli intransigence that affects the most sensitive and delicate part of the peace process. The issue of Jerusalem, which is the most important issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict, must be settled during the period designated by the peace process and in accordance with all Security Council resolutions, in particular Resolution 242, which calls for Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories it occupied in 1967, and Resolution 252 regarding Jerusalem.

STATEMENT BY THE LATIN PATRIARCHATE OF JERUSALEM REGARDING THE ALLEGATION THAT CHRISTIANS ARE BEING PERSECUTED BY THEIR MUSLIM NATIONALS, JERUSALEM, 13 NOVEMBER 1997

The Israeli media has recently reported allegations in which it said that Palestinian Christians are being subject to harassment and persecution under Palestinian Authority in Palestine. It reported that Palestinian Christians are being persecuted by their Muslim nationals.
The allegations made by the Israeli media and others are totally untrue aimed at covering up the real facts of current oppression and political instability in the area, aiming to provoke hostility and breaches within the Palestinian people.

The easiest way for that is to hammer on the religious feelings of both parties.

Nonetheless, it is ironic for the Israeli media to spread such unbased rumors when all Palestinian citizens, Christians and Muslims alike, are subject to general instability due to the continuing Israeli occupation.

As a matter of fact, both Muslims and Christians are trying together to find their way out of the misery they both are enduring under occupation. While aware of the rumors that the Israeli irresponsible media is spreading, we reiterate our firm position that been repeatedly stated:

First, we deny and reject any allegation that we, Christians, are being subject to persecution at the hand of our Muslims nationals.

Secondly, we neither are pro nor con any political regime or government. Our solidarity and defense go to the poor, oppressed regardless of their political identity.

In this moment, we consider Palestinians to be the poor, oppressed under occupation and our solidarity goes to them as such.

Thirdly, we reaffirm that the Palestinian Authority is and has been doing its best to make sure that Christians are being fairly and equally treated as all other Palestinian citizens. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority chaired by Arafat is easily accessible by us, religious leaders, through many channels. It is useless to mention that many Christians are highly ranked within the Palestinian Authority structure.

Finally, we call upon the Israeli media as well as all others to be responsible and truthful in what they report given that the destination of a people is as serious as life and death.

GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, COMMUNIQUÉ ON REDEPLOYMENT, JERUSALEM, 30 NOVEMBER 1997

1. The Cabinet reaffirmed its determination to make progress in the negotiations with the Palestinians.
2. The Cabinet decided that before the permanent settlement, a further redeployment will be carried out in Judea and Samaria. The Cabinet will soon present its plan on this matter, whose implementation will be conditioned on the Palestinians fulfilling their commitments (as detailed in the appendix to the file of 15 January, 1997 The Mutual Commitments Following the Hebron Agreement) and in keeping with principles to be formulated by the government regarding the final status talks.
3. The Cabinet believes that the correct way to make progress in the peace process with the Palestinians is to begin immediate negotiations on the permanent settlement.
4. The Cabinet will hold an intensive debate before formulating its plan for a permanent settlement, including the security zones necessary for the State of Israel, settlement areas and other vital interests, in particular in the fields of water resources and historical Jewish sites. After reaching a decision on this matter, the government will decide upon the method of implementation of the interim steps.
5. The Cabinet will take the necessary steps to continue the existence and strengthening of settlements in Judea and Samaria, steps to decrease friction between the populations in Judea and Samaria and to increase the security of the Jewish and Arab residents.
6. The Cabinet authorized foundation of a ministerial committee headed by the Prime Minister and with the participation of the ministers of defense, foreign affairs and national infrastructure that will submit for Cabinet approval proposals to implement Cabinet decisions.
KING HUSsein of Jordan, open letter to prime minister
Abdul Salam Al-Majali clarifying Jordanian policy on Israeli-Palestinian final status, Amman, 4 December 1997 [Excerpts]

[The letter was occasioned by leaks following a meeting between Israel's Infrastructure Min. Ariel Sharon and Crown Prince Hassan which gave the impression of Israeli-Jordanian coordination on zones to be retained by Israel in the final status.]

These are times characterized by uncertainty and confusion, even bordering on apprehension toward the quest for a just and comprehensive peace, in the wake of what appears to be a continuous attempt on the part of the Israeli Prime Minister to demolish the Palestinian-Israeli Oslo agreements and change the very essence and facets of the peace process. His emphasis seems to be on the objective of implanting a fear of peace in the Israeli society, instead of a serious drive toward attaining it as a means to remove all the causes of fear and instilling the elements of mutual respect, confidence, and collaboration between equals, in order to avert a certain coming catastrophe in its absence. Such a catastrophe, God forbid, will not spare the Israeli people nor the Arab people, foremost among them the Palestinians. Perhaps not even the world entire. Unfortunately, it is a small group of enemies of peace and life, advocates of death, despair, and destruction in both Israel and the Arab world that has led everyone toward this state of worry and anxiety.

It has become necessary for all of us, in light of these complex circumstances, to recall and identify clearly the bare facts of the well-known Jordanian position vis-à-vis the ongoing peace negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis, in order to determine the obligations of the interim phase. In particular, Israel's obligation toward all the articles of the Declaration of Principles, the Cairo agreements, and the Hebron agreement - which we had the honor to achieve and realize - and ensuring Israeli withdrawal from all the areas agreed upon in the middle of next year.

Our position with regards to these negotiations is total support for our Palestinian brethren and their sole and legitimate leadership, which we have recognized and endorsed since the Rabat Summit of 1974, in line with Palestinian and Arab wishes at the time and all that this entailed. This did not absolve us of the moral and national responsibility of addressing the Palestinian problem throughout, including the period of the Madrid peace conference, which enabled us to guide our Palestinian brethren to the negotiating table as an equal partner in the quest to make peace. This continued until we heard, along with the rest of the world, of the signing of the Oslo agreement. Following that, we turned to solving the question of Jordanian-Israeli peace in fulfillment of our duty toward the nation and generations to come.

Recently, we have noticed that some Israeli circles go far in presuming to speak in the name of Jordan by claiming that our security will be compromised in the event of the rise of a Palestinian state. This is used as a pretext to prevent an Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian land on the Jordan River, by claiming that our security and theirs require such an unfair decision that deprives our brethren of their rights. These claims are baseless and they are categorically and unequivocally rejected. We felt that this needed to be clarified, not at the national level, for Jordanians are fully aware of our positions, but at the international level in order for the truth to be highlighted, lest it be distorted in any way, shape, or form. Jordan does not fear anyone in this neighborhood. For the Palestinians are our brethren, and Israel and Jordan are bound by a peace treaty. In any event, Jordan is quite capable of defending itself and bears the responsibility for that.

Insofar as other fields are concerned, we have always called for the urgency of answering the question, where will final status lead? The answer to this question concerns us strictly from the point of view of our national interest. Because we believe that the Palestinian-Israeli negotiating track has become, following the Oslo accords, independent of any external dominance or influence. At the end of the interim period, seven major issues will remain pending negotiations between the two sides, namely, Jerusalem, refugees, borders, settlements, water, security, and sovereignty.
1. The PA must cease conducting television broadcasts from various locations in Judea, Samaria and Gaza in violation of the accords.
2. The PA must halt the illegal use of broadcast frequencies in violation of the agreement, and must cease causing disturbances to transmissions in Israel.

Operation of Offices in Violation of the Accords

The PA must terminate the operation of PA Planning and International Cooperation Minister Dr. Nabil Shaath's office in Dahiyat al-Barid in the Ramallah district in violation of the accords.

C. Foreign Relations

The PA must commit itself in writing to refrain from activities in the realm of foreign relations in accordance with Article IX of the Interim Agreement. The PA must cease its activities in international forums which contravenes the agreement and is designed to pressure Israel by circumventing bilateral negotiating channels.

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UNITED STATES, PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION NO. 98-8 ON WAIVER AND CERTIFICATION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS REGARDING THE PLO, WASHINGTON, DC, 9 DECEMBER 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Waiver and Certification of Statutory Provisions Regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under section 539(d) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Public Law 105-118, I hereby determine and certify that it is important to the national security interests of the United States to waive the provisions of section 1003 of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, Public Law 100-204, through June 4, 1998.

You are authorized and directed to transmit this determination to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.

(Signed:) William J. Clinton

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RESOLUTION NO. 1/8-P (IS) ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The Eighth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (Session of Dignity, Dialogue and Participation), held in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, from 9 to 11 Sha'aban 1418 H (9 to 11 December 1997),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict contained in document no. (IS/8-97/PIL/D.3);

Proceeding from the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

Pursuant to the resolutions of the Islamic Conferences on the Cause of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict;
Recalling the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, especially resolutions 242, 338, 465, 476 and 478, and the resolutions of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States on the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories, including the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and the other occupied Arab territories;

Reaffirming the commitment of Islamic States to realizing a just and comprehensive peace in the region, and upholding peace as a strategic option;

Expressing its strong condemnation of Israel's continuing repressive and terrorist measures and practices, its continued policy of colonization, expansion of existing settlements, confiscation of land and properties, deportation and mass reprisal against Palestinian and Arab citizens in all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, its siege of the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the desecration of Islamic and Christian Holy Shrines;

Condemning the continuous Israeli aggression against Lebanese territories and the civilian population;

Emphasizing that the Israeli policies, practices and expansionist designs do not only threaten the Arab States and the peace process but also threaten the Islamic States and endanger international peace and security;

Holding Israel responsible for the halting of the Middle East peace process along all tracks as a result of the intransigence of the Israeli Government and its evasion of the principles on which the peace process has been built, especially Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 425, as well as the "land for peace" formula and its non-compliance with all the agreements concluded in this regard;

Expressing deep concern over the alarming situation resulting from the hindering by Israel of efforts exerted to reach a just and comprehensive settlement of the Palestine cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 425, as well as the principle of "land for peace" and the realization of the national and political legitimate rights of the Palestinian people;

Commending the efforts made by the Palestine Liberation Organization throughout the occupied Palestinian territories for the reconstruction of what had been destroyed by the Israeli occupation, as well as the efforts exerted by its National Authority for the rehabilitation of the Palestinian national economy and its consolidation, on the way to the establishment of the Palestinian State on its national territory;

Determined to support these efforts through all possible means;

1. Reaffirms all the resolutions of the Islamic Conference relating to the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

2. Reaffirms also that the cause of Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif is the prime cause of all Muslims, and expresses its full solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization in its just struggle for ending Israeli occupation, exercising its sovereignty over its territories and building the Palestinian national institutions on the land of Palestine, with a view to realizing the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of their independent State on their national soil, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital.

3. Calls on Member States to further strengthen their solidarity with the Palestinian people, and continue to support their just and legitimate struggle for ending Israeli occupation and achieving all their goals of freedom and independence.

4. Reaffirms its support for the Middle East peace process and the implementation of all the agreements signed in this context among the parties concerned and the commitments made in accordance with the underpinnings of the Madrid Peace Conference, and in accordance with the UN Charter and the UN resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 425 and the "land for peace" principle, which demand Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif, the occupied Syrian Golan back to the 4 June 1967 borderline, the occupied Lebanese territory back to internationally recognized borders and the realization of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.

5. Reaffirms that Al-Quds Al-Sharif forms an integral part of the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967 and whatever is applicable to other occupied Palestinian territories also applies to it, in implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and the UN General Assembly and
calls for combining efforts to restore Al-Quds Al-Sharif to Palestinian sovereignty as the capital of the State of Palestine, so as to ensure peace and security in the region.

6. **Calls on** the international community, in particular the two sponsors of the peace process to pressure Israel into complying with the resolutions of the international legitimacy, and implementing UN General Assembly resolution ES-10-2 of 24 April 1997 and ES-10/3 of 15 July 1997 regarding halting the building of a new settlement at Jebel Abu Ghneim as well as all other settlement activity, including expansion of existing settlements, building side roads, confiscating land adjacent to settlements, and activities which constitute a violation of international resolutions. It also **requests** Member States to make efforts to get the UN General Assembly to take necessary steps in accordance with the "United for Peace" resolution in the event Israel fails to comply with the two aforementioned resolutions.

7. **Requests** the UN Security Council to revitalize the International Commission on Supervision and Control to prevent colonization in Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories in accordance with its resolution 446.

8. **Urges** the international community and all States that extend economic and financial assistance to Israel, in particular the United States of America, and the States of the European Union, as well as international donor institutions and funds, to cease assistance which is used by Israel to implement its colonialist and expansionist designs in the occupied Arab territories and the occupied Syrian Golan.

9. **Rejects** attempts to disregard the obligations of the transitional phase and jump to the negotiations on the final status, and **demands** the faithful and honest implementation of all the remaining items of the transitional phase agreements concluded between the PLO and Israel.

10. **Affirms** that Israel's disregard for the principles and underpinnings of the peace process, back-tracking on the commitments, pledges and agreements made in the framework of this process, procrastination and evasion have seriously undermined the peace process, and **holds** the Israeli Government responsible for this situation.

11. **Strongly condemns** the Israeli crimes which harm the religious sentiments of Muslims and Christians, and which contradict religious, human and moral values.

12. **Urges** Islamic States which have begun to take steps towards establishing relations with Israel within the framework of the peace process to reconsider their relationships with Israel, including the closing of missions and offices until Israel abides by the UN resolutions and implement the agreements, obligations and commitments arrived at by the parties to the peace process, in accordance with the principles adopted by the Madrid Conference, the Oslo Accord and the other agreements concluded with the PLO, as well as obligations and commitments arrived at with the Arab parties on all tracks during the peace talks.

13. **Calls for** action within UN and international institutions and forums to compel Israel to release the detainees; return the deportees; halt the methods of mass punishment; cease the confiscation of lands and properties and the demolition of homes; also cease any actions that threaten life and the environment in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif.

14. **Calls for** a more effective UN action to ensure the success of the Middle East peace process, for a reaffirmation of the continued UN responsibility for the cause of Palestine until a just and comprehensive solution to all its aspects is found, a solution that puts an end to occupation and fulfils the imprescriptible and inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return to their land, self-determination and the establishment of their independent State on their territory with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital.

15. **Urges** all States and concerned parties to extend their support to the international programme on economic, social and cultural development in the occupied Palestinian territories to avail the Palestinian people of the necessary approved assistance for the reconstruction of its national economy and to back up its national institutions and enable it to establish its independent State with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital.

16. **Affirms** the need to intensify the efforts being made for holding a meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, regarding the protection of civilians during the time of war, aimed at taking the necessary enforcement measures to ensure the application of the Convention to the occupied Palestinian territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif.
17. Calls for abiding by the provisions of the Islamic boycott against Israel and to consider the legislation, rules and provisions governing the boycott, "the General Principles of the Boycott, Islamic Law, the Internal Regulations and Sessional Meetings of the Regional Offices", as part of the current national legislations, and set up the necessary offices and mechanisms to serve that end.

18. Strongly condemns Israel's continuing occupation of Southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa region, its arbitrary practices and military acts of aggression against the Lebanese citizens and against the Palestinian refugees in their camps in Lebanon; calls upon the UN Security Council to take the necessary measures to put an immediate end to these acts of aggression; calls for the implementation of the Security Council resolutions on Lebanon, especially resolution 495 (1978), and Israel's immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal from the Lebanese territory. It affirms its resolve to maintain the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders.

19. Strongly condemns the policy of Israel in refusing to comply with Security Council resolution 497 (1981), and in imposing its jurisdiction, its laws and its administration on the occupied Syrian Golan, as well as Israel's policies of annexation, establishment of settlements, expropriation of lands, diversion of water resources and imposition of Israeli nationality on Syrian citizens. It considers that all those measures are null and void, and constitute a violation of the rules and principles of international law relating to occupation and war and particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. It demands the complete withdrawal of Israel from the entire occupied Syrian Golan to the lines of 4 June 1967.

20. Calls on the international community and the Security Council to compel Israel to comply with UN resolutions, particularly Security Council resolution 487 (1981), to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to implement General Assembly and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions calling for the subjecting of all Israeli atomic facilities to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System, to obtain Israel's renunciation of nuclear armament, and to submit a full report on its capabilities and stockpiles of nuclear weapons and ammunition to the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency as those steps are essential for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, and primarily nuclear weapons in the Middle East region, a fundamental factor for the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the region.

21. Reaffirms the continued responsibility of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to carry on fulfilling the tasks assigned to it for the benefit of all the Palestinian citizens wherever they may be living in accordance with the resolutions of the UN General Assembly in this regard, and calls upon the Member States to request the UN Secretary-General to see to it that the Conciliation Committee undertakes in collaboration with the Relief Agency and the concerned States the preparation of a comprehensive inventory of Palestinian refugees and their property and come out with a integrated conception for the settlement of their problems on the basis of their right to return to their homeland, Palestine, in accordance with the UN Resolution A/RES/194 (III) of 11 December 1948. It further calls on all States to provide more assistance towards the Agency's budget so as to enable it continue providing its services.

22. Requests the Secretary-General to take necessary measures for continuing and strengthening contacts and coordination on the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict between the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the European Union and the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and expresses its appreciation for their all supportive stands and assistance for the just struggle of the Palestinian people.

23. Requests the Secretary General to follow up the implementation of this resolution and to submit a report thereon to the ninth session of the Islamic Summit Conference.

RESOLUTION NO. 2/8-P (IS) ON THE CITY OF AL-QUDS AL-SHARIF

The Eighth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (Session of Dignity, Dialogue and Participation), held in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, from 9 to 11 Sha'aban 1418 H (9 to 11 December 1997),
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict, contained in document no. (IS/8-97/PIL/D.3);
Proceeding from the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;
Pursuant to the Islamic resolutions which reaffirm that the issue of Al-Quds Al-Sharif constitutes the essence of the Palestinian cause which forms the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that no comprehensive and just peace can be achieved without the return of Al-Quds Al-Sharif to Palestinian sovereignty, as the capital of the State of Palestine;
Recalling the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council, in particular resolutions 465, 476 and 478 on the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif;
Reaffirming the resolutions of the tenth extraordinary session of the United Nations General Assembly ES-10/2 and ES-10/3 of 24 April 1997 and 15 July 1997, respectively, on the illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Al-Quds and the other occupied Palestinian territories;
Expressing its deep concern at the escalation of Israel's acts of aggression against the Holy Places in the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and other Palestinian cities and violation of their sanctity;
Reiterating all Security Council resolutions on Al-Quds, including 681, which provides for the applicability of all the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 concerning the protection of civilians in times of war to the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif;
Strongly condemning all illegal Israeli measures and practices, which also contravene all international resolutions and laws, carried out by the Israeli occupation authorities in Al-Quds Al-Sharif aimed at Judaizing the Holy City and obliterating its Arab and Islamic landmarks;
Commending the constant efforts made by the Al-Quds Committee under the Chairmanship of His Majesty King Hassan II, King of Morocco;
Commending also the continuous efforts made by all the Islamic Member States to defend the sanctity of the Islamic places in the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, to safeguard their Arabic identity and their Islamic character, and protect them from Zionist misuse and Judaization plans;
Commending the contribution of His Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, to the renovation work carried out in the Blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Dome of the Rock;
1. Reaffirms all the resolutions adopted by the relevant Islamic Conferences, including the Third Islamic Summit Conference on Al-Quds Al-Sharif, the recommendations and decisions of the Al-Quds Committee at its previous sessions.
2. Reaffirms that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without an Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories foremost of which Al-Quds Al-Sharif as it forms an integral part of the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 and that whatever is applicable to the rest of the occupied territories applies to it in implementation of UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.
3. Urges action to halt all practices and measures undertaken by the Israeli occupation authorities in Al-Quds Al-Sharif aimed at altering the geographical and demographic conditions and violating the sanctity of the Islamic and Christian shrines in order to Judaize the Holy City. It calls for combined efforts to restore Al-Quds Al-Sharif to Palestinian sovereignty as the capital of the State of Palestine so as to ensure peace and security in the region.
4. Invites the Member States to continue their support to the Palestine Liberation Organization in the ongoing negotiations for the transfer of all powers and responsibilities in the occupied Palestinian territories, including the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, to the Palestinian National Authority, to support the steadfastness of the citizens of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, to establish developmental economic, cultural, social and architectural projects and construct housing units for them, to restore their existing houses and to support the national Palestinian institutions in Al-Quds Al-Sharif.
5. Invites States of the world to refrain from having any dealings with the Israeli occupation authorities which might be interpreted in any way by those authorities as an implicit recognition of the fait accompli imposed by the proclamation of Al-Quds as the capital of Israel.
6. **Further invites** the international community, and in particular the two co-sponsors of the peace process, to compel Israel not to effect any geographical or demographic alterations in the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif during the transitional period and to refrain from any action or measure that may affect the outcome of the negotiations on the final status of the City, adhere to the relevant international resolutions, lift the siege imposed on Al-Quds Al-Sharif, ensure the freedom of worship therein, and refrain from destroying houses, withdrawing identity cards of Palestinian citizens and emptying Al-Quds Al-Sharif of its Arab citizens.

7. **Reaffirms** that all legislative, administrative and colonization measures aimed at altering the legal status of the Holy City are null and void and contrary to the resolutions of international legality, and to international agreements, conventions and norms, as well as to the agreements signed between the Palestinian and Israeli parties. It calls on the international community, in particular the two co-sponsors of the peace process, to pressure Israel into complying with the resolutions of the international legality and implement General Assembly resolution ES-10/3 of 15 July 1997 regarding the cessation of building work on a Jewish settlement at Jebel Abu Ghuneim as well as all other settlement activity, including expansion of existing settlements, building of side roads, confiscating land adjacent to settlements and related activities, which constitute a violation of Security Council resolutions.

8. **Strongly condemns** Israel's persistence in the excavation works around Al-Haram Al-Quds Al-Sharif, especially the opening of a tunnel in Al-Quds Al-Sharif which endangers the Islamic and Christian Holy Shrines especially the Blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque. It appeals to the international community to compel Israel to close down this tunnel in accordance with resolution 1073 of the Security Council.

9. **Strongly condemns** the Israeli Supreme Court's decisions, particularly the decision adopted on 25 July 1996 allowing Jews to pray in the precinct of the Blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque and the decision issued on 23 September 1993, claiming the Blessed Mosque of Al-Aqsa as part of the territory of the State of Israel, and considers it as premeditated provocations aimed at opening the way for the Zionist extremist organizations to continue their violations against the sanctity of the Blessed Mosque of Al-Aqsa to establish their presence in its precincts, and to continue looting the religious, historical and cultural relics in Al-Quds and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

10. **Strongly condemns** Israel for the orders it has issued for closing the Palestinian institutions in Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and preventing them from operating freely, and considers such arbitrary measures as a continued violation of the agreements concluded between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israeli parties within the framework of the peace process, as well as a blatant violation of international conventions and agreements, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and a breach of the principles and underpinnings of the Madrid Peace Process.

11. **Calls upon** all States to adhere to Security Council resolution 478 (1980), which invites the Member States to uphold the provisions of the said resolution and refrain from transferring their diplomatic missions to the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif. **Takes note** with appreciation of the general response of the States of the world to this resolution and their compliance with it.

12. **Condemns** the decision of the US House of Representatives to recognize Al-Quds as the united capital of Israel and to transfer the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Al-Quds, and considers it a serious provocation to the sentiments of Muslims and all believers in the world, as well as a blatant violation of the principles of international legality and the stand of the international community, and a glaring contradiction to the role of the United States of America as a sponsor of the peace process, besides being an encouragement to Israel to pursue its aggressive expansionist policy; and calls on the US Administration to adhere to Security Council resolution 478.

13. **Commends** the efforts made by Al-Quds Committee, under the chairmanship of His Majesty King Hassan II, Sovereign of the Kingdom of Morocco, affirms all resolutions adopted by the Committee and urges Member States to apply them.

14. **Expresses** its satisfaction with the commencement of the work of the Al-Quds Fund and welcomes the measures taken by His Majesty King Hassan II, Chairman of the Al-Quds Committee, with regard to the appointment of an Executive Director of the Fund and his assistant, and to the setting up of an Administrative Division for the Agency and its headquarters in Casablanca.
15. Emphasizes the need to continue coordination action and by Member States with regional and international organizations for the implementation of the international resolutions adopted by United Nations and its specialized agencies, in particular UNESCO, and also coordination with the League of Arab States, and the holding of conferences to promote the cause of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and highlight the dangers surrounding it.

16. Invites the Vatican, the Eastern and other Christian Churches to take part in the resistance against the Judaization of Al-Quds Al-Sharif out of respect for the spiritual dimension of all religions, for the sake of peaceful coexistence among them, and in compliance with Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, which demands that Israel withdraw from the part occupied in 1967, including the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, as well as other Security Council resolutions in particular:

- 465 of 1 March 1980, which affirms the illegality of building Israeli settlements in that part and demands their dismantlement and removal;
- 476 of 30 June 1980, which affirms that all measures that have changed the features of the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and its geographical, demographic and historical status are null and void and must be rescinded in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;
- and 478 of 20 August 1980, which decided not to recognize the "Basic Law" and other Israeli acts that aim to change the features and status of Al-Quds. It also decided to call on the States that had established diplomatic missions in Al-Quds to withdraw those missions from the Holy City. It further called for the support of the inhabitants of Al-Quds Al-Sharif so they can resist the Judaization measures aimed at uprooting them from their City.

17. Calls upon the Security Council to take necessary measures that ensure compliance with its resolutions on Al-Quds in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

18. Reaffirms the resolutions of earlier Islamic Conferences which call for the support of the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the consolidation of the steadfastness of its citizens, and also calls for the support of Baitul Mal of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and the Al-Quds Fund.

19. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of this resolution and to submit a report thereon to the ninth session of the Islamic Summit Conference.

RESOLUTION NO. 5/8-P (IS) ON THE AL-QUDS FUND AND ITS WAQF

The Eighth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (Session of Dignity, Dialogue and Participation) held in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, from 8 to 10 Sha'aban 1418 H (9 to 11 December 1997),

Proceeding from the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

Referring to all the Islamic resolutions adopted on the Al-Quds Fund and its Waqf;

Reaffirming the principle of consolidating Islamic solidarity with the Palestinian people and their just and legitimate struggle;

Paying tribute to Member States that regularly fulfil their obligations and make donations to the Al-Quds Fund and its Waqf;

Appreciating the significance of the vital role played by the Al-Quds Fund and its Waqf to support the steadfastness and jihad of the Palestinian people within the occupied Palestinian territories, and particularly the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif;

Noting with deep concern Israel's continued pursuit of its aggressive, expansionist and settlement policy;

Commending the positive role played by the Governing Board of the Al-Quds Fund in quest of financial resources to promote the Fund and its Waqf;

1. Reaffirms all previous relevant resolutions adopted by successive Islamic Conferences.

2. Reiterates all recommendations and resolutions of the earlier meetings of the Governing Board of the Al-Quds Fund.

3. Expresses its profound thanks and appreciation to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and to the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the continued support to the Al-Quds Fund, which falls within the framework of their consistent solicitude towards the foremost cause of the Is-
Islamic Ummah, namely the cause of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and Palestine. It commends the annual appeal made by H.R.H. Prince Salman Bin Abdulaziz, Emir of the Province of Riyadh and Chairman of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Supreme Committee for the Welfare of the Palestinian Freedom Fighters, to citizens and residents to make donations to the Al-Quds Fund. It urges member States to continue their donations campaign in favour of the Al-Quds Fund and its Waqf, together with the appropriate directives to the public and other media to conduct a special campaign for this purpose.

4. **Calls upon** member States to continue their support to the Palestine Liberation Organization, especially at this decisive stage, for the consolidation of its national authority over all occupied Palestinian territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif, capital of the independent Palestinian State, and to extend all forms of support to the Palestinian people so they can build their institutions and national economy.

5. **Commends** the positive role played by the Al-Quds Fund in supporting the steadfastness and boosting the struggle of the Palestinian people.

6. **Requests** the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of this resolution.

RESOLUTION NO. 6/8-P(IS) ON THE CURRENT SITUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS, THE MIDDLE EAST

The Eighth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (Session of Dignity, Dialogue and Participation), held in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, from 9 to 11 Sha‘aban 1418 H (9 to 11 December 1997),

Referring to the declaration on the current situation of the peace process in the Middle East issued by the Twenty-Fourth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Jakarta, Indonesia, from 98 Rajab to 3 Sha‘aban 1417 H (9 to 12 December 1996) as well as to the declaration on the question of Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the Arab-Israeli conflict issued by the Extraordinary Meeting of the Islamic Summit Conference held in Islamabad, Pakistan, on 13 Dhul Qaada 1417 H (23 March 1997), and to the Final Declaration issued by the 16th Session of Al-Quds Committee held in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco, on 17 Dhul Qaada 1417 H (27 March 1997);

Having examined the serious and urgent situation entailed by the policies of the incumbent Israeli Government which are hostile to peace;

1. **Reaffirms** its continued solidarity with the Palestinian people for the recovery of its legitimate and inalienable national rights, including its right to return, to self-determination, and to the establishment of its independent State on its national territory, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital.

2. **Reaffirms** its full support to the peace process in the Middle East and its commitment to the foundations and principles of the peace process, and demands that Israel respect and implement the commitments, obligations and agreements reached within the framework of the process in accordance with the principles adopted at the Madrid Conference and consistent with United Nations resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 475, and the land-for-peace formula which guarantees Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the Golan Heights of Syria, to the lines of 4 June 1967, and from occupied Southern Lebanon and the occupied western Bekaa to the internationally recognized borders.

3. **Calls on** the co-sponsors of the peace process and the international community to be wary of the grave dangers resulting from Israel's pursuance of positions and policies hostile to peace.

4. **Strongly denounces** the Israeli Government's policy and practices which are hostile to peace and are designed to undermine the peace process in order to pursue its colonization of Arab and Palestinian territories, including the City of Al-Quds, and invalidate the foundations and terms of reference of the Madrid Peace Conference, and evade the commitments, pledges and agreements reached in the past five years of peace talks with the Palestinian and other Arab parties.

5. **Expresses** strong condemnation and anger about the threats voiced by Israeli officials for the purpose of reinstating the atmosphere of war in the region and imposing the fait accompli on Arabs and Muslims.

6. **Urges** the member States which have started to take steps towards establishing relations with Israel within the framework of the peace process to reconsider their relations with Israel, includ-
ing the closing of missions and offices until Israel complies with the relevant UN resolutions, in particular, the full Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, and safeguards the national legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and implements the agreements and commitments reached by the parties to the peace process.

* * *

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ, EIGHTH SESSION OF THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE (SESSION OF DIGNITY, DIALOGUE, PARTICIPATION), TEHRAN, IRAN, 9-11 DECEMBER 1997 [EXCERPTS]

At the kind invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Eighth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (Session of Dignity, Dialogue, Participation) was held in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, from 9 to 11 Sha’aban 1418H, corresponding to 9-11 December 1997 under the high patronage of His Excellency Seyed Mohammad Khatami, President of the Islamic Republic of Republic of Iran.

2. The Conference was preceded by the meeting of Senior Officials on 2-5 Sha’aban 1418H (2-5 December, 1997) and the Preparatory Ministerial Meeting on 6-7 Sha’aban 1418H (6-7 December, 1997).

5. His Excellency Dr. Abdellatif FILALI, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Kingdom of Morocco, in his capacity as the Representative of His Majesty King Hassan II, Chairman of the Seventh Islamic Summit Conference delivered the speech of His Majesty to the Summit. His Majesty expressed to His Excellency, President Khatami of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and to the Government and people of Iran, his appreciation of the efforts they made to ensure that this Conference takes place under the best possible conditions. He also expressed his regret at being unable to attend the Summit due to unforeseen difficulties. His Majesty stressed the role of the OIC in supporting the struggle of the Palestinian people to regain their inalienable rights and establish their independent state on national soil with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital. He also praised OIC’s support for the peace process in the Middle-East based on the agreements concluded and commitments made. His Majesty reviewed the efforts he undertook as Chairman of the Seventh Islamic Summit and Chairman of the Al-Quds Committee to urge the international community to assume its responsibilities in having truth prevail and in rejecting any measure affecting the legitimate rights of Arabs and Muslims. He further recalled the initiative of His Majesty which led to the setting up of the “Agency of Bait Mal Al-Quds Al-Sharif”, and indicated that it had started to discharge its mission in terms of preserving the Holy City and its sacred places and confronting the Israeli schemes aimed at the full Judaization of the sacred city. His Majesty highlighted the positive results achieved by the Organisation in the settlement of the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the conclusion of the peace agreement between the Moro National Front, on the one hand, and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, on the other. His Majesty stressed importance of the economic aspect in the opening of countries to one another and in creating actual interaction and practical rapprochement in addition to identifying shared interests as a basis for a strategy of gradual economic complementarity founded on the spirit of Islamic solidarity. His Majesty called for considering ways and means of revitalizing the Organisation and enhancing its output in serving the interests of the Islamic Ummah and solving the problem of the scarcity of resources. He commended the efforts made in this respect by the former OIC Secretary General, H.E. Dr. Hamid Al-Gabid, and those of the current OIC Secretary General, H.E. Dr. Azeddin Laraki. Finally, His Majesty expressed deep gratitude to his brothers the Kings and Presidents of Islamic countries for showing full understanding and support during his Chairmanship of the Organisation. […]

11. His Excellency Dr. Azeddine Laraki, the Secretary General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference delivered a statement in which he expressed his profound thanks to the Islamic Republic of Iran as represented by its President, His Excellency President Seyed Mohammad Khatami, and to the Government and people of Iran for the warm welcome and generous hospitality extended to all the delegations participating in the Conference. He also expressed his gratitude to His Majesty, King Hassan II, Chairman of the Seventh Islamic Summit Conference and
Chairman of the Al-Quds Committee, as well as his gratitude to Their Excellencies the Chairmen of the other Standing Committees for their noble efforts in the field of Joint Islamic action. He referred to the Islamic causes which are on the agenda of the OIC, at the forefront of which is the cause of Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the hurdles blocking the peace process because of Israel’s refusal to implement the agreements signed with the concerned parties. The Secretary General reviewed the outline of the comprehensive reform programme of the OIC pointing out that the programme includes a multidimensional four-year cooperation programme aimed at implementing the plan of action to strengthen economic and commercial cooperation among Member States, restructuring the General Secretariat and conferring a specialized character to its work. He made clear that in order for OIC to play a more effective role it is crucial to provide it with the necessary means to accomplish its work and to find prompt solutions to its acute financial crisis. He expressed his thanks and appreciation for all the benevolent gestures shown by leaders from a number of Member State towards the General Secretariat. […]

POLITICAL AFFAIRS:

QUESTION OF PALESTINE AND AL-QUDS AL-SHARIF:

25. The Conference stressed that the question of Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif is the foremost Islamic cause. It expressed its full solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization in its just struggle to achieve the legitimate inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination to return to its homeland and to establish its independent state in its national territories, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital.

26. The Conference stressed that Al-Quds Al-Sharif is an integral part of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and that what applies to the rest of Palestinian territories applies to it, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. The Conference called for action to put an end to the practices of the Israeli occupation authorities in Al-Quds Al-Sharif aimed at modifying the geographical and demographic situation and desecrating the holy Islamic and Christian places there with a view to judaizing the Holy City. It called for the need to exert maximum effort in order to restore the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif to Palestinian sovereignty, as capital of State of Palestine, for ensuring peace and security in the region.

27. The Conference also called on the international community to avoid any relations with Israeli occupation authorities which might be interpreted by the latter, in any way, as an implicit recognition of the “fait accompli” imposed by Israel when it declared the city of Al-Quds its capital. It stressed that all legal, administrative, and settlement measures and procedures aimed at modifying the legal status of the Holy city is null and void and contravenes international treaties, charters and norms and contrary to the agreements signed by the Palestinian and Israeli sides. The Conference called on the international community, especially the two co-sponsors of the Peace Conference to prompt Israel not to make any geographical or demographic transformation in the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif during the transitional period, to refrain from any action that might affect the outcome of the negotiations on the final status of the City, and to abide by the relevant international resolutions, especially those issued by the Tenth Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly on the halting of the Jewish settlement of Al-Djebel Abu Ghoneim and of all other settlements and to induce Israel also to lift the blockade on the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif to safeguard freedom of worship in it, and to cease destroying houses, withdrawing the identity cards of the Palestinian citizens and emptying the city of its Arab citizens.

28. The Conference affirmed its full support of the peace process in the Middle East and its commitment to its underpinnings. The Conference called for Israel to respect and implement its commitments, pledges, and agreements concluded through this process and in accordance with the principles based on Madrid Conference pursuant to UN resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 425, and the land-for-peace formula. All these instruments provide for Israel’s withdrawal from all occupied Arab and Palestinian territories, including the city of Al-Quds Al-Sharif and the occupied Syrian Golan up to the front line of 4 June 1967, the occupied Southern Lebanon and Western Bekaa and for the realization of inalienable national rights
of the Palestinian people. The Conference rejected Israel’s attempts at bypassing the require-
ments of the transitional period and jump directly to negotiations on the final situation. The Con-
ference called for the faithful implementation of all the remaining articles in the agreements on
the transitional period concluded between the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Israel to end
Israeli occupation and build Palestinian national institutions on the land of Palestine.

29. The Conference underlined that Israel’s violation of the principles and underpinnings of the peace
process, reneging on the commitments, pledges, and agreements concluded within that frame-
work; and procrastination and evasion at the implementation level, have seriously undermined
the peace process. The Conference held Israel wholly responsible for this state of affairs.

30. The Conference also called on the Islamic States which had taken steps toward establishing rela-
tions with Israel within the framework of the peace process to reconsider such relations by clos-
ing missions and bureau until Israel completes its withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories
and fulfills the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish their
own independent state on their national territory, Palestine, with Al-Quds as its capital.

31. The Conference urged the international community, particularly the co-sponsors of the peace
process, to pressure Israel to comply with the resolutions of international legality and to end its
settlement policy. The Conference called on the Security Council to revive the International
Committee for supervising and monitoring the ban on settlements in Al-Quds and the other occu-
pied Palestinian and Arab territories. The Conference also urged the international community and
all states providing economic and financial assistance to Israel to stop such assistance which Is-
rael uses to carry out its colonization scheme in the occupied Arab territories, in the occupied
Palestine and the occupied Syrian Golan.

32. The Conference called for action by the United Nations and other international Organisations to
force Israel to release the detainees, return the deportees, and put an end to the collective pun-
ishments, as well as to the operations of confiscation of land and properties and demolition of
houses, and to desist from any acts endangering life and environment in the occupied Palestinian
and Arab territories, including Al-Quds Al-Sharif. It emphasized the need to convene the meeting
of the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Protection of Ci-
vilian Persons in time of war to take the necessary enforcement measures for implementing this
Convention in the occupied Palestinian territories including Al-Quds Al-Sharif.

33. The Conference requested the international community and the UN Security Council to force
Israel to comply with UN resolutions, particularly Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and to
sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and implement the resolutions of
the International Atomic Energy Agency.

34. The Conference commended the efforts made by the Al-Quds Committee under the Chairmanship
of His Majesty Hassan II, King of Morocco, and expressed satisfaction at the entry into operation
of Bait-ul- Mal Al-Quds.

35. The Conference commended the resistance of the Syrian Arab citizens of the Golan against occu-
pation and strongly condemned Israel for not complying with Security Council resolution 497
(1981). It stressed that Israel’s decision to impose its laws, its sovereignty and its administration
on the occupied Syrian Golan is illegal, null and void and without legal effect whatsoever. It
condemned Israel for continuing to alter the legal and demographic status and the institutional
structure of the occupied Syrian Golan. It reaffirmed the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Con-
vention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to the occupied Syrian Golan and
called for Israel’s total withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan to the lines of 4 June 1967.

36. The Conference strongly condemned Israel for its continuing occupation of parts of Southern Leba-
non and Western Bekaa and urged the international community to ensure the implementation of Se-
curity Council Resolution 425 (1978) stipulating Israel’s immediate end unconditional Israeli with-
drawal from all occupied Lebanese territories to the internationally recognized borders. It called on
the international community to take all measures to compel Israel to immediately free all the prison-
ers and the Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons and in the camps controlled by the forces allied to
Israel and to endeavour to put an end to Israel’s aggression and inhuman practices against the de-
fenseless inhabitants in the Lebanese territories. It reiterated its support to establish its sovereignty
on its entire territory including the area occupied by Israel in Southern Lebanon and Western Bekaa.
POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL:

97. The Conference expressed its deep concern that some Member States of the Organisation of Islamic Conference are establishing relations of military cooperation with Israel and requested the reconsideration of this cooperation with the objective of renouncing it due to the danger it poses to the security of Islamic countries.

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL, PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, LUXEMBOURG, 13 DECEMBER 1997

[The meeting, held on 12-13 Dec., was primarily concerned with the eastward enlargement of the EU and the launch of monetary union, but also included the following statement on the MEPP.]

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

70. The European Council reviewed developments in the Middle East Peace Process in the light of the results of the informal meeting of Foreign Ministers in Mondorf on 25 and 26 October, the visit to the region by the President of the Council of Ministers from 10 to 14 November and a report to the Council by the EU’s Special Envoy.

71. The European Council remained deeply concerned by the lack of progress in implementing all the commitments under the Israeli/Palestinian Interim Agreements and the Hebron Protocol and by the continuing deadlock on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks.

72. The European Council reaffirmed its “Call for Peace in the Middle East” issued in Amsterdam on 16 and 17 June 1997 and recalled its declaration made in Florence on 21 June 1996. It urged all the parties to honour their commitments under existing agreements and to live up to their responsibilities in order to restore momentum to the peace process and to protect it from further setbacks and to renew negotiations in a spirit of mutual confidence, with a view to reaching a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East by the end of the century.

73. It expressed satisfaction at the activities of the Special Envoy and encouraged him to continue his efforts in support of the Middle East Peace Process.

74. It endorsed the following guidelines for an EU policy aimed at facilitating progress and restoring confidence between the parties.

A. Palestinian track

Short-term measures

75. The European Union will continue to use all its political and moral weight to ensure that all the provisions in the agreements already reached are fully implemented on the basis of reciprocity by both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides.

76. The European Council stressed the great urgency for the parties to live up to previous commitments especially as regards credible and significant redeployments. It also stressed the importance of avoiding counterproductive unilateral actions, for instance on settlements and Jerusalem. In this context, it welcomed the work in hand towards the early adoption of the Code of Conduct proposed by the EU.

77. The European Council recalled the EU’s determination to fight terrorism wherever it occurs and for whatever reason. In this context, it also underlines the importance of security cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. This cooperation should be strengthened and not allowed to break down under any circumstances. It also recalled the EU’s proposal for a Permanent Security Committee as a means of institutionalising security cooperation, as well as its counter-terrorism programme of assistance to the Palestinian Authority.

78. These steps will be helpful in restoring the spirit of partnership and mutual trust indispensable to the implementation of the Interim Agreements and the Hebron Protocol, as well as the resumption
of Permanent Status talks. They are aimed at preventing a breakdown in negotiations and at shielding the peace process from adverse circumstances.

79. The European Council underlined the importance of concluding negotiations in the nine committees created by the Interim Agreements. The Gaza airport and port as well as safe passage are issues of special relevance and urgency and the object of a substantial financial contribution from the EU.

80. The European Council emphasized that the EU is a major economic partner of both Israel and the Palestinian Authority as well as the largest donor of financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority. Economic development is a prerequisite for political stability. It reiterated its determination to work, including through the joint dialogue with Israel, towards the removal of obstacles to Palestinian economic development and to facilitate the free movement of people and goods. It also stressed the need for the comprehensive implementation of the EC/PLO Interim Agreement. The EU will also enhance its support to Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem.

81. The European Council stressed the importance of people-to-people programmes as an essential means of reinforcing dialogue and restoring mutual confidence between the parties at the level of civil society.

82. The EU will also continue to monitor closely developments on the ground through its own human rights, Jerusalem and settlements watch instruments.

Medium term

83. The European Council expressed the EU’s readiness to contribute to Permanent Status negotiations, by offering specific suggestions to the parties on related subjects, including possible Palestinian statehood, borders/security arrangements, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem and water issues.

84. It also called for a review of the EU’s financial support, with the aim of ensuring greater effectiveness in achieving the objectives of the Peace Process.

85. It insisted on the revival of regional economic cooperation as a means of promoting social and economic development and creating a sound environment for peaceful relations.

b. Syrian and Lebanese tracks

86. The European Council reiterated the importance which the EU attaches to the relaunching of negotiations on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. The EU seeks the restoration of a comprehensive process on the basis of “Land For Peace” and demands the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 425.

c. Cooperation with the US and other parties

87. The European Council strongly supports US efforts to revive the peace process and expressed the EU’s willingness to work closely with the United States and to maintain close contact with Russia and the regional parties.

* * *

ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, MEMORANDUM OF SECURITY UNDERSTANDINGS, 17 DECEMBER 1997

[The memorandum was negotiated by Shin Bet and PA security services representatives under CIA auspices. It was signed by Maj.-Gen. Shlomo Yanay, Brig.-Gen. Shlomo Brum, and Shin Bet Deputy Chief "Y" on the Israeli side, and on the Palestinian side by Amin Al-Hindi, Head of General Intelligence, Mohammed Dahlan, Head of the Preventive Security Service in Gaza, and security official Mohammad Harun. PM Netanyahu cancelled the memorandum on 22 Dec. because it had no extradition clause and because Palestinian “terrorism” was equated to Israeli violence.]

The struggle against violence and terrorism is the obligation and responsibility of both Israel and the Palestinian Authority [PA]. An effective effort must be comprehensive - against the terrorists, against the terrorist infrastructure, and the environment conducive to support for terrorism. The struggle must be continuous and constant. It must be conducted in cooperation, seeing that no effort can be effec-
tive without Israeli-Palestinian reciprocity and without a continuous exchange of information and ideas as well as operational cooperation.

- Both sides will act to ensure that violence or terrorism, whether committed by Israelis or by Palestinians, is dealt with immediately and effectively.
- There will be a mutual exchange of security information and coordination of policy and lines of action.
- Each side will respond immediately and effectively in the event of a terrorist incident or plans for terrorist activity, violence, or incitement and will take all the steps necessary to prevent such events.
- The PA will confiscate illegal weapons and take all the steps necessary - in coordination and collaboration with Israel - to prevent the infiltration of illegal weapons into the PA. The Israeli government will confiscate weapons from Israeli citizens who plan, overtly support, or are involved in terrorist activity.
- Neither side will release suspected terrorists from prison without giving the other side the opportunity to provide information to reconsider the release.
- The PA will continue to pursue illegal militias and will outlaw militias of opposition parties and organizations. The PA will take legal measures to encourage and assist any Palestinian opposition body that will denounce and deplore the use of violence and terrorism as a means to attain political goals.
- The PA will step up the efforts to arrest people involved in terrorist activities.
- Fighting terrorism and terrorists is a vital requirement of the PA.
- The PA will publicize its categorical objection to any act of terrorism or violence against Israel, as well as against the PA.
- The PA will continue to step up its efforts to sever communication channels and the transfer of funds to suspected terrorist cells.
- The PA will immediately arrest anybody involved in terrorist or violent activities and bring him to court.
- The civilian infrastructure and those who exploit religion for terrorist purposes will be placed under surveillance, and both sides will exchange information about these bodies.
- The PA will take all the security steps necessary to infiltrate the terrorist organizations and put them under close surveillance with the aim of weakening them and destroying them from within.
- A liaison center will be set up which will be manned in times of crisis.
- There will be exchanges of professional views, training, and other assistance.
- Both sides agree to set up a supervisory mechanism to oversee the implementation of this memorandum of understanding.

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GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL, CLOSING STATEMENT, 18TH SESSION OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL, KUWAIT CITY, 20-22 DECEMBER 1997 [EXCERPTS]

In response to a gracious invitation by His Highness Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmad Al-Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait, the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council of the Gulf Arab States convened its Eighteenth Session in the State of Kuwait from 20 to 22 Sha’baan 1418 Hijri, corresponding to 20 to 22 December 1997 A. D. […]

THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The Supreme Council considered the peace process in the Middle East and the serious deadlock it has reached as a result of failure on the part of the government of Israel to fulfill its commitments under the transitional accords signed with the Palestinian side and due to the unilateral steps it is taking prior to the final solution negotiations. Those steps include the expansion of existing settlements and the building of new ones, confiscation of Palestinian land, imposition of economic blockade against the Palestinian population, and obstruction of economic development prospects in the Palestinian territories. All these actions contravene the spirit and underpinning principles of the peace process as well as the provisions of agreements signed within the peace framework.
While the Supreme Council expresses its categorical rejection of the policies and practices of the government of Israel, it calls upon that government to honour all its obligations under the accords signed with the Palestine Liberation Organization, primarily completion of the redeployment phases throughout the West Bank and starting the permanent status negotiations with the Palestinian side with a view to achieve full Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories under occupation since 1967 and to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their full national legitimate rights, including their right to establish their own independent state on their national territory, the capital of which would be Al-Quds Al-Shareef (the Holy City of Jerusalem). The Supreme Council demands that the government of Israel should resume negotiations on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks from the point where all previous rounds have reached. It also demands that Israel must fully pull out from the occupied Syrian Arab Golan back to the border line of 4 June 1967 in accordance with Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. It also demands that Israel must withdraw fully from Southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa and leave all occupied Lebanese territory to return under the sovereignty of Lebanon in accordance with Security resolution 425.

While the Supreme Council appreciates the efforts made by the United States administration in support of the Middle East peace process, as well as the efforts of the Russian Federation, it calls upon them to continue and intensify their roles towards the resumption of negotiations on all tracks in order to put the peace process back in right normal course.

The Supreme Council applauds the international consensus in support of the maintenance of the peace process in the Middle East and the need to fulfill binding obligations and the resumption of negotiations on the basis of the United Nations resolutions and the “land for peace” formula in order to achieve just and comprehensive peace. In this connection, the Supreme Council pays tribute to the European Union and its member states for their efforts as well as for the political and economic support they have been providing to the Palestinian National Authority. […]

JERUSALEM, 13 JANUARY 1998

[The document, which makes any further redeployment contingent upon Palestinian implementation of the some 50 measures enumerated, was unanimously adopted by the Israeli cabinet on 13 Jan.]

"1. Complete the process of revising the Palestinian National Charter"

COMMITMENTS ARISING FROM THE OBLIGATION

Following are the requisite steps for implementation (in stages):

**Stage One**

a. Issuance of a statement by the legal committee specifying the articles of the Covenant which were amended or annulled in accordance with the April 1996 Palestinian National Council (PNC) decision (i.e. the articles in the Covenant which are inconsistent with the Palestinian obligations in the framework of the peace process).

**Stage Two**

b. Reconvening of the PNC to pass a new resolution which affirms the statement issued by the legal committee concerning which specific articles in the Covenant were amended or annulled.

At the same time, the Palestinian Authority must refrain from replacing the articles with other articles which contradict the agreements and/or the peace process, for such a step would be considered a failure to fulfill their obligation to amend the requisite articles in the Covenant.
Articles in the Palestinian Covenant Which Must be Amended

Following is a list of the articles in the Covenant which must be amended. The list is divided into four categories, with some articles appearing under more than one category.

A. Articles Calling for Armed Struggle Against Israel

The following articles in the Covenant contradict Chairman Arafat’s commitment to renounce the use of violence and terror and to resolve differences via negotiations:

Article 7: “the upbringing of the Palestinian individual in an Arab and revolutionary fashion… and preparing him for the conflict and the armed struggle as well as for the sacrifice of his property and his life to restore his homeland”

Article 8: “the Palestinian masses… comprise one national front which acts to restore Palestine and liberate it through armed struggle”

Article 9: “Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine is therefore a strategy and not tactics…” [and other references to armed revolution, etc.]

Article 10: “Fedayeen action forms the nucleus of the popular Palestinian war of liberation” [and other references to armed Palestinian revolution]

Article 15: contains numerous references to the “armed Palestinian revolution”

Article 18: provides that: “liberation of Palestine is a defensive act” [implying that aggression and terror against Israel is legitimate]

Article 26: “the PLO represents the forces of the Palestinian revolution”

Article 27: “…cooperation with all Arab states… on the basis of the requirements of the battle of liberation”

Article 29: “the Palestinian people… will define its position with reference to all states and powers on the basis of their positions with reference to the… extent of their support for the Palestinian revolution”

Article 30: “the fighters and bearers of arms in the battle of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army”

B. Articles Which Contradict the Recognition of Israel’s Right to Exist

Articles 1, 2 and 3: read together, these articles provide that the Palestinian people possesses the exclusive legal rights to its homeland which comprises Palestine within the boundaries that existed at the time of the British mandate, and that following the liberation of this homeland it will exercise exclusive self-determination within this area [i.e. there is no room for an additional sovereign within the area of mandatory Palestine]

Article 8: refers to “the fundamental contradiction between Zionism and colonialism on the one side and the Palestinian Arab people on the other”

Article 15: refers to the “…duty to repulse the Zionist imperialist invasion from the Great Arab homeland and to purge the Zionist presence”

Article 19: provides that “the establishment of Israel is fundamentally null and void…”

Article 21: “rejects every solution that is a substitute for a complete liberation of Palestine and rejects all plans that aim at the settlement of the Palestinian issue or its internationalization”

Article 22: rife with vile accusations against Israel and Zionism, among them: Zionism is “racist”, “expansionist”, “colonialist”, “fascist”, and “nazi”, and Israel “is a constant threat to peace in the Middle East and the entire world”. The article also provides that “the liberation of Palestine will liquidate the Zionist and imperialist presence”

Article 23: calls on all states “to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement and to prohibit its existence and activity”
C. Articles Which Refer to the "Liberation of Palestine"

Article 13: concerns the relation between Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine
Article 14: concerns the relation between the destiny of the Arab nation and the liberation of Palestine
Article 25: concerns the role of the PLO in the liberation of Palestine

D. Other Articles Which Must be Amended

Article 4: provides that Palestinian nationality passes from father to son and "is not affected by the Zionist occupation"
Article 5: "the Palestinians" are those Arab citizens who were living permanently in Palestine until 1947, and anyone born to a Palestinian father after this date.
Article 6: "Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians"
Article 11: the Palestinian mottoes: "national unity, national mobilization and liberation"
Article 12: refers to "this phase of its national struggle"
Article 20: "The Balfour Declaration, the mandate document and what has been based upon them are considered null and void… the Jews are not a people but a religion."

"2. Fighting terror and preventing violence"

The Palestinian Authority must immediately and without delay begin to implement the security demands listed below (though it is clear that most of them will require continuous and ongoing measures).

An oversight mechanism that is effective, ongoing and pervasive must be established in order to monitor the Palestinian Authority's fulfillment of the security commitments detailed below. The mechanism must include on-site checks in the field regarding implementation of the articles in the accords, and periodic and regular monitoring meetings and reports. It will be necessary for the parties concerned to agree on how the mechanism is to be structured and what the nature of its activities will be.

"Preventing incitement and hostile pro da, as specified in Article XXII of the Interim Agreement"

- Palestinian Authority officials must refrain from engaging in and encouraging incitement against Israel. The PA must take immediate steps to promote tolerance and mutual understanding by means of the public statements and actions of its leaders. Incitement against Israel, be it at international forums or in areas under Palestinian control, must cease.
- The PA must prevent the holding of rallies and gatherings at educational and other institutions and on college campuses at which incendiary anti-Israel incitement takes place (such as the burning of mock Israeli buses and flags, the reenactment of terror attacks and marches by masked men).
- The PA must prevent incitement against Israeli goods and products.

Following are a number of key issues regarding Palestinian incitement against Israel which the PA must take immediate steps to cease:

- PA employees, mosque preachers and others who incite against Israel must be dismissed from their posts, prosecuted and punished. A list of preachers will be given to the PA, and their employment by the PA must be terminated. The list appears in Annex II to this document.
- The PA must end the repeated use of terminology in the Palestinian media under its direct and indirect control which runs counter to the agreements. For example, a new lexicon was recently adopted by the Palestinian media according to which the Israel Defense Forces are referred to as "the occupation forces", the Israeli Defense Minister is referred to as "the Minister of War", settlements are labeled as "colonies", and references are made to Israeli "imperialism".
• In violation of the accords, PA officials promote anti-Semitism as an integral part of their rhetoric and encourage its use in the Palestinian media. Six recurrent themes are discernible: 1) Classic anti-Semitic stereotypes; 2) Comparisons of Israel with Nazis and Fascists; 3) Denial of the Holocaust; 4) Libelous Accusations; 5). Israel and the Jewish people; 6) Equating Zionism with racism. Repeated reference is made to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and Palestinian Authority newspapers publish stories about Jewish "plots" and Jewish "fangs". Jews are often depicted as power-hungry and lusting after money, with occasional references to Shakespeare's Shylock and the Merchant of Venice as examples of Jewish greed. The PA must stop its use of anti-Semitic incitement.

• The PA must take immediate measures to end incitement to violence against Israel in the Palestinian media, including on Palestinian radio and television.

• The PA must ensure that the weekly Friday prayer sermons broadcast on the official Palestinian media are free of the incendiary and belligerent statements they regularly contain. Israel will submit to the PA a list of preachers who engage in such incitement.

• The PA must prosecute and punish perpetrators of incitement.

• The PA must formulate and effect a comprehensive public education campaign regarding normalization with Israel and the rejection of violence and terror. This would include reassessing educational programs, curriculums and textbooks to rid them of bigotry and hatred.

• A monitoring mechanism should be established consisting of a trilateral committee composed of American, Israeli and Palestinian representatives to monitor the PA's compliance in this area on an ongoing basis and to ensure that the PA takes punitive measures against all those who engage in incitement.

"e) Requests for transfer of suspects and defendants will be acted upon in accordance with Article II (7f) of Annex IV to the Interim Agreement"

• In accordance with Article II (7f) of Annex IV to the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian Authority must transfer to Israel terror suspects located in Palestinian-controlled areas. Thus far, Israel has submitted 34 requests to the PA for the transfer of terror suspects. The Palestinian Authority must comply with all 34 formal requests which were submitted to it by the Israeli Justice Ministry.

• According to Article I (2) of Annex IV to the Interim Agreement, Israel has sole jurisdiction over cases involving terror attacks against Israelis and Israel is the sole authority that may try and convict suspects in such cases. If the PA tries such a suspect, then the trial and sentence are null and void.

"f) Confiscation of illegal firearms"

• The Palestinian Authority must enact legislation (which shall be given to Israel for review as required under the Interim Agreement) that will define any weapons forbidden under the accords as being illegal.

• The PA must systematically confiscate all illegal weapons.

• The PA must punish those possessing illegal weapons.

• The PA must act to prevent the smuggling of weapons into Palestinian-controlled areas by all elements, including by senior Palestinian officials and VIPs. PA officials involved in such activities must be removed from their posts.

• Weapons and/or explosives in PA possession or in Palestinian-controlled areas which violate the terms of the Interim Agreement regarding types and quantities of weapons must be transferred to Israel.

"3. Size of Palestinian Police will be pursuant to the Interim Agreement"

COMMITMENTS ARISING FROM THE OBLIGATION

• The Palestinian Authority must reduce the size of its police force. Under the Interim Agreement, the PA is currently permitted to deploy 24,000 policemen in the areas under Palestinian jurisdic-
Nevertheless, the PA has deployed approximately 36,000 policemen, exceeding the agreed limit by 12,000, or 50%. This was done without Israeli consent and in violation of the accords.

- Under the Interim Agreement, the PA is obligated to submit to Israel a complete list of all police recruits for review and approval. Thus far, the PA has submitted only 18,500 names. Thus, nearly half of the Palestinian policemen currently serving in the field have not received the required Israeli approval.

- The Palestinian Authority must prohibit those serving in its security forces from taking part in demonstrations, marches or other violent activities directed against Israel. The PA must enforce this prohibition and dismiss from the ranks of its security forces those who violate it.

4. Exercise of Palestinian governmental activity, and location of Palestinian governmental offices, will be as specified in the Interim Agreement."

COMMITMENTS ARISING FROM THE OBLIGATION

A. Jerusalem

The Palestinian Authority must cease all its activities and those of its officials in Jerusalem, as detailed below:

Temple Mount

2) Minister of Religious Affairs Hassan Tahboub's office is located at the Shalshelet Gate entrance to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Tahboub operates openly and publicly as a representative of the Palestinian Authority. Occasionally, he attempts to conceal the nature of his activity by operating under the guise of his position as head of the Higher Islamic Council.

3) "Mufti of Jerusalem and the Holy Land" Sheikh Ikrama Sabri, appointed by Arafat nearly three years ago, assumed his post by ousting the Jordanian appointee. He is based on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, and his weekly prayer sermons regularly contain vitriolic incitement against Israel and the United States.

The Orient House

The PA must close the "Ministry of Jerusalem Affairs" headed by Faisal Husseini which operates out of the Orient House under the cover of the "Arab Affairs Society." Husseini participates in cabinet meetings of the Palestinian Authority with full ministerial status.

Other Prohibited Activity in Jerusalem which the PA must cease

1) The Palestinian security forces operate in Jerusalem, engaging in threats, intimidation and interrogation of city residents. Forces stationed outside the city also conduct operations in Jerusalem.

2) The Palestinian Authority has unilaterally conducted matriculation exams and imposed its curriculum on Arab schools in Jerusalem.

3) Illegal activities such as the PA's attempt to conduct a population census in eastern Jerusalem.

4) The takeover of institutions in Jerusalem such as Al-Mokassad Hospital.

5) The Palestinian Authority must commit in writing to refrain from all activity in the field of tourism in Jerusalem. The Higher Council for the Arab Tourist Industry operates in Jerusalem under the direction of the PLO and serves as an official tourist body for the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian tourist officials from eastern Jerusalem take part in international fairs, where they man Palestinian booths, and market their tourist activities under the heading "Jerusalem, Palestine."

B. Areas B & C

Land Issues

The Palestinians have attempted to exercise powers in Area C in Judea and Samaria to which they are not entitled under the accords. The primary violations are as follows:

1. The PA has declared the expansion of planning zones and building boundaries of Arab villages into Area C (via the issuance of orders by the PA Ministry of Local Government). For example,
the PA has declared the expansion of the boundaries of al-Bireh, Bitunia, Turmous-Aih, and Beit Anan (in the Ramallah district).

2. The PA has undertaken the building of roadwork and agricultural infrastructure without prior Israeli approval as required by the accords.

3. The PA has issued construction permits in Area C even though they do not have the authority to do so.

4. The PA has undertaken and encouraged illegal building within zoning areas forbidden for security reasons (such as building in close proximity to roads).

5. The PA is active at archaeological sites in violation of the accords.

6. The PA has organized and financed a campaign to plant trees in Area C.

The Palestinian Authority must annul all the permits issued regarding the abovementioned activities and must refrain from issuing such permits in the future.

Environment

1. The PA must cease causing the uncontrolled flow of sewage in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, which has resulted in the pollution of groundwater and other environmental damage.

2. The PA must cease the illicit discarding of waste and garbage by PA-controlled institutions and municipalities and must clean up sites where such waste has been dumped.

3. The PA must end its indiscriminate use of Israeli waste removal sites in Area C.

A more detailed accounting of environmental problems and areas where the PA has caused environmental damage is contained in Annex V to this document.

Communications

1. The PA must cease conducting television broadcasts from various locations in Judea, Samaria and Gaza in violation of the accords.

2. The PA must halt the illegal use of broadcast frequencies in violation of the agreement, and must cease causing disturbances to transmissions in Israel.

Operation of Offices in Violation of the Accords

- The PA must terminate the operation of PA Planning and International Cooperation Minister Dr. Nabil Shaath’s office in Dahiyat al-Barid in the Ramallah district in violation of the accords.

C. Foreign Relations

The PA must commit itself in writing to refrain from activities in the realm of foreign relations in accordance with Article IX of the Interim Agreement. The PA must cease its activities in international forums which contravenes the agreement and is designed to pressure Israel by circumventing bilateral negotiating channels.

PRESIDENT YASSER ARAFAT, LETTER TO US PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON, NABLUS, 13 JANUARY 1998

His Excellency President William Clinton
President of the United States of America, Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

In the mutual recognition letters between myself and the late Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin of September 9/10, 1993, the PLO committed to recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security, to accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides. The PLO also agreed to secure the necessary changes in the Palestinian Covenant to reflect these commitments.

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Accordingly, the PNC was held in Gaza city between 22-25 of April 1996, and in an extraordinary session decided that the "Palestine National Charter is hereby amended by canceling the articles that are contrary to the letters exchanged between the P.L.O and the Government of Israel on 9/10 September 1993”.

It should be noted that the above mentioned resolution acquired the consent of both the American Administration and the Israeli Government. Afterwards I sent letters concerning this historic resolution to your Excellency and Prime Minister Shimon Peres, and later a similar letter was sent to Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu.

Both your Excellency and Prime Minister Peres warmly welcomed the PNC Resolution.

The Israeli Labor Party, and in appreciation of the PNC resolution dropped its objection to the establishment of a Palestinian State from its political platform.

From time to time questions have been raised about the effect of the Palestine National Council's action, particularly concerning which of the 33 articles of the Palestinian Covenant have been changed.

We would like to put to rest these concerns. The Palestine National Council's resolution, in accordance with Article 33 of the Covenant, is a comprehensive amendment of the Covenant. All of the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the PLO commitment to recognize and live in peace side by side with Israel are no longer in effect.

As a result, Articles 6-10, 15, 19-23, and 30 have been nullified, and the parts in Articles 1-5, 11-14, 16-18, 25-27 and 29 that are in consistent with the above mentioned commitments have also been nullified.

I can assure you on behalf of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority that all the provisions of the Covenant that were inconsistent with the commitments of September 9/10, 1993 to Prime Minister Rabin, have been nullified.

(Signed:) Yasser Arafat
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, President of the PNA

EUROPEAN UNION, STATEMENT ON THE EU’S ROLE AND FUTURE ASSISTANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, 16 JANUARY 1998

The European Commission has just approved a communication to the Council of Ministers and to the European Parliament on the role of the European Union (EU) in the Middle East peace process. The aim of the document is to provide elements for a thorough debate within the EU on the present situation in the Middle East and the impact of the EU political and economic strategy for the region. The communication, therefore, provides an analysis of (i) the present situation of the Middle East peace process; (ii) the EU political and financial support to it; (iii) the interface with the Euro-Mediterranean partnership; (iv) the results of the EU economic assistance to the Palestinians; (v) the successes and shortcomings of the international aid effort and in its final part; and (vi) the complementary role of the EU alongside the leading role of the US in the process.

Executive summary of the communication

The Middle East peace process that was launched at the 1991 Madrid Conference raised great hopes of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

The Madrid Conference did not produce immediate progress. Nevertheless, it succeeded in triggering the mutual recognition and establishment of direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO (Oslo
channel). This led in turn to unprecedented regional progress towards peace, including the signature of a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority as an interim stage pending the conclusion of a permanent Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty by May 1999.

The EU reacted to this historical opportunity by making available the largest international programme of economic assistance to the peace process: ECU 1,680 million for the period 1993-1997. In parallel, the EU maintained its supportive complementary political role.

However, the political climate has changed during the last year and a half, moving from unprecedented hopes for and steps towards a comprehensive negotiated solution to a general climate of regional instability and impatience and alarm among the international community. The reality is that the peace process is in a state of persistent deadlock. The European Commission's viewpoint is that there is no possibility to make real and credible progress in the peace process without full implementation of all commitments freely accepted by the parties.

This continuous lack of political progress has begun contaminating other international initiatives aiming at stability and prosperity in the region (i.e. MENA, the Middle East and North Africa Economic Forum). Despite the heavy investment in material and economic resources made available by the European Union and the international community at large, it has become clear that regional cooperation and integration cannot make any headway unless there is real progress towards a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Doha conference has been the latest and most glaring symbol of the paralysis of all multilateral cooperation, with the big waste of financial and political efforts that it entails.

Most importantly for the EU, the crisis threatens the Barcelona process. Despite the fact that this forum for policy dialogue between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, launched in Barcelona in November 1995, has been the only forum where all regional actors have worked together over the last two years, it is clear that there is a growing contamination by the political crisis in the peace process of the activities emanating from the Barcelona partnership and of the accompanying measures of the Euro-Med Association Agreements.

As to the success and shortcomings of the international aid effort, the document explains that the international aid was intended to trigger sufficient private sector investment flows into the region, thereby truly improving the economic standards of the peoples in the region, notably the Palestinians. The EU massive programme of economic assistance seems to have failed to achieve its original goals. In fact, the opposite has happened: all Palestinian economic indicators point at a clear deterioration of living conditions. To mention just a few:

- Palestinian per capita GNP has fallen by over 35 per cent;
- Losses due to closures have taken up to 7.4 per cent of GDP per year;
- Unemployment has doubled, from 20 to over 42 per cent;
- Private investment has plummeted to one fourth of what it was in 1993;
- Yearly trade losses have occurred of up to almost US$ 300 million;
- Delays have taken place in the implementation of donor-financed projects.

All this reflects that, in the economic sphere, the efforts made since the Washington donors conference in 1993 have failed; this has caused widespread international donor fatigue.

Nevertheless, the unprecedented effort by the international community, and in particular of the European Union, has not been in vain; it has yielded some valuable achievements.

On the one hand, it has been instrumental in keeping the peace process alive. It has helped in the establishment of a Palestinian institutional capacity that allows the Palestinian Authority to carry out
its basic functions in a satisfactory way. On the other hand, it has substantially upgraded the Palestinian physical and social infrastructure. Furthermore, aid has prevented standards of living for going into free fall due to very unfavourable economic conditions.

In short, the international donor effort has ensured the survival of the peace process. It has also created the conditions that may allow the Palestinian economy to bounce back once obstacles for growth are removed.

In its final part the Commission communication concludes that without the support of an important political and economic contribution, the continuation of the peace process, even in its present difficult state, would not have been possible. The economic goals sought in 1993 have not been reached. In the face of this grave situation the European Commission, in charge of the EU programme of economic assistance, believes that it is necessary to look for ways to continue the present financial assistance programme, which expires in 1998. However, while the Commission can make proposals in order to improve the situation, real advancement will only be possible if a number of conditions are met:

• On the bilateral side, the Palestinians must be allowed to exercise their right to economic development. Obstacles to trade and economic activity must be removed (i.e. the series of measures put in practice by Israel to seal off Palestinian territories from the outside world, usually known as closures). If the Israel-PLO Paris Economic Protocol is to subsist, then closures cannot continue.

• Furthermore, the Palestinians must have open trade access to the outside world, including Israel. This must lead to a situation that will allow the full implementation of the EC-PLO Association Agreement.

• The European Union should be willing to help Israel remove the obstacles to either solution through the Israel-EU Joint Dialogue mechanism, as stressed by the conclusions of the recent Luxembourg European Council. However, the current discussions and studies undertaken under this framework on Palestinian labour, passage of goods and people, fiscal and financial issues, Gaza airport and harbour, and medium-and long-term economic potential, cannot continue without any tangible results. The Joint Dialogue needs to make rapid progress towards eliminating all obstacles to Palestinian economic development. Failing this, the Joint Dialogue would have to be re-evaluated.

• The European Union has reaffirmed its readiness to put all its political weight to the service of safeguarding the security of Israel. The security of the State of Israel and of its citizens is a central piece in the solution to the Middle East conflict. This is one of the reasons for the European Union's support to Palestinian economic development. Contrary to claims that Israel's security demands stiff restrictions on the Palestinian economy, Palestinian economic development will be Israel's best security guarantee, both in the short and the long term, Palestinian economic development will be Israel's best security guarantee, both in the short and the long term.

• In the multilateral forums, the EU, as chair of the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG), should come up with concrete initiatives to revive the process of regional economic integration as soon as progress on the bilateral tracks allows. Indeed, the stalemate in the Palestinian track has had a progressive paralysing effect on the multilateral track.

• Coming to the regional dimension, and in particular the Barcelona process, a renewed EU effort to put an end to peace process contamination in the context of the development of the Euro Mediterranean goals is necessary. "Barcelona" represents a long-term strategy which is crucial to the future of both the EU and its Mediterranean partners. While it was born under a constructive phase of the peace process, its shared goals and the conditions that made it necessary are still there and are worth the effort in themselves.

• The idea launched in Malta of a mid-term review ministerial conference in 1998 must be given urgency so as to reinvigorate the process in order to prevent contamination by the peace process.

The communication ends with a reference to the complementary role of the EU alongside the leading role of the US in the process. The document explains that the EU has accepted a role which is diplomatic and politically complementary to that of the US. This is an arrangement which has worked
imperfectly so far and which can be improved to boost the effect of international community's efforts to put the peace process back on track.

The Commission feels that if the European Union is to continue to be the basic economic foundation of the peace process, then what has happened until now should be taken into account. The role that the European Union has played so far should lead to the conclusion that the way in which the complementary efforts of the two allies is to be organized should be reviewed and then put to the consideration of the US, the Palestinians, the Israelis and the international community.

When submitting these proposals, the Commission does not understand them in any way as a challenge to the role of the US. The present determining role of the US, rooted in the past, will continue in the future.

Therefore, while the European Union should continue to support the crucial political role of the US, the complementarity that has guided the European Union role so far should be changed in two main ways:

- The European Union has so far played a constructive role. This role would be much improved if the parties and the US acknowledged the need for the European Union, both at ministerial level and through its Special Envoy, to participate alongside the US in all forums set up to assist bilateral negotiations between the parties.
- The European Union has contributed by itself over half of the financial resources to the peace process. Because of this, it has more experience, wider links and a considerable political capital. It understands that if the international assistance effort is to be renewed, it must be redefined. It is clear that the basic shareholder should be the key coordinator. Therefore, the international economic effort should be coordinated by the European Union on the basis of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee model: Palestinians, Israelis, the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations and the active participation of key donors.
- Being by far the first donor, the European Union (Presidency and Commission) should play a substantially enhanced role in the coordination of international assistance, according to a formula to be negotiated with other donors.

CIECHANOVER COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT ON THE MASHA’AL AFFAIR, JERUSALEM, 17 FEBRUARY 1998 [EXCERPTS]

[The three-man Commission, headed by El Al Chairman Joseph Ciechanover, was set up by PM Netanyahu in Oct. 1997 to investigate the Mossad’s failed attempt to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Masha’al in Amman on 25 Sept.. The full report - 110 pages excluding the classified sections - found Netanyahu’s behavior appropriate, while the majority criticized Mossad chief Dani Yatom for his role in the affair, but did not call for his resignation. Nonetheless, Yatom resigned on 24 Feb. after a failed Mossad wiretapping operation in Switzerland. The following excerpts do not include the introduction, the minority opinion concerning the operation's division head, and the analysis of the combat unit's behavior.]

DESCRIPTION OF THE OPERATION

On September 23, 1997, the Mossad agents waited at the entrance of the Hamas offices in Amman, with the intention of assassinating Khalid Mishal. They succeeded in injuring him, using a lethal substance. However, immediately afterward, Khalid Mishal's personal chauffeur and a security guard intervened. The chauffeur, who saw what was happening, hit the agent with a newspaper on his hand. The security guard began to chase the agents and was able to note the license plate number of the car in which they had escaped and boarded a passing car in order to pursue them. The agents were unaware that they were being followed. After some 300 meters, they stopped their car and left it. The security guard chased them and, with the help of a plainclothes policeman, managed to overpower

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and apprehend them. The agents were driven by the policeman and the security guard in a taxi to the nearest police station and placed under arrest. When news of the agents' arrest broke in Israel, the head of the Mossad flew to Jordan, with the prime minister's consent, in order to report the events to the king in person, bringing with him an antidote to treat Khalid Mishal.

Mishal was given the antidote, thus saving his life. In the negotiations subsequently conducted for the release of the agents, an agreement was reached with the Jordanian authorities whereby, in exchange for the release of (Hamas's) Shaykh (Ahmad) Yasin and a number of other prisoners held in Israel, they would release our agents and allow them to return to Israel.

Who is Khalid Mishal?
Khalid Mishal is the head of the Political Department of Hamas, based in Amman, Jordan, having succeeded Abu Marzuq in this position. From his base in Jordan, Mishal, in addition to his political functions, activates various groups in Europe and Israel which initiate, encourage, and commit acts of terror and sabotage. Funds to finance these activities are channeled through his office.

The Operation in Jordan
The presence of the Hamas headquarters in Jordan and its extensive activities from this base have presented Israel with a major problem. The decision to carry out the attack in Jordan was based on the principle that no place in the world should be allowed to serve as a safe harbor for those who plan to carry out murders and acts of terror in Israel. Israel will act against those who seek to harm Jews, wherever they may be.

In this the current Israeli government follows the policy of previous governments. The commission does not question this policy, but nevertheless proposes that the government discuss it, define its scope, and establish ground rules for its implementation.

The operation in Jordan was planned on the following assumptions: The operational plan must ensure that its successful execution does not leave any tracks that would incriminate Israel directly. In terms of the intelligence community, it must be a "silent" operation. The possibility of failure of the operation, and its implications, were hardly addressed by the Mossad planners and their superiors.

Peace between Israel and Jordan, and ways to deepen and underpin it, are a cornerstone of Israel's foreign policy. Even in the case of a mishap, the foundations of the Israel-Jordan relationship would not be fundamentally harmed. The planners of the operation assumed that the probability of failure was minuscule. They were aware that the relations that had developed following the peace treaty with Jordan were of prime importance to the authorities of both countries and firmly believed that the "silent" operation, as planned, could in no way harm the king or the Hashimite government in Jordan.

The various heads of the intelligence community, as well as the majority of witnesses who appeared before us, shared these basic assumptions, although they did not necessarily all agree with the timing of the operation.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
Several factors came together, leading to the failure of the operation in Jordan, the main one being the conceptual fixation prevailing in the Mossad, at the various levels involved in planning, approving, and carrying out the operation. It was generally believed that the weapon in question and its mode of use were almost infallible. The weapon was silent and had no immediately evident effect upon the target. It was assumed that the proposed operation would be effective without anybody being immediately aware of it. Furthermore, if for any reason the attack was aborted, the weapon in the hands of the assaulter, looking innocent enough (unlike, say, a handgun), would not expose the fact that an attempt had been made and would thus not lead to anybody pointing an accusing finger at Israel.
This concept of a "silent operation," with minimal chances of failure, hardly took into account the possibility that it could fail for any reason and turn into a "noisy" one. The planning, plans, and preparations did not seriously consider such a possibility, nor was this aspect sufficiently emphasized when the plan was presented to the prime minister. The plan should not have been formulated in this manner in the first place and should certainly not have been presented as such to the prime minister.

The commission found flaws in the planning of the operation in Jordan, the preparations for its launch, in the theory behind the handling and application of the lethal substance and the weapon, and in the coordination of the operation between the various branches of the intelligence community.

In the course of its work, the commission identified several structural and system defects in the Mossad, which, in its view, contributed to the creation of these erroneous conceptions, with resulting faulty methods and procedures. The commission dealt with these issues at considerable length in its report, following up with many recommendations, most of which are highly classified for obvious reasons and which cannot therefore be made public.

The commission also addressed the matter of coordination between the services within the intelligence community, with particular reference to the modus operandi of the Heads of Services Committee, and has made certain recommendations.

The commission addressed the issue of the establishment of a National Security Council, concluding that it was very doubtful whether, in the present circumstances, it would be appropriate and practical to create such a body, and therefore does not recommend that such a council be established at this point.

The commission examined and made certain recommendations related to the intelligence advisory functions in the Prime Minister's Office. The commission recommends that an assistant for intelligence and security, with a rank equivalent or close to that of a major general in the Israel Defense Forces [IDF], be appointed to serve the prime minister. This person should be an intelligence expert and should be responsible for dealing with the extensive flow of intelligence information to the Prime Minister's Office. The assistant would serve as a direct link between the prime minister and the heads of the intelligence services and would be a regular member of the Heads of Services Committee. He would be in a position to present to the prime minister the essence of the available intelligence information and to draw his attention to any issues as required, bearing in mind that the prime minister cannot be reasonably expected to handle the large flow of intelligence information effectively, without a modicum of expert assistance...

**CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO INDIVIDUALS**

**General**

The head of the Mossad and the division head in charge of the combat unit tried to convince us that their conduct, as well as the plans and preparations made prior to the operation, were flawless, and that the failure of the attempt resulted directly from mistakes made by the combatants in the course of the operation. We have not overlooked the fact that such mistakes were made, but feel that the combatants should not bear the full responsibility for them. In fact, we have concluded that their mistakes in the course of the operation were in large measure due to flaws in conception and planning, in the ultimate operational plan as well as in training for the operation. We have found that the head of the Mossad and the division head bear a heavy responsibility in these matters.

When we arrived at the above conclusions, we deemed it appropriate to advise the head of the Mossad and the division head accordingly. We indicated the specifics of our conclusions to them, and where we thought they had apparently been deficient, and that they might in consequence be adversely affected by our conclusions. We requested that they address these issues. They have done so, in writing, and we have considered their responses in preparing our detailed observations and conclusions in the report.

**The Prime Minister**

We are unanimous in conclusions regarding the prime minister. In examining the conduct of the prime minister, bearing in mind that the head of the Mossad reports to him directly, we tried to define
our own criteria, to help us analyze the process in which he examined and approved the plans for the
attack against Khalid Mishal.

To assist us in our analysis, we compared the prime minister's handling of the case with the manner in
which similar cases had been handled in the past. In doing so we reached the conclusion that the
prime minister had dealt with the case in a responsible manner, having considered and examined the
plans presented to him from every possible aspect that might have been expected of him.

From the minutes of discussions held in the Prime Minister's Office, we learned that the prime minister
had inquired about details of the plans as might have been expected of him. We found that he repeatedly
asked that the operation be coordinated with the other heads of the intelligence community, to ensure that
they be informed and coordinated as necessary, and we are aware of the fact that a number of discussions
were held in the Prime Minister's Office before the plan was approved and executed.

We also inquired whether the prime minister's conduct in relation to the attack against Mishal was
any different from that of other incumbents in similar circumstances. We therefore studied the rele-
vant minutes regarding similar operations in the past and heard the testimonies of former prime min-
isters. We reached the conclusion that the prime minister's conduct in no way deviated from the
norms and procedures customary in similar cases in the past.

The commission also examined the question of whether the prime minister had exerted any unreasonable
pressure to carry out the operation "quickly and at any cost," so that it might serve as an immediate re-
response to the terrorist attacks at the Mahane Yehuda market and the pedestrian mall in Jerusalem. We
reached the conclusion that no unreasonable pressure had been exerted by the prime minister in this matter.

We do not therefore find any flaw in the conduct of the prime minister and minister in charge of the
Mossad.

The commission did not deem it appropriate to delve into the question of the prime minister's ministe-
rial responsibility for the failure of the operation. This matter had already been examined in the past
by various investigating commissions, which determined that the issue of political responsibility is
not a matter for investigation by commissions or other courts of inquiry, but rather within the purview
of relations between elected representatives and the electorate. In stating the above, we do not imply
that we have found any flaw, from the political aspect, in the prime minister's conduct.

The Head of the Mossad

Dan Yatom was appointed to the position of head of the Mossad approximately a year and half ago.
His last position prior to this appointment was military secretary to the prime minister, with the rank
of major general in the IDF. He has devoted his entire active life to the security of the state and to the
Israel Defense Forces. Dan Yatom has served, inter alia, in numerous combat command posts at the
highest level and has impressive achievements to his credit. We were impressed by Mr. Yatom's ap-
ppearance before us, his openness, and the manner in which he addressed the issue.

Giving evidence, Dan Yatom addressed the question of the extent to which the head of the Mossad
must delve into details of the plans of Mossad units before giving his approval. We did not wish to
answer this question in a general manner, but we are certain that before approving a plan of the type
in question, the head of the Mossad must indeed study it in detail.

We found that the senior ranks involved in approval of the plans within the Mossad and their presen-
tation to the prime minister were among the main factors leading to failure of the operation. The
commission noted a series of shortcomings and errors in the Mossad's basic approach, leading to what
was planned as a "silent operation." These were evident in the planning process, in the structure and
composition of the plans, and in the manner in which the particular weapon was treated in the plans.
We believe that the head of the Mossad erred in his handling of the operation and in approval of the plan. This should not have been structured as a "silent operation," without providing for contingency measures should it become a "noisy" one.

The commission believes that the head of the Mossad had enough time at his disposal to convene an additional orderly discussion with the heads of the intelligence services, prior to the operation, and that this should have been done. Nevertheless, the commission is of the opinion that the heads of the intelligence community were indeed informed by the head of the Mossad of a possible operation directed against Mishal.

The head of the Mossad has extensive experience and knowledge in the field of military operations and it might well have been expected from him that before approving the plan he would identify and address its numerous shortcomings, which were revealed to us in the course of our examination, and would act to rectify them, rather than approve them in what was their final form. It would also have been appropriate that the head of the Mossad inform the prime minister in greater detail of the operational and political implications of carrying out the plan.

We should add that a significant part of the military doctrine underlying the plan is the product of concepts and practices developed and shaped in the Mossad over many years. The head of the Mossad essentially continued to apply the existing planning, handling, and execution procedures and processes previously formed and used in the Mossad.

Summary of the Majority Opinion of the Commission

We believe that in the context of our functions as a commission of inquiry, we have thoroughly covered all that was required of us concerning Dan Yatom, the head of the Mossad. We have spelled out the matters in which we believe he erred and have enumerated the reasons for these errors. We do not deem it appropriate to make any further recommendations regarding him, as we believe that this should be left to the government's discretion, after study of the facts and recommendations in our report which, we think, speak for themselves.

Summary of the Minority Opinion - Rafi Peled

Following the conclusions reached by the commission, based on the material presented to it, concerning the conduct of the head of the Mossad and the measure of his responsibility in the failed operation in Jordan, one cannot refrain from making more specific recommendations. In fact, I believe it is the duty of the commission to do so. In light of the above, I recommend that Mr. Dan Yatom be relieved of his duties as head of the Mossad.

The Division Head in Charge of the Combat Unit - [Majority Opinion]

The division head in charge of the combat unit has much experience, with many successes to his credit, and belongs in the list of unknown combatants to whom the State of Israel is deeply indebted, whose numerous contributions cannot be publicly acknowledged.

He was in charge of the unit which carried out the field operation against Khalid Mishal and was therefore directly responsible for planning and approving the plans, and ordering their execution, without adequate study and without making the most of all possible sources of information to help ensure success.

This officer's main error was that he did not identify the shortcomings in the plans and approved a plan which might have perhaps been adequate for a "silent operation," not taking into account the possibility that it might rapidly turn "noisy," for various reasons. A "noisy" operation required a totally different approach, and therefore at least part of the components of such an approach should have been included as contingencies in the plan for the operation in question. He should not have approved this flawed and inadequate plan and should have warned his superior more emphatically and indicated to him the plan's shortcomings. In the course of the commission's work, the division
head announced that he had completed his intended term of service in his current position and that he was in the process of retiring from the Mossad.

The commission deems it appropriate to mention his particularly impressive conduct before it and his complete cooperation when giving evidence.

This short summary of the report is published in order to provide the public with some knowledge of the commission's conclusions and recommendations. The difficulty involved in preparing this publication is that it conceals more than it reveals, which might be misleading. Nevertheless, we feel it our duty to bring before the public a portion, however limited, of our main conclusions, the publication of which does not divulge information harmful to the state.

-ISRAELI RESERVE ARMY OFFICERS, LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU, JERUSALEM, 8 MARCH 1998-

[The letter, signed by 1,554 officers, was published as a full-page ad in Yedi'ot Aharonot.]

To the Prime Minister

Sir,

This letter is sent to you by citizens who serve as reserve soldiers and officers in the Israel Defense Forces.

It is not lightly that we took the decision to write you the following words. Once again, new horizons are opening for the state of Israel, possibilities for life of peace and coexistence in our region.

At such a time, we regard it as our duty to call upon you to avoid taking steps which future generations of our people would rue.

We write to you out of a feeling of deep anxiety.

A government preferring to maintain the "Greater Israel" borders rather than pursuing the possibility of a peaceful Israel living in good neighborliness would cause us to feel severe doubts.

A government preferring the existence of settlements beyond the Green Line to the ending of the historical conflict and the creation of normal relations in our region would cause us to doubt the justice of our way. A governmental policy leading to continued rule over two and a half million Palestinians could damage the Jewish-democratic character of the state and make it difficult for us to identify with the way of the State of Israel.

We are aware of Israel's security needs and of the difficulties on the way to peace, but we know that only peace can give true security.

The strength of the IDF comes from the soldiers' identification with the way of the State of Israel.

We call upon you to choose for the path of peace and strengthen our identification with the justice of our way.

-ISRAELI RESERVE ARMY OFFICERS, LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU, JERUSALEM, 8 MARCH 1998-
US SENATORS, LETTER SUPPORTING SECRETARY OF STATE ALBRIGHT ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, WASHINGTON, DC, 2 APRIL 1998

[With mounting tension between Pres. Clinton and the Netanyahu Govt. over US efforts to restart the MEPP, a number of senators, led by Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and Connie Mack (R-FL), drafted a letter to Clinton criticizing the Admin.'s role (see next document). This prompted a milder counter-letter, circulated by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and addressed to Sec. of State Albright, praising the Admin.'s efforts. The Levin letter was signed by six senators: Biden (D-DE), Daschel (D-SD), and Levin (D-MI) as well as (curiously) by Joseph Lieberman and by Graham (D-FL) and Lautenberg (D-NJ), both of whom also signed the Lieberman-Mack letter.]

Dear Madam Secretary,

America's support for Israel's existence and security has been steadfast for fifty years. This administration has strongly upheld that tradition, and we applaud you for doing so.

We know that for those engaged in the negotiations for the United States, the frustrations can be greater and the setbacks frequent; but American diplomacy is key to achieving peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

The United States, and the United States alone, has the ability to create the environment where negotiations can succeed and to explore options with the parties.

But as the administration fully knows, and has accepted as a fundamental premise, only the parties themselves can make peace-peace cannot be imposed upon them. We also recognize that the parties must be willing to make difficult decisions if peace is to be achieved and it is urgent for them to do so.

Following that premise, we believe it is important for the administration to reassert its determination both (1) to pursue those negotiations, and (2) to do so privately, without public disclosure of details of proposals that it is in the process of exploring with the parties. Disclosure of such proposals could be seen as substituting our judgment for that of the parties and as placing undue public pressure where private discussions and persuasion regarding specific details are more helpful in achieving the trust and confidence in our good offices that are so essential to the parties achieving a negotiated peace.

We would welcome your reassurance on both those points.

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US SENATORS, LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON WARNING HIM AGAINST PRESSURING ISRAEL, WASHINGTON, DC, 3 APRIL 1998

[The letter, sponsored by Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and Connie Mack (R-FL) and signed by 81 senators, was criticized by some because of AIPAC's role in promoting it.]

Dear Mr. President,

We are writing about the Middle East peace process and the published reports of a disagreement between our administration and the Israeli government that may lead to the United States publicly presenting a peace proposal which is known to be unacceptable to Israel. We hope these reports are not true.

At the heart of the Oslo peace process is a central understanding, a core bargain: land for peace. Israel cedes land and political authority to the Palestinians in exchange for which the Palestinians provide peace and security to Israel by rescinding their stated intention to destroy Israel and vowing to fight those who continue to perpetuate acts of terror and violence against Israel.

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This bargain was inherently more difficult for Israel since land is easier to give but harder to withdraw, and peace is harder to give but easier to withdraw. In fact, since the Oslo process began, Israel has yielded virtually all of the Gaza Strip and 27% of the West Bank - where 98% of the Palestinians live - to the Palestinian Authority for civil administration.

During the same period of time the Palestinian intifada has ended and cooperative contacts between Israel and the Palestinian Authority have increased, but the fact is that many Palestinians continue to use terror and violence as a political tool against Israel. Chairman Arafat, himself, repeatedly threatens renewal of widespread violence and continues to withhold full security cooperation with Israel.

Since Israel's withdrawal from Hebron in fulfillment of its Oslo promise last year, there has been no progress in the peace process. We share your administration's frustration with this lack of movement, but believe it would be a serious mistake for the United States to change from its traditional role as facilitator of the peace process to use public pressure against Israel. This would be particularly unfair and counterproductive since Israel has kept the promises it made at Oslo, and today is prepared to withdraw from even more territory of the West Bank before final status negotiations, territory that is qualitatively important to the Palestinians' desire for self-governance.

On the other hand, the Palestinians have not provided Israel with adequate security, and Chairman Arafat has refused to conclude negotiations for the remaining interim status issues, even though Israel's current offers move the Palestinian people significantly forward in their quest for self-governance. Chairman Arafat may hope that American frustration with the pace of the process will lead to an American decision to force even more from Israel. Instead, the United States should quietly urge the Palestinians to accept Israel's latest offer and move to final status negotiations.

America's commitment to Israel's security undergirds the entire peace process and provides Israel the confidence it needs to take very real risks for peace. As you know, Secretary Christopher made a written commitment that it would be up to Israel to decide the size and scope of further redeployments of Israeli forces on the West Bank. Presenting an American plan - especially one that includes a specific redeployment figure beyond what Israel believes to be in its national security interest before final status arrangements - runs counter to Secretary Christopher's commitment and can only undermine Israel's confidence.

American Middle East diplomacy, as you know and have shown so well, has always worked best when pursued quietly and in concert with Israel. We strongly urge you to continue our critical role as facilitator of a process that can ultimately succeed only through the direct negotiations of the parties themselves.

US REPRESENTATIVES, LETTER TO PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON SUPPORTING THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, WASHINGTON, DC, 6 APRIL 1998

[At the same time that the Lieberman-Mack letter (see above) criticizing Clinton's Middle East role was circulating in the Senate, a similar letter, also supported by AIPAC, was circulating in the House but not released until May to give time for more signatures. It inspired this counter-letter of support signed by 33 delegates, incl. 15 Jewish House members.]

Dear Mr. President,

As the Middle East approaches another crossroads - and the world continues to face the dual threats of terrorism and non-conventional weapons - we write to express our bipartisan support for America's ongoing efforts to help achieve a diplomatic resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The success of these efforts is crucial to the fulfillment of America's commitments to ensure Israeli security, to enhance regional stability and to protect U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East.
In seeking ways to move the peace talks forward, America has relied on fundamental principles that are critical to the achievement of an agreement. First and foremost, Secretary of State Albright has insisted that a 100% Palestinian effort against terror and Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation are *sine qua non* of further progress; this must never be forgotten.

As we continue these efforts, the U.S. must never endeavor to impose an agreement; only the parties themselves can make the vital decisions about their futures. We must never presume to pressure Israel, but instead we must use respectful, steady-handed diplomacy to move the process forward, as Republican and Democratic administrations have done over the past twenty-four years - beginning with the first Israeli-Egyptian agreements.

At this juncture, as at many turning points in the past, American leadership in the peace process could once again prove decisive. That is why we support your continuing efforts to build bridges. Rather than attempting to dictate a solution, you are helping to create the conditions for progress, by suggesting ideas for breaking the impasse and urging restraint and realism.

We are keenly aware that, without American diplomacy, Israel and the Palestinians may not be able to bridge the current gaps between them. The longer this diplomatic stalemate persists, the greater the risk that extremism and violence will once again take center stage in the West Bank and Gaza.

Our commitments to Israel - our most important ally and closest friend in the Middle East - must remain unconditional, ironclad, and obvious to all. Our determination to end the spread of weapons of mass destruction must also be unrelenting. And our dedication to bringing peace and stability to the Middle East must be constant.

[The letter, which was signed by 221 people and had circulated since March, was finally released the day after PM Netanyahu - declaring that Israel does "not accept dictates" - declined to attend the Washington summit called by Sec. of State Albright. The text was circulated with a covering note pointing out that Pres. Clinton's pressure on Israel is "providing an incentive to Palestinian Chairman Arafat to hold-out in the hope that American pressure will move Israel in his direction" and warning representatives that, if unchecked, "our government's efforts, although they are well-intentioned, actually prevent the parties from making long-awaited progress."

Dear Mr. President:

As strong supporters of the Middle East peace process and American efforts to facilitate negotiations, we wish to express our support for your efforts to promote peace between Israel and her neighbors. However, we would like to express our concern about published reports that our government intends to publicly present a proposal which includes a specific withdrawal figure to Israel and Palestinians. We do not know if these reports are accurate, but we want you to know why we believe that such a course of action would be counterproductive.

At the heart of the Oslo process is a core bargain; Israel cedes land and political authority in exchange for which the Palestinians renounce terror and violence, and vow to fight those who continue to perpetrate such acts. Israel has ceded land and political authority. Virtually all of the Gaza Strip and 27% of the West Bank - where 98% of the Palestinians live - are now under the full civil administration of the Palestinian Authority. Chairman Arafat, however, repeatedly threatens renewal of widespread violence and continues to allow the use of terror and violence as a political tool. Despite that, Israel has announced its readiness to withdraw from yet more territory of the West Bank - even before final status negotiations - and has called for the start of negotiations immediately and on an accelerated basis.
Chairman Arafat may believe that keeping the peace process stalled works to his advantage. He has refused to conclude negotiations for the remaining interim status issues. He may hope that American frustration with the pace of the process will lead to an American plan to force more from Israel.

Such an expectation leaves Chairman Arafat with very little incentive to negotiate. That is why public presentation of such a specific plan is counterproductive.

America’s commitment to Israel’s security undergirds the entire peace process and provides Israel the confidence it needs to take very real risks for peace. As you know, Secretary Christopher made a written commitment that it would be up to Israel to decide the size and scope of further redeployments of Israeli forces on the West Bank. Public presentation of an American plan as has been reported in the media - especially one that includes a specific redeployment figure beyond what Israel believes to be prudent to its national security before final status arrangements - runs counter to Secretary Christopher’s commitment and can only undermine Israel’s confidence.

American Middle East diplomacy, as you know so well, has always worked best when pursued quietly and in concert with Israel. We strongly urge you to continue the critical American role as facilitator of a process that can ultimately succeed only through the direct negotiations by the parties themselves.

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SPEAKER OF THE US HOUSE, NEWT GINGRICH, LETTER TO PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON ON THE ADMINISTRATION’S ISRAEL POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC, 6 MAY 1998

I have followed the recent changes in your administration’s Israel policy with a deep and growing sense of concern.

I strongly believe that genuine and lasting peace in Israel can only be achieved through voluntary direct dialogue between the parties, and not as a result of heavy-handed outside pressure by the United States. Israel must be able to decide her own security needs and set her own conditions for negotiations without facing coercion from the U.S.

If your administration uses its influence to unilaterally design a "solution" or force Israel to the table despite Israel’s legitimate concerns regarding terrorism, then we are removing any incentive for Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority to negotiate. What motivation does Chairman Arafat have to move toward common ground when America volunteers to drag Israel to his current position?

Worse, America’s strong-arm tactics would send a clear signal to the supporters of terrorism that their murderous actions are an effective tool in forcing concessions from Israel. Such signals endanger Israel and further weaken the peace process.

Our most loyal democratic allies in the region should not be punished with threats and ultimatums, but given our fullest confidence as they attempt to balance their mutual needs of peace and security. America’s best assistance can be offered as a facilitator, not a bully.

Your administration must reevaluate its policy in this area.

* * *
US FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, REMARKS ON PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD, WASHINGTON, DC, 6 MAY 1998

[Clinton was speaking via WorldNet satellite with 75 Israeli and Arab teenagers attending a Middle East Youth Summit in Villars, Switzerland. On a question about the potential role of Palestinian women in politics she said that "I would hope that women in the Palestine state, just as throughout the Middle East, would be given the opportunity to demonstrate their talents and make their contributions." During the question-and-answer period, an Israeli student, picking up on that comment, asked the following question that elicited the controversial statement, which a White House spokesman later the same day declared as "her own personal view. The administration's position on this matter has not changed."]

Question: [...] I would like to know very sincerely what do you think will be the consequences of your declaration a few minutes ago of Palestine, considering to the fact that this country does not exist? Thank you.

Mrs. Clinton: Well, I think that it will be in the long-term interests of the Middle East for Palestine to be a state and for it to be a state that is responsible for its citizens' well being, a state that has responsibility for providing education and health care and economic opportunity to its citizens, a state that has to accept the responsibility of governing. I think that is very important for the Palestinian people. But I also think it's very important for the broader goal of peace in the Middle East.

So I think that the territory that the Palestinians currently inhabit, and whatever additional territory they may obtain through the peace negotiations, should be considered and evolve into a functioning modern state that is responsible for the well-being of its people and is seen on the same footing as any other state in terms of dealing responsibly with all of the issues that state governments must deal with.

GOOD Afternoon, I am pleased to be here.

Two weeks ago, before departing for Asia and talks in London on the Middle East, I attended a dinner sponsored by the Seeds of Peace. This is a group that brings young people together from all around the Middle East to learn about and from each other to go beyond the stereotypes and to understand how much they have in common.

At that dinner, I was given a letter signed by Arab and Israeli youngsters which I hand-delivered in London to Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat. I want to begin my remarks today by quoting from that letter.

“In our history books, the Middle East has always appeared as (a) ... magnificent crossroads. Yet ... we have not tasted its grandness, for we are blinded by its destructive wars...

We at Seeds of Peace had a taste of what it is like to coexist peacefully. We learned to accept the fact that both sides, Arabs and Israelis, have a right to a home in this disputed holy land... We are writing this letter as people who have experienced peace temporarily and we enjoyed the taste, but we want the whole pie. However, this is up to you. It is up to you to shape or build our future.”
I would have liked very, very much to have been able to return to the United States this past weekend with the news that the prayers of those young people had been answered and that a new milestone in the Middle East peace process had been reached.

It was our hope that this week would have marked the start of permanent status negotiations between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat, hosted by the President of the United States.

Unfortunately, despite exhaustive - and exhausting - efforts to remove them, there remain obstacles to an agreement that would allow those permanent status talks to begin.

However, I look forward to meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu here in Washington tomorrow to see if it is possible to clear the way.

Today, I want to do two things. First, on behalf of President Clinton, I want to reaffirm America's commitment to the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace and our determination to continue exploring every possible avenue for helping the parties to achieve it. We do this because it is in our interests, and because it is right. The peoples of the Middle East deserve a future free from terror and violence; a future in which they can prosper in security and peace.

Second, I wanted to explain the logic of our approach and provide some perspective about what we have been doing in recent months to overcome the impasse that has developed in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

The past year has been the most disappointing since the Oslo accords were signed in 1993. It was 16 months ago that active US mediation helped to produce an agreement on Hebron. Since then, a crisis of confidence has arisen between Israelis and Palestinians that has stalled progress at the bargaining table, and put at risk both historic accomplishments and future hopes.

In only two years, we've gone from a situation where Israel had some form of peace negotiation, relationship or promising contact with every Arab state except Iraq and Libya to a stalemate which has eroded regional cooperation on issues such as water, economic integration, the environment and refugees; stalled Arab-Israeli contacts; and caused optimism to be replaced by a sense of fatalism and helplessness about the future.

At the root of the stalemate is a crisis of partnership between Israelis and Palestinians wherein short term tactical considerations have too often trumped broader understandings of common interest and cooperation.

Indeed, we have gone from a situation where no problem was too big to solve to a situation where every issue is argued about. We have seen tragic incidents of terror, unilateral actions and provocative rhetoric undermine the historic accomplishments of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

For more than a year now, the United States has been working hard to revive the missing spirit of partnership. We have been trying literally to restore the ability of the parties to talk constructively with each other, to overcome mistrust, to solve problems, to arrive at agreements and to implement obligations.

Early last year, we were approached by Prime Minister Netanyahu with an idea for reorienting the process. He argued that the confidence-building period provided for under the Oslo Accords had begun instead to destroy confidence - and he was right.

The Prime Minister argued that it therefore made sense to move directly into final status negotiations and to do so on an accelerated timetable. He asked President Clinton to help achieve this purpose. And as Israel's ally and friend, the President decided to try to do so.
Beginning last spring, and throughout the summer of 1997, we sought an agreement that would put the process back on track by focusing the parties on the importance of getting to permanent status talks. In August, I proposed in a speech here in Washington that the parties "marry the incremental approach of the interim agreement ... to an accelerated approach to permanent status."

Then, last September, the Israelis and Palestinians agreed on a four part agenda that included accelerated permanent status talks and three other issues: security with the emphasis on preempting and fighting terror, the further redeployment of Israeli troops, and a time-out on unhelpful unilateral steps. There followed several months of intensive discussions on that agenda, along with resumed negotiations on key interim issues.

During this period, there was some narrowing in the differences between the parties, but very substantial gaps remained. Despite our efforts, we could not get the Israelis and Palestinians to agree to an accord.

Both urged us, nevertheless, to persist and to help them find a way to bridge their differences. By early this year we had come to the conclusion that even if the parties could not be responsive to each other's ideas, they might respond to ours.

Working closely and quietly with both sides, we began to share our views on how the parties might resolve their differences over the four part agenda.

In January, here in Washington, President Clinton met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat. I met with them when I traveled to the region in February and then again in Europe in March. Ambassador Ross and Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have been in almost constant contact. Throughout, we continued to urge the parties to sort out the issues directly with each other.

Unfortunately, none of these discussions produced sufficient results. It was clear that tough decisions were required if Israelis and Palestinians were to reach an agreement, and that neither side was prepared to make them.

Having worked since January to share our thoughts informally with the parties at the highest level, it was logical that we should at some point share a more fully integrated set of ideas in an effort to facilitate decisions. We took this step not because we wanted to, but because there seemed no other way to break the dangerous logjam that had developed.

Our ideas stemmed from intensive consultations with both sides and take into account both the obligations each side has accepted and the vital interests each must protect. They are balanced, flexible, practical and reasonable.

They are based on the principle of reciprocity, another concept stressed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and embraced by us because of our belief that parallel implementation of each side's obligations is the only way to restore the partnership between Israelis and Palestinians.

In presenting our ideas, we made it clear that we were offering them as suggestions, not as an ultimatum or an effort to impose a settlement. Both parties have their own decision making processes and interests, which we respect. Our purpose was only, in response to the parties' request, to help them find the way forward.

The role of the mediator is never an easy one. The challenge is how to meet the needs of both sides in a way that is acceptable to the other. And logically, that presents both sides with the need to be flexible and to make decisions that reflect the concerns not just of one party, but of two.

In this regard, our ideas were designed to find that balance and to persuade each side that the balance could be struck in a way that addressed their particular requirements.
Now, let me try to explain our approach as it relates to addressing Israel's requirements, foremost of which is security.

Let me say at the outset that there should be no doubt about the commitment of the Clinton Administration or of America to Israeli security. That commitment is unshakable and has been demonstrated over and over again, not only in words but in actions; in our joint struggle against terrorism; in the assistance to Israel that the American people have so long and so generously provided; and in the steps we have taken to ensure Israel's qualitative military edge.

These include providing Israel with the F-15-I, the most advanced fighter aircraft in the American arsenal; the pre-positioning of American military stocks and material in Israel for possible joint use; and jointly-funded research and development projects designed to enhance Israel's ability to protect itself against long range missiles and Katyusha rockets.

And let me add that our commitment to Israel's security does not come with a time limit. There is no expiration date. It will continue today, tomorrow and for as long as the sun shall rise. I said that in Israel last year and I meant it. And that's true whether there is progress in the Middle East peace process or not - or whether we have differences with Israel at a particular moment or not.

At the same time, we have agreed with Israeli leaders from Prime Ministers Ben Gurion to Begin and from Rabin to Netanyahu that the key to long term security for the Israeli people lies in lasting peace. That is why we have been working so hard to resolve the present impasse. In so doing, we would not for a minute assert for ourselves the right to determine Israel's security needs. That is - and must remain - an Israeli prerogative.

Moreover, both in our ideas and in the way we presented them, we took fully into account Israeli concerns both about process and substance.

For example, we have given the parties many weeks to consider our ideas in private; we did not launch a public campaign on their behalf. And in response primarily to Israeli requests, we allowed more time and then more time and then more time for our suggestions to be studied, considered and discussed.

Moreover, the ideas we presented posed some very difficult choices for the Palestinians. They were required to make substantial changes in their negotiating position. Nevertheless, Chairman Arafat agreed to our ideas in principle.

The real centerpiece of our efforts to address Israeli requirements focused on dealing with Israel's fundamental and legitimate security concerns.

It was no coincidence that security was the first point on our four point agenda. Creating the right environment for negotiations had as its focus the issue of ensuring that Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation was functioning at 100% and that Palestinians were exerting 100% effort to take effective unilateral steps against terror. That's why our ideas on security create a structure to ensure that the fight against terror will not be episodic, but that it endures.

From the beginning, we have made the security issue the center of our dialogue with the Palestinians. We have pressed them to understand that the fight against terror is a basic Palestinian interest.

And what we have seen, especially over the past several months, is a concerted Palestinian effort - even in the absence of an agreement with Israel on the four part agenda - against those who would threaten peace with terror and violence. The Palestinian Authority deserves credit for taking on such groups, but it is essential as they do, that others in the region who tell us they support peace refrain from greeting with cordial hospitality and financial backing the enemies of peace.
Our suggestions for Israeli redeployments were also formulated with Israel's prerogatives and concerns in mind. We recognize, as reflected in the Christopher letter, that further redeployment is an Israeli responsibility under Oslo, rather than an issue to be negotiated. But it is in the nature of partnership that Israel should take Palestinian concerns into account, while following the terms of its agreement. Otherwise, the peace process cannot move forward.

In presenting our ideas, we did not define the areas from which Israel should redeploy. Our ideas placed a premium on Israel retaining overall security responsibility in the areas affected by the proposed redeployment. And our suggestion about the size of the next redeployment came down far closer to Israel's position than to that of the Palestinians.

Why did we suggest a size? Because that is the only way to reach the agreement on launching permanent status talks that Prime Minister Netanyahu asked us to achieve.

In presenting and discussing our ideas, we have acted with discretion and patience. Because we realize the difficulty of the decisions the parties were being asked to make, we have gone the extra mile - in fact, the extra 20,000 miles back and forth across the Atlantic many times. And we have done so without complaint, because America will always go the extra mile for peace.

I want to mention at this point also that America's commitment to peace and security in the Middle East has historically been a bipartisan commitment, stretching from the administrations of Truman and Eisenhower to Bush and Clinton.

Because that commitment involves the security of a cherished ally, and the vital strategic interests of the United States, our leaders have historically stood together - in support of Israel and shoulder to shoulder with our Arab friends in pursuit of peace. If America is to play its proper role in promoting stability in the Middle East, it is imperative that our leaders now - in the Executive Branch, in Congress, and within the Jewish-American and Arab-American communities - continue to work together on behalf of shared goals.

Tomorrow, I will meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu again. I very much look forward to that meeting. We are working hard to overcome differences and I hope we will be able to make progress.

But the key point that I have been emphasizing to both Israeli and Palestinian leaders is that although America remains committed to the pursuit of peace, it is up to them - not to us - whether peace is achieved.

Over the past months, we have played the role of mediator, counselor, friend, shutter, cajoler and idea-maker. We have responded whenever called at literally any time of the day or night. We have done this because we care about Israel and its people; we care about the Palestinians and Arabs; and we care about the future peace and stability of the region.

We are not giving any ultimatums; we are not threatening any country's security; we are not trying to make any party suffer at the expense of another - all we are trying to do is find the path to peace, as the parties have repeatedly urged us to do.

And what we have especially been trying to do in recent weeks is to issue a wake-up call. The leaders of the region have reached a crossroads. Act before it is too late. Decide before the peace process collapses. And understand that in a neighborhood as tough as the Middle East, there is no security from hard choices, and no lasting security without hard choices.

The parties must understand, as well, that there is urgency to this task. For time is no longer an ally of this process; it has become an adversary.

The historic accomplishments that flowed from the Oslo process represented a strategic opportunity for peace that is now being put at risk.
Consider that just two years ago, at Sharm al-Sheikh, representatives from Israel and a host of Arab states gathered at the Summit of the Peacemakers to say no to terror and yes to peace. They saw Israel as a partner. Unfortunately, that exhilarating sense of partnership has been lost.

Second, the very idea that negotiations can peacefully resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict is now under threat. Unless the leaders are willing to make hard choices, the field will be left to extremists who have no interest in peace.

Third, the clock continues to tick. The interim period under Oslo concludes on May 4, 1999 - less than a year from now. Those who believe that drifting is acceptable, or who believe they can declare unilateral positions or take unilateral acts when the interim period ends, are courting disaster.

Both sides must understand that the issues reserved for permanent status discussions - including the status of the West Bank and Gaza and of settlements - can only be settled by negotiation. That was the spirit and logic of Oslo.

America's interest - and goal - is a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, including the principle of land for peace. That will require decisive progress on all tracks, including the Israel-Lebanon track, and the Israel-Syria track.

We are not a party to the negotiations. As President Clinton has repeatedly emphasized, it is not our right, nor our intention, nor is it within our capacity, to dictate the terms or impose a settlement.

At the same time, our credibility and interests are indeed affected by what the Israelis, Palestinians and Arabs do or fail to do. We are prepared to support their efforts as long as we judge they are serious about wanting to reach an agreement; and serious enough to make the decisions necessary to achieve it.

For too long, too many children in too many parts of the Middle East have grown up amidst violence, deprivation and fear.

Too many lives have been cut short by the terrorist's bomb, the enemy's shell and the assassin's bullet.

Too many opportunities have been lost to heal old wounds, narrow differences and transform destructive conflict into constructive cooperation.

Everyone with a stake in the Middle East has an obligation to do what can be done to seize the strategic opportunity for peace that now exists and thereby to make possible a future of stability and prosperity for all the people of the region.

The United States believes this kind of future is within our grasp. But the peoples of the region will not realize that future if their leaders do not reach out, with a vision as great as the goal, to overcome past grievances, treat neighbors as partners, and undertake in good faith the hard work of cooperation and peace. All that is required is for each to accord dignity and accept responsibility; and to act not out of passion and fear, but out of reason and hope.

For the peoples of the region, who have suffered too long, the path out of the wilderness is uphill, but clearly marked. The time has come now, before the dusk obscures the guideposts, to move up that road - and by so doing, to answer the too-long denied prayers of the children - all the children - of the Middle East.

Thank you very much.

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G8 SUMMIT, STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS,
BIRMINGHAM, 15 MAY 1998

Political Statement - Regional Issues

[...] MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

We are deeply concerned at the continuing stalemate in the peace process, with concluded agreements not yet being implemented. We encourage all efforts to help revive the peace process. We strongly support the efforts to gain the agreement of the parties to a package of constructive and realistic ideas which have already been presented by the United States, including a second Israeli redeployment. We welcome Palestinian agreement in principle to these ideas which, if accepted by all sides, would lead to the resumption of final status talks. We call on Israeli and Palestinian leaders to refrain from unilateral acts which pre-determine the final status negotiations and undermine confidence. We remain determined to work with all the parties – Israel, the Palestinians, Syria, Lebanon – for a comprehensive peace. A resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would build confidence in the region and help to restore momentum to the peace process as a whole. A continuing blockage on the other hand could have grave consequences for security throughout the region.

 ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU, ADDRESS ON ISRAEL AND THE PEACE PROCESS, AIPAC, WASHINGTON, DC, 17 MAY 1998 [EXCERPTS]

Only last week, there were bloody riots in Jerusalem, in Bethlehem and Gaza, and again, they resulted in the tragic loss of life. I think that every - every innocent person that dies, every child that dies - I don't care if it's an Israeli child or a Palestinian child - that is a tragedy, a tragedy for that life cut down, a tragedy for that family, for those mothers and fathers - their pain for the rest of their life.

No one hurts more than we do when life is lost, no matter whose life is lost. But we cannot ignore another fact. And that is that these were not riots protesting the dispute over percentages or protesting that the Oslo process is not moving fast enough or delays - no. You know what these riots were about? Do any of you?

Ah - the handful who go beyond the press, that's good. Let me tell you. These were riots that were sponsored and organized by the Palestinian Authority to protest the actual existence, the founding of the State of Israel fifty years ago. They gave it a name - al-Nakba - the Great Disaster. This is over the partition resolution when Israel was a tiny country.

They refused then to accept Israel in any form, in any shape, in any boundary. This was and remains the source of the conflict between us and our Arab neighbors. And to the extent that we have that remaining opposition to the Jewish state, it is an opposition to the Jewish state - period.

And yet what we see when the Palestinian Authority that is supposed to be at peace with us is organizing these riots, that means that there are those there who still harbor the basic hostility to the basic existence of the state. We cannot ignore these riots against the very survival and existence of the State of Israel, and we cannot ignore what motivates them, just as we cannot ignore those demonstrations on behalf of Saddam Hussein that we saw just a few months ago and his calls to annihilate the state.

We cannot ignore such riots because they are not isolated incidents. They follow a pattern of total disregard of the Palestinian Authority for the commitments and obligations of the Oslo process.

I don't know if you're aware of it - but the Palestinian Authority made commitments to us three times - at least three times, some of them four and five times. But three times - first, in the Gaza-Jericho
accord of 1994; again in the Oslo II accord of 1995; and yet again, in the Hebron protocol of 1997, which I was a party to.

None of those commitments, to date, have been fulfilled, and they must be fulfilled if peace is to have any meaning. If contracts, treaties and peace are to have any meaning the Palestinian Authority must fulfill its commitments. And the first commitment they must fulfill is that they must abolish the Palestinian National Charter.

If they tell me - But it's hard. It's hard for Arafat to convene several hundred members of the Palestine National Council. I say - So what? This is the test of peace. If he cannot get the governing body of the Palestinian Authority to meet and ratify the letter that Yasir Arafat sent to President Clinton itemizing those items of the PLO charter that will be thrown into the dustbin so that Israel no longer is destined for distinction in their eyes, if he cannot do a simple act like that, this is not a real peace. We insist, and we stand on the fulfillment of the commitment given to us that the Palestine National Charter will be abolished. It must be abolished.

And equally, they must fulfill their other obligations. They must uproot the terrorist infrastructure. They must transfer wanted fugitives to Israel. They must confiscate all illegal weapons - and that's not by passing a law saying that people can hold Kalashnikovs legally, things like that. They have to take possession of control of law, of order. They must live up to what they promised us. They must stop incitement - just as we have seen in recent days, in recent years.

They must turn toward peace. They must clean up Palestinian textbooks. They must show Israel on those maps. How can you make peace with a country that doesn't even exist?

This is what has to be done - in word, in deed, in inner conviction. They must live up to the contract.

And I believe that Palestinian compliance is one of the two necessary foundations for moving the peace process forward. Mind you, our government is not asking for a single new commitment. Nothing is new. This is the same commitment, these are the same promises that were given to us, once, twice, twice. And it's about time that we have Palestinian compliance. This is foundation number one for the advancement of the peace.

You may ask, what about Israeli compliance, to which I answer, we've given and we've fulfilled - what we promised to give and what we promised to fulfill. A full 98 percent of the Palestinians now live in land that we transferred over to the Palestinians. There is no more - quote - the so-called occupation. All the Palestinians now live under Palestinian jurisdiction. We promised to do it; we did it.

We further promised to do a deliberation and a consideration on further redeployment. We made a decision on the first redeployment, applauded by the United States, exactly on the date that we promised to do the Hebron protocol two weeks after we redeployed from Hebron. And mind you we redeployed from Hebron and mind you, we released women prisoners, a very difficult decision for me personally because these were terrorist women who had murdered innocent people. And I've staked a good portion of my life and my own beliefs against such an action. But this was agreed upon by the previous government, and we did that, too.

We've allowed Palestinians to work at Israel in unprecedented numbers. There are now 60,000 legal workers and about twice that number altogether with illegal workers-more workers in Israel than at the time before the intifada. We've double trained.

We've doubled the number of merchants who can have VIP passes so they don't have to go through checkpoints. We've done all that because we believe in peace and we want peace, and we believe in compliance. We've complied; they have not. We want peace for something, not for nothing. And we certainly don't believe in trading land for terrorism.
Which brings me to the second point. If compliance is the first foundation to peace with the Palestinians, then the second is security. We've agreed and we're prepared to redeploy from additional lands. But we know that no peace agreement that is struck in which we are asked to endanger our defenses, to erode the barricades that defend the Jewish state - no peace treaty like that would endure and would be worth signing. And that is why all successive American administrations have agreed with us that it is Israel, and Israel alone, that must determine its security needs - and Israel, and Israel alone, that must determine its redeployment.

I know that many consider the equation differently. They say to us - You know, but the real security for Israel is peace. They don't live in the Middle East. Peace is a tremendous, tremendous object. It's a tremendous desire. But peace agreements, a piece of paper, is important. We strive for it. Normalization is important. We strive for it. But normalization in our part of the world amidst undemocratized regimes is reversible like that [snaps his fingers]. A ruler, a government on the other side decides to stop normalization, it stops. Like that. They cut down the number of tourists like that. They cut down the number of trade exchanges like that. They cut you out of a book fair like that. Normalization is an add-on. It's a tremendous boost. But because we don't live in a democratic environment, the fact that we have people-to-people exchanges does not mean much because the people don't determine policy. They don't elect the governments. And as a result, what determines whether we can have peace in the first place is the ability to deter the violation of the peace, the ability to deter war.

In the Middle East, the foundation for peace is security. Without security, peace is meaningless. Peace without security is a sham. It will not last. It is not something that we can ever accept. […] What we have sought is to continue the negotiations, and indeed, to continue the process, by transferring to Palestinian control only those lands that are not vital for Israel's security. And when I talk about the importance to Israel's security, this is not an abstract concept. It means that we have to be responsible so that a bus of forty or fifty children is not blown up because of a bad decision that we took, so that a plane landing in Ben Gurion Airport or in Jerusalem Airport is not blown up by a shoulder-fired missile from terrain around that airport that we do not control because of a rash decision. It means that a housewife in Tel Aviv can open the tap and there's water running to it, and it's not been dried up because of a rash decision that handed over control of our aquifers to the wrong hands. It means that our early warning stations will be in our control so that we can see incoming aircraft or missiles, and we cannot make a rash decision on that, either.

These are not abstract or tactical or stratagems that we use in order to build up some number. It is a real consideration for real security that we know is important for the daily life, for running the lives and protecting the lives of our children, but also for our grandchildren. Because Israel must retain those defensive buffers that give it security against terrorism and against any future attack.

This is what will keep the peace. This is what has brought the peace. If I had to say, what is the day - give me the day, the one day, that peace became possible in the Middle East between Israel and its neighbors, and I would say that day was June 12th, 1967. Because on that day, Israel pushed the border from the suburbs of Tel Aviv to the banks of the Jordan, across a stone wall a thousand meters high, the mountains of Samaria and Judea, and made peace possible, because it made successful conquest impossible. […]

When we seek now a solution for our conflict with the Palestinians, we seek a solution that will give the people who are living on that wall, the Palestinians, the ability to govern their lives but not any ability to threaten our life. It is possible to do that. There are ways and concepts of doing that. But one of them is not unbridled self-determination.

If every national group - and there are about fifty of them in fifty countries right now - were to have a state unlimited in power, fully sovereign, fully independent because they claim it, then the international water (sic) would collapse in a fortnight.

And I can tell you that we must find a different arrangement where all of the powers the Palestinians need to govern themselves are in their possession. Some of the powers are shared between us - those that relate, for example, to environment. Mosquitoes don't know boundaries or the underwater tables of water.
And some of the powers, those that relate to security, those that relate to the external defense of the country, those that prohibit the Palestinian entity from making pacts with Iraq or with Iran, those powers remain with Israel. This is a real formula for real peace in the real Middle East. […]

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COMMITTEE FOR SAVING THE OSLO ACCORDS, INTERNATIONAL APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, PARIS, MAY 1998

[The Committee, founded in Paris in 1997 by a group of activists, mainly French Jews, collected over 1,000 signatures, incl. 17 Nobel laureates as well as academics, jurists, writers and artists. The text was published in the New York Review of Books, on 16 July 1998]

For a year and a half, the Israeli government has undertaken to turn into an empty shell the Oslo agreement which Israel and the PLO signed in Washington, D.C. on September 15, 1993.

Such a policy of contempt, of outright lies and provocations (through continued settlements, repeated blockade of occupied territories…), increasingly isolates Israel from other nations, affects its economic development, and seriously jeopardizes peace as well as the future of the country.

Israel cannot forever ignore the world around her. Her government cannot keep on inflicting both military occupation and economic asphyxia on the Palestinians, while trampling their national aspirations by reducing their territory to a series of Bantustans. Mr. Netanyahu's policy, far from thwarting terrorism, has only exacerbated existing antagonisms, made the country more unsafe, and increased the risks of war.

Only a firm commitment toward mutual recognition and the sharing of the land between the two peoples will enable the Zionist endeavor engaged upon a hundred years ago to retain its legitimacy. Unconditional support of the legitimacy of Israel does not imply unconditional support of the Israeli government.

We are calling upon the Diaspora and all of the friends of Israel to raise their voice to stop the systematic undermining of the peace process and to ensure that this peace process be reinstated, in accordance with the agreements which have been signed.

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US UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE STUART E. EIZENSTAT, ADDRESS ON "ISRAELIS STAKE IN THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS," JERUSALEM, 14 JUNE 1998

Thank you for that kind introduction. In this job, as the State Department's senior official for economic issues worldwide, I am on the go a great deal, flying to a host of cities and countries around the world. But I am always glad to have the chance to return to Jerusalem, which is one of the world's truly special, truly magical cities - one with which I have strong personal ties, as my son and his family are living and studying here, and many other relatives and close friends live here permanently.

World Economic Integration

All of the senior Policy-makers in Washington understand that an open, growing, and prosperous world economy is an important prerequisite not only for America's economic health, but also for its national security. With the increasing integration of the global economy, economic and financial developments in one part of the world influence events in places far away - or at least what used to be considered far away. Economic issues therefore play an increasingly important role in the making and shaping of U.S. foreign policy on a day-to-day basis.

The senior leadership of the State Department, along with our colleagues in the Treasury, the White house, and the Federal Reserve, have devoted an enormous amount of time and energy over the past year
trying to cope with the Asian financial crisis and its various economic and political implications. We have done so precisely because what happens in Asia directly affects important American economic and political interests, both in the region, and in the world at large. We are likely to lose from one-half to one percent of growth due to the Asia financial crisis and our current account and trade deficits will soar.

I understand from my friends and colleagues here that the Asian crisis has also received a good deal of attention in Israel. The estimates I have seen are that the Asian crisis - through its direct effects on Israeli exports and through its indirect effects on world trade more generally - could take perhaps a half a percent or more off of Israel's already weak 1998 economic growth rate. Even though Israel's influence over what happens in Asia is relatively modest, Israel's concern over events there is entirely appropriate, in light of the linkages in today's global economy.

Closer to Home: the Palestinian Economy

But my purpose here today is not to talk about the Asian economic crisis, as important as it is for Israel, but about an economic crisis that is much closer to home, one that affects Israeli economic and political interests much more directly, and over which Israel has much more influence: the economic crisis engulfing your immediate neighbors, the Palestinians. For if it is appropriate for Israelis to be concerned about events in Korea or Indonesia - and you should - then you should be even more concerned over the continuing economic trauma that is happening right in your own backyards.

When I visited Israel last October and December, I spoke of the "catastrophic" economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza. Yesterday, I visited the territories again. And while there are some signs of improvement due to the absence of closures and the increased number of Palestinian workers given permits in Israel, I cannot emphasize too strongly that the situation remains dire.

This is not the peace process that either the Palestinians anticipated or deserve. Israel has benefited greatly from the peace process. GDP increased an average of more than 6 percent between 1994 and 1996. Unemployment, though rising today, is still lower than the 11.1 percent rate in 1992. Direct investment has soared from 0.8 percent of GDP in 1992 to 3.5 percent in 1997 and foreign investors who once shunned Israel's market are flooding in. But this has not been the case for the Palestinian economy. In fact, the opposite is the case. The situation must be reversed and quickly. We are at risk of diminishing the constituency for peace, not only among the public at large, but increasingly among the Palestinian business people who expected the peace process to deliver economic stability, normalcy and improved relations with their Israeli partners and customers. Jordanians have a frustration with the lack of peace dividends as well.

The Palestinian economy has gone backward, not forward since the Oslo peace accords. Simply put, Palestinians are earning less, spending less, and growing even poorer.

- One-fifth of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza live in poverty, struggling to get by on less than eight shekels a day.
- The unemployment rate among Palestinians stands at about 30%, and has been about that high for a number of years. To put it mildly, that is shockingly high. Few places in the world, in a peace-time environment, approach that level. And as we all know, unemployment is a key barometer of social and political pressures.
- According to the IMF, real per capita GNP has plunged by about 22% since the Declaration of Principles in 1993 and currently stands at $1,700 annually, roughly one-tenth Israel's per capita income.
- In 1997, Palestinian living standards continued to slip: monthly wages fell by 6% in 1997, and household expenditures fell by almost 10%. Put simply, Palestinians are earning less, spending less, and growing ever poorer.

But the numbers are only part of the story. People can accept economic sacrifices in the short term if they can hope for a more prosperous future. And the Oslo and Paris agreements offered such hope.
The Protocol on Economic Relations opened with a pledge by both sides to cooperate in the economic arena on the basis of mutual respect for each others' economic interests, reciprocity, equity and fairness. The agreement goes on to stipulate the free movement of industrial goods, free of any restrictions, including customs and income taxes, and Palestinian rights to export to external markets without restrictions. For agricultural goods the protocol also guaranteed free movement, with appropriate guarantees for health and safety. Both sides also agreed to attempt to maintain normal labor flows. The Economic Protocol envisaged a trade regime that amounted to a virtual free trade area agreement between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza - allowing the Palestinians to reorient their economy towards agricultural and industrial exports and reduce their dependence on the export of labor.

And, just as important, the peace process allowed Palestinians to hope that political and economic stability would reduce the economic uncertainty that was the biggest single impediment to private investment.

As we all know, things have not turned out that way. Terrorist acts have led to closures and other restrictions on the movement of people and goods. There has been little progress in the peace process in recent years, and little new private investment in the West Bank and Gaza. The economic hopes that were sustained by Oslo and subsequent agreements are being steadily dashed by impediments to the free flow of labor and goods.

The policy of closure which has been in effect in one way or another since 1994 is the most frequently cited problem. Fortunately, since we have not seen any major terrorist bombings, there have not been any full closures since last September. But a recent IMF paper points out that closures have a long term residual effect because they deter future investment and distort the business practices of existing businesses - for example by forcing firms to stockpile raw materials or by causing commodity exporters to raise prices to cover the costs of goods that must be dumped during closures. These increased costs, combined with the uncertainty of closures themselves, in turn, can jeopardize relations with buyers in external markets. In short, the IMF suggests the threat of closures is itself an impediment to Palestinian economic development.

In addition to closures, there are other restrictions on the movement of Palestinian goods that, according to the World Bank, have tripled the transportation costs for a truckload of goods between the West Bank and Gaza. These two parts of the territories are virtually completely divided as economic units. For Palestinian exporters, this raises the costs of both inputs and outputs. Palestinian exporters to third countries face an additional barrier, since their goods must go through a further inspection at the Israeli port of exit. Imports are delayed. In practical terms, this means that Gazans generally do not import from the West Bank. For example, they buy more expensive Israeli grapes because the transportation costs associated with the security measures, make West Bank grapes uncompetitive. Palestinian business people have told me that it is cheaper to ship a container of goods from Hebron to Venice, than from Hebron to Gaza.

There are also restrictions on the movement of business people, some of which are quite difficult to understand from a security standpoint. For example, every Palestinian businessman must have a special pass to leave the West Bank or Gaza. Israel has issued a total of 16,300 passes for travel of Palestinians into Israel, but less than one tenth of that amount for travel between the West Bank and Gaza. In practice, it is relatively easy for the average Palestinian businessperson in Ramallah to travel to Israel, but almost impossible for him or her to travel to Gaza.

Just last night, I had dinner with a prominent businessman from Hebron - a man with who has had good relations with Israeli officials for over thirty years. He has done business in Gaza for decades, but this ended in 1994 because he was not permitted to drive into Gaza. If he were to try, he would have to leave his car on the Israeli side and walk into Gaza, carrying his goods for about a kilometer, through the line for Palestinian laborers, and find a taxi on the other side. This is impractical.

These are just a few examples of the kinds of Israeli measures - all of them taken for security reasons - which have negated the benefits of free trade. To put it another way, while there are no tariffs, a set
of non-tariff barriers have been erected which have significantly affected the economy of the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel has the full right and responsibility to protect its citizens from the awful - and all too real - threat of terrorist attack. The prime responsibility of any state is the safety of its citizens. But it is likewise important that security measures take into account the risks to Israel which can arise from an impoverished population at its doorstep whose economic expectations are dashed. Every state has a primary right to security and only Israel can determine what is in its security interests. We cannot second-guess Israel's security needs from ten thousand miles away. What we can hope is that Israel will carefully balance its need to fight terrorism with a heightened perception that having a prosperous neighbor is in its security interests.

Let me be clear. Nothing justifies terrorism. No more than poverty is an excuse for crime. Those who plan and carry-out terrorist acts against Israeli citizens do so not because of poverty, but out of a twisted and radical political ideology. But prosperity will strengthen the forces of moderation and provide a greater equity for the broad Palestinian public in the peace process.

Promoting prosperity in the West Bank and Gaza is the best way to enhance Israel's security because it gives the Palestinians a stake in peace.

The Palestinian economy is in crisis - a crisis measured not just in terms of declining income but also of declining hope, as it becomes clear that the arrangements envisaged in the Paris agreement have not been fully realized.

The dire state of the Palestinian economy is not by any means the sole responsibility of Israel. The Palestinian Authority has been slow to implement investor-friendly tax, investment, intellectual property and procurement laws. A transparent set of rules and procedures, predictable arms-length bidding procedures are all essential building blocks which must be put into place to go with an increasingly positive capacity at budget management demonstrated by the Palestinian Authority. Yet investors must have certainty that there will be predictable markets open for their products at market-driven costs. That certainty does not exist.

**Impact on the Israeli Economy**

But why should this concern Israel? Doesn't Israel have enough economic problems of its own to worry about right now?

It is precisely because of Israel's economic problems that each and every Israeli should care about the economic crisis in the West Bank and Gaza. Just as America is concerned with the economic crisis in Asia thousands of miles away principally because of how it affects American interests, Israel should be concerned with the economic crisis among the Palestinians because of Israel's own interests. As none other than Prime Minister Netanyahu recently put it, before the Israel-American Chamber of Commerce a few weeks ago, speaking about measures to boost the Palestinian economy, "If it's good for them, (then) ultimately it's good for us." And I could not agree with him more.

First of all, in simple economic terms, the Palestinians are a vital market for Israeli products. When you exclude diamonds from the picture, next to the United States, the Palestinians are Israel's second largest export market overall - amounting to $1.6 billion in sales in 1997. This figure amounts to more than 10% of Israel's total non-diamond exports, and is well above Israel's exports to the UK ($1.2 billion), Germany ($900 million), or Japan ($450 million), markets traditionally seen as key to Israel's growth and prosperity.

Moreover, for the most part, the products that Palestinians buy are from precisely those sectors of the Israeli economy that are today suffering the most from the economic slowdown - food products and beverages, textiles and shoes, and other traditional industries. These industries are in no position to
lose customers, given that unemployment in the regions of Israel which rely on traditional industries is particularly acute. But you cannot make money from a customer who does not have any.

Second, Israel relies heavily on Palestinian labor. At its peak, some 120,000 Palestinians worked in Israel, most at higher wages than they could receive in the West Bank and Gaza. These are a critical part of the Palestinian economy. The Netanyahu government is to be commended for increasing the number of authorized Palestinian workers from its low point of 22,000 in 1996 to roughly 50,000 today. Yet this remains only about half of its peak. More permits would be granted if demand existed. Unfortunately, the previous government, in an effort to compensate for the uncertainty of closures on Israeli businesses and its impact on the flow of Palestinian labor, allowed a huge influx of foreign workers. Today, almost one in ten workers, over 200,000, are from abroad, with little if any connection to Zionist values. Of these numbers, roughly half are illegally here, presenting an increasing social problem and potentially displacing both Israeli and Palestinian workers. Foreign workers are far more expensive in strict economic terms. They are far less adaptable. And in social terms - as European nations such as Germany have learned and as I witnessed as U.S. Ambassador to the European Union - the long-term presence of foreign workers can be very politically and socially divisive.

I know that this government shares many of these concerns and has taken measures to try to reduce the number of foreign workers and increase the number of Palestinian workers. This is a very welcome development. I believe the next step is to try to make labor flows from the West Bank to Gaza more predictable. This benefits not only Palestinian workers but also Israeli employers.

Third, the Palestinian population can and does serve as a bridge to the broader Arab market, a market of 250 million consumers that is growing and modernizing rapidly. The opportunities for business and investment in the Middle East are enormous, one reason that I spend much of my time during visits such as this one to the region advocating on behalf of major U.S. firms interested in investing in Israel and in the Arab world. For example, many Arab governments - such as Egypt and Jordan - are implementing ambitious privatization programs, opening up lucrative sectors to outside investment. The commercial opportunities in the telecommunications sector along are staggering: according to the International Finance Corporation, some nine billion dollars will need to be invested annually in the Middle East and North Africa just to keep up with increasing demand.

Some day, I hope fervently sooner rather than later, Israelis will be able to take advantage of these opportunities on their own. In the current political environment, and for the foreseeable future, Israeli business people will need partners to penetrate Arab markets. Palestinians - with their well-educated, knowledgeable and energetic population, their proximity, their Arabic language, and their access to large pools of expatriate financing - would be a perfect fit.

And finally, there is what is loosely known as the "contagion factor." Israelis often see themselves as largely separate from the broader Middle East, a European country on the eastern edge of the Mediterranean. To a large extent, this is accurate. But, for better or worse, Israel is part of the Middle East, and is viewed as such by international markets and investors. The stability of Israel's neighbors - both politically and economically - affects investors' perceptions of Israel's economy. A robust Palestinian economy is essential to change this perception of regional instability, which will have a clear, positive impact on investor attitudes towards Israel.

The Agenda, Past and Future

A prosperous Palestinian economy and increased trade and economic access between the West Bank, Gaza and Israel - as well as increased access by Jordan to the Israeli and West Bank/Gaza markets - is in everyone's interest. It is a win-win situation for Israel and the Palestinians.

But it involves a lot of hard work and creativity to translate this conviction into concrete changes, and identify specific ways to lower economic barriers without endangering Israel's legitimate security interests. Those challenges have been at the heart of a dialogue in which I have engaged the Israeli Government since last fall. It is a dialogue that was sparked by an evening I spent with Palestinian business
people in Ramallah last October. It was a very enlightening, and sobering evening. It became clear that our bilateral assistance program for the West Bank and Gaza would have to be complemented by a concerted effort to create a better environment for private sector activity in the West Bank and Gaza. I received a number of specific suggestions from those business people - some of which I have subsequently taken up with senior Israeli leadership, including the Prime Minister and with leaders in the Israeli business community. I have suggested concrete ways in which the movement of people and goods could be facilitated without compromising Israeli security.

This is a dialogue I intend to continue, both with the Palestinian business community, Israeli business leaders and with the Israeli government. That is why I took the long drive up to Nablus earlier today, to visit the Stock exchange and meet with Palestinian business people. And that is why I will be meeting tomorrow with Defense Minister Mordechai and others from the IDF. Later today, I will be meeting with the Prime Minister to go over these same issues, as I have done on previous visits.

Let me re-emphasize that we are seeking to resolve these problems fully consistent with Israeli security. And I am pleased to report that, since my last visit to Israel some six months ago, there has been some progress achieved by the Israeli government in alleviating certain barriers to Palestinian economic development. Permits for Palestinian day laborers to enter Israel are up considerably compared to last summer, as are permits for Palestinian business people. The Israeli Government has agreed to allow some laborers to overnight in Israel, and has compiled a list of day laborers who would be allowed back into Israel quickly should a future security incident occur. Truck traffic between Israel and the Palestinian areas has increased as well. Citrus products from Gaza were given access to markets during the 1998 harvest season. And only a few days ago, we were very pleased to learn the Government of Israel agreed to the reunification of the Gaza Electricity Grid, which will free-up additional megawatts for new job creating investments, including a U.S. flour mill.

This has happened not because of "American pressure" on Israel, but because the top echelons of the Israeli government agree with us that Israeli security is promoted, not harmed, by Palestinian economic development.

At the same time, more can be done by Israel to free up the Palestinian economy and thus accelerate economic growth. The West Bank and Gaza markets have been split, creating harmful inefficiencies with regard to Palestinian economic activity. I hope the Israeli government can greatly expand permits for business travel between the West Bank and Gaza. Such a move would be consistent with security policy; right now, some 50,000 Palestinian laborers and upwards of 16,000 business people enter Israel to work and conduct business every day. If this situation is tolerable from a security standpoint, then why is the current number of Palestinian business people who can travel between the West Bank and Gaza capped at only 800 in each direction? If thousands of business people can enter Israel, how is it a greater security threat than if they transit Israel on their way from Gaza to the West Bank, or vice versa.

It should be easier in general for all Palestinians to travel. Palestinians need more and better options for travel between the West Bank and Gaza, into Israel, and to the outside world. This would reduce burdens such as Gazans traveling to Jordan byway of flights from Egypt. It would also assist Palestinian laborers traveling to their work sites in Israel.

There are other measures the Israeli government can take to improve conditions for private sector in the West Bank and Gaza: Abbreviating port inspections would do much to instill confidence in trading with the Palestinians, perhaps even eliminating inspections of exports altogether. Another helpful expression of goodwill would be the extension of political risk insurance programs to Israeli investors who wish to invest in projects in the West Bank and Gaza, as is now available for investments in Egypt or Jordan.

Again it must be stressed that Israeli restrictions are not the only hindrance on that growth - far from it. Lack of transparency, the absence of an investor-friendly legal and regulatory system, inadequate sources of finance for business - these are but some of the problems that the Palestinians themselves must resolve if the talents and productive energies of the Palestinian people are to be fully realized.
These issues lie beyond Israel's reach. Palestinians must seize the economic opportunity to deal with what is in their capacities, rather than to wait solely for Israel to adapt its economic policies.

But what Israel can do, it should do, not out of charity, but with an eye to its own interests.

A Vision of Israel's Place in the Middle East

In closing, I would like to look ahead to a time when Israel enjoys commercial relations - even more linked than Israel, the Palestinian territories and Jordan are today - with Palestinian businesses, buyers and sellers, and with those in Jordan. The model is today's model, the model envisioned by the drafters of the Paris Protocol, but deeper, more cooperative, with better use of comparative advantage, and with greater commercial benefit to each side. Business links would be free to prosper and in turn engender additional political support for peace. Israel and the Palestinians would expand their free trade understandings to incorporate a broader area, inclusive of their Arab neighbors, beginning with Jordan.

I see the eventual long-term need for an Israel-Palestinian-Jordanian free trade area with unrestricted trade and commerce flowing in all directions, common rules of origin, open investment, and the free movement of goods and services.

A planned regional development bank - the MENA Bank - will offer another important instrument to help this region reach its economic potential. This Bank would be a key source of capital for cross-border commercial ventures.

Concomitant with liberal commerce we can expect greater understanding and appreciation between the societies. The atmosphere would encourage a decline in mutual animosity and foster greater trust. The climate would favor reconciliation. With time and good will, peace could be reinforced by rising prosperity. In short, physical neighbors would, in time, become good neighbors - neighbors for whom the prosperity of the person next door was important to both sides.

Think of the strong, positive, impact Israel could have on the political development of the Palestinian Authority. Polls consistently show that Palestinians rate the Israeli political system above all others, including ours in U.S., as the best government after which to model theirs. Despite decades of conflict, Palestinians have enormous respect for Israeli democracy and the prosperous society it has created, and want their government to mirror these values.

In short, we can look ahead to an era in which Israel helps stimulate the birth of an Arab democracy in the Palestinian Authority; where there is commerce and profit between yourselves and the Palestinian community; where the building blocks of peaceful compromise and normalization grow into a great and stable edifice.

It is easy to disparage this kind of vision, but visions are the lifeblood of hope, and hope is a priceless commodity in the world of peace making. The Palestinians desperately need an infusion of hope. They need to be able to envision a plausible future in which they will be stakeholders with Israel in an increasingly prosperous region.

At Israel's 50th Anniversary, you have come further, faster, and with more success than any other country born after World War II. You have made enormous strides economically, have one of the world's most vibrant democracies, and one of the globe's most sophisticated militaries. Yet, Israelis too need an additional infusion of hope - hope for normalcy and security from terror and threats; hope for engaging in commerce and realizing your full economic potential; and hope for a future in which Arabs and Jews live side by side in security, dignity and mutual respect.

Thank you.
HAMAS, STATEMENT TO PRESIDENT YASSER ARAFAT REGARDING THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, 18 JUNE 1998

In the Name of Allah the Merciful

We have called this meeting in order to emphasize the undertaking of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, of this discussion. This is vital to the security of our militant Jihad for the implementation of our national project for liberation, in the shadow of the escalation of the malicious Zionist settlement attack on our land, our sanctuaries and on our people. It is vital too, for the unity of our people before all political and theoretical challenges. We aim at constructing a strong civil Palestinian society, capable of overcoming all difficulties and of confronting the Zionist entity on the land of Palestine, forcing its withdrawal.

We emphasize that our acceptance to this meeting is not in any way linked with consultations on the composition of the governmental council, which is part of the evil Oslo Agreements, which have been rejected by our people as well as by our movement. These agreements have no legitimacy in our project of liberation - to eliminate the Zionist occupation of Palestine, and the establishment of the independent Palestinian State whose capital will be Jerusalem. We stress our adherence to the decision of the Palestinian People and the Resistance, and our rejection of these agreements, which have harmed our national unity and put an end to the popular uprising against the Occupation. On this basis we present what is, in our view, the most essential issues to the reform of the Palestinian actions.

a. The political sphere

The past four years since the Oslo Agreements have proven that this option was harmful and would not lead to the achievement of the Palestinian's goals of being liberated from the Occupation. On the contrary, it may eternalize the Occupation. Therefore, we call for the following measures:

1. A real reassessment and reevaluation of the Oslo Accords.
2. Cessation of the negotiations, and of all security cooperation, with the enemy.
3. Implementation of the Palestinian people's decision in favor of the resistance by recruiting and motivating the people to confront the Occupation, forcing its withdrawal.
4. Open a serious and comprehensive dialogue between all the Palestinian groups both in Palestine and abroad, in order to establish a national project to answer the needs of this stage of the struggle and to meet the expectations of the Palestinian people of freedom and independence.
5. Emphasize the Arab and Islamic dimensions of the Palestinian problem, employing this positive element for the sake of our legitimate rights.

b. The internal situation

1. To strengthen the national unity of the people in light of their various political spheres and their different lines of thinking.
2. To empower the Palestinian individual with self-determination and the assurance of his human rights and political freedom.
3. To secure the independence of the system of justice and the sovereignty of the law.
4. To put an end to the involvement of the security apparatus in civil life and to all forms of harassment and oppression of the people.
5. To release all the political prisoners in the Palestinian Authority's jails.
6. To place priority on the issue of Palestinian prisoners in the jails of the Occupation and the handling of all aspects pertaining to their release, while supporting their families by assuring their wellbeing.
7. To hold municipal elections in all provinces of the homeland in order to improve the administration and rally all Palestinian circles in the struggle for internal development.
8. To reform the administration and to prosecute all those involved in corruption; and to enforce the "How-do-you-own-this?" Law on all government employees.
9. To grant equal opportunity of employment to all people and nominate people according to their skills, integrity and ability, as to opposed to bribery and "protection."
10. To place priority on the education of the young, supplying their needs and establishing the mode of education that will best preserve the moral, vigor and the civilized nature of our Palestinian identity.

11. To preserve the general morals of Islam, defending them from scorn and negligence.

c. The Economy

1. We call for the construction of a Palestinian economy, according to the robust disciplines that will guarantee the preservation and independence of this economy; assuring its development and the provision of employment opportunities for everyone; and the effective use of its human resources and revenues.

d. Society

1. To reevaluate the role of the mosque in correct education and instilling the lofty morals of a healthy society, and good citizenship for the best interests of the nation. To ensure the appointment of the right Imams, the freedom of Islamic activity and reappointment of the deposed Imams of the Islamic Movement.

2. To enlarge the number of social institutions in society, allowing them the opportunity to fulfill their social role - that of providing for poor families and fighting poverty. To allow the reopening the closed Islamic institutes.

3. To supervise the foreign institutions so that they will serve the philosophy of society and its internal construction and keep its customs and legacy.

4. To provide healthcare and develop the private and public health system.

We pray to Allah for his guidance and the achievement of the wishes of our people for liberation, for its legitimates rights and the establishment of our independent state with its capital in Jerusalem, all over the Palestinian national land.

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ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON JERUSALEM, JERUSALEM, 21 JUNE 1998

[To counter the departure of a growing number of Jews from Jerusalem, while the city’s Arab population grew - an Israeli govt. committee proposed expansion of the city’s municipal area. The US State Dept. called this “a provocative step at this sensitive time in the negotiations”. Nevertheless, the Cabinet adopted the Committee’s recommendations.]

At the Cabinet meeting today (Sunday), 21.6.98:

The Cabinet decided to adopt the recommendations of the Committee to Strengthen Jerusalem for All Its Residents.

The main components of the plan are:

1. The expansion of Jerusalem’s jurisdiction.

2. The creation of an umbrella Jerusalem municipality, in order to streamline services in the Jerusalem region.

3. Incentives for high-technology industries in Jerusalem.

4. Housing benefits designed to reduce the gap, by as much as possible, between prices of apartments within Jerusalem and comparable apartments in its metropolitan area.

5. The upgrading of the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem train line.

6. The creation of an integrated mass transit network, street-cars and buses in Jerusalem.

7. The accelerated development of arterial roads in Jerusalem.

8. The acceleration of neighborhood rehabilitation projects in Jerusalem.
At the meeting, the Prime Minister said that there is no basis for the condemnations of Israel as a result of the plan. Israel is acting to strengthen Jerusalem, not to change the political status of the city, and there has been no addition of territory to the east of the city, only to the west.

The Prime Minister said that this is nothing but an artificial attempt by the Palestinians to castigate Israel, and he hopes that this is not being done with the encouragement of Israelis.

The plan is to be welcomed since it elevates Jerusalem to the top of the pyramid of priorities for government ministries.

The Mayor of Jerusalem and the Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office presented the plan. The Prime Minister and the Mayor praised the professional staff, headed by the Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office, which prepared the report.

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UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 52/250 ON THE PARTICIPATION OF PALESTINE IN THE WORK OF THE UN, NEW YORK, 7 JULY 1998

[The resolution, upgrading Palestine’s representation at the UN, was passed by 124 votes in favor (incl. all the EU countries), four against (the US, Israel, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia), and 10 abstentions (Bulgaria, the Congo, Honduras, Liberia, Malawi, Paraguay, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, and Zambia). The resolution confers on Palestine a unique status situated between the regular member states and the other observers, granting it additional rights and privileges previously exclusive to member states (including the right to participate in the general debate, the right to co-sponsor resolutions, the right to raise points of order on Middle East issues, and so on).

The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, in which, inter alia, it recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State, with Jerusalem as a corpus separatum,
Recalling also its resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, by which it granted observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization,
Recalling further its resolution 43/160 A of 9 December 1988, adopted under the item entitled “Observer status of national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and/or by the League of Arab States”, in which it decided that the Palestine Liberation Organization was entitled to have its communications issued and circulated as official documents of the United Nations,
Recalling its resolution 43/177 of 15 December 1988, in which it acknowledged the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988 and decided that the designation “Palestine” should be used in place of the designation “Palestine Liberation Organization” in the United Nations system,
Recalling also its resolutions 49/12 A of 9 November 1994 and 49/12 B of 24 May 1995, through which, inter alia, arrangements for the special commemorative meeting of the General Assembly on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, in addition to applying to all Member and observer States, were also applied to Palestine, in its capacity as observer, including in the organizing process of the list of speakers for the commemorative meeting,
Recalling further that Palestine enjoys full membership in the Group of Asian States and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia,
Aware that Palestine is a full member of the League of Arab States, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Group of 77 and China,
Aware also that general democratic Palestinian elections were held on 20 January 1996 and that the Palestinian Authority was established on part of the occupied Palestinian territory,
Desiring of contributing to the achievement of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, thus attaining a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East,
1. **Decides** to confer upon Palestine, in its capacity as observer, and as contained in the annex to the present resolution, additional rights and privileges of participation in the sessions and work of the General Assembly and the international conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly or other organs of the United Nations, as well as in United Nations conferences;

2. **Requests** the Secretary-General to inform the General Assembly, within the current session, about the implementation of the modalities annexed to the present resolution.

**ANNEX**

The additional rights and privileges of participation of Palestine shall be effected through the following modalities, without prejudice to the existing rights and privileges:

3. The right to participate in the general debate of the General Assembly.
4. Without prejudice to the priority of Member States, Palestine shall have the right of inscription on the list of speakers under agenda items other than Palestinian and Middle East issues at any plenary meeting of the General Assembly, after the last Member State inscribed on the list of that meeting.
5. The right of reply.
6. The right to raise points of order related to the proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East issues, provided that the right to raise such a point of order shall not include the right to challenge the decision of the presiding officer.
7. The right to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions on Palestinian and Middle East issues. Such draft resolutions and decisions shall be put to a vote only upon request from a Member State.
8. The right to make interventions, with a precursory explanation or the recall of relevant General Assembly resolutions being made only once by the President of the General Assembly at the start of each session of the Assembly.
9. Seating for Palestine shall be arranged immediately after non-member States and before the other observers; and with the allocation of six seats in the General Assembly Hall.
10. Palestine shall not have the right to vote or to put forward candidates.

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**UN SECURITY COUNCIL, PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM, NEW YORK, 13 JULY 1998**

[Following the Israeli Cabinet decisions on Jerusalem on 21 June (see above), a UNSC debate - requested by the Arab states – was held on 30 June. As the US threatened to veto any draft resolution fearing it would harm the peace process, the Council had to be content with a non-binding statement on Israeli actions in Jerusalem by its President. Israel regretted the Statement insisting that its decision was not affecting the peace accords with the Palestinians but was purely municipal in nature]


The Security Council recognizes the importance and sensitivity of the issue of Jerusalem to all parties and expresses its support for the decision of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Government of Israel, in accordance with the Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1998, that the Permanent Status Negotiations shall cover the issue of Jerusalem. The Council, therefore, calls upon the parties to avoid actions which might prejudice the outcome of these negotiations.

In the context of its previous relevant resolutions, the Security Council considered the decision by the Government of Israel on 21 June 1998 to take steps to broaden the jurisdiction and planning boundaries of Jerusalem a serious and damaging development. The Council, therefore, calls upon the Government of
Israel not to proceed with that decision and also not to take any other steps which would prejudice the outcome of the Permanent Status Negotiations. Further, the Council also calls upon Israel to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilians in times of war of 12 August 1949. The Security Council supports the efforts of the United States aimed at breaking the stalemate in the peace process, calls upon the parties to respond positively to these efforts, notes that the Palestinian side has already given agreement in principle to the United States proposal, and expresses the hope that the Permanent Status Negotiations can resume and progress can be made toward the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

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FINAL DOCUMENT, 12TH SUMMIT OF HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA, 2-3 SEPTEMBER 1998 [EXCERPTS]

CHAPTER II - ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

A: PALESTINE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Palestine

184. The Heads of State or Government reiterated their traditional long-standing solidarity with the Palestinian people, and noted that these days mark the 50th Anniversary of the dispossession of the Palestinian people and the uprooting of hundreds of thousands Palestinians from their land, homes and properties. They called for the implementation of all United Nations resolutions on the question of Palestine including those related to Palestinian refugees. They reiterated their support for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return to their homeland and to have their own independent State with Jerusalem as its capital, and they reiterated their demand for the withdrawal of Israel, the occupying Power, from all the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the other Arab territories occupied since 1967.

185. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed their position on occupied east Jerusalem, the illegal Israeli settlements, and the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to all the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. They demanded that Israel, the Occupying Power, implement relevant Security Council Resolutions in this regard and abide by its legal obligations. They reiterated their support for the recommendations contained in the resolutions adopted during the Tenth Emergency Special Session (ES-10/2, ES-10/3, ES-10/4 and ES-10/5) including, inter alia, the recommendation to convene a conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention on measures to enforce the Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and to ensure its respect in fulfilment of their collective responsibility as stipulated in common article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

186. The Heads of State or Government welcomed the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 52/250 on the participation of Palestine in the work of the United Nations and expressed confidence that Palestine will enjoy full membership in the United Nations in the near future, preferably during the 53rd session of the General Assembly. They also reiterated that Israeli representation in the work of the General Assembly must be in conformity with international law, thus ensuring that Israeli credentials do not cover the occupied territories since 1967, including Jerusalem.

187. The Heads of State or Government strongly condemned the decision of the Government of Israel on 21st June 1998 to take further steps to expand the jurisdiction and planned boundaries of Jerusalem. In this regard, they highly appreciated the efforts deployed by His Majesty Hassan II, King of Morocco, Chairperson of Al-Quds Committee for the safeguard of Jerusalem. They fully supported the content of the Final Communiqué, and recommendations adopted by the Committee at its XVII Session held in Casablanca on 29-30 July 1998.

188. The Heads of State or Government expressed their deep concern over the current deadlock of the Palestinian-Israeli Track of the Middle East peace process as a result of the policies and actions of the Israeli Government, in violation of the existing agreements, including settlement activities,
repressive measures and economic suffocation of the Palestinian people. In this regard, they condemned in particular the recent killing and wounding by the Israeli army of scores of Palestinian civilians. They called for increasing efforts to ensure compliance by Israel with the existing agreements and their timely implementation.

[...]

Lebanon

191. The Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, while expressing their deep concern over the continued Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the ensuing illegal detainment of Lebanese nationals, loss of innocent civilian lives and extensive destruction of property, called on Israel to withdraw immediately, completely and unconditionally from Southern Lebanon and Western Bekaa to the internationally recognised boundaries in compliance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and to fully and strictly respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon. They also maintained that any conditions put forward by Israel for the implementation of resolution 425 (1978) would alter its legal and political structure and are hence unacceptable.

The Peace Process

192. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the need to achieve comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. They affirmed their determination to actively strive toward the attainment of this objective. They reiterated their support for the Middle East Peace Process based on Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 425 and the principle of land for peace. They further reiterated the need for compliance with and implementation of the agreements reached between the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Israel as well as the fulfilment of the commitments and pledges made in accordance with the terms of reference of the Madrid conference and the ensued negotiations. They expressed grave concern over the current plight of the process, the deadlock of the Palestinian-Israeli track and the total cessation of the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks. They deplored the attempts of the Israeli Government to change the terms of reference of the peace process, to create facts on the ground which are obstacles to peace and to try to develop unacceptable concepts which are contrary to the principle of land for peace and the national rights of the Palestinian people.

193. In view of the urgency and seriousness of the situation, the Heads of State or Government request the Non-Aligned Movement Countries to increase pressure and use all available measures on regional and international level to ensure Israel's compliance with the terms of reference of the Madrid Conference and the land for peace principles and its full implementation of all agreements, undertakings, and commitments reached by the concerned parties on all tracks during the peace talks. They also affirmed that failure by the Israeli government to respond positively would require the Non-Aligned Movement Members to take further appropriate measures.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, RESOLUTION REGARDING PALESTINE'S PARTICIPATION IN ITS WORK - GC (42)/RES/20, GENERAL CONFERENCE, 10TH PLENARY MEETING, 25 SEPTEMBER 1998

The General Conference,

(a) Recalling General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, in which the General Assembly granted observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization,

(b) Recalling General Conference resolution GC(XX)RES/334 of 23 September 1976, in which it granted observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization within the International Atomic Energy Agency,

(c) Aware that Palestine is a full member of the League of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Group of 77,

(d) Recalling General Conference decision (XXXIII)/DEC/16 of 29 September 1989, in which it decided that "Palestine" should be used instead of the "Palestine Liberation Organization", and
(e) Recalling General Assembly resolution 52/250 of 7 July 1998, in which the General Assembly granted additional rights and privileges of participation to Palestine,

1. Decides to confer upon Palestine in its capacity as observer, and as set forth in the Annex to the present resolution, additional rights and privileges of participation in the work of the Agency;
2. Requests the Director General to inform the General Conference about the implementation of the present resolution.

ANNEX

The additional rights and privileges of participation of Palestine shall be effected through the following modalities, without prejudice to the existing rights and privileges:

1. The right to participate in the General debate, and the sessions of the IAEA General Conference and the International Conferences convened under the auspices of the IAEA.
2. Without prejudice to the priority of Member States, Palestine shall have the right of inscription on the list of speakers under agenda items other than Palestinian and Middle East issues, at any meeting of the plenary; after the last Member State inscribed on the list of that meeting.
3. The right to reply.
4. The right to raise points of order related to the proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East issues, provided that the right to raise such a point of order shall not include the right to challenge the decision of the presiding officer.
5. The right to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions on Palestinian and Middle East issues. Such draft resolutions and decisions shall only be put to a vote upon request from a Member State.
6. The right to make interventions, with a precursory explanation or the recall of relevant IAEA resolutions and decisions being made only once by the President at the start of each session.
7. Seating for Palestine shall be arranged immediately after Non-Member States and before the other Observers, with allocation of seats similar to Member States.

Palestine shall not have the right to vote or to put forward candidates.

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ASSISTANT SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER NIZAR OBAID MADANI, STATEMENT TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 53RD SESSION, NEW YORK, 29 SEPTEMBER 1998 [EXCERPTS]  

In the name of Allah, Most Compassionate, Most Merciful

[…] Mr. President:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in accordance with its objectives of achieving peace, security, and stability in the Middle East, supported the peace process from the very beginning, and participated as an observer in the Madrid Conference. It also actively participated in the multilateral negotiations, and will continue to support the peace process in its international activities and contacts.

In addition, the Arab countries, in conformity with the Arab Summit which was held in Cairo in June 1996, unanimously adopted a firm position which stipulated that peace is a strategic Arab option. This affirms that there is no Arab retreat from this firm position.

What is regrettable, and a cause of grave concern, is that after a glimpse of hope for peace in the region, and after the feelings of optimism that peace was possible, the peace process, which started in Madrid on the principle of international legality, United Nations resolutions, and the principle of land-for-peace, faces repeated obstruction from the present Israeli government. This government endeavored to follow policies that are based on retreating from the principles of the peace process that was decided in the Madrid Conference, as well as from the agreements signed with the Palestinian National Authority, and continues to refuse to resume negotiations with Syria from the point which was previously reached.
In its efforts to destroy the peace process, the Israeli government continued to build “settlements” on Palestinian lands in order to alter its character and create new so-called realities. It is also adopting a policy of judaizing Holy Jerusalem by planning more settlements in and around it, as well as annexing areas with Jewish settlers and emptying it from its Arab residents. It also enacted a law to enlarge the municipality of Holy Jerusalem to include neighboring settlements to preempt the negotiations on the final status of Holy Jerusalem.

These Israeli practices have aborted the efforts of the international community which aimed at achieving a complete and just peace based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principle of land-for-peace. Such practices have landed the peace process on a dead-end road. The behavior of the present Israeli government does not make us optimistic about the possibility of achieving the peace which the peoples of the region aspire to. Unless these practices are met by firm measures to compel Israel to completely implement its agreements with the Palestinians, respect the principles on which the peace process was founded, enter into serious negotiations with the Palestinians, with Syria and Lebanon, then all the previous efforts will have been in vain. We urge the international community, and the United States of America in particular, to continue exerting all efforts to save the peace process and to act resolutely to stop the outrageous aggression against Jerusalem which constitutes the most sensitive issue on the agenda of negotiations. Adhering to the rules of international legality and fulfilling promises is the best way to achieve peace and security. If the present Israeli government is serious in its efforts to achieve peace with the Palestinians, all it has to do is to affirm its adherence to the text of the signed agreements and restart the negotiations on the unresolved issues. If the Israeli government intends to reach a state of mutual security with its neighbor, Syria, the Syrian government spared no efforts in declaring its readiness to resume negotiations with Israel from the point where such negotiations have stopped. As for tension and the cycle of violence in southern Lebanon, its end can be achieved through Israeli withdrawal from that part of Lebanon and the Western Bqaa Valley in accordance with Security Council Resolution 425.

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WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM SIGNING CEREMONY: REMARKS BY US PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON, US VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN, ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BINYAMIN NETANYAHU, PLO CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT, AND SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, WASHINGTON, DC, 23 OCTOBER 1998

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT:

Mr. President, Prime Minister Netanyahu, Chairman Arafat, Vice President Gore, King Hussein, diplomatic colleagues, distinguished guests, and friends of the Middle East. We meet this afternoon to mark not a conclusion, but rather a new chapter in the pursuit of permanent peace with security and justice in the Middle East.

I begin by expressing my admiration for the effort to reach an agreement that was made by both the Israeli and Palestinian leaders and their delegations. The issues considered this week were difficult and complex. But in the end, both sides made the hard choices required to move the process forward. In so doing, they demonstrated leadership, courage and vision.

I express my heartfelt appreciation for the contributions made by His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan. His passion for peace inspired us all to believe that with sufficient faith and unyielding will, the seemingly unattainable would prove within our grasp.

I would like to thank the Vice President for his most helpful participation in our discussions; and the CIA Director, George Tenet, for his critical assistance at a number of key points.

And most of all, I congratulate President Clinton, who has given new meaning to the term shuttle diplomacy. This agreement would not have been reached without his incredible persistence and de-
termination. From the outset, he put America squarely on the side of peace and cleared the path so that both sides could join us there.

Today's ceremony culminates almost a year and a half of efforts to restore confidence and forward movement to the peace process. It ends a dangerous impasse that has eroded trust and stalled progress towards a broader peace.

The United States hopes that the implementation of this agreement will spur forward movement on the other tracks of the peace process and lead to improved relations between Israel and all her Arab neighbors. Today's agreement is an important way station on the upward path towards peace. It proves again that progress is the product of negotiation, while the alternatives of extremism and violence yield only more stalemate, suffering, and grief.

If we're to continue forward, the parties must rise to the challenge of implementing their commitments. They must work together to resolve differences and prevent new misunderstandings. And they must act in the spirit of peace embodied so vividly at Wye this week by the courage of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat, the persuasiveness of President Clinton, the wisdom of King Hussein, the good sense and good nature of Sandy Berger, and the patience and skill of Dennis Ross, Martin Indyk, Aaron Miller, Gamal Helal, Toni Verstandig and Jonathan Schwartz.

And now, I am pleased to introduce someone who has had a passion for Middle East peace and security for a long time, and will for a long time in the future. He has been a major contributor to today's success: the Vice President of the United States, Al Gore. (Applause.)

THE VICE PRESIDENT:

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. Secretary Albright, thank you for your very generous introduction and for your tireless work in pursuit of peace, your constant travel to the region, your dedication to the result that is announced today. At Wye Plantation, everyone saw again how your earnest efforts have won you the trust and respect of the parties involved, and you relied on that trust to keep these peace talks on track through many a tense moment. Your country and the world are honored by your service.

I would also like to acknowledge the outstanding contributions of Sandy Berger, our courageous and rock-steady National Security Advisor, whose commitment and counsel have been so vital to the efforts in pursuit of peace. And also, a diplomat of endless endurance, Dennis Ross, who has served the cause of peace through several administrations and has defied fatigue in his constant shuttling to points and between points in the Middle East.

I want to join the Secretary in acknowledging the work of George Tenet, and others that deserve credit. To those who will be speaking and to those who have labored without sleep for nine days now, the world is extremely grateful. I would also like to acknowledge Her Majesty Queen Noor and Mrs. Sarah Netanyahu, the members of the Palestinian delegation and Israeli delegation, members of President Clinton's Cabinet, members of the House and Senate including Senator Kennedy and Senator Biden, Senator Lautenberg, Senator Robb and Congressman Wexler.

A great deal of credit for today's announcement belongs to still another man now in the room, a great statesman of the Middle East who you will also hear from, a man who himself made peace with Israel here at the White House four years ago - a man long devoted to the cause of peace and whose personal stature as a peacemaker and dramatic appearance and presentation at a key moment inspired the progress and the success of these talks - His Majesty King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. We're grateful to you, Your Majesty, for your courage in being here. (Applause.)

Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat are heroes today. What they have done has taken genuine courage. But it often happens that even the deepest commitment to peace cannot overcome
all obstacles without the strong and active encouragement of an outside party, an honest broker, a peacemaker, who shares their passion for peace and can help both sides clarify their positions, understand their options, and overcome their doubts.

In Bosnia, in Haiti, in Northern Ireland, and now again in the Middle East, President Bill Clinton has demonstrated his uncompromising personal commitment to bringing peace to some of the world's most troubled regions - regions that have had too much of war and are now seeking a path to peace.

In introducing the President, I would just like to say to any person who thinks for one moment that the outcome about to be signed here was somehow foreordained, somehow prearranged, expected, I assure you, this was not the case. Far, far from it. No one in the President’s administration, in the Israeli delegation, in the Palestinian delegation had any idea of whether or not this might really succeed to the extent that it has. There is no question that the personal commitment and perseverance and stamina and determination and sheer will of President Clinton was the key ingredient in keeping these talks going beyond the point where it was time to go to bed and get some sleep, beyond the point where people were willing to give up, and up to the point where it was possible to make peace. (Applause.)

As a result of that commitment and the courageous decisions of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat, there is greater hope today than yesterday that children born tomorrow will know only peace in the Middle East. We know that the road to permanent peace lies out long before us. But today, we are several steps closer to that goal.

And, ladies and gentlemen, it is with great pride that I present the individual who has been the person responsible for these forward steps today. On behalf of the American people and the world community, I would like to say thank you, Mr. President. President Bill Clinton. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT:

Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President, Madam Secretary, Your Majesty, Prime Minister Netanyahu, Chairman Arafat. To the Israeli and Palestinian delegations, the members of Congress and the Cabinet, members of the diplomatic corps, my fellow Americans who are here. It's a great honor for me to welcome you here. I only wish the First Lady were here as well. She is in Chicago. We talked a few moments ago, and she sends her great happiness and best wishes, especially to Queen Noor and Mrs. Netanyahu.

After some very difficult negotiations, very long, dare I say, quite sleepless, the Israelis and Palestinians here have reached an agreement on issues over which they have been divided for more than 17 months. This agreement is designed to rebuild trust and renew hope for peace between the parties. Now both sides must build on that hope, carry out their commitments, begin the difficult, but urgent journey toward a permanent settlement.

Over the last nine days I have witnessed extraordinary efforts on behalf of peace. I thank our team, beginning with its head, the Secretary of State, who showed remarkable creativity, strength and patience. I thank the Vice President for his interventions. I thank my good friend, Sandy Berger; our Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, who had an unusual, almost unprecedented role to play because of the security considerations; our Special Middle East Coordinator, Dennis Ross, who was a young man with no gray hair when all this began. (Laughter.) I thank all the other outstanding members of our delegation.

I thank Prime Minister Netanyahu, who stood so firmly for the security of his citizens and of his country, and of the impressive members of his Cabinet and administration. I thank Chairman Arafat, who tenaciously defended the interests of his people, and the very impressive members of his team as well. In the end, after all the twists and turns and ups and downs, all their late and ultimately sleepless nights, both reaffirmed their commitment to the path of peace. And for that, the world can be grateful.

And finally, let me thank His Majesty King Hussein, whose courage, commitment, wisdom, and, frankly, stern instruction at appropriate times, were at the heart of this success. Your Majesty, we are all profoundly in your debt.
This agreement is good for Israel's security. The commitments made by the Palestinians were very strong, as strong as any we have ever seen. They include continuous security cooperation with Israel and a comprehensive plan against terrorism and its support infrastructure.

This agreement is good for the political and economic well-being of Palestinians. It significantly expands areas under Palestinian authority to some 40 percent of the West Bank. It also offers the Palestinian people new economic opportunities, with an airport and industrial zone, soon safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, and in time a seaport. The Palestinian people will be able to breathe a little easier and benefit from the fruits of peace.

Most importantly, perhaps, this agreement is actually good for the peace process itself. For 18 months, it has been paralyzed, a victim of mistrust, misunderstanding and fear. Now, ordinary Israelis and Palestinians once again can become partners for peace.

To bolster this effort, Chairman Arafat will invite members of the Palestinian National Council and other important political entities to reaffirm his prior commitments and their support for the peace process. I have agreed to address that meeting, several weeks hence, and to underscore the values of reconciliation, tolerance and respect, and my support for those commitments and this process.

People around the world should be heartened by this achievement today. These leaders and those with whom they work have come a very long way. The Israeli and Palestinian peoples, whose bitter rivalry in this century has brought so much suffering to both sides, have moved yet another step closer toward fulfilling the promise of the Oslo Accords; closer to the day when they can live peacefully as true neighbors, with security, prosperity, self-governance, cooperation and eventually, God willing, genuine friendship.

No doubt, as peace gains momentum, forces of hate, no matter how isolated and disparate, will once again lash out. They know this, the leaders, and they are prepared to face it. Staying on the path of peace under these circumstances will demand even greater leadership and courage.

The work at Wye River shows what can happen when the will for peace is strong. But let me say once again to all the rest of you - everyone who is tempted to handicap every twist and turn over the last nine days, you need to know one overwhelming thing: The Prime Minister and the Chairman, and the members of their delegation who supported this process, even when there were things about it they did not agree with, are quite well aware that the enemies of peace will seek to extract a price from both sides. They are quite well aware that in the short run, they themselves may have put themselves at greater risk. But by pledging themselves to the peaceful course for the future, to the same values and, ultimately, to the same enemies, they have given both Israelis and Palestinians a chance to have the future we all want for our children and our children's children.

Every effort will have to be exerted to ensure the faithful implementation of this agreement - not because the parties do not want to do so, but because the agreement covers many things, was developed over many days, involved many discussions and sleepless nights. It will test whether the Palestinian people are prepared to live in peace, recognizing Israel's permanence, legitimacy and a common interest in security. It will tell us whether Israelis want to help build a strong Palestinian entity that can fulfill the aspirations of its people and provide both real security and real partnership for Palestinians and Israelis.

The United States is determined to be of whatever help we can to both sides in their endeavors. I will consult with Congress to design a package of aid to help Israel meet the security costs of redeployment, and help the Palestinian Authority meet the economic costs of development. I hope we will have support from Republicans and Democrats in that endeavor.

With respect to Mr. Pollard, I have agreed to review this matter seriously, at the Prime Minister's request. I have made no commitment as to the outcome of the review. Ultimately, the parties will have to translate the gains of Wye River into renewed efforts to secure a just and lasting peace. For as big a step as today is
- and after 17 months, it is a very large step, indeed - it is just another step along the way. Therefore, perhaps as important as any other statement to be made today, let me say how grateful I am that the Prime Minister and the Chairman have agreed to begin permanent status talks upon ratification of this agreement.

I have agreed to convene the two leaders at an appropriate time to seek to complete these talks. We have all agreed to try to do it under circumstances which permit more sleep at night. (Laughter.)

Let me say that no agreement can wipe away decades of distrust. But I think these last several days have helped each side to get a better understanding of the other's hopes and fears, a better feel for all they have in common, including on occasion, thank the Lord, a good sense of humor.

The future can be bright for Israelis and Palestinians if they maintain the will for peace. If we continue to work together, the next generation will grow up without fear. Israel can have the genuine security and recognition it has sought for so long. The Palestinian people can, at long last, realize their aspirations to live free in safety, in charge of their own destiny.

So, on behalf of all the people of the United States, let me say to the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, salaam - shalom - peace be with you in the hard and hopeful days ahead. We value our friendship and we thank you for your trust, for giving us the opportunity to walk this road with you.

Now it is my privilege to introduce Prime Minister Netanyahu. Let me say, I was, once again, extraordinarily impressed by the energy, the drive, the determination, the will, the complete grasp of every detailed aspect of every issue that this Prime Minister brought to these talks. He showed himself willing to take political risks for peace, but not to risk the security of his people. And as a result, this agreement embodies an enormous increase in the security of the people of Israel. Mr. Prime Minister, the microphone is yours. (Applause.)

PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU:

Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, the Vice President, Your Majesty, Her Majesty Queen Noor, Madam Secretary, Sandy Berger, their staff and especially - especially Dennis, of the white hair and Olympic endurance - and all the delegations assembled here, and all the distinguished ministers of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the members of the Senate and Congress, and the many friends who are here today.

Today's a day when Israel and our entire region are more secure. Now, this has required sacrifice from both sides, and reaching into what Lincoln called, "the better nature of mankind." This is an important moment to give a secure and peaceful future for our children and the children of our neighbors, the Palestinians. We have seized this moment.

I'm asking all people of goodwill, of honesty and candor, I'm asking all of them to join us in support for this important step for a secure future, a future of peace.

We are more secure today because, for the first since the signing of the Oslo Accords, we will see concrete and verifiable commitments carried out. Our Palestinian partners will join us in fighting terrorism. They will follow a detailed and systematic plan to fight terrorists and their infrastructure; to jail killers that have so far roamed at large; to stop vitriolic incitement; and above all, finally, after 35 years, to cancel the articles in the Palestinian Charter which call for the destruction of Israel.

This means that our world today will be safer for our children and for our neighbors' children. But it has been said here, and it's true, that we are just at the beginning, or maybe at the middle, of the road to a permanent peace. We will soon embark on negotiations for a permanent peace settlement between our two peoples. Now, I guarantee you it will not be easy and it will not be simple and it will be, Mr. President, despite your best wishes, sleepless. I guarantee you. (Laughter.) Mr. Chairman, I guarantee that to you, too. (Laughter.)
But I am today brimming with some confidence - and not overconfidence - simply because we have overcome tremendous challenges and achieved success for both sides - not at the expense of one side and the benefit of the other, but success and advantage and progress for both sides. And that fills me with the confidence that we are able to tackle the larger challenges that still await us and that still await our two peoples.

There are so many people that I could thank in the American delegation. It's a wonderful one, headed by the Secretary of State and Sandy Berger and George Tenet and the team that was there - Dennis and Gamal - (laughter) - a provider of cigars - (laughter) - and good humor - and so many others. But I want to especially thank President Clinton. He is - if I can borrow a cliché - he is a warrior for peace. I mean, he doesn't stop. He has this ability to maintain a tireless pace and to nudge and prod and suggest, and use a nimble and flexible mind to truly explore the possibilities of both sides, and never just of one side. That is a great gift, I think a precious and unique one. And it served us well.

So I thank you, Mr. President, for serving us and the cause of peace well. (Applause.) I thank you, too, for your boundless optimism, without which these qualities cannot come into effect. You needed a lot of optimism.

I want to thank Chairman Arafat. Mr. Chairman, you're cooperation was invaluable. And I want to thank you, personally, once again, for the kind wishes you extended me on a birthday that I shall never forget. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

I want to thank Minister Sharansky - Mr. Sharansky is in Israel. He is celebrating now his daughter's Bat Mitzvah. I'm sure you all send him your best and excuse him for not being here. But he and Defense Minister Mordechai and Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon brought to Wye their patriotism and their commitment. They are great patriots. They are people who have put themselves in line for their country and their people. And they've brought all that experience, all that courage and all that perseverance, all that skill, and they assisted me and the state of Israel in ways that I think should be recounted, and probably will repeat themselves, I hope, in the new future in a successful bid for peace.

And I want, most especially, to thank two people at the close. I want to thank King Hussein, who visited us twice. And, Your Majesty, you gave us an unforgettable and inspiring example of courage and humanity, and it moved me deeply. It moved every one of our people and our delegates deeply, and I thank you for that. (Applause.)

And, lastly, I would like to thank my wife, Sarah, who joined me, who offered me support and a great deal of wisdom in some trying moments, and who constantly reminded me of our two children, of all the children for whom we toil and dream and pray. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT:

Let me say, I wish that all of you who care about this could have seen at least a portion of what I saw in the last nine days in the interchanges between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat. It was very interesting. They were so different. I can't imagine Mr. Netanyahu in a kaffiyeh. (Laughter / applause.) But they were very much alike in their tenacity and their astonishing intelligence and knowledge.

Just as I was able to say a thank-you to Prime Minister Netanyahu, let me say to Chairman Arafat, I thank you. I thank you for turning away from violence toward peace. I thank you for embracing the idea that Palestinians and Israelis can actually share the land of our fathers together. I thank you for believing that the home of Islam and Judaism and Christianity can surely be the home of people who love one God and respect every life God has created. And I thank you for decades and decades and decades of tireless representation of the longing of the Palestinian people to be free, self-sufficient, and at home. Mr. Chairman, the microphone is yours. (Applause.)
CHAIRMAN ARAFAT:

Mr. William Clinton, the President; Mr. Al Gore; Mrs. Madeleine Albright; members of the US delegation; friends; my co-partner - the new co-partner in the peace process - Mr. Netanyahu; and here I mention my late co-partner, Yitzhak Rabin; and my co-partner Shimon Peres - members of the Israeli delegation with whom we worked together until we reached whatever we achieved; my brothers; members of the Palestinian delegation; ladies and gentlemen.

Here in this regard, I would like to give special tribute from my heart to His Majesty King Hussein, and Her Majesty, the Queen, for everything they presented us.

This is an important and a happy day, a day of achievement that we will always remember with optimism and hope. It is true that whatever we achieved is only temporary, that has been late. But our agreement in the Wye River underscores that the peace process is going ahead, and that whatever we agreed upon in Madrid, Oslo, and in Washington and Cairo is being implemented on the same bases that have been agreed to, and that we will never go back. We will never leave the peace process, and we will never go back to violence and confrontation. No return to confrontation and violence. (Applause.)

Please allow me to mention in this connection, first and foremost, to direct my talk to Mr. Bill Clinton for the long hours which he exerted during the past 10 days, particularly those 24 hours that he spent continuously, where he was always alert and understanding, creative in order to bring back history between the cousins - this friendliness that had been separated through wars and destruction and violence for many years.

And please allow me to present my tribute and acknowledgement to Mr. Al Gore for whatever he did and whatever he does for pushing forward and protecting the peace process - the peace process of courageous people.

My dear friend, we quite feel grateful to you and to the US people and, indeed, I'm quite comfortable about the future of my people and that of the small peoples, having you as a great leader of the world at this great level of youth and sincerity and wisdom. This mixture of great things is a gift from God to you and to your American people, and for humanity as a whole. Your presence at the head of the international politics brings justice in the balance of peace and coexistence, which is just and well-balanced.

I would also like to send this tribute from my heart to His Majesty King Hussein, for his efforts, even though he has very special health concerns and in spite of the difficulty of the negotiations that we have gone through.

Please allow me, also, to talk to Mrs. Albright and to Mr. Sandy Berger, and Mr. George Tenet. You have worked a lot for long months, which was strenuous, indeed, during which, my dear Minister, you crossed for thousands of miles for peace and the future of our children and contributed through your understanding. We all appreciate your efforts.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Mr. Dennis Ross and the US team working with them for their efforts with us, for long hours and long days, because they did believe in the importance of peace for us, for our children after us.

This reconciliation between the two peoples, the Palestinian and the Israeli people, will not divert this path and will go through negotiations on the table and go through tanks, grenades and barbed wires. We have achieved today a large step, but it is important - my co-partner, Mr. Netanyahu - it is important in establishing the peace process because this is the peace of courageous people.

The implementation of the Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace, achievement of political rights of the Palestinian people, and putting every effort possible in the service
of achieving security for all, particularly for the Israeli people - all this will bring us to begin at once and quickly in the negotiations of the final solution that will try to achieve just and peaceful permanent peace in order to complement what takes place also on the Syrian and the Lebanese paths very soon.

What we achieved together with the leading and effective role of President William Clinton and his US team is something, if fully and sincerely implemented, will open the door before the Palestinian and Israeli people for more achievements, more hope, and more optimism not only for ourselves, but also for the Middle East regions as a whole.

Once again, I'm saying that it is a big step that came late, but it is, indeed, an important one because it will allow the return of 13 percent of the Palestinian land on the West Bank to the Palestinian people, to their sovereignty, and will allow to double the area where the Palestinian Authority will enjoy full-fledged authority and sovereignty. Yes, indeed, it is a step that will allow the Palestinian airplanes to fly to and from the Gaza International Airport, carrying visitors and merchandise, carrying to the whole world the Palestinian flowers and fresh fruit.

It will also open the door to build the Gaza seaport and the realization of the Palestinian dream of geographic unification between the regions of the Palestinian land in the Bank and Gaza through a secured area. It will also allow the achievement of real happiness for hundreds of the prisoners of Palestinians in the Israeli jails, and also for the families everywhere, liberating them. And I will never forget this, in fact, for Mr. Netanyahu, with the assistance of King Hussein and President Clinton.

I say they will be liberated outside their cells, to where there is freedom and participation in the completion of what we started of a peace process and building their free land, with their heads held high and proud.

I led those children during our struggle for freedom, and they gave their freedom and their lives for the sake of the land. However, they adopted the peace process, adopted peace and stood by peace, while they were in the jails. And now, they are joining us in our peace process for the sake of peace. It is the peace of courageous people.

We have succeeded in the agreement to stop all the unilateral actions that would undermine the final solution and bring about a difficult climate for negotiations on peace. With this agreement, we begin the final solution negotiations, which we will take very seriously, and commitment in order to achieve it on its stipulated times in all the agreements we signed together, which is the 4th of May 1999. We will have understanding around this date between us and the Israeli partners, and between us and our friends in the US, and between us and our brothers, the Arabs, at the forefront of which is His Excellency, His Majesty King Hussein, and my brother, President Mubarak, who has been following with commitment what we are doing here in the US, and also our brothers, the Arab leaders who have been following our work minute by minute. And I will not forget the Federation of Russia, as well, and China and Japan, and the states of the non-alignment countries.

In particular I would like to mention, in this regard, the European role, who sent their delegation, Mr. Moratinos, in order to be here beside us during these negotiations.

We are quite certain that we will stand together here in this place which is at high level forum, and under the guardianship of President Clinton, in order to announce the achievement of permanent peace between the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples, that we have completed the solution of all issues - the return of the land, the status of Jerusalem, the status of the settlements, the final frontiers, and the return of refugees, and the just distribution of order and security, and good relations with our neighbors, and that we have achieved freedom and independence and security for all.

We will begin a new era of new relations based on equality, mutual feelings and cooperation between two independent, neighboring countries enjoying security and openness with their neighbors, in a regional framework that would bring about peace, justice, and stability for all.
Mr. President - President Clinton; Your Majesty King Hussein; my co-partner, Mr. Netanyahu; Mr. Al Gore; ladies and gentlemen, I talked in hope and optimism about the future, which I hope will be achieved together through sincere and accurate achievement of whatever we agreed upon. But I would like to, certain in honesty and sincerity, that we are fully committed to whatever is required from us in order to achieve real security and constant peace for every Israeli person and for the Israeli people. We will not forget our duties as we underline our rights.

I am quite confident that I'm talking in the name of all Palestinians when I assure you that we are all committed to the security of every child, woman and man in Israel. Here we have come to a detailed agreement, and we are committed to play our independent role to keep security. And we will achieve whatever we promise here.

I will do everything I can so that no Israeli mother will be worried if her son or daughter is late coming home, or any Israeli would be afraid when they heard an explosion. It is true that nobody can secure 100 percent results of security for all Palestinians and all Israelis. But I am proud that we were able to work together and we will be able to do more together, with assistance of all our friends all over the world, in America and in Europe, and with great commitment to achieve much more in the years ahead - yes, indeed.

Ladies and gentlemen, we want achievement of the peace of courageous people to end this long suffering in order to build an independent nation having a lot of democracy and caring for his children. We want a school and education for every child and young man. We want a job for every man and woman, and a modern medical clinic and a hospital, and a small house as well, where everybody feels comfortable and where laughter is heard of happy, healthy kids. We want that and more for our neighbors and co-partners, the Israeli people, and the Arabs.

We want a factory, a lab, an airport and a seaport, a clean environment and an ability to grow and to develop. And on the occasion of the new millennium, which represents the birth of Jesus Christ in Bethlehem, where His light came out to the world, we would like to receive the whole world now, calling for peace and justice and freedom, for a world where there is stability, fraternity and cooperation. We would also like to pursue the joint work with our neighbors, the Arabs, as well as the regional work, which is cooperative and successful.

And even though I realize the difficulties that we face and my full knowledge of whatever we sign today will only trickle down to worthless ink on paper unless it is implemented accurately and quickly, so I call upon President Clinton to remain with us, alert and supportive, in order to make sure that we implement everything we agreed upon. However, I am also happy that I call upon my sons and children in Palestine in the Diaspora and confinement, bringing to them the good news of a better future where they enjoy a better life with freedom, dignity and independent country. I want them to work with me, seriously and sincerely, in order to do everything we can, all the sacrifices to build our nation, Palestine.

So I also say something special for my children, that they our in our imagination and minds and conscience, and we will never forget their rights, their efforts and their tortures. And in particular, I call upon my brothers and sisters in the refugee camps in Lebanon that this long standing apart will not be long, and they will come back to Palestine in their dignity.

For those who sacrificed for Palestine, the martyrs, the wounded, the widows, the orphans and the prisoners, without whom we wouldn't have achieved this day for freedom, for them for all, I tell them that we are going to achieve peace. To all our brothers, the Arabs, who embrace us in our difficulties and supported us during war and peace, I told them that we will continue our effort and will be committed to our cause.

I am really honored with the presence of King Hussein with us - to stand with us, supporting our efforts for peace, even though he needs rest and medical care - to go back safe to his kingdom once again and to the Arab nation and Islamic nation.
Our daily contacts with President Mubarak and Minister Amre Musa was important in giving us the sincere advice and support and expertise. And I say the same thing for all the Arab leaders who were in constant contact with us, supporting us, guiding us, and wishing us success in our effort.

Mr. President; members of the US government; my co-partner, Mr. Netanyahu; and the delegation and Israeli people; the US administration has done every possible and creative effort for the success of this work that took place on American land and in the hospitality of the US administration. What President Clinton did, along with his colleagues, is rare to see or find anywhere. In spite of his full schedule, President Clinton gave us his full attention, with members of his government and the officials and scores of experts and assistants, for the success of these negotiations and bringing us to this result that has been achieved.

President Clinton and for assistants, I would like to say that you have a special place in our hearts and the peace process has witnessed under your directions all the success and with our presence here with him the White House. We are certain that he will be witnessing the signing of the final agreement here in the White House. So he will have achieved the two important things in the peace process - Palestine and Ireland. And he will stay in the heart of every Palestinian person with every love.

In this regard, I would also like to thank the European Union for the continued support of the peace process. And from here, I will go to Vienna, where the European presidency - in order to tell them and to thank them for their support of the peace process in the coming days.

I would also like to thank the Russian President, and I believe that my visit to President Yeltsin and Primakov and Blair, as a support to continue this peace process, and to support the same role played by the Russians and the Europeans. I would like to thank them all - to thank China, in particular, and Japan and the Asian and African countries, and the non-aligned countries - Islamic countries - and the Latin American countries, all of them. All of them support the peace and the rights of our people, and know that they will celebrate the achievement of peace in our region because this peace will establish security and stability and growth all over the world.

And at last, I would like to direct my talk to Mr. Netanyahu and his colleagues, to say today we have achieved a great positive agreement. We have to continue that together very soon and to implement it quite sincerely in reality.

Your security is our security. Your security is our security, and peace for your children and our children. And we will work together through the peace process and negotiations, even though they are difficult, in order to achieve a final solution. We will not retreat, we will not go back to violence or confrontation. And we, together, will be the leaders in order that peace would prevail on our land and the land of our neighbors. And peace be with you all. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT:

Ladies and gentlemen, many kind things have been said about the efforts of the American delegation and the hours that I spent at Wye Plantation, every one of which I treasured. (Laughter.) Some more than others. But in truth, all that was required of us was a listening ear and a helpful suggestion now and then, and a kind of determination to keep us all moving forward. It is a little too easy, I think, sometimes for people who are not directly, themselves, parties to a peace negotiation to believe they truly understand the judgments that the parties themselves must make, and how difficult they are, and what price they might carry. I think, as hard as we tried not to fall prey to that, from time to time we did. I know we did, because there are people on both sides smiling at me just now as I speak. So the lion's share of the credit belongs to Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat and their close aides.

But His Majesty King Hussein provided an element quite different from what the United States brought to these negotiations, for he reminded us of what rises above the facts, the arguments, the
legitimate interests, even the painful sacrifices involved. He was the living embodiment of the best of our past and the brightest of our hope for the future. And every time he was in the room, he made us all become a little closer to the people we all would like to see ourselves as being. For that, we and the world are immeasurably in his debt. Your Majesty. (Applause.)

KING HUSSEIN:

Mr. President; Mr. Vice President; Ms. Albright, Secretary of State; my friend, Sandy Berger; and, of course, all our friends here and all our friends who played such a vital part in the last few days in which I was privileged to be an observer and one who sought to give courage to the process that was ongoing - George Tenet. And as the President said, Dennis has lost his black hair and replaced it to grey; I've lost all mine and even my eyebrows. (Laughter.) But this is part of the life in which we live. And I was privileged to be with you all. And no matter what, I would have been. If I had an ounce of strength, I would have done my utmost to be there, and to help in any way I can. (Applause.) By the way, many in our part of the world and different parts of the world have written me off. But I have a lot of faith in God, and I believe that one lives one's destiny. And as far as I'm concerned, my morale is the highest it has ever been. And this has been a shot in the arm for me, what you have accomplished today, President Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu. (Applause.)

I recall in discovering past events over many years, and one thing that remained with me throughout those many years was a total commitment to the cause of peace. We quarrel, we agree; we are friendly, we are not friendly. But we have no right to dictate through irresponsible action or narrow-mindedness the future of our children and their children's children. There has been enough destruction. Enough death. Enough waste. And it's time that, together, we occupy a place beyond ourselves, our peoples, that is worthy of them under the sun, the descendants of the children of Abraham.

Palestinians and Israelis coming together. I have attended, sir, previous occasions here, and, of course, you, Mr. President, together with the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, were my partners four years ago in the Washington Declaration, and later on when the state of peace was finalized in our weekend in Jordan and in Aqaba. I don't think we might have given you as much hard work, or less sleep than you have been subjected to of late. But what I found this time, and what really gives me hope and confidence, is that that same chemistry, after the first meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Arafat, is there.

I think that we passed a crossroad. We have made our commitment to the welfare and happiness and security and future of our peoples in all the times to come. And now our partners are numerous, and we wish them every success in their endeavors and we'll do everything we can to help them.

I think such a step as is concluded today will inevitably trigger those who want to destroy life, destroy hope, create fear in the hearts and minds of people, trigger in them their worst instincts. They will be skeptical on the surface, but if they can, they will cause damage, wherever they are and wherever they belong. Let's hope that the overwhelming majority of us - those who are committed to the future, those who know what responsibilities they hold now - will be able, through steady progress and a determined combined joint effort, be able to thwart their aims and their objectives and move - and maybe, God willing, witness the dawn that we are always seeking of a comprehensive peace in our entire region.

Mr. President, I have had the privilege of being a friend of the United States and Presidents since late President Eisenhower. Throughout all the years that have passed, I have kept in touch. But on the subject of peace, the peace we are seeking, I have never - with all due respect and all the affection that I held for your predecessors - have known someone with your dedication, clear-headedness, focus and determination to help resolve this issue in the best possible way. (Applause.)

Mr. President, permit me to say what I feel - I was mentioning it more than once in the last few days. You have the tolerance and the patience of Job, and you are the subject of our admiration and respect.
And we hope that you will be with us as we see greater successes and as we help our brethren and our friends move ahead towards a better tomorrow.

On behalf of Noor and for those colleagues of mine from Jordan, thank you all for your great kindness. And thank you, our Israeli friends and this very fine delegation, for all your contributions and efforts. And, obviously, my pride is limitless in the efforts and in the commitment of President Arafat and his colleagues.

I think we are moving. We are not marking time, but we are moving in the right direction. I believe that very sincerely. And may God bless our efforts. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT:

Let me say - everyone sit down. We have to hurry because the hour is growing late and it's almost Shabbat. I have to say one thing; very quickly. We have three men of peace here who have extraordinary military backgrounds. We have many others here - I want to mention two who came with Prime Minister Netanyahu: General Sharon and General Mordechai; we're glad to have you here. (Applause.) And I say that because I want you to understand a piece of history.

This table was brought to this house in 1869 by one of America's greatest military leaders, Ulysses Grant, who revolutionized infantry warfare in our Civil War. One hundred years ago, this table was used to sign the peace treaty between the United States and Spain. And for 100 years this table, brought here by one of our greatest warriors, has been the exclusive repository of our peace agreements - the one we signed with Your Majesty King Hussein on this table; President Kennedy's test ban treaty, signed on this table.

So I think it is fitting that these three great leaders - two signers, one, His Majesty, observing - who know a great deal about war have come to make peace on this table, which, for our country, has come to embody it. And we thank them. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

(The agreement is signed.)

THE WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC, 23 OCTOBER 1998

[See also Map 3 in the annex.]

The following are steps to facilitate implementation of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip of September 28, 1995 (the "Interim Agreement") and other related agreements including the Note for the Record of January 17, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as "the prior agreements") so that the Israeli and Palestinian sides can more effectively carry out their reciprocal responsibilities, including those relating to further redeployments and security respectively. These steps are to be carried out in a parallel phased approach in accordance with this Memorandum and the attached time line. They are subject to the relevant terms and conditions of the prior agreements and do not supersede their other requirements.

I. FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS

A. PHASE ONE AND TWO FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS

1. Pursuant to the Interim Agreement and subsequent agreements, the Israeli side's implementation of the first and second F.R.D. will consist of the transfer to the Palestinian of 13 percent from Area C as follows:
The Palestinian side has informed that it will allocate an area/areas amounting to 3 percent from the above area (B) to be designated as the Green Areas and/or Nature Reserves. The Palestinian side has further informed that they will act according to the established scientific standards, and that therefore there will be no changes to the status of these areas, without prejudice to the rights of existing inhabitants in these areas including Bedouins; while these standards do not allow new construction in these areas, existing roads and buildings may be maintained.

The Israeli side will retain in these Green Areas/Nature Reserves the overriding security responsibility for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism. Activities and movements of the Palestinian Police forces may be carried out after coordination and confirmation; the Israeli side will respond to such requests expeditiously.

2. As part of the foregoing implementation of the first and second F.R.D., 14.2 percent from Area (B) will become Area (A).

B. THIRD PHASE OF FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS.

With regard to the terms of the Interim Agreement and of Secretary Christopher's letters to the two sides of January 17, 1997, relating to the further redeployment process, there will be a committee to address this question. The United States will be briefed regularly.

II. SECURITY

In the provisions on security arrangements of the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian side agreed to take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against the Israeli side, against individuals falling under the Israeli side's authority and against their property, just as the Israeli side agreed to take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities and against their property. The two sides also agreed to take legal measures against within their jurisdiction and to prevent incitement against each other by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.

Both sides recognize that it is in their vital interests to combat terrorism and fight violence in accord with Annex I of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the Record. They also recognize that the struggle against terror and violence must be comprehensive in that it deals with terrorists, the terror support structure and the environment conducive to the support of terror. It must be continuous and constant over a long-term, in that there can be no pauses in the work against terrorists and their structure. It must be cooperative in that no effort can be fully effective without Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and the continuous exchange of information, concepts and actions.

Pursuant to the prior agreements, the Palestinian side's implementation of its responsibilities for security, security cooperation, and other issues will be as detailed below during the time periods specified in the attached time line.

A. SECURITY ACTIONS

1. Outlawing and Combating Terrorist Organizations
   a. The Palestinian side will make known its policy for zero tolerance for terror and violence against both sides.
   b. A work plan developed by the Palestinian side will be shared with the US and hereafter implementation will begin immediately to ensure the systematic and effective combat of terrorist organizations and their infrastructure.
   c. In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a US-Palestinian committee will meet biweekly to review the steps being taken to eliminate terrorist cells and the support structure that plans, finances, supplies and abets terror. In these meetings, the Palestinian side will inform the US fully of the actions it has taken to outlaw all organizations (or wings of organiza-
d. The Palestinian side will apprehend the specific individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror for the purpose of further investigation, and prosecution and punishment of all persons involved in acts of violence and terror.
e. A US-Palestinian committee will meet to review and evaluate information pertinent to the decisions on prosecution, punishment or other legal measures which affect the status of individuals suspected of abetting or perpetrating acts of violence or terror.

2. Prohibiting Illegal Weapons
a. The Palestinian side will ensure an effective legal framework is in place to criminalize, in conformity with the prior agreements, any importation, manufacturing or unlicensed sale, acquisition or possession of firearms, ammunition or weapons in areas under Palestinian jurisdiction.
b. In addition, the Palestinian side will establish and vigorously and continuously implement a systematic program for the collection and appropriate handling of all such illegal items in accordance with the prior agreements. The US has agreed to assist in carrying out this program.
c. A US-Palestinian-Israeli committee will be established to assist and enhance cooperation in preventing the smuggling or other unauthorized introduction of weapons or explosive materials into areas under Palestinian jurisdiction.

3. Preventing Incitement
a. Drawing on relevant international practice and pursuant to Article XXII (1) of the Interim Agreement and Note for the Record, the Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror. This decree will be comparable to the existing Israeli legislation which deals with the same subject.
b. A US-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet on a regular basis to monitor cases of possible incitement to violence or terror, and to make recommendations and reports on how to prevent such incitement. The Israeli-Palestinian and US sides will each appoint a media specialist, a law enforcement representative, an educational specialist and a current or former elected official to the committee.

B. SECURITY COOPERATION
The two sides agree that their security cooperation will be based on a spirit of partnership and will include, among other things, the following steps:

1. Bilateral Cooperation: There will be full bilateral cooperation between the two sides, which will be continuous, intensive and comprehensive.
2. Forensic Cooperation: There will be an exchange of forensic expertise, training and other assistance.
3. Trilateral Committee: In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a high-ranking US-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet as required and not less than biweekly to assess current threats, deal with any impediments to effective security cooperation and coordination and address the steps being taken to combat terror and terrorist organizations. The committee will also serve as a forum to address the issue of external support for terror. In these meetings, the Palestinian side will fully inform the members of the committee of the results of its investigations concerning terrorist suspects already in custody and the participants will exchange additional relevant information. The committee will report regularly to the leaders of the two sides on the status of cooperation, the results of the meetings and its recommendations.

C. OTHER ISSUES
1. Palestinian Police Force
a. The Palestinian side will provide a list of its policemen to the Israeli side in conformity with the prior agreements.
b. Should the Palestinian side request technical assistance, the US has indicated its willingness to help meet these needs in cooperation with other donors.
The Monitoring and Steering Committee will, as part of its functions, monitor the implementation of this provision and brief the US.

2. PLO Charter

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Central Council will reaffirm the letter of 22 January 1998 from PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to President Clinton concerning the nullification of the Palestinian National Charter provisions that are inconsistent with the letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel on 9/10 September 1993. PLO Chairman Arafat, the Speaker of the Palestine National Council, and the Speaker of the Palestinian Council will invite the members of the PNC, as well as the members of the Central Council, the Council, and the Palestinian Heads of Ministries to a meeting to be addressed by President Clinton to reaffirm their support for the peace process and the aforementioned decisions of the Executive Committee and the Central Council.

3. Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

Among other forms of legal assistance in criminal matters, the requests for arrest and transfer of suspects and defendants pursuant to Article II (7) of Annex IV of the Interim Agreement will be submitted (or resubmitted) through the mechanism of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Legal Committee and will be responded to in conformity with Article II (7) (f) of Annex IV of the Interim Agreement within the twelve week period. Requests submitted after the eighth week will be responded to in conformity with Article II (7) (f) within four weeks of their submission. The US has been requested by the sides to report on a regular basis on the steps being taken to respond to the above requests.

4. Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Pursuant of Article XI (1) of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, and without derogating from the above, the Palestinian Police will exercise powers and responsibilities to implement this Memorandum with due regard to internationally accepted norms of human rights and the rule of law, and will be guided by the need to protect the public, respect human dignity, and avoid harassment.

III. INTERIM COMMITTEES AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. The Israeli and Palestinian sides reaffirm their commitment to enhancing their relationship and agree on the need actively to promote economic development in the West Bank and Gaza. In this regard, the parties agree to continue or to reactivate all standing committees established by the Interim Agreement, including the Monitoring and Steering Committee, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC), the Civil Affairs Committee (CAC), the Legal Committee and the Standing Cooperation Committee.

2. The Israeli and Palestinian sides have agreed on arrangements which will permit the timely opening of the Gaza Industrial Estate. They also have concluded a “Protocol Regarding the Establishment and Operation of the International Airport in the Gaza Strip During the Interim Period.”

3. Both sides will renew negotiations on the Safe Passage immediately. As regards the southern route, the sides will make best efforts to conclude the agreement within a week of the entry into force of this Memorandum. Operation of the southern route will start as soon as possible thereafter. As regards the northern route, negotiations will continue with the goal of reaching agreement as soon as possible. Implementation will take place expeditiously thereafter.

4. The Israeli and Palestinian sides acknowledge the great importance of the Port of Gaza for the development of the Palestinian economy, and the expansion of Palestinian trade. They commit themselves to proceeding without delay to conclude an agreement to allow the construction and operation of the port in accordance with the prior agreements. The Israeli-Palestinian Committee will re-activate its work immediately with a goal of concluding the protocol within sixty days, which will allow commencement of the construction of the port.

5. The two sides recognize that unresolved legal issues adversely affect the relationship between the two peoples. They therefore will accelerate efforts through the Legal Committee to address outstanding legal issues and to implement solutions to these issues in the shortest possible period. The Palestinian side will provide to the Israeli side copies of all of its laws in effect.

6. The Israeli and Palestinian sides also will launch a strategic economic dialogue to enhance their economic relationship. They will establish within the framework of the JEC an ad hoc Committee for
this purpose. The committee will review the following four issues: (1) Israeli purchase taxes; (2) cooperation in combating vehicle theft; (3) dealing with unpaid Palestinian debts; and (4) the impact of Israeli standards as barriers to trade and the expansion of A1 and A2 lists. The committee will submit an interim report within three weeks of entry into force of this Memorandum, and within six weeks will submit its conclusions and recommendations to be implemented.

7. The two sides agree on the importance of continued international donor assistance to facilitate implementation by both sides of agreements reached. They also recognize the need for enhanced donor support for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza. They agree to jointly approach the donor community to organize a Ministerial Conference before the end of 1998 to seek pledges of enhanced levels of assistance.

IV. PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

The two sides will immediately resume permanent status negotiations on an accelerated basis and will make a determined effort to achieve the mutual goal of reaching an agreement by May 4, 1999. The negotiations will be continuous and without interruption. The U.S. has expressed its willingness to facilitate these negotiations.

V. UNILATERAL ACTIONS

Recognizing the necessity to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement.

ATTACHMENT: Time Line

This Memorandum will enter into force ten days from the date of signature.

Done at Washington, D.C. this 23d day of October 1998.

For the Government of the State of Israel:  Benjamin Netanyahu
For the PLO:     Yasser Arafat
Witnessed by:     William J. Clinton, The United States of America

TIME LINE

Note: Parenthetical references below are to paragraphs in "The Wye River Memorandum" to which this time line is an integral attachment. Topics not included in the time line follow the schedule provided for in the text of the Memorandum.

1. Upon Entry into Force of the Memorandum:
   * Third further redeployment committee starts (I (B))
   * Palestinian security work plan shared with the U.S. (II (A) (1) (b))
   * Full bilateral security cooperation (II (B) (1) )
   * Trilateral security cooperation committee starts (II (B) (3))
   * Interim committees resume and continue; Ad Hoc Economic Committee starts (III)
   * Accelerated permanent status negotiations start (IV)

2. Entry into Force - Week 2:
   * Security work plan implementation begins (II (A) (1) (b)); (II (A) (1) (c)) committee starts
   * Illegal weapons framework in place (II (A) (2) (a)); Palestinian implementation report (II (A) (2) (b))
   * Anti-incitement committee starts (II (A) (3) (b)); decree issued (II (A) (3) (a))
   * PLO Executive Committee reaffirms Charter letter (II (C) (2))
   * Stage 1 of F.R.D. implementation: 2% C to B, 7.1% B to A. Israeli officials acquaint their Palestinian counterparts as required with areas; F.R.D. carried out; report on F.R.D. implementation (I(A))
3. Week 2-6:
   * Palestinian Central Council reaffirms Charter letter (weeks two to four) (II (C) (2))
   * PNC and other PLO organizations reaffirm Charter letter (weeks four to six) (II (C) (2))
   * Establishment of weapons collection program (II (A) (2) (b)) and collection stage (II (A) (2) (c)); committee starts and reports on activities.
   * Anti-incitement committee report (II (A) (3) (b))
   * Ad Hoc Economic Committee interim report at week three; final report at week six (III)
   * Policemen list (II (C) (1) (a)); Monitoring and Steering Committee review starts (II (C) (1) (c))
   * Stage 2 of F.R.D. implementation: 5% C to B. Israeli officials acquaint their Palestinian counterparts as required with areas; F.R.D. carried out; report on F.R.D. implementation (I (A))

4. Week 6-12:
   * Weapons collection stage II (A) (2) (b); II (A) (2) (c) committee report on its activities.
   * Anti-incitement committee report (II (A) (3) (b))
   * Monitoring and Steering Committee briefs U.S. on policemen list (II (C) (1) (c))
   * Stage 3 of F.R.D. implementation: 5% C to B, 1% C to A, 7.1% B to A. Israeli officials acquaint Palestinian counterparts as required with areas; F.R.D. carried out; report on F.R.D. implementation (I (A))

5. After Week 12:
   Activities described in the Memorandum continue as appropriate and if necessary, including:
   * Trilateral security cooperation committee (II (B)(3))
   * (II (A) (1) (c)) committee
   * (II (A) (1) (e)) committee
   * Anti-incitement committee (II (A) (3) (b))
   * Third Phase F.R.D. Committee (I (B))
   * Interim Committees (III)
   * Accelerated permanent status negotiations (IV)

End of ATTACHMENT

THE WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM: US SECRETARY OF STATE
MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, LETTER TO PLO CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT,
WASHINGTON, DC 23 OCTOBER 1998 [EXCERPTS]

Dear Mr. Chairman,

The United States is pleased to have worked with you in achieving a successful outcome in the negotiations on “The Wye River Memorandum.”

I want to confirm that the United States regards the implementation of the first and second phases of the further redeployment processes to be one of the pillars of the Memorandum. We understand the importance that the Palestinian side attaches to this objective and will support its fulfillment in accordance with the Memorandum. [...] 

We also appreciate how vital it is for the United States to play the role identified for it in the Memorandum. I can confirm that the United States stands ready to carry out that role. Let me also emphasize that we are prepared to confirm the fulfillment of Palestinian responsibilities as the Palestinian Authority carries them out in accordance with the Memorandum.

We also intend to look for additional means to promote and support the timely and complete implementation of the Memorandum by both sides, including through participation in other mechanisms.
agreed to by the parties. In this regard, we would plan to support the efforts of the Monitoring and Steering Committee in connection with the implementation process, and for this purpose, I am requesting that the Special Middle East Coordinator, the Deputy Special Middle East Coordinator and other United States officials be involved in supporting the process of carrying out the agreement. [...] 

Our partnership in achieving this agreement has served to strengthen the U.S.-Palestinian relationship and give both of us a stake in deepening our bilateral ties. Toward this end, we intend to activate the U.S.-Palestinian Joint Committee as a way to enhance our relationship as well as ties between the American and Palestinian people. It will also consider how we can remove any existing impediment to that relationship, continue and enhance our assistance, and strengthen our bilateral ties.

The United States recognizes that permanent status negotiations will be fundamental to defining a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace. We are prepared, at the request of both sides, to facilitate these negotiations and plan to work with both parties to ensure the right environment for conducting the negotiations on an accelerated basis. In order to create an environment conducive to the success of the negotiations, the United States will continue to make clear the importance of avoiding unilateral steps that would prejudice or preempt the issues reserved for the permanent status negotiations.

Sincerely,

Madeleine K. Albright

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Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The United States is pleased to have worked with you in achieving a successful outcome in the negotiations on "The Wye River Memorandum." We believe its parallel phased approach will help provide greater confidence to both sides in the implementation process, since actions in each stage of the time line are to be completed by both sides before moving to the next stage. I can confirm that the United States is prepared to play the role identified for it in the Memorandum.

The United States recognizes the importance of the security provisions of "The Wye River Memorandum" to the State of Israel. In this context, and given the role specified for the United States in the Memorandum, we wish to reiterate our ironclad commitment to Israel's security and to peace, and to stress that Palestinian security undertakings are a critical foundation of the Memorandum.

In this context, we wanted to confirm our understanding of assurances we have received from the Palestinians on several issues that you have indicated are of special concern to Israel. Regarding the Palestinian apprehension of terrorism suspects (II (A) (1) (d)), we have been assured that all the cases which have been identified will be acted upon. With respect to Palestinian decisions regarding the prosecution, punishment or other legal measures that affect the status of individuals suspected of abetting or perpetrating acts of violence or terror, there are procedures in place to prevent unwarranted releases. Furthermore, we will express our opposition to any unwarranted releases of such suspects, and in the event of such a release, we will be prepared to express our position publicly.

Regarding the Palestinian side's program for confiscation and disposition of illegal weapons under paragraph II (A) (2) (b), our assistance to the Palestinian side will help ensure that any retention of weapons is consistent with the relevant Interim Agreement provisions, including Article IV (5) of Annex I. The U.S. plans to inform Israel periodically of the progress of our assistance program. Finally, with respect to the Palestinian side's provision of its list of policemen to Israel (II (C) (1) (a)), the U.S. has been assured that it will receive all appropriate information concerning current and former policemen as part of our assistance program.

Sincerely,

Madeleine K. Albright

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ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER ARIEL SHARON, LETTER TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL KOFI ANNAN, 30 OCTOBER 1998

In his letter Sharon outlines Israel's interpretation of the Wye Agreement, signed a week earlier, and sets out a number of actions that Israel "expects" from the UN in order for the agreement to be fulfilled successfully.

This is my first letter to you as Foreign Minister and it is being sent almost immediately after the successful conclusion of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians at the Wye Plantation, Maryland. These negotiations testify to the seriousness of Israel's desire to achieve peace with the Palestinians, and to our steadfast determination to see this process through.

As someone deeply involved in the defense of Israel since my youth, I have seen first-hand the terrible destruction that war wreaks upon combatants, families and nations. I can therefore state that the hardest and most hotly contested negotiations are still infinitely preferable to the easiest of military victories. May I assure you that all Israelis fervently hope that this agreement will hasten the achievement of a full and lasting peace in our region.

As the agreement signed by the two sides has tremendous import for the continuation of the peace process, I therefore wish to take this opportunity to apprise you of some of the more salient points contained in the Wye River Memorandum.

Israel has undertaken, inter alia, the following concrete commitments as a result of the negotiations:

(a) The transfer of land in Judea and Samaria, which will result in the Palestinian Authority's controlling some 40 per cent of the land in Judea and Samaria (areas A and B), and exercising its jurisdiction over 98 per cent of the Palestinian inhabitants;
(b) The release of Palestinian prisoners incarcerated in Israel, before the expiration of their sentences;
(c) Agreement on the arrangements that will permit the opening of the Gaza Industrial Estate (at Karni);
(d) The conclusion of a protocol on the opening of the international airport in Gaza;
(e) Agreement to renew negotiations on the "safe passage" of goods and people between Gaza and Judea and Samaria with the intention to conclude an agreement within a week of the Wye River Memorandum's entering into force.

I must note that Israel has taken considerable risks in making the commitments, but we have not done so unilaterally. Rather, they are conditional upon the Palestinian side's in turn scrupulously abiding by its obligations, which are, inter alia:

(a) Zero tolerance for terror and violence and the implementation of a work plan to ensure the systematic and effective combat of terrorist organizations and their infrastructures. A major component of this security plan is the apprehension of specific individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror, for the purpose of further investigation and prosecution;
(b) The criminalization of unlicensed weapons, and their collection and appropriate handling;
(c) A reduction in the numbers of the Palestinian police, as per previous agreements;
(d) The bringing to fruition of the process by which the Palestinian National Covenant is to be annulled, by the convening of the members of the Palestine National Council, as well as the representatives of other Palestinian organizations for this purpose;
(e) An end to incitement to violence in the Palestinian media. This matter will be monitored by a United States of America-Israel-Palestinian committee.

This agreement must not be allowed to exist in a vacuum - it must be utilized to reinvigorate the peace process. To that end, we anticipate:

(a) The reconvening of bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel and Lebanon;
(b) The full reconvening of the multilateral track;
(c) The strengthening of "people-to-people" programmes in order to engender grass-roots support for the peace process and encourage reconciliation;
(d) An end to the denigration of Israel in international forums, including the United Nations General Assembly presently meeting in New York.

Following the Wye River Memorandum, Israel expects that the General Assembly will not put forth resolutions that prejudge the outcome of the final status negotiations, including the issue of statehood. Moreover, I would like to express our view that anachronistic and outdated resolutions recycled and readopted by the Assembly year after year, which no longer reflect present realities and achievements, should be finally removed from the annual agenda and relegated to the legacy of the past. Such resolutions only detract from the process of negotiations.

In this context, I would like to state that Israel's exclusion from any regional grouping in the United Nations system has deprived it of its right to be a full participant in all United Nations bodies, including the Security Council. This situation constitutes a clear violation of the principle of sovereign equality of Member States embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. During your last visit to Israel, when speaking before the Israel Council on Foreign Relations in Jerusalem, on 25 March 1998, you stated:

"I believe it is time to usher in a new era of relations between Israel and the United Nations ... One way to write the new chapter would be to rectify an anomaly - Israel's position as the only Member State that is not a member of one of the regional groupings, which means it has no chance of being elected to serve on main organs such as the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council. This anomaly should be corrected. We must uphold the principle of equality among all States Members of the United Nations."

As you know, Israel cannot join its natural regional group in Asia, owing to the objection of certain members. As a result, Israel is seeking a way of gaining membership, at least temporarily, in another group. While Israel's quest for full participation in the United Nations system stands on its own merits, the signing of the Wye Memorandum serves as an opportunity for Israel to redouble its efforts to solve this problem. It is our hope that you will continue to support Israel in this regard.

It was on the eve of these negotiations that I was appointed to the helm of Israel's diplomacy. Most of my adult life has been dedicated to the defense of Israel and ensuring its vitality and prosperity. In this respect, my present position reflects a continuation of many ongoing themes that have characterized my professional endeavors. As I now lead Israel into negotiations with the Palestinians with a permanent status, I want to reassure you of my personal commitment to seeing these negotiations through, for the benefit of all the inhabitants of the region.

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UN COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 53RD SESSION, UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK, 4 NOVEMBER 1998

CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE

86. A crucial stage has been reached in the long history of the question of Palestine, the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. The dispossession of the Palestinian people has now passed the half-century mark. Of the two States envisaged under General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, only the Jewish State has come into being, while the Palestinian people still yearns for the establishment of its own State on its national soil. Four million Palestinians still live in refugee camps under precarious conditions. Despite the undeniable achievements of the peace process since 1993, most of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied
by Israel in 1967, including Jerusalem, remain under occupation, vulnerable to exploitation of resources, land confiscation and encroaching settlements. The area under the Palestinian Authority remains fragmented, its social and economic life jeopardized by damaging closures, lack of free passage and access to the outside world. Thousands of Palestinians are still in Israeli jails.

87. The continuation of this unjust situation and the widespread suffering it entails is unacceptable, particularly since agreements outlining the framework for a peaceful solution were already reached by the parties. The Committee believes that, as humankind prepares to enter the new millennium, it is incumbent upon the co-sponsors of the peace process, the Security Council and the international community as a whole to do everything within their power to achieve peace and reconciliation in the Middle East, which is so essential for international peace and security. In this context, the Committee expressed the hope that the Wye River Memorandum, signed on 23 October 1998, would be fully implemented, provide the much-needed impetus to the Oslo process and help the parties to move forward to the negotiations on permanent status issues.

88. To be truly lasting, peace must be based on solid foundations of justice, respect for human rights and humanitarian law, and relations of equality and partnership between neighbours. The policies and practices of occupation, which seek to create actuality on the ground and to permanently alter the demographic composition of the occupied territory, violate the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and statehood and make the achievement of real peace impossible. The international community, in particular the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, must intensify its efforts to ensure protection for the Palestinian people, pending the achievement of a final settlement. The Committee, accordingly, will remain fully engaged in efforts to convene the conference requested by the General Assembly at its tenth emergency special session.

89. The Committee reaffirms that the United Nations has a permanent responsibility with respect to the question of Palestine until a satisfactory settlement based on international legitimacy is reached. The Committee reiterates that the involvement of the United Nations in the peace process, both as the guardian of international legitimacy and in the mobilization and provision of international assistance for development, is essential for the successful outcome of the peace efforts. As the organ of the General Assembly established to deal with the question of Palestine, the Committee pledges itself to continue to mobilize the international community at the governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental levels, in support of a comprehensive, just and lasting solution of this question, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

90. The Committee considers that its programme of meetings in the various regions and its cooperation with non-governmental organizations have played a useful role in heightening international awareness of the relevant issues and in achieving wider recognition of and support for the achievement of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. In that regard, the Committee will continue to review and assess its programme in order to achieve maximum effectiveness in its programme of meetings and other activities, and to respond adequately to developments on the ground and in the peace process. Recommendations to that effect will be submitted in due course.

91. In response to the call by the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and President of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, for the convening of the millennial celebration at Bethlehem in the context of a global vision of peace and reconciliation, the Committee has requested the inclusion of an item in the agenda of the fifty-third session of the General Assembly in order to mobilize wide international support for the event. It is the hope of the Committee that the Assembly will adopt a consensus resolution on this item. The Committee is also planning to convene a Bethlehem 2000 international conference in Rome in early 1999. The Committee invites the greatest international participation in this major event.

92. The Committee stresses the essential contribution of the Division for Palestinian Rights of the United Nations Secretariat in support of the objectives of the Committee and requests it to continue its programme of publications and other activities, in particular the further development of the UNISPAL collection, and the completion of the project for the modernization of the records of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. The Committee also considers that the annual training programme for staff of the Palestinian Authority has demonstrated its usefulness and requests that it be continued.
93. The Committee also considers that the special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Public Information has made an important contribution to informing the media and public opinion of the relevant issues, and requests that it be continued, with the flexibility necessary in the light of new developments. The Committee believes that strengthening cooperation and coordination with the Department will help to enhance the special information programme on the question of Palestine and assist the Committee in the implementation of its mandate. The Committee is of the view that cooperation and coordination between the Department and the Division for Palestinian Rights should also be strengthened. The Committee requests the Department to give particular attention to the preparation of audio-visual and other informational materials aimed at the general public.

94. Wishing to make the greatest possible contribution to the achievement of a just and lasting peace during the difficult times that lie ahead, the Committee calls upon all States to join in this endeavour and invites the General Assembly again to recognize the importance of the role of the Committee and to reconfirm its mandate with overwhelming support.

ISRAELI CABINET, DECISIONS ON THE WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, JERUSALEM, 5 NOVEMBER 1998

The Cabinet is today (Thursday) 5.11.98, discussing the Wye Memorandum, and it is possible that the debate will continue tomorrow.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has decided to establish a special ministerial committee headed by Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai and consisting of Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon, Immigration and Absorption Minister Yuli Edelstein, Agriculture Minister Rafael Eitan, and Education Minister Yitzhak Levy. The committee will meet for three days and examine the maps and present the various positions of experts and settlers in Judea and Samaria. The intention is to vote on the agreement before the ministerial committee completes its work.

The Prime Minister argued that the establishment of the committee was necessary due to the crucial importance of the issues at stake to so many people, even after the map was drawn up by the most professional bodies, and then examined in over 4000 rigidly tested computer simulations.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu this afternoon (Thursday), 5.11.98, finished presenting the Wye River Memorandum to the Cabinet. In addition to addressing the issue of the Palestinian National Council’s convening to annul the Palestinian Charter, the imprisonment of wanted terrorists and the American guarantees, the Prime Minister emphasized the redeployment phases and Israel’s release of Palestinian prisoners.

1. Regarding Palestinian prisoners:
   The Palestinians demanded the release of 3,500 prisoners, including 1,000 security prisoners. Prime Minister Netanyahu said that it was ultimately decided that 750 prisoners would be released, as follows:
   • Fewer than 200 prisoners who do not have blood on their hands and who are not Hamas members.
   • The rest (about 550) are prisoners in other categories.

2. The redeployments:
   • 2% in a first phase.
   • 8% in a second phase.
   • 3% will be a nature reserve.

The Cabinet intends to decide that the scope of the third redeployment will be no more than 1%. This is based on the American letter of clarification, according to which the Israeli government has the authority to make this decision.
The United States has given its assurance not to raise a counter-proposal.

* Note: Israel has sole authority to determine what areas will be transferred in each redeployment.
* The Palestinians have not seen the map.

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**ISRAELI CABINET, RESOLUTION REGARDING THE RATIFICATION OF THE WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, JERUSALEM, 6 NOVEMBER 1998**

[After two days of deliberations, the Cabinet failed to approve the Memorandum noting ‘terrorist’ attacks and controversial speeches by PA leaders regarding the cancellation of the Palestinian Covenant.]

The Israel Cabinet has convened for the second consecutive day with the clear intention of ratifying the agreement with the Palestinians. A proposed draft to this effect was presented to the Government. Regrettably, since the Wye River Conference, two troubling developments have undermined Israel's intention:

- repeated terrorist attacks in which Israelis were killed and wounded and only a miracle prevented the mass murder of civilians, including scores of children.
- repeated attempts by the PA leaders to evade commitments they undertook in the Wye Agreement.

The Cabinet will discuss the ratification of the Wye agreement when it is convinced that the PA is taking decisive steps in a determined war on the terrorist organizations and their infrastructure, and when it is convinced that the PA intends to fully live up to all the commitments it undertook in the agreement, including the obligation to conduct a vote by the Palestinian National Council to affirm the repeal of the Palestinian Charter articles calling for Israel's destruction, and the arrest of wanted murderers.

The government will act to secure its citizens and strengthen Israel's capital, Jerusalem. The Prime Minister reiterated his commitment to advance the agreement with the Palestinians based on full implementation according to the principle of reciprocity.

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**GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, DECISION APPROVING THE WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, JERUSALEM, 11 NOVEMBER 1998**

1. The Government approves the Wye River Memorandum signed in Washington on October 23, 1998 (henceforth "the Agreement") and will present it to the Knesset for approval.

2. a) The implementation of all the Palestinian obligations throughout all phases of the Agreement is a condition for the implementation of the Israeli obligation under the Agreement according to the timetable set in it.
b) The implementation of each phase of the Further Redeployments mentioned in the Agreement will be brought before the Government for prior discussion and approval.

3. a) The Government approves the map of the first phase of the Further Redeployment as presented to the Government. Approval of the maps of the additional phases of the Further Redeployment shall be given in the Ministerial Committee mentioned below, which shall decide on the matter with the Government's consent.
b) In accordance with Paragraph 36(A)(6) of the Basic Law the Prime Minister has appointed a Ministerial Committee consisting of the Minister of Defense, chairman; the Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Minister of Education, Culture and Sport; the Minister of Immigrant Absorption; and the Minister for Public Security.
c) Government Ministers may view the maps of each phase of the Further Redeployment at the Government Secretariat as the date of its implementation approaches and they may appear before the Committee and express their views.
d) The Minister of Defense will determine the work agenda of the Committee.
4. a) Since the signing of the Agreement, official Palestinian declarations regarding the PLO Covenant have substantively contradicted the Agreement.
b) The Agreement decrees a decision at the Palestinian National Council to confirm the Palestinian Authority Chairman’s statement in his letter to President Clinton regarding the cancellation of the Palestinian Covenant articles which contravene the PLO’s commitment to denounce terrorism, recognize Israel and live peacefully with Israel.
c) In the light of the above, the fulfillment of Israel’s commitment according to the Agreement is conditioned on a properly conducted vote at the Palestinian National Council.

5. a) Israel persists in its demand for the transfer of suspects and wanted fugitives according to the Agreement.
b) As for the list of 30 suspects, the Government notes the Prime Minister’s statement, according to which: "The arrest of the 30 suspects is included in the “Working Plan for combating terrorism”, so that one third will be arrested at each phase of the 12 weeks, and the U.S. has promised Israel that this will be implemented. The U.S. has also committed to Israel that there will be special arrangements to prevent a “revolving door” policy in relation to these prisoners, and that if nevertheless a release of these prisoners will occur, it will be considered a violation of the Agreement”.

6. As to the third further Redeployment, in so far as Israel, according to its own judgment, will make a decision on it, the scope of the Redeployment will not exceed the total of one percent in all categories.

7. In the negotiations on Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District the Government will preserve the vital national interests of the State of Israel, as affirmed in the Government’s decision of January 14, 1998. These include security areas, the areas around Jerusalem, the areas of Jewish settlement, infrastructure interests, water sources, military and security locations, the areas around north-south and west-east transportation arteries, and historic sites of the Jewish people.

8. The government asserts that a unilateral declaration by the Palestinian Authority on the establishment of a Palestinian state, prior to the achievement of a Final Status Agreement, would constitute a substantive and fundamental violation of the Interim Agreement. In the event of such a violation, the Government would consider itself entitled to take all necessary steps, including the application of Israeli rule, law and administration to settlement areas and security areas in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, as it sees fit. Israel reiterates its position, in accordance with the agreement with the PA, that the Final Status must be the result of free negotiations between the parties without the implementation of unilateral steps which will change the status of the area.

9. The Government will continue to pursue its policy of strengthening and developing the communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza Strip, on the basis of a multi-annual plan.

10. The Government will see to it that security roads will be built in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.

11. The Government expresses its hope that there will be complete compliance with the provisions of the Wye River Memorandum, and that this Agreement will contribute to the advancement of peace.

FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE DAMASCUS DECLARATION, COMMUNIQUÉ BY THE 16TH CONFERENCE, DOHA, 12 NOVEMBER 1998

The foreign ministers of the member states of the Damascus Declaration called for adherence to and efforts in accordance with, the contents of the final communiqué of the Arab Summit held in the Arab Republic of Egypt in June, 1996, particularly the decisions approved unanimously by the Arab leaders. These were: to further enhance Arab solidarity; and to establish a just and comprehensive peace serving the vital interests of the Arab world, restoring its usurped territories and rights, and following up with effective Arab action. The foreign ministers reiterated the stance of their respective countries that fair and comprehensive peace necessitates the restoration of all occupied Arab territories in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular numbers 242, 338 and 425, which call for Israel to withdraw completely from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights to the line of June 4,
and from southern Lebanon including the western Baka’a; and from the occupied Palestinian territories, including Arab Jerusalem; and to guarantee to the Palestinian people their legitimate rights, including those of returning home, self-determination and establishment of their independent state with the Holy Al-Quds [Jerusalem] as its capital.

The ministers underlined their absolute rejection and denunciation of the expansionist settlement policies of Israel in the occupied territories as well as the Israeli government's decision to expand the geographical frontiers of Holy Al-Quds [Jerusalem] and to change its demographic structure, describing this as flagrant violation of international law as well as the Madrid Accords and all the relevant UN security council and general assembly resolutions. They confirmed the importance of adhering to UN resolutions, denied acceptance of any situation resulting from the Israeli settlement activity in the occupied Arab territories, and demanded that all such activities in Jordan and Palestine cease, particularly in Al-Quds [Jerusalem], and that these settlements be eliminated. The ministers expressed deep concern over Israel's attempts related to imposing conditions on the implementation of UN Resolution 425 concerning Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and underscored the importance of continuing the Middle East peace process based on the UN resolutions and the principle of land for peace. In this regard, the ministers expressed firm support for the Palestinian people and called on Israel to adhere to the articles of the agreement it has concluded with the Palestinians.

The ministers praised the efforts of the United States of America in helping bring about the recent Wye Memorandum between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and urged the U.S. administration to force the Israeli government to live up to its commitments. They underscored the importance of resumption of negotiations on both the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, and called on the co-sponsors of the peace process, particularly the United States and the European Union, to take effective measures to activate the Middle East peace process and restore it to its correct track according to Madrid and the UN resolutions.

The ministers underscored the importance of keeping the Middle East, including the Gulf region, free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and of Israel joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation nuclear Treaty and accepting the guarantees prescribed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. They urged Iraq to revoke its decision to halt cooperation with UNSCOM, and confirmed that the Iraqi government should be held responsible for any repercussions affecting the Iraqi people.

The ministers noted that Iran continues its "unacceptable claims" of sovereignty over the three UAE islands and is carrying out measures to further consolidate its occupation of the islands. They reiterated their call to the Iranian government to respond to the appeal of the United Arab emirates, the GCC member states, the countries of the Damascus Declaration, and a number of other international and regional organizations, to resort to a peaceful solution in keeping with the recent positive orientation of the Government of [Iranian] President Mohammed Khatami in building confidence with neighbors and developing cooperation in order to enhance stability and security in the Gulf region.

In this regard, the ministers confirmed the right of the UAE to sovereignty over the islands of Greater Tunbs, Lesser Tunbs, and Abu-Musa, and their support for any peaceful measures it might resort to for this purpose. They urged Iran to desist from its policy of status quo in the disputed islands, and confirmed that the security of the UAE is an integral part of the security of the member states of the Damascus Declaration. Nevertheless, they expressed satisfaction at the recent orientation of policies of the Iranian government, considering them an important element for stability in the region. In this regard, they expressed readiness to build positive relations with Tehran based on reciprocal respect, good neighborliness, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, as well as rejection of the use of force, threats or blackmail to solve problems.

The ministers called for a solution of the Lockerbie issue, in order to pave the way for lifting the embargo on Libya. They expressed rejection of all forms of terrorism and violence, and called for countries not to provide havens for terrorist elements, regretting that a number of countries friendly to
the Damascus Declaration member states were doing this. They stated that combating terrorism should be a concerted, international action. In this regard, they supported the proposal presented by [Egyptian] President Hosni Mubarak to convene an international conference to combat terrorism under the umbrella of the United Nations. They also underscored the importance of cooperation amongst themselves to fight extremism, violence, terrorism and stand side by side to face such phenomena.

In conclusion, the ministers called on an expert panel to proceed with its study to establish a common Arab market, which was begun in Cairo in December of 1997.


Our Lord Jesus Christ said, in a sublime message:

"So peace is on me the day I was born, the day that I die, and the day that I shall be raised up to life (again)!" (The Holy Koran, XIX:33)

What could be more natural than that, as the third millennium dawns, an entire year be devoted to commemorating the birth of this Lord of Peace.

As the twentieth century draws to an end, the peoples of the entire world await with growing impatience the arrival of the new millennium in the hope of a better world, a world of peace, reconciliation and understanding among all peoples in all parts of the world. The celebration of the next millennium will be particularly important, for it will also mark the two thousandth anniversary of the birth of Jesus Christ in Bethlehem, which brought to the small town of Bethlehem, in Palestine, a cultural and religious significance that is unique throughout history. This event is thus of monumental importance, not only to the Palestinian people and to the Middle East, but to all the world's believers and to all the international community.

The commemoration of the two thousandth anniversary of the birth of Jesus Christ in Bethlehem is particularly symbolic, for it comes at a time when the peoples of the region have new hope and new reasons for believing that the question of Palestine will reach a peaceful outcome which will promote peace, stability and prosperity in the region. It is our hope today that this commemoration will herald the dawn of a new era of dialogue, reconciliation and economic recovery for Palestinians, Israelis and all the peoples of the Middle East.

The name Bethlehem evokes scenes of rare beauty, enhanced by breathtakingly beautiful landscapes and by the perfect and symbiotic meshing of Eastern and Western cultures. Unfortunately, decades of conflict have altered the precious treasures of Bethlehem and have had a negative impact on the socio-economic infrastructure of the town and the surrounding areas. Many magnificent buildings now need restoration. The infrastructures in the town have to be rebuilt, particularly given that massive numbers of pilgrims are expected to arrive from all corners of the globe.

Responding to the appeal made by President Yasser Arafat, President of the Palestinian Authority, at the conference in support of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian People held in Brussels in February 1998, our Committee indicated that it would fully support the Bethlehem 2000 project of the Palestinian Authority.

The project includes commemorative cultural events that will be international in character, the restoration and modernization of the city's infrastructure, the improvement of basic social, health and security services, preservation of the rich Palestinian history and the provision of all the necessary tourist services.
The conference of participants in the Bethlehem 2000 project, which was also held in Brussels, in May 1998 - and which I had the privilege of attending together with President Arafat, the President of the European Community and the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) - showed the broad international support for the project on the part of donor Governments, organizations within the United Nations system, the European Commission, UNESCO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, other intergovernmental organizations, the private sector, the media and non-governmental organizations. The level of contributions to date is very encouraging. At the same time, more must be done to ensure the success of this commendable Palestinian initiative at a time when the Palestinian people still face serious difficulties.

The Committee is firmly convinced that the reconstruction of the historic sites in this Holy Land will be a well-deserved tribute to the historic and religious importance of Bethlehem on the occasion of the commemoration of the millennium, particularly for future generations, for whom Bethlehem will always be the symbol of lasting spiritual and cultural harmony. The Committee also believes that solid improvements on the ground in the area around Bethlehem are necessary, especially with regard to guaranteeing freedom of movement and free and unhindered access to the holy places in Bethlehem for the faithful of all religions and nationalities.

The Committee is doing all it can to inform and mobilize public opinion in all regions in support of this project through meetings and other activities to provide information. In this context the Committee, with the support of the Italian Government, will be organizing early next year in Rome an international conference on Bethlehem 2000 designed to promote this initiative and to ensure the broadest possible international participation in it. The conference will be an opportunity for all parties concerned to increase dialogue and cooperation for the promotion of peace and reconciliation, to assess the progress made in the project and to determine needs, with a view to mobilizing additional international support.

This event can be successful only if there is commitment and participation by the international community as a whole. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People believes that the commemoration of the millennium in Bethlehem is a unique opportunity for all peoples, whatever their beliefs, race or nationality, to come together to reflect upon the lessons of the unique messages of peace, reconciliation and love which have come from this crossroads of history and of the world.

There can be no better time for us to reaffirm our belief in these eternal messages. There can be no better time for members of the human race to be reconciled with each other and to heal the wounds inflicted by past conflicts so that we can at last reaffirm our desire for a better life for all at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

The events to commemorate the millennium in Bethlehem will begin at Christmas 1999 and continue until Easter 2001.

On behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I now have the honour to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Bethlehem 2000". First of all, I should like to take this opportunity to announce that Algeria, Guyana and Niger have also sponsored the draft resolution.

In the draft resolution, the General Assembly welcomes the global and historic event to mark both the commemoration of the birth of Jesus Christ and the beginning of the third millennium. It associates itself fully with the Palestinian initiative for the Bethlehem 2000 project and encourages the international community, in particular the bodies of the United Nations, to offer assistance to bring about the objectives set forth therein. In order for this commemoration to be duly channelled and supported in a spirit of peace and reconciliation in the Middle East, a request has again been made that the item entitled "Bethlehem 2000" be included in the provisional agenda of the fifty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

(spoke in English)
I would like, on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution, to introduce the following revision in the first preambular paragraph. The words “Bethlehem, in the Palestinian land” should be replaced with the words “the Palestinian city of Bethlehem”. The entire paragraph would then read:

“Recalling the fact that the Palestinian city of Bethlehem is the birthplace of Jesus Christ and one of the most historic and significant sites on earth.”

(spoke in French)

I should like to extend the Committee's deep appreciation to Governments, bodies of the United Nations and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations which from the very beginning have embraced the idea of the Bethlehem 2000 project by making their contribution and supporting the spirit of this initiative.

The draft resolution reflects our hopes and our common aspirations for a better world at the dawn of the new millennium. The Committee believes that consensus adoption of the draft resolution will contribute to supporting and promoting the peace process which we all hold dear. I would therefore encourage all Member States to support the draft resolution by adopting it by consensus.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 53/27 REGARDING “BETHLEHEM 2000,” NEW YORK, 18 NOVEMBER 1998

The General Assembly,

Recalling the fact that Bethlehem, in the Palestinian land, is the birthplace of Jesus Christ and one of the most historic and significant sites on earth,

Noting that the world will celebrate in Bethlehem, a city of peace, the onset of the new millennium in a global vision of hope for all peoples,

Stressing the monumental importance of the event for the Palestinian people, for the peoples of the region and for the international community as a whole, as it comprises significant religious, historical and cultural dimensions,

Aware of the Bethlehem 2000 project as a multifaceted undertaking for commemoration of the event, which will begin at Christmas, 1999, and conclude at Easter, 2001,

Aware also of the needed assistance with regard to the above-mentioned project, and expressing appreciation for the steps taken towards increasing the engagement and participation of the international community, including donor countries, and organizations of the United Nations system, in particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank, as well as the European Commission, religious institutions and others,

Expressing the need for immediate change in the situation on the ground in the vicinity of Bethlehem, especially with regard to ensuring freedom of movement,

Stressing the need for ensuring free and unhindered access to the holy places in Bethlehem to the faithful of all religions and citizens of all nationalities,

Expressing the hope for rapid progress in the Middle East peace process and the achievement of the final settlement between the Palestinian and Israeli sides within the agreed time, so that the millennium may be celebrated most appropriately in an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation,

1. Welcomes the impending arrival of this global, historic celebration in Bethlehem of the birth of Jesus Christ and the onset of the third millennium as a symbol of the shared hope for peace among all peoples of the world;

2. Expresses support for the Bethlehem 2000 project and commends the efforts undertaken by the Palestinian Authority in this regard;
3. *Notes with appreciation* the assistance given by the international community in support of the Bethlehem 2000 project, and calls for increased assistance and engagement by the international community as a whole, including private sector participation, to ensure the success of the Bethlehem 2000 project and the fruition of this monumental commemoration;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to mobilize the pertinent organizations and agencies of the United Nations system to increase their efforts towards ensuring the success of the Bethlehem 2000 project;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled "Bethlehem 2000" so that the General Assembly may have a renewed opportunity to reaffirm its further support for the event immediately prior to the occasion of its commemoration.

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UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS, GENEVA, 4 DECEMBER 1998 [EXCERPTS]

*The Committee is charged with regularly reviewing the compliance of signatory states with their legal obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Noteworthy about this committee’s work was that it was the first time a UN human rights body questioned Israel not only about its practices, but also about its fundamental laws and institutions (i.e. Draft Basic Law: Social Rights; Status Law of 1952; Law of Return).*

1. The Committee considered the initial report of Israel on the implementation of the Covenant (E/1990/5/Add.39), together with the written replies to the list of issues, at its 31st to 33rd meetings, held on 17 and 18 November 1998, and adopted at its 53rd meeting (nineteenth session) held on 2 December 1998 the following concluding observations.

**A. INTRODUCTION**

2. The Committee welcomes the submission of the initial report which generally conforms to its guidelines on the preparation of reports. The Committee regrets, however, the delay in the submission of the report.

3. The Committee expresses appreciation for the presentation of the State's representatives and the additional information they provided during the dialogue. The Committee also takes note of the extensive information submitted to it by a large number of non-governmental organizations which was available to the Committee for its dialogue with the State party.

**B. POSITIVE FACTORS**

4. The Committee welcomes the enactment in 1995 of the National Health Insurance Law which provides for primary health care and ensures equal and adequate health services for each citizen and permanent resident of Israel.

   The Committee also welcomes the amendment in 1996 of the same law to enable housewives to receive the minimum old-age pension while remaining exempt from contributions.

5. The Committee welcomes the recent establishment of the Authority for the Advancement of the Status of Women which is vested with advisory powers with respect to policies to promote gender equality, eliminate discrimination against women and prevent domestic violence against women.

6. The Committee takes note of the statement by State party's representatives that with respect to the Covenant's applicability in the occupied territories, Israel accepts direct responsibility in some areas covered by the Covenant, indirect responsibility in other areas and overall significant legal responsibility across the board. This conforms to the Committee's view that the Covenant applies to all areas where Israel maintains geographical, functional or personal jurisdiction.
C. FACTORS AND DIFFICULTIES AFFECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COVENANT

7. The Committee notes that Israel's emphasis on its security concerns, including its policies on closures, has hampered the realization of economic, social and cultural rights within Israel and the occupied territories.

D. PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS OF CONCERN

8. The Committee notes with concern that the Government's written and oral reports included statistics indicating the enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the Covenant by Israeli settlers in the occupied territories but that the Palestinian population within the same jurisdictional areas were excluded from both the report and the protection of the Covenant. The Committee is of the view that the State's obligations under the Covenant apply to all territories and populations under its effective control. The Committee therefore regrets that the State party was not prepared to provide adequate information in relation to the occupied territories.

Status of the Covenant

9. The Committee notes that economic, social and cultural rights have not been granted constitutional recognition in Israel's legal system. The Committee is of the view that the current Draft Basic Law: Social Rights does not meet the requirements of Israel's obligations under the Covenant.

Discrimination

10. The Committee expresses concern that excessive emphasis upon the State as a "Jewish State" encourages discrimination and accords a second-class status to its non-Jewish citizens. The Committee notes with concern that the Government of Israel does not accord equal rights to its Arab citizens, although they comprise over 19 per cent of the total population. This discriminatory attitude is apparent in the lower standard of living of Israeli Arabs as a result, inter alia, of lack of access to housing, water, electricity and health care and their lower level of education. The Committee also notes with concern that despite the fact that the Arabic language has official status in law, it is not given equal importance in practice.

11. The Committee notes with grave concern that the Status Law of 1952 authorizes the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency and its subsidiaries, including the Jewish National Fund, to control most of the land in Israel, since these institutions are chartered to benefit Jews exclusively. Despite the fact that the institutions are chartered under private law, the State of Israel nevertheless has a decisive influence on their policies and thus remains responsible for their activities. A State party cannot divest itself of its obligations under the Covenant by privatizing governmental functions. The Committee takes the view that large-scale and systematic confiscation of Palestinian land and property by the State and the transfer of that property to these agencies constitute an institutionalized form of discrimination because these agencies by definition would deny the use of these properties to non-Jews. Thus, these practices constitute a breach of Israel's obligations under the Covenant.

12. The Committee notes with deep concern the situation of the Jahalin Bedouin families who were forcibly evicted from their ancestral lands to make way for the expansion of the Ma'aleh Adumim and Kedar settlements. The Committee deplores the manner in which the Government of Israel has housed these families - in steel container vans in a garbage dump in Abu Dis in subhuman living conditions. The Committee regrets that instead of providing assurances that this matter will be resolved, the State party has insisted that it can only be solved through litigation.

13. The Committee notes with concern that the Law of Return, which allows any Jew from anywhere in the world to immigrate and thereby virtually automatically enjoy residence and obtain citizenship in Israel, discriminates against Palestinians in the diaspora upon whom the Government of Israel has imposed restrictive requirements which make it almost impossible to return to their land of birth.

Employment

14. The Committee notes with concern the rapid growth of unemployment in Israel as a result of which more and more workers are employed in low-paying part-time work where they have little or no legal protection.
15. The Committee notes with regret that more than 72 per cent of persons with disabilities are unemployed. The new Law of Equality for People with Disabilities 1998 has not set any quota for the employment of such persons.

16. The Committee is alarmed that only half of the workers entitled to the minimum wage actually get it, and that foreign workers, Palestinians and “manpower contractor” workers are particularly vulnerable in this regard.

Closure

17. The Committee regrets that the Government of Israel has maintained "general closures" continuously since 1993, thereby restricting and controlling the movement of people and goods between Israel and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, between Jerusalem and the West Bank and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Committee notes with concern that these restrictions apply only to Palestinians and not to Jewish Israeli citizens. The Committee is of the view that closures have cut off Palestinians from their own land and resources, resulting in widespread violations of their economic, social and cultural rights, including in particular those contained in article 1 (2) of the Covenant.

18. The Committee notes with grave concern the severe consequences of closure on the Palestinian population. Closures have prevented access to health care, first and foremost during medical emergencies, which at times have tragically ended in death at checkpoints and elsewhere. Workers from the occupied territories are prevented from reaching their workplaces, depriving them of income and livelihood and the enjoyment of their rights under the Covenant. Poverty and lack of food aggravated by closures particularly affect children, pregnant women and the elderly who are most vulnerable to malnutrition.

19. The Committee is concerned at the forcible separation of Palestinian families because of closures and the refusal of Israeli authorities to allow students in Gaza to return to their universities in the West Bank.

Permanent residency law

20. The Committee expresses its concern at the effect of the directive of the Ministry of the Interior, according to which Palestinians may lose their right to live in the city if they cannot prove that East Jerusalem has been their “centre of life” for the past seven years. The Committee also regrets a serious lack of transparency in the application of the directive, as indicated by numerous reports. The Committee notes with concern that this policy is being applied retroactively both to Palestinians who live abroad and to those who live in the West Bank or in nearby Jerusalem suburbs, but not to Israeli Jews or to foreign Jews who are permanent residents of East Jerusalem. This system has resulted in, inter alia, the separation of Arab families and the denial of their right to social services and health care, including maternity care for Arab women, which are privileges linked to residency status in Jerusalem. The Committee is deeply concerned that the implementation of a quota system for the reunification of Palestinian families affected by this residency law involves long delays and does not meet the needs of all divided families. Similarly, the granting of residency status is often a long process and, as a result, many children are separated from at least one of their parents and spouses are not able to live together.

Land use and housing

21. The Committee is deeply concerned about the adverse impact of the growing exclusion faced by Palestinians in East Jerusalem from the enjoyment of their economic, social and cultural rights. The Committee is also concerned over the continued Israeli policies of building settlements to expand the boundaries of East Jerusalem and of transferring Jewish residents into East Jerusalem with the result that they now outnumber the Palestinian residents.

22. The Committee deplores the continuing practices of the Government of Israel of home demolitions, land confiscations and restrictions on family reunification and residency rights, and its adoption of policies which result in substandard housing and living conditions, including extreme overcrowding and lack of services, of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, in particular in the old city.

23. The Committee notes with concern the situation of Arab neighbourhoods in mixed cities such as Jaffa and Lod which have deteriorated into virtual slums because of Israel’s excessively restrictive system of granting government permits without which it is illegal to undertake any kind of structural repair or renovation.
24. The Committee notes that despite State party’s obligation under article 11 of the Covenant, the Government of Israel continues to expropriate Palestinian lands and resources for the expansion of Israeli settlements. Thousands of dunams (hectares) of land in the West Bank have recently been confiscated to build 20 new bypass roads which cut West Bank towns off from outlying villages and farms. The consequence - if not the motivation - is the fragmentation and isolation of the Palestinian communities and facilitation of the expansion of illegal settlements. The Committee also notes with concern that while the Government annually diverts millions of cubic metres of water from the West Bank’s Eastern Aquifer Basin, the annual per capita consumption allocation for Palestinians is only 125 cubic metres while settlers are allocated 1,000 cubic metres per capita.

25. The Committee expresses its concern over the plight of an estimated 200,000 uprooted "present absentees", Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel most of whom were forced to leave their villages during the 1948 war on the understanding that they would be allowed by the Government of Israel to return after the war. Although a few have been given back their property, the vast majority continue to be displaced and dispossessed within the State because their lands were confiscated and not returned to them.

Unrecognized villages

26. The Committee notes with deep concern that a significant proportion of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel continue to live in unrecognized villages without access to water, electricity, sanitation and roads. Such an existence has caused extreme difficulties for the villagers in regard to their access to health care, education and employment opportunities. In addition, these villagers are continuously threatened with demolition of their home and confiscation of their land. The Committee regrets the inordinate delay in the provision of essential services to even the few villages that have been recognized. In this connection, the Committee takes note that while Jewish settlements are constructed on a regular basis, no new Arab villages have been built in the Galilee.

27. The Committee regrets that the Regional Master Plan for the Northern District of Israel and the Plan for the Negev have projected a future where there is little place for Arab citizens of Israel whose needs arising from natural demographic growth are largely ignored.

28. The Committee expresses its grave concern about the situation of the Bedouin Palestinians settled in Israel. The number of Bedouins living below the poverty line, their living and housing conditions, their levels of malnutrition, unemployment and infant mortality are all significantly higher than the national averages. They have no access to water, electricity and sanitation and are subjected on a regular basis to land confiscations, house demolitions, fines for building "illegally", destruction of agricultural fields and trees, and systematic harassment and persecution by the Green Patrol. The Committee notes in particular that the Government's policy of settling Bedouins in seven "townships" has caused high levels of unemployment and loss of livelihood.

Other concerns

29. The Committee notes with regret the large gaps within the Israeli educational system. Dropout rates are higher and eligibility for matriculation certificates is lower within certain segments of society: Arabs and Jews in poor neighborhoods and in development towns, where many of the residents are Jews of Asian and African origin, including Ethiopian Jews. The Committee is particularly concerned about the gap in educational expenditure per capita for the Arab sector which is substantially less than for the Jewish sector.

30. The Committee notes with concern that the recently adopted Arrangements Law has the effect of eroding the principles of universality and equality set out in the National Health Insurance Law. The Arrangements Law imposes payments for medical services in addition to the health tax; a periodic health tax links the amount of tax required to the amount of health services needed, thereby increasing inequality in health care. In spite of assurances that the Knesset sets a cap on such taxes, the Committee is concerned that this provision does not conform to the Government's avowed commitment to an equitable health-care system.

31. The Committee notes with grave concern the high incidence of domestic violence against women which is estimated at 200,000 cases per year. The Committee is concerned about the situation of non-Jewish women who are reportedly worse off in terms of living conditions, health and education. The Committee is concerned at persistent reports that the Dimona nuclear plant could pose a serious threat to the right to health and to the environment unless urgent preventive measures are undertaken.
E. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

32. The Committee requests the State party to provide additional information on the realization of economic, social and cultural rights in the occupied territories, in order to complete the State party’s initial report and thereby ensure full compliance with its reporting obligations. Detailed information, including the latest statistical data, is also requested on the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights in East Jerusalem, keeping in mind the concerns raised by the Committee in the relevant paragraphs of these concluding observations. In addition, the Committee also requests updated information on the target dates for recognizing unrecognized villages and a plan for the delivery of basic services, including water, electricity, access roads, health care and primary education, to which the villagers are entitled as citizens of Israel. The Committee requests that the additional information also include an update of the Outline Plan of Ein Hod and on progress in the recognition of Arab El-Na’im, as well as an update on the Jahalin Bedouins who are presently camped in Abu Dis awaiting a court decision on their resettlement. The Committee requests the submission of the detailed additional information in this respect in time for the twenty-third session of the Committee in November-December 2000.

33. The Committee calls upon the State party to undertake the necessary steps to ensure the full legal application of the Covenant within the domestic legal order.

34. The Committee calls upon the State party to ensure equality of treatment of all Israeli citizens in relation to all Covenant rights.

35. The Committee urges the State party to review the status of its relationship with the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency and its subsidiaries, including the Jewish National Fund, with a view to remedying the problems identified in paragraph 11 above.

36. In order to ensure respect of article 1 (2) of the Covenant and to ensure equality of treatment and non-discrimination, the Committee strongly recommends a review of re-entry policies for Palestinians who wish to re-establish their domicile in their homeland, with a view to bringing such policies level with the Law of Return as applied to Jews.

37. The Committee calls upon the State party to take all necessary steps to reduce unemployment and to ensure proper enforcement of Israel’s protective labour legislation, including assigning additional personnel to enforce such legislation. Special attention should be accorded to enforcing the Minimum Wage Law, the Equal Pay for Men and Women Law, and the Equal Opportunities in Employment Law.

38. The Committee calls upon the State party to complete the process of implementing the Law of Equality for People with Disabilities and to address the problem of accessibility to public buildings, including schools, and public transportation by persons with disabilities.

39. The Committee urges the State party to respect the right to self-determination as recognized in article 1 (2) of the Covenant, which provides that "in no way may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence". Closure restricts the movement of people and goods, cutting off access to external markets and to income derived from employment and livelihood. The Committee also calls upon the Government to give full effect to its obligations under the Covenant and, as a matter of the highest priority, to undertake to ensure safe passage at checkpoints for Palestinian medical staff and people seeking treatment, the unhampered flow of essential foodstuffs and supplies, the safe conduct of students and teachers to and from schools, and the reunification of families separated by closures.

40. The Committee calls upon the State party to reassess its Permanent Residency Law with a view to ensuring that its implementation does not result in impeding the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by Palestinians in East Jerusalem. In particular, the Committee urges the State party to remove the quota system currently in place so that families separated by residency rules can be reunited without delay.

41. The Committee calls upon the State party to cease the practices of facilitating the building of illegal settlements and constructing bypass roads, expropriating land, water and resources, demolishing houses and arbitrary evictions. The Committee urges the State party immediately to take steps to respect and implement the right to an adequate standard of living, including housing, of the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and the Palestinian Arabs in the mixed cities. The Committee strongly recommends equal access to housing and settlement on State land for the "present absentees" who are citizens of Israel. The Committee recalls in this connection its General Comment No. 4.
42. The Committee urges the State party to recognize the existing Arab Bedouin villages, the land rights of the inhabitants and their right to basic services, including water.

43. The Committee calls upon the State party to undertake measures addressing the inequalities in the educational system at the secondary and university levels, particularly in terms of budget allocations. The Committee recommends that a study be made of the viability of establishing an Arab university within Israel for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunities and access to higher education in the respective official languages.

44. The Committee urges the State party to adopt effective measures to combat domestic violence against women and to promote equal treatment of women in the field of employment, including in the Government and in education and health.

45. The Committee requests the State party to ensure the wide dissemination in Israel of these concluding observations.

46. The Committee reiterates that the additional information requested in these concluding observations should be submitted in time for the twenty-third session of the Committee in November-December 2000.

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PRESIDENT YASSER ARAFAT, SPEECH ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, SWEDISH PARLIAMENT, STOCKHOLM, 5 DECEMBER 1998

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me, first of all to express my sincere appreciation to all those who have responded to the Swedish government’s gracious invitation to attend this ceremony commemorating the launch of the Middle East peace process, from Stockholm, capital of this ancient land, Sweden.

On this occasion, and on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestine National Authority, the Palestinian people and myself personally, I would also like to extend my heartfelt thanks and deep appreciation to the Swedish government for the enormous effort it has invested in organizing and sponsoring this ceremony, and for allowing me the opportunity to speak before you today.

And allow me as well, to express my especial gratitude to my dear friend, Sten Andersson, that seasoned veteran and long-time companion along the path to peace, who has sacrificed so much of his time and energy in order to bring peace to our area that has suffered so greatly from war and destruction.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Some ten years ago, during the first week of December 1988, the city of Stockholm was the scene for a new and important change in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the initiative of its then foreign minister, Sten Andersson, the Swedish government sponsored the first vital steps that brought together the different conflicting parties in the Middle East.

Sweden’s good offices then succeeded in paving the way for the first dialogue between the PLO, the American-Jewish personalities and the administration, after a long political estrangement between the two sides. This step was to constitute the first link in the chain of events ultimately leading to the Madrid peace conference of 1991. The success of Sweden’s good offices also led to the consolidation of our continuing dialogue with all supporters of peace within the American Jewish community, within the Israeli peace camp, and abroad.

But as we commemorate Sweden’s groundbreaking and effective role in 1988, we must also recall Sweden’s distinguished historical record in support of the cause of peace and justice in our area since 1948, and its traditional role as defender of all peoples struggle for freedom and independence wherever they may be.

It is no surprise therefore, that we should return to this gracious and hospitable land, to commemorate the past history of our common efforts in the cause of peace, and to reaffirm our total and uncondi-
tional commitment to renew these efforts to ensure the success of the peace process, and bring the ship of peace safely to shore.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We did not come to Stockholm today to tell you about the wounds of our history steeped with suffering and pain, with blood and grief. Nor did we come here merely to reiterate our rightful and legitimate demands for freedom and independence. Nor did we come, to accuse or criticize any party or quarter whatsoever. And we did not come here, to announce our negotiating demands or to disclose their details. Rather, we have come to this important engagement to make use of the opportunity it provides on the anniversary of the 1988 initiative in order to achieve a new and positive goal. That goal, is to develop a new and contemporary political discourse, one that we believe will be appropriate to the coming phase, and that we hope will strengthen the foundation of peace, and increase the chances of fulfilling our aspirations from the current peace process in the Middle East.

As you know, our region is witnessing a sustained and irreversible effort in the pursuit of peace in the Land of peace, the Holy Land. A just and comprehensive peace, a peace of the brave, that is our unwaving strategic choice. But we are very aware that the road to peace is still long and hard, and that we will face many difficult and acute challenges before we achieve our hopes. We also know that the era of peace is not the same as the era of war, and that the requirement of violent struggle are not those of the struggle for peace, and that the bitter struggle for peace, may be still harder and more difficult than the challenges of confrontation and war.

As we near negotiations over that which we treasure most in the final status talks, we find it necessary to develop some concepts and principles that will guide our political and negotiating approach, and that can serve as a broad framework for the talks. This framework is based on non-contentious universal political, moral and spiritual human values; such values that cannot be disputed or rejected, no matter what political or ideological differences there are between us.

From this perspective, we see that our first task is to undertake a qualitative change in our political discourse. This means the transition from the logic of war and confrontation to the logic of peace in our mutual dealings. For actions and words that may be appropriate to the era of war and confrontation can no longer be useful or appropriate in the era of peace and co-operation. Thus we call on all sides to restrain and modify their words and deeds, according to this principle and in support of it.

In this context, the transition from the logic of war to the logic of peace requires a readiness to reach an agreed settlement that is based on legitimacy, and international resolutions. We believe that a necessary condition for achieving peace in the region, is the recognition of the deep attachment of both the Palestinian and Israeli peoples to the peace of the brave in the Holy Land of Palestine. Consequently, there can be no just solution to the conflict without agreement on the existence of two states on this precious land; the state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel, co-existing by mutual agreement and acceptance, and in a manner that does not infringe on the vital interests of either side.

The transition from the logic of war to the logic of peace also requires both sides to refrain from violence or armed action or the use of war as a tool of policy in order to impose a settlement on other side. For our part, we wish to emphasize that the Palestinian side does not seek today, and will not seek tomorrow, to enter into any military struggle or any arms race with Israel or with any other party in the area.

On a different level; for peace to endure, there can be no alternative but to acknowledge the principles of equality and reciprocity. It is self-evident to us, that any agreement must be based on the complete moral, political and legal equality between the two sides, for there can be no real meaning to peace in our view, without both sides' strictest commitment to the equality and mutuality of their obligations and rights.

Thus, each side is entitled to full and equal consideration of its national dignity, human rights and national aspirations. Equally, each side is entitled to fulfill its aspirations to live in peace and dignity on its own soil, within agreed, secure and recognized borders free from war or the threat of violence.
Furthermore, any resolution of the conflict must be based on principles of fairness and justice. There is no doubt that any agreement that is not based on a minimally achievable level of justice for both sides, will be neither stable nor durable nor sustainable. Nor will it stand the test of future challenges; indeed any agreement that ignores the principle of justice will merely sow the seed of bitter renewed conflict in the future rather than serve to end it.

Within this same context, we believe that the political and national rights of one side cannot be attained at the expense of the other, and that any settlement should allow for the Palestinian and Israeli peoples to live, work and move freely in any part of Palestine or Israel, without prejudice to the sovereign rights or laws of either side.

Among the principles that we hold true, is the need for a comprehensive settlement. Thus we believe that a final settlement should encompass all issues, as agreed in the agenda for final status talks, such that no issue is left without resolution, and nothing is left to stoke the fire of future conflict or give cause for it to be ignited anew.

Here we must also stress the necessity of a comprehensive settlement in the region as a whole. This should include all tracks, including the Lebanese and Syrian tracks, based on our starting point at the Madrid Conference of 1991, that is to say, based on international legitimacy especially UN resolutions 242, 338, and 425 and the principle of land for peace.

We also believe that we cannot build a just and durable peace, in the shadow of the raw balance of power or military might alone; for if political agreements are to prove lasting and durable they must correspond to legitimate needs and aspiration; such needs that cannot be addressed through reliance on naked force or domination alone.

It is necessary to pause here to give special attention to the issue of security. First of all, we wish to reaffirm that we are committed to everything that has been agreed upon till now in order to ensure that nothing will disturb the peace and stability of either side; and that no party will challenge the peace process or threaten its future; we are fully cognizant of the sensitivity of this issue, and of the depth of the fears of the Israeli people and their security concerns.

However, even as we reaffirm our belief in the importance of the security issue and the need for cooperation to ensure it, it is important to recognize that the Palestinian side has its own security fears and concerns and that the essence of security is mutuality; the security of one side cannot be obtained at the expense of other. We believe, that each side has the equal right to live in peace and security free from war or violence, or the threat of war and violence, and that each side must endeavor to ensure that its territory shall not be used for military operations or violence or the threat of violence against the other side.

In addition, we believe that each side should refrain from military alliances or agreements that are aimed at the other side, or that threaten its security. For its part, the Palestinian side has no intention of joining such hostile military or political alliances or axes against any of the states in the area. But we must state, quite frankly, that we believe that the security of one side cannot be attained through the occupation of another’s territory and that the retention or annexation of territory under the guise of security will not reinforce the chances of peace, and will not constitute a real and effective response to possible future security threats.

Lastly, we believe that real security will spring from peaceful coexistence and normal interaction between peoples and states, and from the process of building common relations and interests, free from an environment of domination and intimidation, or the threat of force and violence, and free unilateral steps that undermine the interests of either party.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

These principles and values can be seen as forming a general framework that will guide our approach to final status issues. But there are also some operational principles that we would like to put
to you today. We hope these will help to clarify and hasten the settlement to which we aspire; a settlement that encompasses the issues agreed at Oslo concerning the final phase that will follow the interim phase. This necessitates that every effort be made to reach an agreement and to delineate the borders of the Palestinian State before May 4, 1999.

First, there can be no alternative to resolving the disputed issues between the two sides except through negotiations, which result in a mutually acceptable and agreed settlement. For disputes can only be settled by negotiations. Second, each side should refrain from taking unilateral actions that may threaten or undermine the outcome of the negotiations, especially the annexation of land and the building of settlements. Third, the city of Jerusalem should be open to all its inhabitants without exception or discrimination, and should remain undivided by physical barriers, trenches or fortifications. We believe, that the vital interests of both sides in the Holy City, should be mutually recognized, and that both parties should acknowledge that there can be no resolution of the issue of Jerusalem without taking these interests into account. We must emphasize here the need to end attempts to change the character of Arab Jerusalem.

We also believe that any settlement should respect the legitimate religious rights of all communities and religions equally, and should ensure the safety and security of all their holy places wherever they may be.

Fourth, there can be no final settlement without a just and mutually acceptable solution for the refugee problem, those sons and daughters of ours who have been dispossessed and dispersed from their lands since 1948. Fifth, and with regard to security; the Palestinian side is ready to consider any security arrangements that do not conflict with the principle of Palestinian sovereignty over Palestinian soil. As we reaffirm that violence is not an option, we wish to emphasize that common and reciprocal security is our goal in building peace and peaceful coexistence. Sixth, in return for a final agreement that ends the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, we believe it will be possible to deal with Israeli security concerns via the following mechanisms:

- agreed arrangements on the ground,
- bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements,
- international guarantees and agreements,
- and finally, last but not least, true reliance on the logic of peace.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We believe that the values and principles that we have put forward today, constitute a sound basis for the attainment of a durable peace in the Middle East. And that if these values and principles were to be truly embodied and translated into reality by agreement in the final status accords, we would have fulfilled our national hopes and aspirations on the ground.

For these values and principles which have universal moral and human resonance, constitute no challenge, except to those who reject the logic of peace. And present no threat, except to those who would deny human values, and hide nothing, but a genuine intention to enter the era of peace and turn the page on war and destruction. And have no ulterior motive, but to carry the message of a peace of the brave to both the Palestinian and Israeli peoples, and bring them, after a century of conflict, the fruits of coexistence, stability and a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

Thank you and may peace be upon you.

GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL, CLOSING STATEMENT, 19TH SESSION OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL, ABU DHABI, 7-9 DECEMBER 1998 [EXCERPTS]

In response to the gracious invitation by His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al - Nahayan, President of the State of the UAE, the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) held its Nineteenth session in Abu Dhabi, the State of the UAE, from 18th to 20th
Shaa’ban 1419 AH, corresponding to 7th-9th December under the Chairmanship of His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahayan, President of the State of the UAE […]

THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS:
The Supreme Council reviewed the developments in the Middle East Peace Process and welcomed the "Wye Plantation Agreement", which was concluded on 23rd October 1998 AD, between the Palestinian and the Israeli sides and which, represents an important and positive step and should be followed by steps towards implementation of all agreements signed between the concerned sides so as to preserve all the rights of the Arabs on the one hand and to ensure security, stability and a comprehensive and lasting peace for all the peoples of the region on the other. The Council expressed its appreciation of His Excellency President Clinton for the enormous efforts made by him in order to facilitate the two sides to reach that Agreement. In this regard, the Supreme Council urged Israel to complete the implementation of this agreement faithfully and precisely without any procrastination or postponement.

The Supreme Council affirmed that the desired peace cannot be attained except by the restoration of all the legitimate rights of the Arabs, compliance with resolutions of international law, the principles enunciated by the Madrid Conference and the principle of "land-for-peace" in accordance with Security Council resolutions 242, 338, 425 and 426. It also re-affirmed that the peace will not be just, enduring and comprehensive unless the Palestinian people receive their legitimate national rights, foremost among those is the establishment of their independent state with Holy Jerusalem as its capital; and the need for the complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, including from the Syrian Golan Heights back to the border line existing on the 4th of June 1967 A.D. the Southern Lebanon and its West Bqaa area in line with the resolutions 425 and 426, without laying any pre-conditions or qualifications.

The Supreme Council expressed its categorical rejection and condemnation of the Israeli policy of building settlements in the occupied Arab territories and of the Israeli decisions to enlarge the geographic borders of the Holy Jerusalem and to change its demographic structure as it constitutes a violation of the international laws calling for non-recognition or acceptance of any situation resulting from the settlement activities in the occupied Arab territories, demanding from Israel to stop these activities and to desist from taking actions that negatively impact the final settlement agreement with the Palestinian side.

While the Council appreciates the efforts of the American Administration, the Russian Federation and the European Union along with its member countries for supporting the peace process and helping to bring it back on its right course, the Council appeals to these countries to intensify the effective roles in pressing Israel to abide by its pledges and on the need to resume negotiations on the Syrian track from where it broke down, as also on the Lebanese track so that peace, security and stability may be achieved for the region and its peoples. […]

RESOLUTIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN OPPOSITION CONFERENCE ('PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CONFERENCE'), DAMASCUS, 12-13 DECEMBER 1998

On the 12th and 13th of December of 1998, and in the presence of a large number of Arab and Muslim guests, 350 delegates representing Palestinian organizations and persons adhering to the principle of carrying on with the struggle to liberate all of Palestine, met in Damascus, Syria, to send the world the following message: the people of Palestine everywhere categorically reject the agreements of Oslo and Wye Plantation, and the amendment or annulment of the Palestinian National Charter.

Moreover, the convention of the Palestinian National Conference in Damascus simultaneously with the two other national meetings in Gaza and Ramallah, serves to underscore the unity of our people inside and outside Palestine against all attempts to liquidate the cause, along with the escalation of popular protests against the occupation.
Thus our meeting resolves that:

1. The Palestinian people deem the two meetings on the 10th and the 14th in Gaza to invalidate the National Charter and endorse the Oslo and Wye Agreements, neither representative nor expressive of the Palestinian national will. They have come merely to appease Zionist and American dictates. Our people then stand firmly opposed to the annulment of the Palestinian National Charter, whose political constants have been the locus of national consensus so far. Voiding the Charter is hence a de facto abrogation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its institutions, and a nullification of the national unity of the Palestinian people.

2. The conference deems those who annulled the Charter and squandered our national and historical rights lacking in legitimacy, both legally and patriotically. They are outlaws as far as the national will of our people is concerned, and thus they represent only themselves and their narrow sordid interests. The Palestinian cause belongs to the Palestinians, and to the Arab and Muslim nation, not to them. Our people hence renew their commitment to their inalienable national rights, including the right of return to the lands occupied in 1948 and 1967. They assert that no one has been authorized to yield the right of return to the homeland in any negotiations. Thus all the agreements and treaties that infringe on that right are hereby declared null, void, and non-binding for the people of Palestine.

3. Our conference notes that the restoration of the national cause back from the improvident hands of the Oslo team, and thwarting the effectiveness of the dangerous concessions it made, requires developing a clear strategy for Palestinian national action, and the reconstruction of a national unity which resists occupation and opposes surrender treaties. The burden of this great task falls squarely on the backs of patriotic organizations and persons.

4. The conference proclaims the unshakable belief of the Palestinian Arab people in the deep connection between the destiny of Palestinians and that of the Arab and Muslim nation. Consequently, the conference urges all to vigorously challenge all attempts to isolate the Palestinian cause from its Arab and Islamic depth. The conflict with Zionism and its allies is more than a conflict with the Palestinian people. Therefore, the prerequisites for a successful confrontation necessarily include Arab nationalist and Islamist elements, with a central role for the Palestinians.

5. The conference alerts the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Unity that the Oslo-Wye Agreements do not represent the will, and contradict the interests, of our Palestinian people. The conference therefore calls on them to withhold their cover and support from these agreements, including calling for their full implementation on the ground.

6. The conference calls on the international community to withdraw its support for the Oslo and subsequent agreements, since these conflict with international conventions and the principle of self-determination for all peoples. We call on the peoples and states of the world to support our people's right to struggle to regain their national rights, in accordance with the principles of justice and freedom. We call on the international community to condemn the systematic Zionist practice of terrorism. We seek rights, justice, and peace. But we also hold that genuine peace will never be achieved except with the liberation of our land and the return there of our people.

7. The conference reaffirms the right of our people to continue their resistance to get their national rights in full. That is a legitimate and holy right that has been sanctioned by said international laws and covenants. We dispute all attempts to portray the struggle of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation as a form of terrorism. All the while, Zionists have been violating international laws and committing organized terror in the form of massacres and other forms against the people of Palestine, Lebanon, and the Arab nation for the last fifty years with full support from the U.S. government.

8. The conference reasserts its rejection of all projects to dilute the national identity of Palestinians, and to settle them in or to remove them from where they reside now. We call on hosting Arab states to recognize the civil and social rights of Palestinians, including their right to work, live, and travel in dignity. We especially call attention to the horrendous circumstances of the Palestinians residing in Lebanon, and call in this regard for the emulation there of the Syrian Arab example in the way Palestinian brothers living on its soil are hosted.

9. The conference condemns the measures taken by the Jordanian government to prevent delegates and invitees from Jordan from exercising their right to travel and to attend the conference. The justifications presented by the Jordanian government have been unacceptable and inconsistent.
with the special historical links between the Palestinian and Jordanian people. The conference furthermore considers these measures part of the context in which Oslo-Wye and the Wadi Arabah Treaty are being implemented.

10. The conference announces the formation of a High National Executive Committee to oversee the implementation of its resolutions and recommendations. The Committee is also to sketch a strategy and a program for action to reformulate and revive the Palestinian national project, and to preserve the accomplishments of our people.

Salutations:

The conference concluded with a warm salutation for the steadfast people of Lebanon for providing an example to follow in resistance and struggle.

Then the conference extended many salutations to the people of Egypt for providing an example to follow in the area of resisting normalization with "Israel".

It also saluted the people of Jordan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the people of Iraq, calling for lifting the unjust siege, which was termed "one of the most heinous crimes of the modern age". It saluted the people of Libya also calling for lifting the sanctions, and saluted Sudan calling for keeping foreign hands off its internal affairs.

The conference finally saluted the Palestinian people everywhere, from those residing in the land occupied in 1948, to the people of the West Bank and Gaza, to the Palestinian of the Diaspora. It saluted the prisoners in the jails of the Zionist occupation and the limited self-autonomy authority (PNA). It saluted those injured and handicapped during the Intifada, and the Syrian people and leadership which hosted the conference and supported the Palestinian struggle.

Finally this call: "Palestine, with Jerusalem as its eternal capital, was and will always be the LAND and the home of the Palestinian Arab people forevermore. To it, the eyes and the hearts of all Arabs and Muslims will always turn".

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US PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON, SPEECH BEFORE THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL, GAZA, 14 DECEMBER 1998

[Clinton's address formed part of Wye River Memorandum agreements. After the speech, the PNC voted by a show of hands almost unanimously to reaffirm its cancellation of the offending articles of the 1968 Palestinian Covenant that called for the destruction or non-acceptance of Israel.]

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Za'anoun, Chairman Arafat, Mrs. Arafat, members of the Palestinian National Council, the Palestinian Central Council, the Palestinian Executive Committee, Palestinian Council heads of ministries, leaders of business and religion, to all members of the Palestinian community and to my fellow Americans who come here from many walks of life - Arab-Americans, Jewish-Americans - this is a remarkable day.

Today, the eyes of the world are on you. I am profoundly honored to be the first American president to address the Palestinian people in a city government by Palestinians. Thank you.

I have listened carefully to all that has been said. I have watched carefully the reactions of all of you to what has been said. I know that the Palestinian people stand at a crossroads - behind you a history of dispossession and dispersal, before you the opportunity to shape a new Palestinian future on your own land.

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I know the way is often difficult and frustrating, but you have come to this point through a commitment to peace and negotiations.

You reaffirmed that commitment today. I believe it is the only way to fulfill the aspirations of your people. And I am profoundly grateful to have had the opportunity to work with Chairman Arafat for the cause of peace, to come here as a friend of peace and a friend of your future, and to witness you raising your hands, standing up tall, standing up not only against what you believe is wrong, but for what you believe is right in the future.

I was sitting here thinking that this moment would have been inconceivable a decade ago. No Palestinian Authority, no elections in Gaza and the West Bank, no relations between the United States and the Palestinians, no Israeli troop redeployments from the West Bank and Gaza, no Palestinians in charge of Gaza, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron, Tulkarem, Jenin, Nablus, Jericho and so many other places.

There was no Gaza International Airport. Today, I had the privilege of cutting the ribbon on the international airport. Hillary and I, along with Chairman and Mrs. Arafat, celebrated a place that will become a magnet for planes from throughout the Middle East and beyond bringing you a future in which Palestinians can travel directly to the far corners of the world, a future in which it is easier and cheaper to bring materials, technology and expertise in and out of Gaza, a future in which tourists and traders can flock here to this beautiful place on the Mediterranean, a future in short in which the Palestinian people are connected to the world.

I am told that just a few months ago, at a time of profound pessimism in the peace process, your largest exporter of fruit and flowers was prepared to plow under a field of roses, convinced the airport would never open. But Israelis and Palestinians came to agreement at Wye River. The airport has opened, and now I am told that company plans to export roses and carnations to Europe and throughout the Gulf - a true flowering of Palestinian promise.

I come here today to talk about that promise, to ask you to rededicate yourselves to it, to ask you to think for a moment about how we can get beyond the president state of things - where every step forward is like - as we say in America - pulling teeth, where there is still, in spite of the agreement at Wye, achieved because we don't need much sleep, and we worked so hard and Mr. Netanyahu worked with us and we made this agreement.

But I want to talk to you about how we can get beyond this moment where there is still so much mistrust and misunderstanding and quite a few missteps.

You did a good thing today in raising your hand. You know why? It has nothing to do with the government in Israel. You will touch the people of Israel.

I want the people of Israel to know that for many Palestinians, five years after Oslo, the benefits of this process remain remote. That for too many Palestinians, lives are hard, jobs are scarce, prospects are uncertain and personal grief is great.

I know that tremendous pain remains as a result of losses suffered from violence, the separation of families, the restrictions on the movement of people and goods.

I understand your concerns about settlement activity, land confiscation and home demolitions. I understand your concern and theirs about unilateral statements that could prejudice the outcome of final status negotiations. I understand, in short, that there's still a good deal of misunderstanding five years after the beginning of this remarkable process.

It takes time to change things and still time for the change to benefit everyone. It takes determination and courage to make these, and sometimes even to persevere for peace, but, slowly but surely, the peace agreements are turning into concrete progress.
The transfer of territories, the Gaza industrialist state and the airport - these changes will make a difference in many Palestinian lives.

I thank you, I thank you, Mr. Chairman for your leadership for peace and your perseverance, for enduring all the criticism from all sides, for being willing to change course and for being strong enough to stay with what is right. You have done a remarkable thing for your people.

America is determined to do what we can to bring tangible benefits of peace. I am proud that the roads we traveled on to get here were paved in part with our assistance as were hundreds of miles of roads that knit together towns and villages throughout the West Bank and Gaza.

Two weeks ago in Washington, we joined with other nations to pledge hundreds of millions of dollars toward your development, including health care and clean water, education for your children, rule of law projects to nurture democracy.

Today I am pleased to announce we will also fund the training of Palestinian health care providers and airport administrators; increase our support to Palestinian refugees.

And next year I will ask the Congress for another several hundred million dollars to support the development of the Palestinian people. But make no mistake about it, all this was made possible because of what you did. Because five years ago, you made a choice for peace, and because through all the tough times since, when in your own mind you had a hundred good reasons to walk away, you didn't. Because you still harbor the wisdom that led to the Oslo accords, that led to the signing in Washington in September of '93. You still can raise your hand and stand and lift your voice for peace.

Mr. Chairman, you said some profound words today in embracing the idea that Israelis and Palestinians can live in peace as neighbors. Again, I say, you have led the way, and we would not be here without you.

I say to all of you, I can come here and work. I can bring you to America, and we can work. But in the end, this is up to you. You and the Israelis. For you have to live with the consequences of what you do.

I can help because I believe it is my job to do so. I believe it is my duty to do so because America has Palestinian-Americans, Jewish-Americans, other Arab-Americans who desperately want us to be helpful. But in the end, you have to decide what the understanding will be and you have to decide whether we can get beyond the present moment where there is still, for all the progress we have made, so much mistrust. And the people who are listening to us today in Israel, they have to make the same decision. Peace must mean many things - legitimate rights for Palestinians, real security for Israel. Thank you.

Legitimate rights for Palestinians, real security for Israel, but it must begin with something even basic - mutual recognition; seeing people who are different - with whom there have been profound differences - as people.

I've had two profoundly emotional experiences in the last less than 24 hours. I was with Chairman Arafat and four little children came to see me whose fathers are in Israeli prisons.

Last night, I met some little children whose fathers had been killed in conflict with Palestinians at the dinner that Prime Minister Netanyahu had for me.

Those children brought tears to my eyes. We have to find a way for both sets of children to get their lives back and to go forward.

Palestinians must recognize the right of Israel and its people to live safe and secure lives today, tomorrow and forever. Israel plus recognize the right of Palestinians to aspire to live free today, tomorrow and forever.
And I ask you to remember these experiences I had with these two groups of children. If I had met them in reverse order, I would not have known which ones were Israeli and which Palestinian. If they had all been lined up in a row and I had seen their tears, I could not tell whose father was dead whose father was in prison, or what the story of their lives were, making up the grief that they bore. We must acknowledge that neither side has a monopoly on pain or virtue.

At the end of America's civil war, in my home state, a man was elected governor who had fought with President Lincoln's forces, even though most of the people in my home state fought with the secessionist forces. And he made his inaugural speech after four years of unbelievable bloodshed in America, in which he had been on the winning side, but in the minority in our home.

And everyone wondered what kind of leader he would be. His first sentence was, “We have all done wrong.” I say that because I think the beginning of mutual respect after so much pain is to recognize not only the positive characteristics of people on both sides, but the fact that there has been a lot, a lot of hurt and harm. The fulfillment of one side’s aspirations must not come at the expense of the other.

We must believe that everyone can win in the new Middle East. It does not hurt Israelis to hear Palestinians peacefully and proudly asserting their identity, as we saw today. That is not a bad thing. And it does not hurt Palestinians to acknowledge the profound desire of Israelis to live without fear. It is in this spirit that I ask you to consider where we go from here.

I thank you for your rejection, fully, finally and forever, of the passages in the Palestinian charter calling for the destruction of Israel. For they were the ideological underpinnings of a struggle renounced at Oslo.

By revoking them once and for all, you have sent, I say again, a powerful message, not to the government, but to the people of Israel. You will touch people on the street there. You will reach their hearts there.

I know how profoundly important this is to Israelis. I have been there four times as president and I have spent a lot of time with people other than the political leaders - Israeli school children, who heard about you only as someone who thought they should be driven into the sea. They did not know what their parents or grandparents did that you thought was so bad. They were just children, too.

Is it surprising that all this has led to the hardening of hearts on both sides? That they refused to acknowledge your existence as a people and that led to a terrible reaction by you?

By turning this page on the past, you are taking the lead in writing a new story for the future and you have issued a challenge to the government and the leaders of Israel to walk down that path with you.

I thank you for doing that. The children of all the Middle East thank you. But declaring a change of heart still won't be enough. Let's be realistic here.

First of all, there are real differences. And secondly, a lot of water has flowed under the bridge, as we used to say at home.

An American poet has written – “Too long a sacrifice can make a stone of the heart.”

Palestinians and Israelis, in their past, both share a history of oppression and dispossession.

Both have felt their hearts turn to stone for living too long in fear and seeing loved ones die too young. You are two great people of strong talent and soaring ambition, sharing such a small piece of sacred land.

The time has come to sanctify your holy ground with genuine forgiveness and reconciliation. Every influential Palestinian, from teacher to journalist, from politician to community leader, must make
this a mission to banish from the minds of children glorifying suicide bombers, to end the practice of speaking peace in one place and preaching hatred in another, to teach school children the value of peace and the waste of war, to break the cycle of violence.

Our great American prophet, Martin Luther King, once said, the old law of an eye for an eye leaves everybody blind.

I believe you have gained more in five years of peace than in 45 years of war. I believe that what we are doing to today, working together for security, will lead to further gains and changes in the heart.

I believe that our work against terrorism, if you stand strong, will be rewarded. For that must become a fact of the past. It must never be a part of your future. Let me say this as clearly as I can. No matter how sharp a grievance or how deep a hurt, there is no justification for killing innocents.

Mr. Chairman, you said at the White House that no Israeli mother should have to worry if her son or daughter is late coming home. Your words touched many people.

You said much the same thing today. We must invest those words with the weight of reality in the minds of every person in Israel and every Palestinian.

I feel this all the more strongly because the acts of a few can falsify the image of the many. How many times have we seen it? How many times has it happened to us? We both know it is profoundly wrong to equate Palestinians in particular and Islam in general with terrorism, or to see a fundamental conflict between Islam and the West.

For the vast majority of the one billion Muslims in the world, tolerance is an article of faith and terrorism a travesty of faith.

I know that in my own country, where Islam is one of the fastest-growing religions, we share the same devotion to family and hard work and community.

When it comes to relations between the United States and Palestinians, we have come far to overcome our misperceptions of each other. Americans have come to appreciate the strength of your identity and the depth of your aspirations. And we have learned to listen to your grievances as well.

I hope you have begun to see America as your friend.

I have tried to speak plainly to you about the need to reach out to the people of Israel, to understand the pain of their children, to understand the history of their fear and mistrust, their yearning, gnawing desire for security - because that is the only way friends can speak and the only way we can move forward.

I took the same liberty yesterday in Israel. I talked there about the need to see one's own mistakes, not just those of others; to recognize the steps others have taken for peace, not just one's own; to break out of the politics of absolute; to treat one's neighbors with respect and dignity.

I talked about the profound courage of both peoples and their leaders, which must continue in order for secure, just and lasting peace to occur; the courage of Israelis to continue turning over territory for peace and security; the courage of Palestinians to take action against all those who resort to and support violence and terrorism; the courage of Israelis to guarantee safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza and allow for greater trade and development; the courage of Palestinians to confiscate illegal weapons of war and terror; the courage of Israelis to curtail closures and curfews that remain a daily hardship; the courage of Palestinians to resolve all differences at the negotiating table; the courage of both peoples to abandon the rhetoric of hate that still poisons public discourse and limits the vision of your children; and the courage to move ahead to final status negotiations together - without either side taking unilateral
steps or making unilateral statements that could prejudice the outcome, whether governing refugees, settlements, borders, Jerusalem or any other issue encompassed by the Oslo accords.

Now, it will take good faith, mutual respect and compromise to forge a final agreement. I think there will be breakdowns, frankly. But I think there will be breakthroughs as well. There will be challenges to peace from its enemies, and so I ask you today never to lose sight of how far you have come.

With Chairman Arafat's leadership, already you have accomplished what many said was impossible. The seemingly intractable problems of the past can clearly find practical solutions in the future, but it requires a consistent commitment and a genuine willingness to change hearts.

As we approach this new century, think of this. Think of all the conflicts in the 20th century that many people thought were permanent that have been healed or are healing.

Two great world wars between the French and the Germans - they are best friends. The Americans and the Russians, the whole Cold War - now we have a constructive partnership.

The Irish Catholics and Protestants, the Chinese and the Japanese, the black and white South Africans, the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia, all have turned from conflict to cooperation.

Yes, there's still some distrust. Yes, there's still some difficulty, but they are walking down the right road together. And when they see each other's children, increasingly they only see children together.

When they see the children crying, they realize the pain is real, whatever the child's story.

In each case there was a vision of greater peace and prosperity and security.

In Biblical times, Jews and Arabs lived side by side. They contributed to the flowering of Alexandria. During the Golden Age of Spain, Jews, Muslims and Christians came together in an era of remarkable tolerance and learning. A third of the population laid down its tools on Friday, a third on Saturday, a third on Sunday.

They were scholars and scientists, poets, musicians, merchants and statesmen, setting an example of peaceful coexistence that we can make a model for the future.

There is no guarantee of success or failure today. But the challenge of this generation of Palestinians is to wage a historic and heroic struggle for peace.

Again I say, this is an historic day. I thank you for coming. I thank you for raising your hands. I thank you for standing up. I thank you for your voices. I thank you for clapping every time I said what you were really doing was reaching deep into the heart of the people of Israel.

Chairman Arafat said he is - and Mrs. Arafat are taking Hillary and Chelsea and me, and we're going to Bethlehem tomorrow.

For a Christian family to light the Christmas tree in Bethlehem is a great honor. It is an interesting thing to contemplate that in this small place, the home of Islam, Judaism and Christianity, the embodiment of my faith was born a Jew and is still recognized by Muslims as a prophet.

He said a lot of very interesting things. But in the end he was known as the Prince of Peace. And we celebrated Christmastime, the birth of the Prince of Peace. One reason he is known as the prince of peace is he knew something about what it takes to make peace. And one of the wisest things he ever said was, we will be judged by the same standard by which we judge.
But mercy triumphs over judgment.

In this Christmas season, in this Hanukkah season, on the edge of Ramadan, this is a time for mercy and vision and looking at all of our children together. You have reaffirmed the fact that you now intend to share this piece of land without war, with your neighbors, forever. They have heard you. They have heard you.

Now, you and they must now determine what kind of peace you will have. Will it be grudging and mean-spirited and confining? Or will it be generous and open? Will you begin to judge each other in the way you would like to be judged? Will you begin to see each other's children in the way you see your own? Will they feel your pain and will you understand theirs?

Surely to goodness after five years of this peace process and decades of suffering, and after you have come here today and done what you have done, we can say enough of this gnashing of teeth, let us join hands and proudly go forward together.

Thank you very much.

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PLO CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT, SPEECH AT THE PALESTINIAN CONFERENCE TO AFFIRM RENUNCIATION OF THE PLO CHARTER, GAZA, 14 DECEMBER 1998 (EXCERPTS)

Ten years ago, the PNC, in its conference convened in Algeria, adopted the "Palestinian Peace Initiative," which constituted an attempt for historic reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis on the basis of "a two-state solution."…[This initiative] also recorded the decisive turning point in confirming negotiations as the instrument of conflict resolution in our world and the introduction of a just order to enable the people to live in peace, freedom, and justice in accordance with the resolutions of international legitimacy.

Then came the Palestinian participation in the Madrid Conference and the Washington talks as a reaffirmation of our commitment to peace. After that we signed the Oslo Accord in the White House under your Excellency’s auspices five years ago. The Government of Israel was represented by the late prime minister, my partner in the peace of the brave, Yitzhak Rabin, and then the Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. The most important issues specified for the permanent status negotiations included: Holy Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, water, and military locations.

With that signing, we knocked on the doors of a new era not only in our region but in the world at large. We walked this road empowered by the massive support of our people for the peace process. We were determined very early on to confront the enemies of peace, and we asked the others to act with the same decisiveness.

Dear Mr. President,

I reiterate our commitment to implement our obligations, including those in the Wye River Memorandum. That agreement saved the peace process, Mr. President: it would not have been possible to conclude this memorandum without your direct involvement and continuous efforts and active participation. History will record this achievement for you as one of the distinguished peacemakers of our times. Your efforts for peace in Northern Ireland will be equally recorded.

Mr. President:

I would like to state that the continuation of Israeli settlement activities in Holy Jerusalem and in other parts of the Palestinian land and the encirclement of the city of Bethlehem constitute not only a
violation of the signed agreements and the United Nations Charter and its resolutions, but also constitute a direct attempt to deprive our people of hope and confidence in the future and the peace process.

To keep our sons in Israeli jails means keeping open the bleeding wound in the heart of every Palestinian family. Those who struggled for freedom must be the first to enjoy the warmth of peace. Our heroes in prisons who struggled for freedom pledged their full support for the peace process since its inception.

Therefore, we reiterate the necessity to stop all settlement activities and confiscation of land and to release Palestinian prisoners as essential vital needs for the support of the peace process and to create the environment conducive for peace. We want our boys to come home.

Mr. President, Palestine's great guest. Sisters. Brothers, Conference Participants:

We are nearing the end of the interim period on 4 May 1999 as specified in the DOP and subsequent agreements. We are also nearing the end of a century that witnessed a tremendous suffering of our people. This requires from all parties the courage to take the difficult and right decisions and to be able to have a vision for the future, its realities and necessities.

The basic requirements for a permanent, just, and comprehensive peace is the termination of Israeli occupation of all the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967, including Holy Jerusalem, in accordance with principles of the Madrid Peace Conference "Land for Peace," along with solving the refugee problem, the removal of settlements, and the guarantee that the Palestinian people will live in freedom and tranquility within the Independent Palestinian State with its capital, Holy Jerusalem. This achievement will pave the way for the conclusion of agreements based on the resolutions of international legitimacy on both the Lebanese and Syrian tracks, in accordance with the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 425.

I know we can achieve our objectives and shape a better future for both the Palestinian and Israeli people. The future must be based on mutual respect, dignity, and tolerance where both sides' needs are fulfilled and both sides treat one another as equal partners. In this way we can create a new future:

- A future where Palestinian and Israeli mothers and fathers no longer grieve for their children whose lives have been cut short.
- A future where Palestinian and Israeli children can study and work together to claimant berries of hatred [sic].
- A future where Palestinian and Israeli scientists, engineers, and doctors can harness their experience for the benefit of both people and the benefit of all people of the region.
- And a future where together our two peoples, with your support Mr. President, can move into the next century with the hope of achieving peace and prosperity in the region.

Mr. President, Sisters and Brothers:

The Israeli occupation left behind a devastated infrastructure throughout the Palestinian homeland, which doubled our responsibilities in reconstruction and development Mr. President, you have seen some of [the] economic and construction sites being established by us. These are the signs of the resurrection of Palestine. This process begun by the Palestinian National Authority is being made possible by the creative abilities of our people and the contributions of the Palestinian business community here and in the diaspora.

This process received the support and the backing of the international community, and from you, Mr. President, when you initiated in 1993, after the signing of the DOP, the donors conference for the Palestinian people. Last month you initiated the second donors conference to help the Palestinian development and reconstruction for the coming years. Your speech, Mr. President, at that conference was very much appreciated by our people, whose hopes were revived.

I take this occasion to extend a special thanks on behalf of our people for the assistance provided by the U.S. to our development projects and programs for the coming years. [...]

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The massive work for construction in our homeland constitutes an essential dimension in our National Program aimed to transfer Palestine to a homeland where all citizens live under the rule of law, where freedom of expression, political pluralism, and human rights are all preserved and guaranteed, along with democratization of our institutions, maintaining the independence of the judiciary system, the separation of powers, to guarantee equality for all citizens, regardless of gender or religion, and to open new horizons for Palestinian women to continue their active participation in the construction of our homeland on equal footing with men.

Mr. President,

The beginning of this century marked the major injustice inflicted on our people. Today we see a nearing shining light, we feel a renewed hope due to your support. We hope that the end of this century will witness the correction of that injustice and the inauguration of a new era, the era of peace and freedom.

Mr. President,

We reaffirm our people's commitment to a lasting, just, and comprehensive peace, the peace of the brace. Our people will not go back to the ways of the past, we will not allow or tolerate any violence or terror irrespective of its source, for we will continue to exert maximum efforts to ensure security for both sides.

Mr. President, Sisters, Brothers, Participants of the Conference:

Finally, I would like to remind all of you that the PNC decided in 1996 to amend its Charter by nullifying all the provisions that are contrary to our commitment to a peaceful solution, our renunciation of violence and terror, and inconsistent with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. On behalf of the PLO, I sent a letter to President Clinton on 22 January 1998 in which I clarified the specific provisions of the charter that had been nullified as a result of the 1996 PNC decision and in which I reiterated our commitment to live in peace side by side with Israel. I have received President Clinton's positive reaction to both the 1996 PNC decision and the letter, which constituted our full compliance with our agreed commitment. It should be noted that the Israeli government of Mr. Shimon Peres welcomed the decision, and the Israeli Labor party dropped its reservation of the establishment of a Palestinian state in response to the PNC decision.

On 6 November 1998 and in compliance with the Wye River Memorandum, the PLO Executive Committee reaffirmed my letter to President Clinton. Four days ago, the Palestine Central Council reaffirmed the same letter. Now, in the presence of the president of the USA, and pursuant to the Wye River Memorandum, and on the basis of the PNC decision of April 1996, I am calling on you, the members of the PNC, the PCC, the Legislative Council, the Executive Committee, the cabinet ministers, and all the representatives of our national, social, and popular institutions to reaffirm this letter and the aforementioned decisions of the PLO Executive Committee and the Central Council, in support of the peace process.

Mr. President,

As you see, there is strong support for our decision and my letter to you, and I hope that this will close this chapter forever, for we have carried out our commitments and obligations, and we are determined to continue our quest for peace and coexistence on the basis of justice, honoring of obligations as well as respect for rights and international legitimacy.

Mr. President,

I reiterate what I have said to you at the White House: we will proceed on the road of peace, without violence and confrontation, the peace of the brave, the peace of righteousness and justice, the peace that will provide freedom, dignity for our people on their free land, so peace can benefit all peoples of the region.

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UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION, JOINT DECLARATION
ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, 18 DECEMBER 1998

The signature on October 23 of the Wye River Memorandum broke a dangerous deadlock in the Middle East and opened the perspective for new progress in the Peace Process. We welcome implementation of the first phase of the Memorandum by both sides. We call on the parties to implement fully the remaining obligations, and thereby contribute to rebuilding the confidence essential to the completion of the Peace Process begun at Madrid and Oslo.

We will work together, including through our respective envoys, in the political and economic area, to build on this achievement and to help the parties move the Peace Process forward to a successful conclusion. We will use our partnership to support the implementation of outstanding elements of the Interim Agreement. We will work for the early resumption of the Multilateral Track of the Process. We will also seek ways to help the parties in the Lebanese and Syrian tracks to restart negotiations with the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement.

Alongside other participants at the November 30 Washington Conference to Support Middle East Peace and Development, we made significant additional pledges of economic assistance to the West Bank and Gaza for the next five years. Against this background, the U.S. and the EU will continue their leading roles in the Palestinian donor effort in order to ensure that international assistance translates into tangible improvements in the living conditions of the Palestinians, starting at the coming meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee in February in Germany.

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ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU, ADDRESS TO THE LIKUD CENTRAL COMMITTEE, TEL AVIV, 27 DECEMBER 1998 [EXCERPTS]

But, friends, the real battle will not be between ourselves, and it will not be only between me and the other contenders for prime minister. I tell you that the real battle will start on the day after the elections. It will be waged, we hope, around the negotiating table between us and the Palestinians, between us and the Syrians, between us and the Lebanese. And it won't be easy. It will be a major endeavor to achieve real peace instead of a false peace. And I tell you: It won't be easy.

I would like to say one main thing today. If we do not face them resolutely, they will not give up the continuation of the struggle up to the partition borders. They will not accept an agreement that will not give them Jerusalem. These Palestinian declarations are, to my regret, accompanied by daily violations of the Wye accords and violations of the Oslo Accord. They are accompanied by demonstrations, the hoarding of illegal weapons, incitement to violence, and violence.

Arafat knows that if he declares the establishment of a Palestinian state unilaterally, it will mean the annulment of the Oslo accords. He also knows full well that we will remain vigilant. He knows who will not permit a deviation of even one centimeter from the agreements we signed with him. That is why Arafat and his people are now considering - first of all, because of the elections - to postpone the declaration. Take note: Arafat wants a turnabout. He wants to conduct the negotiations on the permanent status with a government headed by the Left. […] Who is capable of standing firm against these pressures? Who will guarantee security? Who will safeguard Jerusalem? Who will guarantee the chance of making a real peace and not a false peace? The answer is unequivocal: The answer is us and only us. […]

We inherited the defective and hole-ridden Oslo agreement. We said in all honesty that we would honor it but that we would reduce its risks. I wish to say that we did exactly what we promised. We reduced the withdrawals, we fought terrorism, we bolstered security, we stopped the use of Orient House as the Palestinian Foreign Ministry in the heart of Jerusalem. We permitted construction at Har Homa. We have issued tenders, we stopped the strangulation of the settlements, and we stopped the race to the 1967 lines.
We are building in Jerusalem, and we are proud of it. We are building in the settlements, and we are proud of it. We are fighting terrorism with all our might everywhere and all the time. Above all, what we introduced into negotiations with the Palestinians is a single principle—the principle of reciprocity.

In one of his speeches in the Knesset on the Oslo Accord, a former Labor leader and prime minister said about the negotiations with the Palestinians: Our job is to give, and their job is to take. [...] It is not a question of our giving and their getting. The system works differently. They will get only if they are given; if they are not given, they will not get.

It's not sophisticated, it's not elegant, some people do not like the wording, but it's true and it's just the most important thing, to my regret, is that during the entire life of the previous government, they operated in total contradiction to that principle. They gave - and God knows, they gave. During a very short time, they transferred territories to the Palestinians, they permitted them to set up a military force made up of tens of thousands of people, they armed them with thousands of rifles, they permitted them to set up government offices in the heart of Jerusalem. The question, of course, is what did we receive in return? The answer is nothing. That is not precise. We did get something. We received horrible terrorism, the likes of which the people of Israel have never known. The leadership of the leftist government accepted it as something necessary, almost understandable. […]

When we came to power, we made it immediately clear that we were putting an end to that policy. In my maiden speech in the Knesset as prime minister, and then in my address to the U.S. Congress and on many other opportunities, I referred to the principle of reciprocity on which we would insist in the implementation of the Oslo Accord. We stood firm in our promise. The entire nation wants us to continue to demand of the Palestinians that they give us something in return for getting anything, and we will give only when we receive.

Ladies and gentlemen, that is what we did in the Wye accord. We made progress in the process as long as the Palestinians fulfilled their part. For instance, they annull ed the Palestinian Charter at the Palestine National Council, as we demanded in Wye, but when we learned that they were not meeting their other commitments and had returned to the track of blatant violations - violations accompanied by incitement, violence, and lynchings or near lynchings - we immediately halted the withdrawal. We said we would advance only if they fulfill the conditions agreed on at Wye. I do not think there is anything clearer, more logical, and more just. That is why I hoped that the Labor party would also agree to those basic conditions. Last Monday, I called on Knesset Member [MK] Barak to support me on these five principles which, by the way, are all, without exception, included in the Wye agreement:

1) to continue the peace process in line with the principle of reciprocity;
2) to demand of the PA to back down on its intention to declare the establishment of an independent state with Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine in violation of the Wye agreements, which prohibit changing the status of the territories unilaterally;
3) to demand of the PA to halt violence and incitement to violence;
4) to once again make it clear that Israel will not release murderers and prisoners with blood on their hands. We will never release murderers;
5) to demand of the PA to collect and get rid of the illegal weapons in the hands of the PA and its citizens - entire mountains of weapons, to fight the terrorist infrastructure, and to fulfill its other commitments.

Nothing is clearer, most just, more simple. Ehud Barak and his colleagues totally rejected this proposal, but they did not make do with that. Many Labor and Meretz Knesset members chose to support the proposal by the anti-Zionist parties. I want you to hear what the proposals presented by Talib al-Sani and Tamar Gozansky said. I quote: The Knesset calls on the government to return immediately to the negotiations on the permanent status arrangement in which a Palestinian state will be set up with East Jerusalem as its capital. Among the supporters of the HADASH [Democratic Front for Peace and Equality] and Arab Democratic Party-Arab United List was former Construction and Housing Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer. Listen to this: former Knesset Speaker Shevah Weiss; former Labor Secretary Nisim Zvili; MK Eytan Kabel; and MK Shlomo Ben-Ami. I am referring to senior Labor members. Listen carefully. An-
other twenty Labor MKs abstained, and I will name only some of them: Labor Secretary Ra'anan Kohen, former Finance Minister Avraham Shohat, Hayim Ra-mon, Goldschmidt, Goldman, Merom, and Beilin. These are senior Labor leaders. The significance is that over forty of the fifty-eight left-wing MKs do not oppose the partition of Jerusalem and the establishment of a Palestinian state. That is almost 80 percent. [...] Why are they racing ahead so eagerly to set up a Palestinian state which will join the United Nations and immediately receive broad international recognition? It will form pacts with our sworn enemies like Iran and Iraq. The Palestinians do not miss a single opportunity to dance on the rooftops, organize demonstrations in support of Saddam Hussein, and burn flags.

I would like to stress something else. The Left also knows what the people want. That is why it tries to obscure the differences between them and us in every way possible. They say, for example, that I agreed in my talks with Barak to give up most of the Golan Heights. That is a total lie. They say that I agreed to conscription for yeshiva students. That is a total lie. A solution through agreement, yes; an imposed solution, under no circumstances. [...] They talk about credibility, they who finalized the Oslo Accord behind the backs of the people and in total violation of their election promises. They handed Asad the Golan Heights as a deposit in total contravention of their promises on the eve of the elections, and they talk about credibility. They want credibility. We did precisely what we undertook to do. No less and no more…

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ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM – STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION AS AT 1 JANUARY 1999

The Wye River Memorandum, signed in Washington on October 23, 1998, sets out a series of specific obligations of the Israeli and Palestinian sides to be implemented in a phased approach in accordance with a detailed Time Line. The third phase of this Time Line (weeks 2 - 6 after entry into force) was due to have been completed on 18 December 1998, but, as outlined below, most of the obligations of this phase are still awaiting implementation.

Despite recent internal political developments in Israel, the Government of Israel has reiterated its commitment to the Wye Memorandum in all its aspects, together with all the other Israel-Palestinian agreements. Israel will continue to negotiate all outstanding issues and implement its obligations on the basis of reciprocity.

Security Obligations
Significant Palestinian security obligations are still outstanding from the earlier phases of the Wye Time Line. In particular, the Palestinian side has not taken the necessary measures to "outlaw all organizations (or wings of organizations, as appropriate) of a military, terrorist or violent character and their support structure". Other areas of serious concern in the field of security are the failure of the Palestinian side to comply with its security work plan and to engage in "full bilateral security cooperation" as required by the Memorandum, and the continuation of the "revolving door" policy whereby security offenders are subjected to token arrests and almost immediately released.

Illegal Weapons
Under the Wye Memorandum, the Palestinian side undertook to establish a legal framework for the collection of illegal weapons, and also to take significant steps to collect and dispose of illegal weapons during the current phase. The collection of these weapons is to be completed by 12th week of the Time Line. Notwithstanding these commitments, and despite the decree issued by the Palestinian side, there are literally thousands of illegal weapons freely held in the areas under Palestinian jurisdiction, not only in the hands of civilians but also in the hands of the Palestinian Police. These weapons considerably exceed the numbers permitted by the Interim Agreement and many of them, including mortars, mines and grenade launchers, are totally prohibited by the Agreement. During the current period, when the international community is witness to the importance of supervision of weaponry and ammunition, these breaches must be treated with particularly gravity.
At the Wye talks it was also agreed that the modalities for granting weapons licenses, and the categories of persons to be granted such licenses, would be agreed between the two sides in the Joint Security Committee, as required by the Security Annex of the Interim Agreement. This commitment was restated in a letter from Saeb Erakat to the Israeli Cabinet Secretary, dated November 18, 1998. However, despite Israeli requests to raise this issue in the Joint Security Committee, the Palestinian side has refused to discuss it.

Under the Wye Memorandum it was agreed that a trilateral committee would be established to deal with the unauthorized introduction of weapons and explosive materials into the Palestinian areas. According to the Time Line, this committee should not only have met, but also have submitted its first report. However, although Israel has appointed its representatives to this committee and requested that it convene, it has still not met.

**Palestinian Police**

Under the Wye Time Line, the Palestinian side is obliged to fulfill its outstanding commitment under the Interim Agreement and transfer a list of Palestinian policemen to the Israeli side for its approval. In doing so, it should ensure that the number of policemen does not exceed 30,000, as prescribed by the Interim Agreement. The size of the Palestinian police is currently considerably in excess of this number. Notwithstanding repeated statements by the Palestinian side that the list will "shortly be transferred to Israel"; it has still not been received by the Israeli side. It should be recalled that the Wye Time Line requires not only that the list be transferred but also that the Monitoring and Steering Committee commence its review of this list before the conclusion of the current phase.

**Preventing Incitement**

In the Wye Memorandum, the Palestinian side undertook to issue a decree prohibiting "all forms of incitement to violence and terror" and to establish a mechanism which would "act systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror". A decree was published by the Palestinian side on 19 November 1998, and although it makes no reference to terrorism as required by the Memorandum, and contains a number of legal inconsistencies, it was welcomed as a positive step by the Israeli side. However, despite the continuing incitement to violence and official statements that encourage or condone such acts, Israel has yet to see any implementation whatsoever of the anti-incitement decree published by the Palestinian side.

**PLO Charter**

Israel was pleased to note that at a meeting in Gaza on 14 December 1998, the PNC adopted a resolution amending the PLO charter, as required by its outstanding obligations from: the exchange of letters between Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin dated September 1993, the exchange of letters attached to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of May 1994, the Interim Agreement of September 1995 and the Note for the Record attached to the Hebron Protocol of January 1997.

**Unilateral Actions**

The Wye Memorandum restates the prohibition established in the previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements against initiating or taking any step which will change the status of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip. However, notwithstanding the obligation to resolve this issue through negotiations, the Palestinian side has repeatedly stated its intention to unilaterally declare an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital in May 1999. Such statements are inconsistent with the provisions of the Wye Memorandum, with the Interim Agreement, and with the undertaking in Chairman Arafat's letter of September 9, 1993, that "all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations".

**Further Redeployment (FRD)**

The Wye Memorandum provides for three stages of further redeployment in the course of the Time Line. Each of these is listed at the end of the relevant phase and is contingent upon the implementation of the prior Palestinian commitments within that phase. Upon completion of these commitments
Israel is obliged to implement the FRD obligation. Thus, at the conclusion of the second phase, ending week 2 of the Time Line, Israel implemented the first stage of the FRD, transferring 2% of Area C to the status of Area B and 7.1% of Area B to Area A.

By the conclusion of the phase ending week 6, Israel was to have implemented the second FRD stage. However, as noted above, significant Palestinian obligations required to be implemented prior to this stage are still outstanding. Israel awaits implementation of these commitments so that it can implement its FRD undertaking on the basis of reciprocity.

While the Wye Memorandum recognizes that the third FRD is to be the subject of a unilateral Israeli decision, it provides for the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian committee to discuss matters relating to this issue. Israel has notified the Palestinian side of its representatives to this committee, but the committee has not yet been convened.

Release of Prisoners
The release of prisoners by Israel was not specifically included in the Wye Memorandum, but it was agreed that 750 prisoners would be released in three phases. Israel has released prisoners in full compliance with both the Wye understanding and the Interim Agreement, and with Israel's clear statement at the Wye talks that it would not release prisoners that were members of the Hamas or Islamic Jihad organizations or who have blood on the hands. Although the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Wye understanding on this issue are perfectly clear, the Palestinian side has raised new demands, insisting on the release of terrorists with blood on their hands, which have no basis in any of the agreements between the two sides. Moreover, rather than condemn or seek to calm the violent demonstrations that have been fomented over this issue, Palestinian leaders have condoned and even encouraged such violence.

Interim Committees and Economic Issues
The Wye Memorandum provided that the parties would reactivate all standing committees established by the Interim Agreement, and specified in particular the Monitoring and Steering Committee, the Joint Economic Committee, the Civil Affairs Committee, the Legal Committee and the Standing Cooperation Committee. All of these have met on a regular basis since the entry of the Memorandum into force, except for the Legal Committee and the Standing Cooperation Committee, both of which, despite repeated Israeli calls, the Palestinian side has refused to convene.

The current status of the various interim committees is as follows:

Gaza Airport Committee
The Committee has completed its work. The protocol on Gaza Airport was signed on 20 November 1998, and the airport was officially opened on 24 November 1998. Technical issues relating to the airport continue to be dealt with on a professional basis between the two sides. Israel has expressed particular concern over a recent incident in which Palestinian officials refused to undergo security inspections as agreed in the Airport Protocol, and has stated that should such an incident recur, it will not be able to continue to permit the airport to function.

Gaza Industrial Estate
Following the conclusion of the negotiations between the two sides, the Karni commercial crossing point was opened on 14 December 1998. Israel now awaits Palestinian confirmation that the industrial estate is ready to commence operation.

Gaza Port
The negotiations on this issue continue with seven rounds of negotiations having taken place since the signing of the Wye Memorandum. The key issues requiring resolution relate to security responsibilities concerning incoming vessels and in the port area. A number of constructive new proposals are under discussion.

Safe Passage
The two sides have continued to negotiate this issue and have had five rounds of negotiations since Wye.
The Wye Memorandum provided that the two sides would make best efforts to conclude the safe passage agreement in relation to the southern route within a week of the entry into force of the Memorandum and start operation of this route as soon as possible thereafter. But although the protocol on safe passage is virtually complete, the Palestinian side has gone back on a number of practical arrangements that were agreed in the Wye talks and, in direct contravention of the Wye Memorandum, insists on dealing with issues relating to the northern route prior to the opening of the southern route.

**Standing Cooperation Committee (“People to People”)**

Hundreds of practical projects designed to break down barriers between the two sides are actually happening in the field but, despite repeated Israeli requests, the Palestinian side has not agreed to convene this committee.

**Joint Economic Committee**

As provided by the Wye Memorandum, the JEC has established an ad hoc committee. It has held five rounds of talks to date, dealing with four key issues as follows:

- Car thefts from Israel to the areas under Palestinian jurisdiction - a joint task force of the Israeli and Palestinian police has been established to deal with this problem.
- Repayment of Palestinian debts - Palestinian undertakings have been received to repay a number of outstanding debts (telephone, water and hospital bills).
- Expansion of the A1 and A2 lists set out in the Paris Economic Protocol - Israel has agreed to expand the list relating to trade with Jordan and Egypt; discussion on the extent of this expansion continues.
- Purchase tax - Israel has agreed to the Palestinian request for a refund of purchase tax on Israeli products.

**Legal Committee**

Israel has received no response to its repeated requests to convene the Legal Committee in accordance with Article III of the Memorandum.

**Trilateral Anti-Incitement Committee**

This committee, established by the Wye Memorandum to monitor and prevent incitement, has met four times to date. Very little of substance has been achieved, primarily because of the insistence of the Palestinian side on including discussions of settlements, prisoner releases and other issues dealt with in other fora of negotiations. The Palestinian side has yet to investigate or respond to any of the many examples of incitement to violence provided by the Israeli side, and despite Israeli concerns about frequent calls to Jihad and the use of violence in Palestinian textbooks, refuses to discuss the issue of incitement within the educational system.

**Civil Affairs Committee and Civilian Sub-Committees**

These committees continue to operate to resolve issues arising from the transfer of Israeli civilian responsibilities to the Palestinian side, and have held tens of meetings since the conclusion of the Wye Memorandum. Regular meetings are held at the professional level to deal with such issues as water, electricity and the environment, as well as the population registry in the territories.

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**ISRAELI CABINET, COMMUNIQUÉ ON PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD, JERUSALEM, 10 JANUARY 1999**

At the weekly Cabinet meeting today (Sunday), 10.1.99:

1. The Prime Minister took note of press reports according to which Egypt has recommended that Arafat not declare a Palestinian state, with its capital in Jerusalem, before the elections in Israel.
The Prime Minister said that these reports come against the established backdrop of Israeli policy. Certain circles in Egypt know that such a declaration by Arafat would be met with a firm response by the Government of Israel - and these circles may hope for a change of government in Israel, on the assumption that Arafat will then be able to create a Palestinian state and divide Jerusalem without any serious Israeli opposition. It is important for the Israeli public to be aware of these intentions.

The Prime Minister reiterated that the Cabinet intends to implement its decision concerning Israel's response to a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood or the division of Jerusalem. Israel reserves the right to extend Israeli law to the territories under its control if Arafat and the Palestinians violate the agreements they have signed and unilaterally declare the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The Prime Minister added that this issue will be our primary concern in the near future, as it relates to the fate of the State of Israel and the future of coming generations. "We will not allow Arafat and the Palestinians to determine the borders of our state and the future of our capital. We will continue to adhere to our firm and clear policy, which does not allow for the creation of a Palestinian state in the heart of the Land of Israel, and we will not allow Jerusalem to be redivided."

US SPECIAL MIDDLE EAST COORDINATOR DENNIS ROSS, REMARKS ON THE PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS, PERES CENTER FOR PEACE, TEL AVIV, 12 JANUARY 1999

This panel has been asked to deal with permanent status, the strategies for permanent status, and also how to mediate permanent status. So let me immediately start by being somewhat contrarian. Permanent status is not something that should be mediated. We are dealing here or, more importantly and more to the point, the parties are dealing here with what are existential questions for them. These are issues that are going to have to be negotiated directly by them. They are, after all, neighbors; they are, after all, not going any place. I have often said Israelis are not going any place and Palestinians are not going any place. They are going to have to learn to live together. Now you are not living together if somebody is mediating for you. The only way you learn to live together is to hammer out your differences. In fact, that's one of the best means of doing so. The more you learn to hammer out differences, the more you learn to understand what are the needs, the limitations, the interests of the other side. It's the recognition of the needs and interests and limitations of the other side that lays the basis for understanding.

Now I would also add one other point that I think is crucial in terms of the significance of direct bilateral negotiations. I have often also said the key to insuring that these agreements hold is that the parties themselves "own" the agreements. They have to be the parties' agreements. The sides have to be able to defend these agreements. They have to have a stake in these agreements. When you have a mediator, you run the risk that the sense of ownership will not be as strong as it needs to be. The sides must be able to return and defend agreements before their own constituencies.

So, the first point here is when you are talking about permanent status, the issue has got to be one of direct negotiations, and the focus should not be on the mediation of this because the two sides have to do it.

The second point is having just said that there shouldn't be a mediator as such, the second point is that the United States has a large interest in there being a permanent status agreement. At one level that interest is what I would describe as driven by a moral imperative. As Prime Minister Rabin said on September 13th, 1993: "Enough of blood and tears. There has been too much violence, there have been too many victims, there has been too much pain. It is time to try to bring this conflict to an end."

So there is a moral imperative to insure that that's the case. From an American point of view, there is also a national security imperative as well. There is no question that peace between Arabs and Israelis and dealing with the existential core of this conflict - that part of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians - if
one is able to do that, if one is able to bring this to a conclusion, it's going to change the character of the region. This is not because it will end all conflicts in the region - it will not do that. But because there is no question that if there is peace between Israelis and Palestinians, the extremists in this region are going to be on the decline. Those who want to turn the clock back, those who want to continue with the struggle are going to become discredited and they are going to become far fewer in number. It is in our interest to see the character of the region change, it's in our interest to see peace and stability prevail here, it's in our interest to see the emergence of a real peace coalition, and see that coalition emerge with great strength.

So from the national security perspective of the United States we cannot be indifferent to the Arab-Israeli conflict and we will not be indifferent to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

What does that say about our role? Well, we have a lot of roles to play. We have to insulate this process from threats. Frequently we have to reassure or give assurances to the parties so they can take the risk for peace, so they can take difficult decisions. Sometimes we have to clarify, sometimes we are simply facilitating, sometime we have to intervene - either because if the parties ask us to, or because there is a crisis in the negotiation. So we will play a continual role in this. We will not walk away from it. We have a large stake in it and we cannot be indifferent to it. That doesn't mean the parties shouldn't negotiate this directly. It does mean that we will continue to have an interest in terms of trying to reach an agreement.

My third point gets to the question of what does it take to succeed in permanent status negotiations? Well, obviously both sides have got to be able to reconcile the fundamental differences between them. That's not going to happen unless there is a kind of sensitivity and a willingness to recognize the needs, the limitations, and the interest of the other side. What you boil that down to is you have to first and foremost develop a partnership. The idea that you can negotiate issues is difficult in permanent status if there is no partnership. It's just not realistic. There has to be a sense that you are in this together. There cannot be a zero-sum mentality; there cannot be a sense that one side is going to gain. Because if one side gains, the other side has to gain, too, or both are going to lose. Partners have a stake not only in each other, but in the strength of each other. A weak partner cannot deliver. A weak partner can't make difficult decisions. A weak partner is not in a position to make the kinds of concessions or compromises. This is going to be critical to being able to produce a permanent status agreement. Merely having partnership doesn't guarantee that you can overcome the differences, but it creates a context in which it becomes possible. Trust is derivative of partnership. When the two sides have trust in each other, when the two sides understand and become convinced that the other's intention is to see that they, too, have their needs and their interests addressed, then in fact you see a kind of mutuality, you see a kind of reciprocity that makes it possible to come up with a kind of creative solution that in different circumstances would simply be impossible. So, partnership and trust, I think, are probably the key to being able to succeed in permanent status negotiation. Let me sum it up again then. When it comes to the permanent status, the two sides are going to have to negotiate this directly. We, the United States, will have a strong interest in helping ensure that they do reach an outcome and we will not be indifferent to this process. But the key here is not that you have anybody mediate. The key here is that the two sides will be able to negotiate this on their own. For them to be able to do it in the end, they have to approach it from the standpoint of partnership. If there is not going to be partnership, then there is not going to be a permanent status agreement.

UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, NEW YORK, 20 JANUARY 1999

1. At its forty-ninth session, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 1993/2 A of 19 February 1993, in which it decided to appoint a special rapporteur with the following mandate:

(a) To investigate Israel's violations of the principles and bases of international law, international humanitarian law and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967;

(b) To receive communications, to hear witnesses, and to use such modalities of procedure as he may deem necessary for his mandate;

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(c) To report, with his conclusions and recommendations, to the Commission on Human Rights at its future sessions, until the end of the Israeli occupation of those territories.


3. The Special Rapporteur once again wishes to reiterate the belief that his role is not an accusatory one, but rather has the objectives of establishing a meaningful and constructive dialogue with all the parties concerned and helping overcome problems having to do with human rights concerns in the area. He continues to believe that the exercise of his mandate should prevent violations of human rights and improve the overall human rights situation.

4. During the period under review, the Special Rapporteur met with representatives of Governments, intergovernmental, non-governmental organizations and individuals and received written information from intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations as well as individuals. The Special Rapporteur should once again like to reiterate his regret at the lack of cooperation on the part of the Government of Israel, which he continues to believe would be clearly in the interest not only of respect for human rights but also of the Government itself.

5. Since the last session of the Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur availed himself of every opportunity afforded to him to hold both formal and informal discussions on issues related to his mandate, in Geneva, Brussels, the Middle East and other venues. Before submitting his report to the Commission, the Special Rapporteur decided to carry out a visit to the occupied Palestinian territories, Israel and Egypt from 3 to 12 January 1999, together with a staff member from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. He visited Jerusalem, Gaza, Ramallah, Jericho, Tel Aviv, and Cairo.

6. The Special Rapporteur met in Ramallah with the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mr. Yasser Arafat, and discussed issues relating to his mandate. Also in Ramallah, he met with Mr. Nabeel Shaath, Minister of Planning and International Cooperation of the Palestinian Authority, and with Mrs. Hanan Ashrawi, Member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. In Jericho, the Special Rapporteur met with Mr. Saeb Erekat, the Minister for Local Government of the Palestinian Authority. In Gaza, the Special Rapporteur met with Mr. Kamal El-Sharafi, Chairman of the Committee of Oversight and Human Rights of the Palestinian Legislative Council; as well as with Dr. Haider Abdel Shafi, Commissioner-General of The Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights. While in Gaza, the Special Rapporteur met with Mrs. Soha Arafat, President of the Palestinian High Council for Motherhood and Childhood, as well as with Mr. Chinmaya Gharekhan, the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories. In Jerusalem, the Special Rapporteur met with Mr. Feisal Hussein. During his visit to the area, the Special Rapporteur met with representatives of United Nations agencies, national and international humanitarian organizations, with representatives of a large number of Palestinian and Israeli nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions as well as with private individuals.

7. In June 1998, the Special Rapporteur attended a conference in Jerusalem entitled “Fifty Years of Human Rights Violations”.

8. In Egypt, the Special Rapporteur met in Cairo with Mr. Amr Moussa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, and Mrs. Naila Gabr, Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister for Human Rights. While in Cairo, the Special Rapporteur also met with Mr. Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, and Mr. Said Kamal, the head of the Palestinian Affairs Department of the League of Arab States. In addition, he met with Mr. Edmund Cain, United Nations Resident Coordinator, and Mr. Nadir Hadj-Hammou, Deputy Resident Representative, United Nations Development Programme.

9. The Special Rapporteur wishes to express his appreciation to Mr. Arafat and the Palestinian Authority for the kind cooperation extended to him in the course of his mission. The Special Rapporteur also wishes to extend his appreciation to Mr. Amr Moussa and the Government of Egypt as well as to the League of Arab States.

10. The Special Rapporteur expresses his sincere gratitude to the High Commissioner for Human Rights and to the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories and the staff of their offices in Gaza for the most efficient logistical and other support provided to the mission.
I. PRINCIPAL CONCERNS REGARDING THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

11. Despite encouraging steps agreed upon at Wye Plantation in October 1998, the process leading to a lasting peace remains stalled. Some positive developments can be recognized in the alleviation of human rights concerns in the area. However, the threat of further human rights violations has increased in a tangible way due to frustration linked to the non-implementation of the agreed processes, on the one hand, and heightened political tension on the other.

12. The Special Rapporteur reaffirms once again that sustainable peace cannot be achieved without respect for human rights. The promotion and protection of human rights is an indispensable part of maintaining and strengthening peace and security as well as advancing social and economic development. A piecemeal approach to peace is not viable; only a comprehensive peace covering the economic, social and security interests of both sides can guarantee a lasting solution. Human rights are universal, indivisible, independent and interrelated. This approach, adopted by the international community at the World Conference on Human Rights, applies also to peace. The old axiom, *Si vis pacem, para bellum* (If you want peace, prepare yourself for war.), can no longer offer either side an acceptable justification, in terms of purely military considerations. A wider concept of security - as discussed and formulated in other regions of the world is required to establish the basis for the search for peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

13. To understand the inherent interrelationship between human rights and peace and security requires trust on both sides in future peaceful coexistence between the two peoples, based on equal human values. Instead of imposing unilateral acts on the other partner, a determined quest by both sides for confidence-building measures is urgently needed. Confidence is not built by breaking agreements or acquiescing to situations that cause frustration. In the long run, an effective fight against terrorism is unthinkable without trust and confidence between the parties.

14. The foundation of peace and security is firmly established in international law. Strict adherence, de facto and de jure, to international human rights law and international humanitarian law is the prerequisite for creating trust and strengthening security in the wider sense. The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories is the root cause of human rights violations in the area. The occupation remains legally in force during the transition period. International humanitarian law, and particularly the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is therefore fully applicable to and binding on the Government of Israel.

15. The United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution ES-10/3 recommended that the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention convene a conference on measures to enforce the Convention in the occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and to ensure its respect in accordance with their obligations under article 1. This recommendation was reiterated in resolutions ES10/4 and ES10/5. It is necessary to proceed on the path suggested by the General Assembly as soon as possible, for two main reasons: first, at a time of complex political processes there is a need to reaffirm the legal status of the occupied territories until the end of the occupation; second, the human rights and humanitarian concerns as described below are in themselves a *raison d'être* for re-establishing the applicability of the Convention in general, as well as with respect to the concrete situations in question.

16. Notwithstanding steps taken to improve the Palestinian economy such as shorter periods of closures, increased number of work permits, the opening of the Gaza airport and discussions on the seaport and industrial park - there are still no signs of sustained economic growth. Too many factors remain which create obstacles in the pursuit of, *inter alia*, open access to markets, fair competition rules and taxation procedures, as well as private and public sector investments. The disproportional dependence of the occupied territories on the Israeli trade and economy does not allow healthy economic development for the Palestinians. To let Palestinians exercise their right to economic development would inevitably contribute to enforcing political stability and security for both Israelis and Palestinians.

17. The following paragraphs contain a brief summary of the principal concerns regarding the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967. The Special Rapporteur wishes to reiterate that the reason he draws attention to these concerns is to foster respect for human rights. They should therefore not be read as being accusatory, but rather in the context of finding ways to overcome these concerns. The report once again contains less first-hand information than the Special Rapporteur would have hoped to present owing to the lack of a possibility to
visit Israel officially. He remains convinced that more contacts and discussions would enable him to fulfil his mandate in an even more objective and impartial manner.

18. The Special Rapporteur wishes to recall that during his visits to Gaza, East Jerusalem, parts of the West Bank and Israel, he was able to obtain valuable written and oral information from intergovernmental, non-governmental and humanitarian organizations as well as from individuals. He made a point of meeting the main Israeli non-governmental organizations in order to ensure that his sources of information were as wide and accurate as possible in light of the constraints cited above.

19. Violations of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories have continued during the period under review, to a large extent along the same lines as in the past. During his recent visit to the area, the Special Rapporteur was able to gain insight into the human rights issues currently giving rise to the greatest preoccupation among the Palestinian population. These concerns have been exacerbated by the unilateral suspension by Israel on 2 December 1998 of the implementation of the Wye River Memorandum. Several interlocutors told the Special Rapporteur that human rights violations actually stemmed from the peace agreements and that the Palestinian population was currently living in a vacuum as far as protection of their human rights was concerned. He was told that Israel was violating human rights in the name of security. Nevertheless, human rights were, more than before, being seen by some as the vehicle to advance the peace process.

20. The occupation was viewed as being more forceful after the beginning of the peace process. The Special Rapporteur was told that before the peace process, the majority of human rights violations were individual, whereas they had become more collective in nature. The general human rights situation in areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority had deteriorated since the signing of the Wye River Memorandum. People thought that the situation was better without the peace process. Other sources informed the Special Rapporteur that not much had changed in the pattern of human rights violations, but rather in their scope.

21. The expansion of existing Israeli settlements and the building of new ones, as well as bypass roads connecting the settlements between themselves and with Israel, is currently the source of greatest concern in the occupied territories. In addition, the bypass roads disrupt the demographic continuity of the Arab environment. Ten bypass roads are said to have been built in the occupied territories in 1998. The attendant confiscation of Palestinian-owned land and the destruction of their agricultural infrastructure is further exacerbating tensions in the occupied territories. The Special Rapporteur was told that for the first time, farmers in some areas were prevented by the Israeli authorities from harvesting their crops. The Special Rapporteur's attention was drawn by all of his interlocutors to the pronounced increase in Israeli settlement activity and the concomitant confiscation of Palestinian-owned land since the signing of the Wye River Memorandum in October 1998. According to most estimates, the number of settlements built in contravention of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention has reached 190.

22. The Special Rapporteur was able to visit a number of settlements in and around Jerusalem and to observe the network of bypass roads. He was informed that the building of 28 new bypass roads was announced after the signing of the Wye River Memorandum. He was told that the Israeli occupation had deprived Arab Jerusalemites of approximately 80 per cent of their land and that there were currently 17 settlements which spread in three “belts” around the city. The intention was to expand “Greater Jerusalem” into “Metropolitan Jerusalem”, an “umbrella” that would incorporate neighbouring municipalities. The Special Rapporteur was told that 52 per cent of the land in East Jerusalem was for Palestinians while some 34 per cent had been given to Jews. There were practically no Jews in East Jerusalem in 1967; at present, there are some 163,000 Israelis and 155,000 to 158,000 Palestinians. The Israeli authorities have set the ratio of the Israeli and Palestinian populations in East Jerusalem at 73.5 per cent Jews and 26.5 per cent Arabs. Of particular concern to Palestinians was Israeli construction in the Arab neighbourhoods of Ras El Amud and Silwan. After the signing of the Wye River Memorandum, settlers seized a house in the Sheikh Jara neighbourhood and moved into two additional houses. Preparations for similar actions were said also to be under way in Ras El Amud and Bur Valley and Jericho areas. The Special Rapporteur visited a Palestinian living in a bus which is completely surrounded by a settlement built on his land.

23. The Special Rapporteur was able to observe the infrastructure work which had been carried out for the settlement on Jabal Abu Ghneim, to be called Har Homa. It will be recalled that in its resolution ES10/2, the General Assembly condemned the construction by Israel of a new settle-
ment in Jabal Abu Ghneim to the south of occupied East Jerusalem, and reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 were illegal and an obstacle to peace. In its resolution ES10/3, the Assembly condemned the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with the demands made by the Assembly at its tenth emergency special session in resolution ES10/2. It reiterated that all illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied Palestinian territory, especially settlement activity, and the practical results thereof could not be recognized irrespective of the passage of time.

24. The increased rate of demolition of Palestinian houses which has continued unabated has given rise to serious concern over the period under review. The reason given is that they had been built without a licence, in an "unscientific way" or in a "green area". Some 21,000 housing units would be required for the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem alone. A licence to build a house, which involves a lengthy procedure, costs approximately US$ 25,000 and expires within a year even if no construction takes place. In addition, Palestinians are not allowed to build more than two floors. In 1997, the Special Rapporteur visited the Samud “Steadfastness Camp” on a site in East Jerusalem where some 70 families whose houses had been demolished were living in tents in order not to leave the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and lose their identity cards. During his recent visit to the area, he visited 16 of those families who are now living in an unfinished building in East Jerusalem with no amenities. According to the sources, 31 Palestinian structures were demolished in Jerusalem in 1998, affecting more than 300 persons including 120 children. He was told that 17 houses and a school had been demolished for the construction of Road No. 1. Over 700 demolitions are estimated to have taken place from the signing of the Oslo Accords until the end of 1998. The Special Rapporteur was informed that, in addition to constituting collective punishment, house demolitions were considered by Palestinians as sources of extreme provocation and incitement.

25. The situation of the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem continued to be precarious, particularly with regard to their identity cards, which made the registration of newborn children and family reuni-fication in the city difficult. The registration of children may take up to seven years if one of the parents is not from Jerusalem. It is estimated that there are currently some 10,000 unregistered Palestinian children in Jerusalem. This means that they do not have a birth certificate and cannot obtain an identity card at the age of 16, cannot enrol at a university or get married. The “centre of life” criterion has continued to be applied by the Israeli authorities to determine whether Palestin-i ans are entitled to live in Jerusalem. All Palestinians in Jerusalem are considered as foreigners and the “Law of Entry into Israel” of 1952 is applied. The Special Rapporteur was informed that many persons with identity cards discover that they have been deleted from the municipality's com-puter. From January to August 1998, 346 identity cards were taken from Arab Jerusalemites. The Special Rapporteur was informed that the conflict was being changed from a national into an ethnic one. He was told that the Israeli authorities applied a “three circles policy” to the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem, consisting of isolation, deportation and replacement, with the alleged aim of reducing the Palestinian population to not even a minority by the time of the final status negotiations.

26. The Special Rapporteur was informed that the issue of residency rights and identity cards had serious repercussions on the health of Arab Jerusalemites, particularly infants, since the National Insurance Institute conducts an investigation of the whole family's residency status every time a child is born. The investigation may take more than a year and starts anew with every new birth in the family. During the investigation, the infant does not benefit from health insurance. This practice may have very serious repercussions for children who require medical treatment after birth. The Special Rapporteur was informed that the infant mortality rate in East Jerusalem was double that of the Jewish sector.

27. The Special Rapporteur was informed about the situation of disabled Palestinians and the legacy of the occupation with regard to the destruction of the infrastructure, affecting economic and so-cial rights and having a negative psychological effect. Disabled Palestinians felt discriminated against and said they were receiving only 15 to 20 per cent of the services provided to Israelis. The Special Rapporteur was told that Israeli soldiers treat Palestinians with disabilities in a de-humanizing way and that many did not receive permits to enter Israel for treatment. It was esti-mated that some 15,000 Palestinians were permanently disabled during the intifada. Reference was made to the access law regarding all public facilities. The situation of prisoners with disabili-
ties was described as particularly difficult. In addition, the Special Rapporteur was told that prisoners who had been imprisoned in small spaces could develop physical disabilities.

28. The issue of Palestinian prisoners who remain detained in Israeli prisons and detention centres, in violation of articles 49 and 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, continues to be a serious source of concern for the population of the occupied territories. The Special Rapporteur was informed that more than 2,200 Palestinians continue to be detained in Israel, 7 of whom are women and some 40 of whom are minors under 16 years of age. Their conditions of detention were described as not meeting international standards, especially regarding medical care and sanitation. The Special Rapporteur was told that detainees only received urgent dental treatment while convicted prisoners receive more thorough dental treatment. Many prisoners are placed in isolation, individually and in groups, at times reportedly for no reason or on the grounds that they are "troublemakers". The Special Rapporteur was informed that two prisoners had been killed during a recent hunger strike.

29. A serious problem facing Palestinian detainees is lack of access to their lawyers and of family visits owing to the restrictions placed by the Israeli authorities on the freedom of movement of Palestinians between parts of the occupied territories and Israel. The Special Rapporteur was informed that some prisoners had not received family visits for years because their family members cannot obtain a permit to enter Israel. Prisoners are occasionally subjected to transfers which creates additional difficulties for visits. The Special Rapporteur was told that the sentences meted out to Palestinian prisoners were harsher after the signing of the Oslo Accords. For example, on 4 January 1999 five minors were sentenced to five-month prison sentences for throwing stones. A number of Palestinian detainees are represented by Israeli lawyers.

30. Palestinian lawyers have complained that they do not receive Israeli military orders in writing immediately after they have been issued. Military orders are issued in accordance with the Emergency Regulations dating back to the British Mandate and are applicable even in area A which is under the control of the Palestinian Authority. The Special Rapporteur was told that the lack of due process and of fair trial guarantees has serious repercussions for both the prisoners and their family, especially children, including at the psychological level. The Special Rapporteur was informed about Military Order 1456 of 11 June 1998 concerning armed civil guards in settlements whom the police are allowed to ask for assistance. He was told that settler guards, like the police and army, have the right to arrest persons. Four Palestinians were killed by settlers in the West Bank in 1998. So far, 1,457 military orders have been issued regarding the West Bank and 1,316 concerning the Gaza Strip.

31. The Special Rapporteur was informed that the number of administrative detainees had declined considerably during the period under review, and currently stands at fewer than 100 persons. Among the administrative detainees are persons who had served their prison terms and had been transferred to administrative detention instead of being released, as was the case with a person who had completed serving a 10-year prison sentence. In 1998, three persons from the Gaza Strip were placed in administrative detention. There were nine hunger strikes in different prisons during the same period. The current longeststanding administrative detainee is in his fifth year of detention. It should be recalled that the Oslo Accords called for the release of Palestinian detainees. In addition, the Wye River Memorandum called for the release of 750 Palestinian prisoners, only 250 of whom have been released to date.

32. Administrative detentions by the Palestinian Authority continue to be worrying. Reportedly, there was a sharp increase in detentions during the last months of 1998. Many cases were related to individuals exercising their right to freedom of expression.

33. The interrogation methods used by the Israeli General Security Service (GSS) with regard to Palestinian detainees and prisoners suspected of alleged security offences have remained the same. The Special Rapporteur was informed that the new development in this connection was that the GSS had stopped denying that it resorts to such methods. It will be recalled that the administrative guidelines under the confidential Landau Commission report followed by the GSS permit the exercise of "moderate physical pressure" and that, in 1997, the United Nations Committee against Torture found that such methods constituted breaches of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ratified by Israel in 1991, and therefore amounted to torture. International law absolutely prohibits torture and "no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture". The Committee rec-
ommended that interrogations applying any other methods that are in conflict with the provisions of articles 1 and 16 of the Convention cease immediately.

34. One source informed the Special Rapporteur that during the period under review, the methods of torture used by the GSS had become less dramatic and violent, mostly consisting of hooding and position abuse. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur was informed about an interrogation method which consisted of cutting off a detainee's blood circulation by placing him in extremely tight handcuffs; the resulting strong pressure on the upper arm causes the person to lose consciousness in approximately three minutes. A lawyer showed the Special Rapporteur a "torture chart" drawn up by the GSS indicating the type of torture or ill-treatment to which a detainee or prisoner was subjected, on what dates and at what times.

35. The Special Rapporteur's attention was drawn to the role of doctors in the context of interrogation methods amounting to torture who are required to fill in a type of "fitness for interrogation" form, thereby indicating which interrogation methods should not be used and hence contributing to torture. He was informed that the GSS law and the discussion of the bill concerning compensation to Palestinian victims of torture by the Israel Defence Forces in the Knesset Committee on Constitutional Law had been suspended, but that they could be resumed at any time.

36. The Special Rapporteur met in Gaza with mental health professionals who deal with Palestinian torture victims. They informed him that even years after their release, former prisoners and their families continued to suffer traumas which affected the whole Palestinian community. One of the manifestations of the humiliation and psychological effects of torture was domestic violence. The Special Rapporteur's interlocutors were currently working on prevention, capacity-building, awareness campaigns and training services in the field of mental health as well as therapies to teach people how to cope. Numerous people suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The situation of former prisoners and their wives and children was further compounded by the serious economic situation in which parents at times cannot even provide the family with food, as well as the dashed hopes regarding the peace process and the hardships it has brought to the population of the occupied territories. The Special Rapporteur was informed that the unemployment rate in Gaza stood at 62 per cent and that there was a very strong correlation between the unemployment of fathers and anxiety in children.

37. The Special Rapporteur was informed about the process of legitimizing torture in Israel through legislation. To date, the High Court of Justice has not pronounced itself regarding the legality of interrogation methods which amount to torture, but has lifted interim injunctions prohibiting torture with regard to specific cases. The Knesset has also not taken a decision on the matter to date. Should it pass legislation to that effect, Israel would become the first country to officially legalize torture. The Special Rapporteur was informed that the Israeli authorities persisted in the affirmation that the methods described above did not amount to torture.

38. Palestinians detained by the Palestinian Authority are often, in the course of interrogation, subjected to torture. It has been mentioned that in a number of cases, a chain of culpability can be established: the Palestinian policeman torturing detainees may well himself have been a victim of torture by Israelis.

39. The Special Rapporteur was informed that on the whole, strict closures of the occupied territories as a form of collective punishment had been implemented to a lesser degree than in the past. Nevertheless, the occupied territories were subjected to six weeks of closure between September 1998 and mid-November. Closures as well as curfews continued to be applied in specific locations in the occupied territories when security incidents occurred.

40. Palestinian workers need a permit to work in Israel. These are issued in limited numbers and according to certain criteria. The permits are time-limited and allow the bearers to work, but are not obtained through a governmental employment agency so the workers do not get health and other insurance, proper wages and other benefits. Most Palestinian workers employed in Israel receive minimum wages or well below that level. The Special Rapporteur was informed that restrictions on the freedom of movement and the need to obtain work permits were becoming a form of blackmail used against workers by so-called "permit brokers". In addition, the sources stated that the issuing of magnetic identity cards and the renewal of permits had increasingly become conditioned upon accepting to collaborate with the Israeli security authorities. The Special Rapporteur was informed that numerous workers were fired after only a few days and their permits cancelled. There has been a 30 per cent increase in this type of worker complaint during the period under re-
view: 120 out of 300 cases of complaint concerned cheating by Israeli employers. Workers were on occasion also beaten by their employers. Employers have also threatened workers who ask for their rights with dismissal or tell them they will call the police and say that the worker tried to stab them. The situation of Palestinian workers was said to be worst in the Erez industrial zone.

41. The limitations imposed on the freedom of movement of the population of the occupied territories have continued to affect to a large extent their social and economic wellbeing. In addition to the limited number of Palestinian workers who have permits to work in Israel, the harsh economic situation has been further compounded by the failure of Israeli tax authorities to refund monies owed to Palestinians. The Palestinian and Israeli economies continue to be closely interrelated, and the Palestinian economy is totally dependent on Israel. The Special Rapporteur was told that 90 per cent of all goods consumed by Palestinians come from Israel. The amount of Israeli control exercised over the import and export of goods, in particular agricultural produce, continued to have a negative impact on Palestinian trade.

42. Palestinians still need permits to enter Israel and other parts of the occupied territories, in particular East Jerusalem, despite the fact that article 4 of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements states that "the two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit". The subsequent Interim Agreement signed on 28 September 1995 provides for procedures to operate a "safe passage" between the two parts of the territories, which has not occurred to date. Movement between parts of the occupied territories and between the occupied territories and Israel remains very difficult. During his recent mission to the area, the Special Rapporteur was obliged to hold one meeting in the West Bank since one of the persons present did not have a permit to enter Jerusalem.

43. The Special Rapporteur was once again informed about the situation of children in the occupied territories, in particular in the Gaza Strip. He was informed that the economic and social situation also affected the health of children. According to a survey, 20 per cent of children under six years of age suffered from malnutrition. Most children do not complete primary education. The Special Rapporteur was informed that children in the Gaza Strip were harassed by soldiers near settlements when they had to cross certain areas in order to go to school. In addition, some 400 students from Gaza continued to be denied access to universities in the West Bank. As an example, the Special Rapporteur was informed that five years ago, 35 per cent of students in one faculty of Bir Zeit University in the West Bank were from Gaza. This number has now been reduced to 1 out of 120. The restrictions imposed on the freedom of movement of Palestinians continued to have serious repercussions on their health, causing daily suffering for people who cannot get permits in order to undergo medical treatment in Israel or other parts of the occupied territories. The Special Rapporteur was told that out of the 600 children born with a congenital heart condition in Gaza, only half were sent for treatment.

44. The Special Rapporteur visited the Palestinian High Council for Motherhood and Childhood which was in the process of developing a Palestinian National Plan for Motherhood and Childhood. He also visited the "Palestine Avenir Foundation" which had programmes for children in the areas of rehabilitation of physically handicapped children; a mobile education unit; education and culture courses; and a mural painting programme.

45. The number of violent clashes between Palestinians and Israelis declined owing to the fewer opportunities for direct physical contact in comparison to the intifada period. Still, 334 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli soldiers or settlers since the Oslo peace process began. Five Palestinians were killed during recent clashes in the occupied territories, some of whom by rubber-coated steel bullets which are used to disperse demonstrations. One of them was 20-year-old Nasser Erekat who was shot in the head with a rubber bullet from a distance of about 10 metres while the Israeli army's rules of engagement directives concerning regulations for opening fire stipulate that rubber bullets should not be fired from less than 40 metres' distance, should not be fired at children, and should only be fired at the lower part of the body. It is estimated that since the beginning of the intifada, at least 57 Palestinians, including 28 children, have been killed by rubber-coated steel bullets. Hardly any soldiers have been brought to justice. In Bethlehem, 18 children were shot by Israeli soldiers in recent clashes and 2 persons were killed in Kalkilya by live ammunition. Most of the persons injured had been shot in the lower part of the body.

46. The Special Rapporteur was informed that there were fewer deaths at checkpoints owing to Israeli soldiers refusing to allow Palestinian ambulances to pass. Nevertheless, there were two deaths at
checkpoints in 1998. One of them was a mother who died after childbirth at the checkpoint in Hebron. The Israeli soldiers made her wait because she did not have a permit. The Special Rapporteur was told that the Israeli army had admitted that this was a mistake and against its policy and the soldiers concerned were reportedly brought before a military court.

47. The Special Rapporteur asked most of his interlocutors about people-to-people relations between Israelis and Palestinians. He was told that the Israelis most often encountered by Palestinians were soldiers and settlers. The Special Rapporteur was also told that it was difficult to have people-to-people contacts in the light of the restrictions on the freedom of movement of Palestinians. He was told that there had been a higher level of cooperation between the two peoples during the intifada and before the signing of the Oslo Agreements. One person said that Israel was “the furthest country in the world” for Palestinians.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

48. The human rights situation in the occupied territories is hostage to political considerations and expediencies. The understanding of the importance of a wider concept of security, including respect for human rights and humanitarian law, with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is spreading within the international community. Unfortunately, the parties themselves do not yet share this view, thereby prolonging the conflict unnecessarily.

49. Human rights must be integrated into the political and economic discussions concerning the conflict. To facilitate this, solutions and conclusions reached elsewhere should be carefully studied - such as the model of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe referred to by the Special Rapporteur in his last report (E/CN.4/1998/17, paras. 6870). Within the United Nations, only a few years ago the interrelationship between human rights and peace and security was fiercely contested. Today, this fact is routinely accepted, highlighted by the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Member States in their statements and actions. This consideration could be a starting point for reviewing human rights in the context of ongoing processes, in particular those based on the Oslo Agreements and the Wye River Memorandum.

50. Regrettably, an overall assessment of the human rights situation remains worrying. While there is certain positive development to be recognized on the Israeli side - such as the decrease in administrative detentions and discontinuation of the most flagrant torture methods - it appears that such violations are increasing on the Palestinian side. The pressure exercised by the Occupying Power on the Palestinian Authority, while explaining many violations, does not justify them, nor does it absolve the Palestinian Authority of its responsibility. Tackling human rights violations is not a zero-sum game: both parties have their responsibilities to combat violations, based on their commitments and obligations under international law.

51. Persons placed under administrative detention by the Palestinian Authority should be brought before a court of justice without delay or released. Decisions of the court should be promptly implemented. Special emphasis should be given to the independence of the judiciary. Torture should not be allowed under any circumstances.

52. The volatile and disturbing political situation requires in-depth studies of the applicability of international law and continuous scrutiny of the fulfilment of obligations therein. This involves mainly the Government of Israel as a party to relevant conventions and agreements. A constructive engagement by the Government of Israel is called for.

53. An early and well-prepared convening of a conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, as recommended by the General Assembly, is of the utmost importance.

54. The full and equal enjoyment by women of all human rights is a priority for the United Nations and for its Member States. This includes the integration and full participation of women in the Palestinian nation-building programmes as well as working towards the elimination of violence against women in public and private life. While bearing in mind that respect for rights of women and children in the occupied territories depends to a large extent on religion, social customs and family traditions, determined legislative efforts need to be maintained to enforce those rights.

55. The Palestinian people are being subjected to intensified pressure to do their part in the peace process. The Palestinian Authority, the Legislative Council, Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian
people have to work together to fight against all human rights violations and build a democratic nation. The international community, Governments, non-governmental organizations and individuals should increasingly focus on this field in assisting Palestinians in their nation-building programme.

56. The Palestinian Authority, the Legislative Council, non-governmental organizations and the Palestinian people are once again to be commended for the full and constructive cooperation accorded to the Special Rapporteur. Their openness and readiness to discuss the human rights situation in all its aspects in a frank and transparent manner reflects a serious attitude towards respect for human rights. At the same time, it provides the basis for combating violations and improving the situation. The invaluable support of the international community in this work will continue to be crucial in the future.

57. The Government of Israel, regrettably, still refuses to cooperate with the United Nations human rights mechanisms. The position of the Government is contained in a letter addressed to the Special Rapporteur, which is reproduced below:

"Dear Mr. Ambassador,

1. We have taken note of your request of 22 December 1998, that Israel cooperate with you as Special Rapporteur to the Territories during your forthcoming visit to the area.

2. As you are aware, on 19 February 1993, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 1993/2 A on the 'Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine', in which it decided to 'appoint a Special Rapporteur to investigate Israel's violations of the principles and bases of international law, international humanitarian law and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967'.

3. This resolution, like any other such resolutions adopted within the United Nations system, singles out Israel in a flagrantly negative way:

(a) It predetermines the Rapporteur's role, resolving ab initio that Israel is in violation of international law and international conventions.

(b) Contrary to all other 'geographical' rapporteurs who are appointed by the Commission on an annual basis, this Rapporteur has been assigned an open-ended mandate that is never subject to scrutiny, critique or modification.

(c) The mandate is intrinsically anachronistic. It disregards the negotiations that have taken place between Israel and the PLO, resulting in a series of agreements by which over 97 per cent of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are living under autonomous Palestinian administration. The Palestinian Authority, established by these agreements, exercises legislative, administrative and judicial powers over virtually all spheres of the population's daily life.

(d) The mandate completely ignores the fact that there are two sides to the Middle East conflict. The Palestinian Authority has undertaken to respect human rights, yet at least 14 people have died while being tortured under interrogation in Palestinian prisons during the last three years. International humanitarian organizations cite numerous other grave violations of human rights under the Palestinian Authority, which the Rapporteur is not authorized to investigate according to the mandate.

4. Despite the biased and unbalanced mandate, Israel decided to invite the previous Rapporteur - former President of Switzerland, Mr. René Felber - as a personal guest of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with a view to assisting him in carrying out his functions.

5. Two years after his appointment, Mr. Felber reached the conclusion that the problems in the Territories are political, and not humanitarian in nature. He thereupon resigned as Special Rapporteur on 9 February 1995.

6. The Commission turned a blind eye to the conclusions set out in his report and, in April 1995, appointed a successor, in your person, without consulting Israel or even troubling to inform its Foreign Minister of the appointment.

7. In light of the above, Israel decided to discontinue its cooperation with the Special Rapporteur, indicating however, that if the mandate were amended to become even-handed and time-limited, Israel would reconsider its position.
8. Nevertheless, Israel's Ambassador in Geneva cooperated with you informally in 1995, 1996 and 1997, yet your reports have been consistently inaccurate and misleading, containing unsubstantiated or simply false facts, and repeatedly disregarding Israel's position.

9. In this context, allow me to quote your own reports, between 1996 and 1998 on the need to change your mandate:

'...the Special Rapporteur invites the Commission on Human Rights to consider amending his mandate in accordance with the foregoing' (para. 40, E/CN.4/1996/18 of 6 March 1996) (emphasis added).

...'it is clear that the mandate of the Special Rapporteur as adopted some four years ago is in some ways obsolete and exceptional; it does not refer at all to the peace process; it does not authorize the Special Rapporteur to study and recommend constructive human rights and humanitarian programmes to prevent violations or remedy their aftermath. It limits itself to Israel's violations only in the Occupied Territories; and unlike all other mandates, its duration is open-ended ...' (para. 37, E/CN.4/1997/16 of 19 February 1997);

'the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, as it stands, is exceptional. It puts Israel in a different position compared to other countries subjected to the scrutiny of a Special Rapporteur. The mandate prejudges the outcome of the investigation. The consideration of the human rights situation in the area on the basis of the mandate is limited only to Israel's violations of international law. And the mandate, unlike all the other mandates under the Commission on Human Rights, is not reviewed periodically.' (paras. 72-73, E/CN.4/1998/17 dated 19 February 1998).

10. Until a revision is adopted, Israel regrets that it remains unable to accede to your request of 22 December 1998.

'We would request that the full text of this letter be incorporated in the body of your forthcoming report, as an authoritative statement of Israel's position.'

'Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration.'

David Peleg
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

58. In his statement at the fifty-fourth session of the Commission on Human Rights on 20 March 1998, the Special Rapporteur stated: "The attempt to discredit the report of the Special Rapporteur by the Government concerned is not new in this forum; that is rather expected particularly from a Government refusing to cooperate with the Rapporteur assigned to it. Therefore, to fulfill my task better, I have felt very strongly on the need to accomplish this cooperation. Based on the contents of my reports, the mandate is not and need not be the obstacle to the cooperation. And if that is the case, let me remind you once again that my voice seems to be among those very few who are asking amendments to the mandate - although in my case from the point of view of overall consistency as well as an improved framework for considering human rights".

59. As referred to in the last report (para.73): "...The only reason for amending the mandate is the respect for human rights; the Special Rapporteur has to have a sufficiently broad mandate to contribute to achieving that goal. To that effect the Special Rapporteur - as an independent expert - needs to be given equal treatment with other special rapporteurs." The Special Rapporteur stands by this statement.

60. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur stated in his report (para. 77): "...Israel should also have the courage to look beyond the mandate, to cooperate fully with the international human rights mechanisms and to participate actively in the substantive debate in this respect." The contents of the reports of the Special Rapporteur, and particularly the debate attached to the last report at the fifty-fourth session of the Commission, are clear evidence of the fact that there is no linkage between the mandate and cooperation. Nor can the cooperation be conditioned by the mandate.

61. The Special Rapporteur disagrees strongly with the insinuation in the letter cited above that there are no humanitarian problems in the occupied territories. If for nothing else, this report, together with earlier reports, is proof of violations against humanitarian as well as human rights law.
62. As referred to in the Introduction to this report, the Special Rapporteur has made every effort to reflect the situation as accurately as possible, based on information from a wide variety of Palestinian, Israeli and international sources. The Special Rapporteur would undoubtedly also take the facts and position of the Israeli Government into account in his report, should the Government choose to share that information with him.

63. It should be reiterated that the human rights concerns in the occupied territories cannot be held hostage to the political processes and discussions. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights is the main body to draw attention to and conduct an in-depth debate on the human rights situation in the area. This debate cannot take place in a vacuum. On the other hand, it should not be used to attack either party for political purposes only. In the debate - instead of accusing one side or the other for violations of human rights - an effort should be made to clarify the role of human rights in the context of ongoing political and economic discussions. Moreover, the debate should seek ways and means to do away with existing violations and to prevent any new violations.

64. The United Nations human rights mechanism has grown to an extensive network of thematic and country rapporteurs. Further efforts should be made to benefit more effectively from this machinery. Improved coordination and dissemination of information between the rapporteurs are essential. The working methods of the Commission, including its agenda, should continuously be reviewed to ensure the maximum output from its deliberations.

65. The international community has established that a just, comprehensive and sustainable peace settlement in the Middle East is based on certain key principles such as the right to self-determination for the Palestinians, including the establishment of a Palestinian State. Building a civil society under occupation remains a major challenge. Democracy, including regular elections and a multiparty system, and the rule of law are goals that need constant and unwavering attention by the Palestinian Authority, together with the Palestinian institutions and people. Democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights are inextricably linked and where continuous support by Governments, international and non-governmental organizations, donors and individuals is needed most.

66. While celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it ought to be recalled that almost all provisions of the Declaration are being violated in the occupied territories. To have a real reason to celebrate, let us start to work together to go through all those articles and make them a reality.

† † †

RELIGIOUS LEADERS, PETITION IN SUPPORT OF PALESTINIAN HUMAN RIGHTS, 26 JANUARY 1999

[Over 900 clergy, incl. over 130 Protestant and Catholic bishops, as well as numerous lay religious leaders, called on the Clinton Administration to press the Netanyahu govt. and the PA, to cease violating the human rights of Palestinians. The statement was delivered by SEARCH for Justice and Equality in Palestine/Israel, a Boston-based human rights group seeking a just Israeli-Palestinian peace.]

“If you want peace, work for justice.” - Pope Paul VI
“Good men must seek to bring into being a real order of justice.” - Martin Luther King, Jr.
“Some are guilty; all are responsible.” - Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel
“My Lord hath commanded justice.” - the Holy Koran

Last December marked the 50th anniversary of the adoption by the United Nations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As religious leaders, we pray and hope for the implementation of the Declaration in Palestine/Israel. We:

- believe Palestinian-Israeli peace is only possible if based on justice, human rights, and self-determination for both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Christians and Muslims.
- oppose violence against civilians, whether by Palestinians, Jewish settlers, or the Israeli government.
- want our government to support the rights of Palestinians as well as of Israelis.
We condemn human rights violations by Israel and Palestinian Authority, violations which preclude justice for Palestinians and security for Israelis.

I. Israeli violations are documented by the US State Department, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Physicians for Human Rights, Lawyers for Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Israeli and Palestinian human rights groups.

Israel signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Yet Israel continues to violate:

Articles of the Universal Declaration which prohibit
- torture and inhuman treatment (Article 5)
- denial of equal protection under the law (Article 7)
- arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (Article 9)
- denial of the right to return to one's country (Article 13)
- arbitrary expropriation of personal property (Article 17)

Articles of the Geneva Convention which prohibit
- torture (Article 32)
- collective punishment (Article 33)
- annexation of occupied territory (Article 47)
- transfer of the occupying power's own population into the occupied area (Article 49)
- destruction of property (Article 53)
- denial of food and medical supplies (Article 55)

II. Palestinian human rights violations are documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Palestinian human rights groups. The Palestinian Authority uses secret trials, torture, and intimidation of political opponents and the media. While the Palestinian Authority is not a signatory of the Universal Declaration, these actions violate its spirit.

III. Under the Geneva Convention the United States has an obligation to see that other signatories, such as Israel, abide by the Convention.

US law prohibits economic or military aid (sections 116 and 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act) to countries "engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognized human rights." Given these international and domestic obligations, we call on our government to:

1) Publicly urge Israel and the Palestinian Authority to abide by international law and human rights conventions.
2) Withhold financial aid to Israel and the Palestinian Authority, until they comply with human rights covenants. Pending compliance, aid should be given only to Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organizations working for peace based on human rights.
3) Publicly support full self-determination of Palestinians in a West Bank-Gaza state within the borders prior to the June 1967 war.
4) Support a peace which recognizes the unique religious significance of Jerusalem and gives equal national status to Israelis and Palestinians in a shared, undivided Jerusalem.
5) Urge Israel to cease demolition of Palestinian homes and the seizure of Palestinian lands and to return all land and water resources confiscated from Palestinians since 1967.
6) Urge Israel to dismantle all settlements except where settlers are willing to live as equal citizens within a Palestinian state.
7) Support the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland or receive compensation, as called for by UN resolutions.
8) Support the release of political prisoners held by Israel.
9) Urge Israel to ensure equal rights and opportunities for all Palestinians living in Israel.
Signatories (affiliations for purposes of identification only) include
Antiochian Orthodox Archbishop Philip Saliba;
Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, past president of the Catholic peace group Pax Christi;
Bishop Edmond L. Browning, past Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church;
Bishop Herbert W. Chilstrom, past Presiding Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America;
Bishop Paul Moore, Jr.
As well as over 130 bishops from the Lutheran, Methodist, Episcopal, Antiochian, and Catholic churches.

Also signing:
Salam Al- Marayati, Director, Muslim Public Affairs Council of Los Angeles; Peace activists Philip Berri-
gan and Daniel Berri gan, S.J.; Dr. Dale L. Bishop, General Secretary for Mission Program, United Church
Board for World Ministries; Richard Deats, editor of Fellowship; Rabbi Lynn Gottlieb; Joe Hale, General
Secretary, World Methodist Council; Rev. J. M. Lawson, Jr., Chair, National Council, Fellowship of Re-
conciliation; Rev. Ken Sehested, Executive Director, Baptist Peace Fellowship; Rev. Patricia Tucker Spier,
President, Division of Overseas Ministries, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ); Gene Stoltzfus, Director,
Christian Peacemaker Teams; Rev. Donald E. Wagner, Director, Evangelicals for Middle East Understand-
ing; Rev. William Wipfler, former Director, Human Rights Office of the National Council of Churches; Five
past Moderators of the Presbyterian Church, USA: Robert Bohl, John Fife, Clinton Marsh, Herbert D.
Valentine, and Benjamin Weir; and theologians John Cobb, Harvey Cox, and Rosemary Ruether.
The statement has been endorsed by the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Catholic, Brethren, Disciples,
Muslim, Episcopal, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Buddhist, and Church of God Peace Fellowships, the Meth-

ISRAELI PERSONALITIES, MANIFESTO FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE,
JERUSALEM, 2 FEBRUARY 1999

[The manifesto, initiated by Gush Shalom and first published with 146 signatures on 2 Feb. as an ad
in Ha'aretz, was signed by 460 prominent Israelis by 22 Feb., incl. five laureates of the Israel Prize -
the writer A. B. Yehoshua, poets Natan Sach and Daliah Ravikowitch, sculptor Danny Karavan, and
actress Hannah Meron; former cabinet members, incl. Shulamit Aloni and Viktor Shem-Tov; past and
present MKs; academics; filmmakers; journalists; rabbis and jurists].

We support the right of the Palestinian nation to declare the establishment of the State of Palestine in
all the territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with united Jerusalem serving as the capital of
both states - West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as capital of Palestine. The
coexistence of Israel and Palestine, side by side, is the basis of peace, security, and reconciliation
between the two nations.

US SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
ON UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE
(S. CON. RES. 5/H. CON. RES. 24), WASHINGTON, DC, 11 AND 16 MARCH 1999

[The non-binding resolution was introduced in anticipation of the 4 May 1999 expiration of the Oslo
Accord's five-year interim phase. It was passed in the Senate 98:1 and on abstention, and, five days
later, in the House by a vote of 380:24 (30 not voting).]

Whereas at the heart of the Oslo peace process lies the basic, irrevocable commitment made by
Palestinian Chairman Yasir Arafat that, in his words, “all outstanding issues relating to permanent
status will be resolved through negotiations”;
Whereas resolving the political status of the territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority
while ensuring Israel's security is one of the central issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
Whereas a declaration of statehood by the Palestinians outside the framework of negotiations would, therefore, constitute a most fundamental violation of the Oslo process;

Whereas Yasir Arafat and other Palestinian leaders have repeatedly threatened to declare unilaterally the establishment of a Palestinian state;

Whereas the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state would introduce a dramatically destabilizing element into the Middle East, risking Israeli countermeasures, a quick descent into violence, and an end to the entire peace process; and

Whereas in light of continuing statements by Palestinian leaders, United States opposition to any unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood should be made clear and unambiguous: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That –

(1) the final political status of the territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority can only be determined through negotiations and agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority,

(2) any attempt to establish Palestinian statehood outside the negotiating process will invoke the strongest congressional opposition; and

(3) the President should unequivocally assert United States opposition to the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian State, making clear that such a declaration would be a grievous violation of the Oslo accords and that a declared state would not be recognized by the United States.

EUROPEAN COUNCIL, PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS (“BERLIN DECLARATION”), BERLIN, 24 AND 25 MARCH 1999 [EXCERPTS]

PART IV - OTHER DECLARATIONS

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The Heads of State and Government of the European Union reaffirm their support for a negotiated settlement in the Middle East, to reflect the principles of “land for peace” and ensure the security both collective and individual of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. In this context, the European Union welcomes the decision by the Palestinian National Council and associated bodies to reaffirm the nullification of the provisions in the Palestinian National Charter which called for the destruction of Israel and to reaffirm their commitment to recognize and live in peace with Israel. However, the European Union remains concerned at the current deadlock in the peace process and calls upon the parties to implement fully and immediately the Wye River Memorandum.

The European Union also calls upon the parties to reaffirm their commitments to the basic principles established within the framework of Madrid, Oslo and subsequent agreements, in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. It urges the parties to agree on an extension of the transitional period established by the Oslo agreements.

The European Union calls in particular for an early resumption of final status negotiations in the coming months on an accelerated basis, and for these to be brought to a prompt conclusion and not prolonged indefinitely.

The European Union believes that it should be possible to conclude the negotiations within a target period of one year. It expresses its readiness to work to facilitate an early conclusion to the negotiations.

The European Union urges both parties to refrain from activities which prejudice the outcome of those final status negotiations and from any activity contrary to international law, including all settlement activity, and to fight incitement and violence.

The European Union reaffirms the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination including the option of a state and looks forward to the early fulfillment of this right. It appeals to the
parties to strive in good faith for a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing agreements, without prejudice to this right, which is not subject to any veto. The European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel’s security and Israel’s acceptance as an equal partner in the region. The European Union declares its readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State in due course in accordance with the basic principles referred to above.

The European Union also calls for an early resumption of negotiations on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks of the Middle East Peace Process, leading to the implementation of UNSCRs 242, 338 and 425.

PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, PRESS RELEASE CONCERNING 4 MAY 1999 AND THE DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD, RAMALLAH, 20 APRIL 1999 [EXCERPTS]

Based on international resolutions, in particular United Nations General Assembly resolutions 181 and 194, and based on the Palestinian declaration of independence in 1988, the main goal of the Palestinian struggle continues to be the independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. This is the Palestinians’ legitimate hope toward which they strive seeking freedom, independence and a dignified life in their homeland. It is the main pillar of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

We conclude, from an objective reading of the regional and international reactions to Israeli policies, that the only way to guarantee our rights is to seek other channels rather than asking for Israeli concessions or allowing them an open timetable to tamper with the agreements. Our rights can only be achieved through a courageous national decision to exercise our natural right to establish our independent state on our homeland with Jerusalem as its capital. This is in accordance with the overwhelming international acceptance of a Palestinian state as a Palestinian decision not subject to negotiations and not connected to any veto power from any party. The PLC highly values the position of the Arab and Islamic states and the non-allied states, as well as the stance of the EU, Japan and Canada.

The Council expresses its deep regret over the United States’ position. It is our belief that the US did not play an effective role, as a sponsor of the peace process, as it did not deter Israel from hostile policies such as settlement expansion and other collective punishment measures against our people. The US has not even agreed to recognize the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state.

Through its discussions, the Palestinian Legislative Council reaffirms the following:

First: Ending the transitional stage on May 4, 1999, according to signed agreements.
Second: Working toward the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and taking all the necessary measures in this respect.
Third: Reinforcing Palestinian national unity and immediately entering into a comprehensive national dialogue with all factions and Palestinian political groups in order to reinforce the state as well as continuing to confront the ongoing Israeli aggression on Palestinian land, their people and their rights.
Fourth: Calling on the Palestinian people to confront the colonialist settlement activities, the Judaization of Jerusalem and the collective punishments practiced against the Palestinian people.
Fifth: The Palestinian Legislative Council turns toward the international community and international organizations to support and recognize our people’s right to self-determination and the establishment of their state. It also calls on these parties to urge Israel to commit to implementing agreements and to halt all measures against real peace by releasing all Palestinian political prisoners from Israeli jails.
We in the PLC reaffirm that our national decision regarding the state and our continuing struggle to liberate and build our land is derived from decisions taken by the Palestinians themselves, expressed in the declaration of independence and the programs of the PLO.

PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON THE END OF THE INTERIM PERIOD, RAMALLAH, 20 APRIL 1999

[The report on a course of action with regard to the end of the interim period on 4 May 1999 was drafted on 12 April and submitted to the PLC on 20 April 1999.]

The Palestinian people are in consensus over their right to return, their right to self-determination, their right to establish an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and their right to practice sovereignty over their lands. These are the non-negotiables by which the Palestinian revolution has always been characterized. The international community reinforced these rights through its resolutions, especially UN resolution 181 in 1947, which clearly stipulates the establishment of two states on the historic land of Palestine.

The Palestinian representative body, the PLO, also reinforced these rights in Palestinian National Council sessions, which culminated in a resolution to declare an independent Palestinian state in 1988. This declaration was met with much Arab and international support and an official recognition of the State of Palestine. Embassies were open in most capitals of the world, including some permanent member countries in the UN Security Council.

Then came an international initiative to hold a peace conference in the Middle East, in which the PLO participated, to support and promote the implementation of all international resolutions and to find a political solution that guarantees the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians. After signing the Declaration of Principles and the other consecutive agreements, which included the two phases of interim period and final status negotiations, the PLO and the Palestinian Authority carried out democratic presidential and legislative elections. The PA then began the process of building a Palestinian entity despite the obstacles placed by the Israeli government.

It has now become clear to the world that the Israeli government is responsible for the stalemate in the peace process, given their refusal to implement agreements already signed between the two parties. Israel stubbornly continues its policy of enforcing facts on the ground through measures such as land confiscation, settlement activities, Judaization of Jerusalem, closures, violation of human rights and all other forms of collective punishment, which contravene the spirit and the letter of the signed agreements.

Israel has also hindered various international efforts to salvage the peace process and has continued to refuse to implement signed agreements or commit to different initiatives. Therefore, in accordance with the PLO’s commitments as stipulated in the documents of the peace process, in addition to the timetable set for the end of the transitional period and the limited time of final status negotiations, the Palestinian leadership took the decision to declare a Palestinian state on May 4, 1999. This is the date which was clearly specified in the agreements and a date to which the concerned parties committed while the world witnessed.

The international community dealt with the Palestinians’ decision to declare a state positively and with interest, which became clear from the wide Palestinian political and documents AND source material diplomatic actions, headed by President Arafat. Israel, however, resorted to the language of threats and violence by taking a variety of hostile measures against the Palestinian people and its national authority. The political committee warns of the dangers if the Israeli government continues to threaten or carry out these threats that would create an atmosphere of tension. It could also take the region back to the vicious cycle of violence, something for which the Israeli government would bear total responsibility.
The political committee stresses that an independent Palestinian state is not an issue for negotiation, but a legitimate right for the Palestinian people decided on by the international will. This state is the basis and the launching pad for any future negotiations, and international legitimacy is to remain the reference for this process.

Based on what has been presented, the political committee recommends the following:

**First:** To consider the fourth of May an official date for the end of the transitional stage.

**Second:** Declaration of the establishment of an independent state and realization of sovereignty on the specified date based on the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in 1988 and the international resolutions in this respect.

**Third:** The start of establishing and completing the institutions and commissions of the Palestinian state through the following measures:
1. Announcement of a specific date to carry out new Palestinian presidential and parliamentary elections in which all Palestinians participate.
2. Commissioning a specialized committee to prepare a new elections law.
3. Formation of a commission to write the text of the state's constitution.
4. Carrying out all political and administrative measures in order to establish the state and realize sovereignty.
5. Formation of a new government for the state which will bear the responsibilities and challenges of the coming stage.
6. Immediate announcement of a specific date for conducting local government elections.

**Fourth:** Working toward achieving national unity through democratic dialogue and by giving different political affiliations and the largest popular sectors the chance to participate in the government.

**Fifth:** Continuation of efforts at both the Arab and international levels to guarantee the continuation and development of support and protection of the Palestinian decision; call on the countries of the world and international organizations to raise the status of Palestinian representation and to provide a security net for the Palestinian decision aimed at reinforcing the principles of peace and stability in the region.

**Sixth:** That the Central Council which is to begin its sessions on April 27 remain in a state of continuing convention until it decides on the decision and necessary measures to be taken to establish the state and to practice full Palestinian sovereignty over it.

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**US PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON, ‘LETTER OF ASSURANCES’ TO PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PRESIDENT YASSER ARAFAT, WASHINGTON, DC, 26 APRIL 1999**

[In an effort to persuade the Palestinians not to unilaterally declare a state with the expiration of the Oslo interim period on 4 May 1999, the US invited a PA team – headed by Mahmoud Abbas and Saeb Erekat - to Washington to discuss the issue. The Palestinians requested a letter from the US on the order of the EU’s Berlin Declaration that would give Pres. Arafat a quid pro quo enabling him to postpone the declaration. The letter was negotiated with special envoy Dennis Ross; though it fell short of Palestinian aspirations, Arafat used it, along with the White House statement on the peace process, at the PLO Central Council meeting on 27 April to secure acquiescence in postponing the unilateral declaration of statehood.]

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I appreciated the opportunity to see you at the White House last month and exchange views on the current situation. This is indeed a time of challenge and opportunity in the pursuit of Palestinian-Israeli peace. As the leader of the Palestinian people, you have made historic decisions for peace. It is critical now that you stay that course and maintain this courage and vision that can help bring us closer to that goal. The United States is a full partner with Palestinians and Israelis in that endeavor and we will be there to support both sides. It is particularly important that you and I work closely in the period ahead.
Mr. Chairman,

I know that your people have faced great difficulties in the past several years. Clearly the Oslo process has not made the kind of progress we would have hoped to see. Much time has been wasted and many opportunities have been lost. Oslo was based on the principle of mutuality and the critical role negotiations must play in realizing Palestinian aspirations. At the same time, the Palestinian-Israeli partnership - so essential to peacemaking - has been badly shaken. The agreement we helped facilitate between you and Prime Minister Netanyahu at Wye carried with it a great deal of promise. The first phase was implemented. Unfortunately, the second and third phases have not been. The Palestinians have implemented many of their commitments for the second phase, and I appreciate your efforts, particularly in the security area where Palestinians are engaged in a serious effort to fight terror. It is important that you continue these efforts and fulfill all of your commitments. We will continue to work actively for implementation by Israel.

It is also critical that Palestinians and Israelis proceed with the important work of the permanent status negotiations. As agreed by the parties in the Declaration of Principles, “these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors and other issues of common interest.”

As May 4 approaches I also understand that you face enormous pressures and challenges in trying to realize Palestinian aspirations and keep hopes for peace alive. In your effort to deal with these challenges, I am asking that you continue to rely on the peace process as the way to fulfill the aspirations of your people. Indeed, negotiations are the only realistic way to fulfill those aspirations. In this context, and in the spirit of my remarks in Gaza, we support the aspirations of the Palestinian people to determine their own future on their own land. As I said in Gaza, I believe Palestinians should live free today, tomorrow and forever.

Given the importance to Palestinians and Israelis of achieving a just and lasting peace, it is vital that negotiations be re-energized as soon as possible. As we approach May 4 - the date for the end of the five-year transitional period and the conclusion of the permanent status negotiations - I want to mention several important steps we have taken related to the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace.

The United States has called upon both parties to continue to adhere to the terms of reference of the peace process as defined in Madrid and Oslo. The objective of the negotiating process is the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including land for peace, and all other agreements under the Oslo process.

We have also called on the parties to continue to carry out all their interim period responsibilities, including full implementation without any further delay of the Interim Agreement and the Wye River Memorandum and continued cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government.

The United States further believes that the Oslo process was never intended to be open-ended. We have called on both parties to engage in accelerated permanent status negotiations and to rededicate themselves to the goal of reaching an agreement within one year. Toward that end and in an effort to facilitate that process, the United States is ready to help launch those negotiations after the Israeli elections and once an Israeli Government has been formed, and to review and monitor their progress. The United States is also prepared with the consent of the parties to bring them together within six months to review the status of their efforts and to facilitate reaching an agreement.

For these negotiations to succeed, it is vital that the environment in which they occur be credible, serious and fair. The United States knows how destructive settlement activities, land confiscations, and house demolitions are to the pursuit of Palestinian-Israeli peace. In this regard, we will continue to exert maximum efforts to have both parties avoid unilateral steps or actions designed to change the status of the West Bank and Gaza or to prejudge or preempt issues reserved for permanent status negotiations.
As we work together to advance peace, I am also committed to continuing to enhance the U.S.-Palestinian Partnership. I will do everything possible to strengthen that partnership and through the U.S.-Palestinian Bilateral Committee to remove impediments to our relationship.

Mr. Chairman, the road to a just and lasting Palestinian-Israeli peace will not be easy. It will require leadership, partnership, and a commitment to the idea that peace is a strategic goal to promote the well-being of both the Palestinian and Israeli people. For my part, I want to assure you that I am personally committed to this objective and to doing all I can to help the Palestinian and Israeli people achieve the peace and security that they have for too long been denied. Working together with you and your Israeli partners, I know we can realize this goal.

Sincerely,            

Bill Clinton

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GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, POSITION ON EXPANSION OF SETTLEMENTS, JERUSALEM, 27 APRIL 1999

The Government of Israel decided that during the course of implementing the interim agreements and until after the signing of the permanent status agreement with the Palestinians, no new communities will be established in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. At the same time, the government also decided to strengthen existing settlements.

Settlers in a few communities in the territories are taking hold of hilltops overlooking their settlements in order to improve the security conditions. In these locations, the action is being taken only when the land in question is state-owned land which is not arable and cultivated, and only when it does not require expropriation of land.

It is important to emphasize that the issue at stake is only the improvement of security in existing communities in which, as a result of topographical conditions, there is sometimes no contiguity between the existing community and the hilltop necessary to upgrade its security conditions.

These conditions occur as a result of a general effort to avoid damaging in any way cultivated agricultural fields, with the intention of taking maximum consideration of the needs of the Palestinian population.

These actions are not an obstacle to peace, as some would contend. On the contrary, holding the overlooking hilltops is intended to prevent friction and tension which may develop as a result of Palestinians taking control of such sites which overlook and command several Jewish communities, thus creating a security risk to their inhabitants.

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PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL, CLOSING STATEMENT, EMERGENCY SESSION ON THE END OF THE OSLO INTERIM PERIOD, GAZA, 29 APRIL 1999

[From 27-29 April, the PLO Central Council debated how to handle the post-Oslo period, specifically whether to declare a Palestinians state unilaterally. On 29 April, the sessions were suspended without decision other than to reconvene in June, after Israeli elections. This statement is the only official record of what transpired during the meetings; it was published in Shaml, No. 16 (May 1999).]

The Central Council held a series of meetings within the context of its emergency session which commenced on 27th April. The Council heard a full report presented by President Yassir Arafat, in which he gave an overview of various aspects of the political situation and outlined the main tasks outstanding on the Palestinian front, at the forefront of which is the completion of the creation of our independent Palestinian state, with holy Jerusalem as its capital.
The President spoke about the Peace Process on the Palestinian and other Arab tracks which had begun at the Madrid Conference on the basis of Land for Peace, and the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 425, stressing that the Israeli Government bears responsibility for the total halt in this process, due to its rescinding on obligations for which it has signed, and its following an aggressive policy targeted at the Palestinian people, land, and their rights, in flagrant violation of all agreements, covenants and treaties, and in disregard for the global consensus on the rights of the Palestinian people as an essential part of the peace process and a principal ingredient of its advance and its success, as well as in the stability of the situation in the region.

After listening to the report presented by the political leadership regarding the political situation, members of the committee discussed, in a democratic and responsible manner, all possible options that may be endorsed in these crucial times. There was full consensus that the State of Palestine, and its capital, holy Jerusalem, is a reality established on the basis of the natural rights of the Palestinian people to establish their own state, and on the basis of General Assembly resolution number 181 of 1947 and the Declaration of Independence of 1988, and that the Palestinian people with their sacrifice, their steadfastness and their struggle, are the original creators of this state and the determiners of its destiny, and that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation with its national and democratic institutions is the highest source of this national decision, which is neither negotiable nor subject to repeal.

The Council also reached consensus that the current Israeli policy, based on settlement, expansion, and the negation of the Peace Process freezing it in its tracks, as well as on the violation of the national and human rights of the Palestinian people, will in no way break our nation’s resolve to obtain its rights and to mobilise all political and popular capacities to protect Palestinian land, the Palestinian people, and Palestinian rights, on the firmly established basis of national unity and the just and legitimate struggle to obtain the one national objective: the objective of terminating the occupation and obtaining self-determination, the establishment of the state, and the resolution of the case of refugees, on the basis of resolution 194, and of international law.

In this context the members of the Central Council paid respect to the presence of colleagues in the Hamas and Jihad movements during the Council’s meetings, and affirmed that this initiative is a clear message that our people are united in confronting difficult circumstances, and that to wager on our division is to make a losing wager.

The Council reached consensus that the Palestinian people will not turn their backs on peace, as a strategic choice supported by all nations of the world, and sponsored and emphasized by them as one of the bases of regional and international stability.

The Council prized highly the stances taken by fellow Arab, Islamic and African countries, non-aligned countries, Russia, China, and other European and Latin American countries, which were at the forefront in their full recognition of the Palestinian state, with holy Jerusalem as its capital.

The Council also prized the stances taken by the European Union, Norway, Japan and Canada, who supported the Peace Process and declared their recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the establishment of their state, as a legal, unconditional right and a right that cannot be repealed, and which also took a marked stance on the case of Jerusalem and its sovereignty.

The Council received with much attention the letter of President Bill Clinton in which he stressed the commitment of the United States of America to the realization of the objectives of the Peace Process, embodied in the implementation of resolutions 242 and 338, and the principle of Land for Peace, and his support of the aspirations of the Palestinian people to live freely on their own land, and also in consideration of settlements as factors destructive to the Peace Process.

The Council lauded the wide-ranging movements and consistent and productive efforts exerted by President Yassir Arafat on the Arab and international fronts, and which bore the fruit of a qualitative development in the stances of the world’s nations regarding the Palestinian State, further establishment of its international legitimacy, and the development of its current and future relations.
The Council gave great importance to the passing of the five years set in the interim agreement, without the fulfillment of the requirements of this stage, at the forefront of which is Israeli withdrawal from the land, before the fulfillment of the final agreement between both parties. There was consensus that the reason for this is basically due to the policies and stances of the Israeli side, which bears full responsibility for the freezing of the Peace Process.

Consequently, the Central Council calls upon the international community and the United Nations, and particularly the sponsor countries and the countries which are signatory to the agreements, to work to compel Israel to implement its obligations in accordance with the agreements ratified between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, in a way which would lead to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and other pertinent international resolutions.

At the end of the sessions which the Council held over three days, the Council made the following resolutions:

First: To consider the meetings of the current session of the Council open, on condition that it reconvenes in a general meeting during the coming month of June.

Second: To move forward in taking the necessary steps and procedures to complete the fabric of the state and its institutions, and the dedication to its sovereignty, through forming a number of working committees, including the special committee for drawing up the draft constitution of the state. In this context the Council welcomes the response of the Secretary General of the League of Arab States Dr. Esmat Abdul Meguid, to the Palestinian request to form a Higher Arab Committee headed by him, to help draw up the draft constitution.

Third: The Central Council entrusts the Executive Committee with studying the sponsor countries’ correspondence and with dealing with the correspondence in a manner which realizes the higher interests of the Palestinian people.

Fourth: The Council stresses the central importance of the city of Jerusalem, and that all measures and plans which Israel has undertaken and still undertakes as an occupying force in Jerusalem and elsewhere, are null and void, illegal, and to be desisted from, and whose results must be reversed. In this context the Council affirms pertinent UN resolutions, and highly appraises the latest stance of the European Union regarding Jerusalem. It also values highly the steadfast stances of Arab, Islamic and non-aligned countries, in connection with Jerusalem.

Fifth: The Council calls upon all active groups amongst our people to confront with all national capacities the policy of settlements and the dispossession of land and demolition of homes, of building circular roads and highways, and the racist actions of Judaization which are taking place in Jerusalem and in all Palestinian lands, and the Council affirms, on the basis of international law and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, the illegality and invalidity of these aggressive policies and practices. The Council entrusts the Executive Committee with taking necessary measures to confront this danger, and in this context the Council welcomes the convening of a conference of the parties signatory to the Fourth Geneva Convention on 15/7/1999, and calls for the taking of measures established in the Convention to compel Israel to implement this (convention) in occupied Palestinian lands.

Sixth: The Council lauds the steadfastness of our heroic prisoners and detainees in the occupation’s prisons, and stresses its insistence that they be set free, and that their suffering be terminated.

Seventh: The Council stresses the need to consolidate the process of building the nation and dedicating to the rule of law and to democratic practices and the institutions of civil society.

The Central Council applauds the steadfastness of our great people and its rallying round its national leadership, and calls for further vigilance and preparedness during these historical moments in the destiny of our ever struggling people, and affirms in all confidence that the dawn is coming, and that victory is nigh.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
“We will favor our prophets and those who have faith in this life and in the day of reckoning.”

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PRIME MINISTER-ELECT EHUD BARAK, ELECTION VICTORY ADDRESS, JERUSALEM, 17 MAY 1999 [EXCERPTS]

[Barak's speech outlined his four "red lines" in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians].

We will reach peace not from weakness but from strength and a feeling of security not a peace which comes at the expense of security, but peace that will bring security. We are here in Rabin Square thinking of the thousands of citizens who are in shelters on the northern border, and I hereby commit myself to do everything to take the army out of Lebanon within a year [...]

We will move for separation from the Palestinians, in accordance with four red lines: Jerusalem, united under our sovereignty for eternity. Period. There will be no return under any circumstances to the 1967 borders. There will be no foreign army west of the River Jordan. And the majority of the settlers in Judea and Samaria will be in settlement blocs under our sovereignty. As I pledged, any final status arrangement will be submitted to the people for a referendum, in which you, the citizens of Israel, will decide [...]

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G-8 SUMMIT, STATEMENT ON REGIONAL ISSUES, COLOGNE, 20 JUNE 1999 [EXCERPTS]

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

We reaffirm our support for a negotiated settlement in the Middle East, that should be based on the full implementation of existing commitments and on the principles of land for peace, UNSC resolutions 242 and 338, the Madrid and Oslo Agreements, UNSC resolution 425, and secure and recognized boundaries. We welcome recent encouraging statements by the Prime Minister-elect of Israel and call upon all parties to pursue the Middle East Peace Process with resolve, renewed efforts and good faith, leading to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace.

We urge both Israel and the Palestinians to implement fully and promptly the Wye River Memorandum, to combat terror, to fight violence and incitement to violence and to refrain from all activities that prejudge the outcome of the Permanent Status negotiations. We call upon both sides to resume immediately the Permanent Status negotiations. We believe that the parties should set a goal of concluding the Permanent Status negotiations within a target period of one year.

We also call for an early resumption of negotiations between Israel and Syria and Lebanon in order to achieve peace agreements. In the meantime, we urge all parties concerned strictly to respect the provisions of the April 26, 1996, understanding and to contribute actively to the work of the monitoring group in South Lebanon.

We equally underline the importance of resuming the multilateral track of the peace process and encourage the working groups and steering group to pursue their activities, supporting the bilateral negotiations and enhancing regional cooperation and economic integration.

We remind all parties that sustained economic development and improved living standards for the Palestinian people are real factors in securing peace and enhancing stability in the region.

We are convinced that peace and security and the fulfillment of the rights of all the people of the Middle East, including the Palestinians, are vital to a lasting, just and negotiated settlement that provides for the Palestinians to live as a free people on their own land.

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General
1.1 The main objectives of the Government are: national and personal security by way of a determined struggle against terrorism; an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict by achieving genuine peace; the prevention of war and bloodshed; the war on unemployment and the cultivation of stable, employment-creating growth; the reduction of social gaps; the promotion of immigration and immigrant absorption through integration and partnership; the creation of living conditions and an environment that offer a sense of purpose and hope, and promote immigration to Israel; the fortification of democracy, the rule of law, Jewish heritage and human rights, with respect for the courts; the promise of equal opportunity for all; the making education its top priority, ensuring an education for the young generation from kindergarten through university, and; the struggle against violence and traffic accidents.

1.2 The Government of Israel will act to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict through peaceful means, and by standing firm on Israel's national security, integrity and development. The Government will strive to establish peace based on mutual respect, ensuring the security and other vital interests of the State and offering personal security for all its citizens.

1.3 The Government will work for national unity - bringing together all citizens of Israel, cultivating tolerance, moderation and respect for others - and to close rifts among the nation, giving hope for a better future for all citizens of the State, Arabs and Jews, secular and religious.

1.4 The Government will act to guarantee that Israel continues to be a Jewish, democratic and Zionist state with equal rights for all its citizens, and where immigration is encouraged.

1.5 The Government will base its policies on the principles of equality, justice and brotherhood, to be implemented in all sectors, communities and groups of Israeli society.

1.6 The Government will strive to fortify the basic values of democracy, as well as the values of Judaism, the rule of law and equality before the law, based on the ideas of social justice, human and civil rights, the values of Judaism, equality, brotherhood and freedom. The Government will strengthen the judicial apparatus and entrench respect for the law, in the spirit of democracy and Jewish tradition.

1.7 The Government will work to develop the economy in accordance with the principles of free and balanced economics, with a view toward increasing the amount of resources available to the State, being profoundly convinced that the prosperity of the State and its development are central components of its strength. The Government will view a reduction of gaps and the implementation of the principles of social justice as vital components in its economic policy and in the integrity of the State of Israel.

1.8 The Government will work to cultivate stable growth through integration in the international economy, to improve the standard of living, and to advance science, technology and industry. The Government will accomplish this by offering all citizens of Israel an equal opportunity to take a responsible part in the national enterprise.

1.9 The Government will work toward advancing broad groupings among the Israeli population, reducing gaps, raising the standard of living of weak social strata, and instituting a policy of advancement and progress for development towns, and rehabilitating underprivileged neighborhoods.

1.10 The Government will work toward genuine improvements in the spheres of public health, employment and housing conditions, with attention to the elderly, pensioners, the handicapped, multi-child and single parent families and people afflicted with economic or social distress.

1.11 The Government will show respect for the Jewish character of the State and for Jewish heritage, as well as for the religion and traditions of all other religious communities in Israel.

1.12 In determining its policy, the Government will act to preserve the respect of all individuals, their welfare, security and quality of life.

1.13 The Government will work toward gender equality, and toward creating conditions that will assist in the advancement of women in academia, government, the labor market and the economy. The Government will also combat the plague of violence against women and within the family.

1.14 The Government will cultivate cultural and artistic endeavors, and encourage artists, with a view toward creating a climate of creativity, developing talent and rejuvenating culture in Israel.
1.15 The Government will strengthen the ties between Israel and Jews in the Diaspora, through continuous dialogue, and find ways to enhance their Jewish identity and to assist in their struggle against assimilation. The Government, together with Jewish communities around the world, will combat manifestations of anti-Semitism and racism.

1.16 The Government will uphold international agreements signed by Israel.

1.17 The Government will undertake long-range strategic planning in an effort to advance Israel as a modern state, with effective and just management, marching into the next millennium in security and peace, and with hope for a better future.

The Peace, Security and Foreign Relations of Israel

2.1 The Government views peace as a basic value of life in Israel, whose sources draw on the vision of the Prophets, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and in the continued yearning of the Israeli people for peace and security. The Government believes that it is possible to bring an end to the cycle of bloodshed in our region. Making peace is grounded in the strength of the IDF and on the overall strength of Israel, on the deterrent capabilities of the State, and on the desire for stability in the Middle East - that will allow resources to be directed toward economic and social development.

2.2 Peace is a component in the national security conception and the foreign relations of Israel. The arrangements and peace treaties to which Israel will be a partner will be grounded in the preservation of the security and national interests of Israel, resting on the broad support of the people in Israel.

2.3 The Government will cultivate the strength of the IDF as the defensive and deterrent force of Israel.

2.4 The Government will conduct an all-out war against terrorist organizations and the initiators and perpetrators of terrorism, and guarantee the personal security of all residents of Israel.

2.5 As part of its policy to bring about and establish peace in the Middle East, the Government will act toward the development of mechanisms for political, economic, scientific and cultural cooperation between peoples of the region.

2.6 The Government will act to accelerate the negotiations with the Palestinians, based on the existing process, with a view toward ending the conflict with a permanent settlement that guarantees the security and vital interests of Israel. The permanent settlement with the Palestinians will be submitted for approval in a referendum.

2.7 The Government will honor and implement the agreements which Israel has signed with the Palestinians, while, at the same time, insisting that the Palestinian Authority also honor and implement these agreements.

2.8 The Government will resume the negotiations with Syria with a view toward concluding a peace treaty there with - full peace that bolsters the security of Israel, grounded in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on the existence of a normal relationship between two neighboring states, living side by side in peace. The peace treaty with Syria will be submitted for approval in a referendum.

2.9 The Government will act toward bringing the IDF out of Lebanon, while guaranteeing the welfare and security of residents of the north, and aspiring to conclude a peace treaty with Lebanon.

2.10 The Government views Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority as important partners in the effort to establish peace in our region, and will conduct an ongoing political dialogue with each of them. The Government will also work to advance understanding and friendship, as well as the development of the economy, commerce and tourism between the Israeli people and the Egyptian, Jordanian and Palestinian peoples.

2.11 The Government will conduct an ongoing dialogue with the United States with regard to its positions on the permanent settlement. The dialogue will also relate to American political, economic and defense assistance to Israel. The Government will work to intensify the special friendship between the United States and Israel, and to continue and cultivate the strategic cooperation with the United States.

2.12 The Government will work to strengthen and enhance ties with the European Union and its member states. The Government will also act to strengthen ties with Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States and China, as well as with the entire international community.

2.13 The Government will do everything in its power to bring about the release of Israeli prisoners of war and missing soldiers, and to bring them back to Israel.
Jerusalem
3.1 Greater Jerusalem, the eternal capital of Israel, will remain united and complete under the sovereignty of Israel.
3.2 Members of all religions will be guaranteed free access to the holy places, and freedom of worship.
3.3 The Government will work toward the development and prosperity of Jerusalem, and for continued construction therein - for the welfare of all its residents.

Settlement
4.1 The Government views all forms of settlement as a valued social and national enterprise, and will work to improve its ability to contend with the difficulties and challenges it faces.
4.2 Until the status of the Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza is determined, within the framework of the permanent settlement, no new communities will be built and no existing communities will be detrimentally affected.
4.3 The Government will work to ensure the security of the Jewish residents in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and to provide regular Government and municipal services - equal to those offered to residents of all other communities in Israel. The Government will offer a response to the on-going development needs of existing communities. Socio-economic standards will be equally applied to all communities everywhere.

Constitution, Law, Governance and Municipal Government
5.1 The Government will work to ensure social justice, equality, human dignity and freedom, integrity, proper norms of administrative conduct, the cultivation of mutual respect between people, the strengthening of democratic rule in Israel, the preservation of Jewish heritage, and the enshrining of a recognition of the importance of the rule of law and human rights.
5.2 The Government will work, within the framework of the 15th Knesset, to complete the Basic Laws and to formulate the State Constitution. The Constitution and the Basic Laws will ensure a balance between the values that are essential to all sectors of society in Israel - including human rights and the defense of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. The enactment of the Constitution will be carried out in an effort to formulate a broad national consensus.
5.3 The Government will work to strengthen the standing of the Knesset and of the secular and religious courts, of the review process, and of law enforcement authorities, while carefully preserving the principle of the separation between branches of government. The Government will work to improve and reform the Civil Service.
5.4 The Government will combat crime and violence - including violence among youth, and against women and the defenseless - through education, deterrence and rehabilitation.
5.5 The Government will work to strengthen the judicial system, implement reform in the courts, improve service to the public and shorten the pre-trial waiting period.
5.6 The Government will institute fixed, clear, overt and equal criteria for the distribution of various Government grants, and ensure their implementation.

Change in the Order of National Priorities
6.1 The Government will determine the order of priorities in the allocation of available resources. Priority will be given, first and foremost, to education. Priority will also be given to health, the war on unemployment and poverty, the creation of jobs, immigrant absorption, the development of infrastructures vital for economic growth and the quality of life, the strengthening of the settlement enterprise, the struggle against traffic accidents, the promotion of research and the development of advanced technology.
6.2 The Government will re-examine national priority areas and communities. Subject thereto, the status of Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza will be equal to that of communities inside Israel, without preference, except for preference given for reasons related to security.
6.3 The distribution of Government resources will be carried out only in accordance with criteria based on practical considerations, national objectives and the needs of the citizens of Israel, and not in accordance with any political standard.

[...]
Immigration and Immigrant Absorption

8.1 The Government will work to promote immigration and immigrant absorption. The integration of immigrants into Israeli society will be achieved only through dialogue and cooperation with the immigrants themselves. The Government will work for the rapid integration of new immigrants without patrons in Israel, while showing sensitivity and understanding for their distress. Immigrant absorption policy will emphasize the prevention of discrimination, the use of stigmas, and alienation. The Government will cultivate pride as Israeli society becomes stronger and is enriched by the contribution of immigrants to the economy, science and culture of Israel.

8.2 The Government will invest special efforts in the immigration and absorption of immigrants from distressed countries.

8.3 The Government will ensure that all immigrants are able to learn Hebrew regardless of their age. The State will assist immigrants in their training, conversion of profession and employment.

8.4 The Government will work to integrate immigrant scientists and academics into the Israeli economy, the industrial-business sector, and institutes of higher education and research.

8.5 The Government will respect the cultural differences of all groups and try to strengthen that which is shared between them. The Government will implement the principle of multiculturalism and, in this spirit, work to open channels of communication, given the fact that we are one people.

8.6 The Government will strive to cease wage discrimination for identical work, in all spheres, by immigrant and veteran Israelis.

8.7 The Government will work to release public lands in order to lower the cost of construction and facilitate the availability of reasonably priced housing, for purchase and long-term rental, while maintaining the rights of the renter.

8.8 The Government will work to integrate immigrants into education programs, networks and reforms, taking advantage of their cultural and scientific potential for the benefit of the education system.

8.9 The Government will give particular attention to immigrant populations requiring assistance, such as: the elderly, single parent families, the handicapped and the ill.

8.10 The Government will initiate legislation to guarantee the rights and obligations of new immigrants to Israel.

8.11 The Government will work to legislate the Veterans Law, which determines that 9 May is a special, historic day, and grants benefits and assistance to World War II veterans living with us.

8.12 The Government will work to integrate new immigrants into the Government and Civil Service at all levels.

8.13 The Government and the Jewish Agency will strengthen their relationship and take joint action to promote immigration and strengthen Jewish-Zionist education in the Diaspora. Simultaneously, the Government will examine its overall relations with the Jewish Agency. […]

Religion

10.1 The Government recognizes the need to design an appropriate solution for the relationship between religion and state, through dialogue and the establishment of a covenant between the religious and secular populations - to be grounded in consensus, based upon mutual tolerance and bringing together all parts of the nation.

10.2 The Government will work for the passage of Knesset legislation, in accordance with High Court of Justice rulings, and through prior dialogue and efforts to reach an understanding with all relevant parties, regarding military conscription and the exemption from military service given to yeshiva students.

10.3 The Government will guarantee the religious needs of members of all communities and religions in Israel, without political linkage, but in accordance with the principles of equality, reason and propriety.

10.4 The Government will work to strengthen the status of the Chief Rabbinate.

10.5 The Government will work to preserve the places sacred to all religions, to arrange for the possibility of Jewish prayer at all sites sacred to Jews, and to arrange for the possibility of prayer at sites sacred to all other religions, with consideration for public security and order.

10.6 Religious services in Israel will be improved.

[…]
The Status of Israeli Arabs

12.1 The Government will work toward full and equal rights for all Arab, Bedouin, Druze, Circassian and other citizens of Israel. The Government will work for equality in education, employment, housing and infrastructure, and to correct past inequalities in the allocation of resources and availability of public services.

12.2 The Government will act to improve the situation of Arab authorities and to create jobs, through the industrialization of Arab and Druze communities, while gradually closing the gaps between various populations in Israel with respect to economic and social infrastructure.

12.3 The Government will work to improve the education system in the Arab, Bedouin, Druze and Circassian sectors, as in the Jewish sector. The Government will work to promote Arab and Druze culture, in the spirit of these communities.

12.4 The Government will work toward creating an economic and social infrastructure in Arab, Bedouin Druze and Circassian communities that is of equal quality to that in Jewish communities.

12.5 The Government will advance arrangements for the settlement of Bedouins in the Negev - to be based upon an integrated solution for their settlement and an arrangement to resolve the land problem.

12.6 The Government will act to create jobs for the Arab sector at the highest levels of the Government and Civil Service. The Government will allocate additional jobs for the integration of Arab academics in Government and public institutions.

12.7 The Government will work to formulate solutions for chronic problems such as the problems of recognition for unrecognized Arab communities, the appropriation of lands for public use, the problems of Bedouins in the Negev, accelerated approval for master plans, the definition of disputed jurisdictions, solutions for the housing problems of young couples and the underprivileged, and the return of those uprooted from Ikrit and Biram - in accordance with the principles approved by the ministerial committees of previous governments. […]

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ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER EHUD BARAK, INAUGURAL KNESSET ADDRESS, JERUSALEM, 6 JULY 1999

Your Excellency President and Mrs. Weizman,

Mr. Speaker, our friend Avraham Burg, please accept my heartfelt congratulations on your deserved election as Speaker of the Knesset.

Today, the legislature acquires a new, young and energetic leadership, the product of a Torah and Avodah philosophy, which will undoubtedly put its stamp on this House. All of us send you our very best wishes for success - and with you, to your parents Dr. Yosef and Rivka Burg.

I would also like to thank the outgoing temporary Speaker, MK Shimon Peres, who has led the Knesset in the last few weeks with a practiced, experienced and steady hand, and with him, to all the Knesset members who have left the House, this seat, and particularly to Knesset Speaker Dan Tichon, who guided the Knesset in a manner which added honor to the House and to Israeli democracy.

Let me begin with a personal comment. I have been a soldier for practically all my adult life. I have known the pride of victory, but also the pain of failure. And as one whose only clothes, for decades, were olive-drab uniforms, I tell you today that, in the words of the poet Hillel, "We - the gray soldiers, whose hands are blackened with war, whose nostrils reek with death, whose throats are hoarse - we cry love to inside your souls."

I am not alone here today on this podium. Together with me are generations of IDF soldiers who withstood the most severe trials of fire in order to secure our liberty. Together with me are those who returned at dawn from the nighttime inferno, carrying on their shoulders the silent stretchers bearing their lifeless comrades.
I am not alone here today on this podium. Together with me are the white-coated hi-tech people in Herzliya and the struggling unemployed, without a livelihood from Dimona, Ofakim and Hazor, rabbis and secular Jews, fieldworkers, gardeners and construction workers. I am not alone.

I am not alone today. Together with me are the mothers who do not sleep at night and the fathers tormented by anguish. Together with me are all the dreamers and the fighters. And speaking for myself and the entire Israeli government which is setting forth today, I assure you that we have not closed our eyes in the last month, and we will not close our eyes as long as is needed in the future so that mothers in Israel sleep peacefully in the coming years.

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset:

In the annals of the Knesset there are turning points, ends of eras and beginnings of new ones. Today a new government in Israel starts out, resting on the broad-based confidence of the House and most of the people.

I believe that this day will be chronicled as a milestone and turning point - a time of reconciliation, unity and peace. Eight weeks have passed since the people had their say at the polls.

As I begin my address, I would like to again express my profound appreciation to the masses of Israelis who placed their confidence in me, and my appreciation of all citizens, regardless of outlook, who participated in the democratic process and expressed their choice and free will.

I am duty-bound to express my full appreciation for the outgoing government for the efforts it invested and also for the achievements during its tenure. I express my appreciation to all the ministers, and in particular to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who since receiving the decision of the electorate, has behaved in an exemplary and statesmanlike fashion.

And I wish to add a personal comment. Even if, on a political level, we disagreed, very often on matters of style, on the personal level our relationships were hardly ever affected. And as one who has accompanied the Netanyahu family, including Benjamin Netanyahu, for decades, I hope and believe that we will be able to be friends in the future as well.

I already said on the evening of the election that, from the moment I was elected, I view myself as an emissary of all Israeli citizens. I shall act with all my strength on their behalf, and for their sake, together with my colleagues, out of a profound recognition of responsibility and mission, in order to guide and lead the country forward to its great objectives and a promising future. There is an ancient prayer in my heart, the prayer of Solomon: "Give your servant a discerning heart... to distinguish between good and evil, for who is able to judge your great people?"

Mr. Speaker, distinguished Knesset,

I am proud to submit to the people and the House a new, broad-based, good, representative government, supported by the large majority of Knesset members and the citizens of the state. It was not in vain that I took advantage of the full time allotted by law to form the government. I did not take the easy way. The lessons of Jewish history and the depth of the social and political chasm in Israel today required me to choose the long and patient way in order to achieve the goal which I had set for myself: to form a government which will act during a time of difficult national decisions, through consent and balance between most sections of the people. I did not accept any disqualification of any side.

During the negotiations I seriously examined the possibility of expanding the basis of the coalition even further. This was not possible and in retrospect, this may have been best. In a democratic system, there is great importance to the role of a parliamentary opposition, and it is my intention to express my recognition of this by maintaining ongoing contacts with, providing information to and holding consultations with the heads of those factions which are not members of the coalition. I expect substantive and constructive criticism from the opposition which will also enable consideration of its opinion in managing affairs of state.
Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

The basic guidelines of the Government and the coalition agreements are before you. Everything is open and fully disclosed. Nothing is concealed, there are no secret agreements, no "under-the-table" understandings, and as you have seen, there are neither financial commitments nor favors to specific sectors or groups.

I will not go into the details of all the Government guidelines. The guidelines constitute the identity card of the government, the principles of its policy and its declaration of intent. All previous governments had good intentions. Not all were equally successful in putting them into practice. I know that the Government will be judged by its actions, not its intentions. I will try will all my might to ensure that the gap between its good intentions and its actions is as narrow as possible.

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

The Zionist idea which was proclaimed in Basel over 100 years ago has brought about a revolution in the life of the Jewish people and restored it to the stage of history as a sovereign, independent, strong and prosperous people.

The Ingathering of the Exiles, the settlement of the land, the revival of the language, culture, and scientific and intellectual life, the creation of a splendid educational system and Torah institutions, the establishment of a strong national economy, an exemplary defense force and security services, sophisticated infrastructure systems and advanced health and welfare services, the creation of a democratic, free and diverse society based on the supremacy of the rule of law - all of these are achievements which are utterly unparalleled in the history of nations. They were achieved despite the Holocaust, which wiped out a third of our people, and during an unrelenting struggle and a bloody war in which the best of our children and comrades gave their lives. It is because of them that we are here - determined and confident and aspiring to historic acceptance and an end to wars and enmity.

We embrace the bereaved families and the families of the MIAs and POWs, the disabled and wounded of the security establishment. May peace ease their suffering. We know that the victory of Zionism will not be complete until the achievement of genuine peace, full security, and relations of friendship, trust and cooperation with all our neighbors. And therefore, the Government's supreme goal will be to bring peace and security to Israel, while safeguarding the vital interests of the State of Israel. The great historic breakthrough to peace took place 20 years ago, through the vision and courage of two outstanding leaders: the late Menahem Begin and the late Anwar Sadat, may they rest in peace.

A further milestone was the Madrid Conference during the tenure of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Renewed and far-reaching impetus was imparted by Yitzhak Rabin, the courageous and unswerving leader, from whom I learned so much, and who was assassinated during the struggle for his path, the path of peace, and with him, by our friend Shimon Peres.

The government of Benjamin Netanyahu indeed opened with the Hebron Agreement, but it was unable to implement the Wye accords which it had signed.

Now it is our duty to complete the mission, and establish a comprehensive peace in the Middle East which has known so much war. It is our duty to ourselves and our children to take decisive measures to strengthen Israel by ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. This government is determined to make every effort, pursue every path and do everything necessary for Israel's security, the achievement of peace and the prevention of war.

We have an historic obligation to take advantage of the "window of opportunity" which has opened before us in order to bring long-term security and peace to Israel. We know that comprehensive and stable peace can be established only if it rests, simultaneously, on four pillars: Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and Lebanon, in some sense as a single bloc, and of course the Palestinians. As long as peace is not grounded on all these four pillars, it will remain incomplete and unstable. The Arab countries must know that only a strong and self-confident Israel can bring peace.
Here, today, I call upon all the leaders of the region to extend their hands to meet our outstretched hand, and toward a "peace of the brave," in a region which has known so much war, blood and suffering. To our neighbors the Palestinians, I wish to say: the bitter conflict between us has brought great suffering to both our peoples. Now, there is no reason to settle accounts over historical mistakes. Perhaps things could have been otherwise, but we cannot change the past; we can only make the future better. I am not only cognizant of the sufferings of my people, but I also recognize the sufferings of the Palestinian people. My ambition and desire is to bring an end to violence and suffering, and to work with the elected Palestinian leadership, under Chairman Yasser Arafat, in partnership and respect, in order to jointly arrive at a fair and agreed settlement for co-existence in freedom, prosperity and good neighborliness in this beloved land where the two peoples will always live.

To Syrian President Hafez Assad, I say that the new Israeli government is determined, as soon as possible, to advance the negotiations for the achievement of full, bilateral treaty of peace and security, on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

We have been tough and bitter adversaries on the battlefield. The time has come to establish a secure and courageous peace which will ensure the futures of our peoples, our children and our grandchildren.

It is my intention to bring an end to the IDF presence in Lebanon within one year, to deploy the IDF, through agreement, along the border, and to bring our boys home while also taking the necessary measures to guarantee the welfare and security of residents along the northern border, as well as the future of the Lebanese security and civilian assistance personnel who have worked alongside us, over all these years, for the sake of the residents of the region.

I wish to take advantage of this opportunity to praise the residents of Kiryat Shmona and communities along the confrontation line for their firm stand in the face of the Katyushas. From here, on behalf of us all, I offer my support to them. Their determination and the strength of the IDF are what will enable us to create the new situation.

Mr. Speaker, distinguished Knesset,

These two missions - arriving at a permanent settlement with the Palestinians, and achieving peace with Syria and Lebanon - are, in my eyes, equally vital and urgent. One neither outranks the other, nor has priority over it.

The Government’s objective will be to act, at the same time, to bring peace closer on all fronts, but without compromising on Israel's security needs and most vital interests - first and foremost among them, a united Jerusalem, the eternal capital of Israel, under our sovereignty. We will not be deterred by the difficulties.

I know very well that difficult negotiations, replete with crises and ups-and-downs, await us before we reach our desired goal.

I can only promise that, if the other side displays the same degree of determination and good will to reach an agreement as on our side, no force in the world will prevent us from achieving peace here. In this context, I attach the greatest importance to the support of our partners to peace treaties: Egypt and Jordan. I believe that President Hosni Mubarak and King Abdullah can play a vital role in creating the dynamics and an atmosphere of trust so needed for progress toward peace. They can also advance education for peace among the children of Egypt and Jordan, the Palestinians and, in the future, also of Syria and Lebanon - education for peace, which is a condition for any long-term, stable peace. I am convinced that King Hassan of Morocco can also contribute to this, as can other countries who already, in the past, opened channels of communication with Israel, cooperating with the peace process in various spheres. My aspiration will be to firmly resume these contacts in order to create a favorable regional atmosphere that can assist the negotiations.
It goes without saying that the assistance of the United States is a fundamental condition for any progress toward resolving the conflict in the region. The friendship of America, under the leadership of President Clinton, its generosity and the intensity of its support for the peace process in the Middle East constitute a vital component in the chance to achieve our goal. I will soon leave for the United States, at the invitation of President Clinton, a loyal friend of Israel, in order to discuss the gamut of issues facing us, first and foremost, the renewal of the peace process on all tracks, and the fortification of the strength and security of Israel.

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

The guarantee of the peace agreements and their implementation lies in the strength of the Israel Defense Forces. As such, we will attend to bolstering the IDF, the quality of its commanders and soldiers, its equipment - with the best educational and technological systems - training and fitness, its ability to always be prepared to deter and provide a response to distant and near dangers, and to all kinds of threats, whether conventional or otherwise. But security is not only provided with tanks, planes or missile boats. Security is, first and foremost, provided by individuals. It is they who shape the integrity of the society and of the national strength of Israel. Therefore, together with the promotion of security and peace, and foreign policy, and with no less urgency and importance, the Government is obliged to contend with the challenges of society, the economy and the needs of the citizen.

Israeli society is a unique society: a fascinating mosaic of hues and opinions, cultures and creeds - veteran residents and new immigrants, people from different Diasporas, religious and ultra-Orthodox, traditional and secular, Jews and Arabs, Druze and Circassians. Together, equally, they are Israel. A society where none are better or less good, but where, as in every human society, there are fringes of poverty and backwardness. There are weak sectors of hundreds of thousands of agonizing citizens who are unable, without growth or stimulus, to maintain the rapid pace of progress. We must not rush forward and leave them behind by the roadside.

The Government, under my leadership, is committed to waging war on the unemployment and poverty threatening to undermine and unravel our social fabric, and to struggling toward the strengthening of the health system and the improvement of the welfare services in the State of Israel. We will introduce a new national order of priorities.

The most important mission which the Government will take upon itself in the social sphere is the positioning of education as its top priority. I always viewed education as the most correct and worthwhile long-term investment. Therefore, we will aspire to provide the best possible education to every single child and adolescent in Israel, from kindergarten through university. The government will allocate resources and efforts in order to bring about a change and breathe a new spirit into the entire education system - by expanding the knowledge base, fostering curiosity and directing the potential of the talents of the young generation toward creative channels. And to the same extent, the Government will work to education toward values, personal morality, work ethics, social responsibility, volunteerism, assistance to fellow human beings, justice, respect for the law and a loathing for injustice and violence.

The Government will place a special emphasis on an uncompromising struggle against the growing violence among youth. We will not accept a situation in which parents are afraid to send their children to schools and playgrounds.

I wish to say something to those citizens who are members of minority communities in the State of Israel: I wholeheartedly believe in the equal value of all humankind, in equality between people and between citizens, without distinction. The State of Israel has not always been sufficiently wise to grant all its citizens a sense of equality and partnership. The disparities are great, and the sentiment of bitterness is not unjustified. I know that you have heard innumerable slogans and promises, and I pledge today that the Government, under my leadership, will make every effort to gradually bridge the gaps, dissipate the alienation and provide equality for all sectors of the population in Israel. The Rabin and Peres governments began a focused effort to bring about this change. We will continue along this path with renewed vigor.
Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

Emphasizing the social aspect of Government policy is not in contradiction with a policy of free and productive economics, free from unnecessary government interference. An economy which will act as a magnet for foreign investment, and be increasingly based on hi-tech industries and domestic research and development which will put Israel at the forefront of scientific and technological progress - because there can be no healthy society without a healthy economy, and vice versa. The creation of 300,000 new jobs in the next four years - as I pledged in my election campaign - is a concrete and possible objective for reducing the shame of unemployment and strengthening the entire economy. At the same time, this goal is contingent upon imparting a new impetus to the economy, as a result of restored confidence in a future of peace for the region and the country.

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

We are living in an era of the global economy and immediate worldwide communications, being exposed to the cultures of all nations through television screens, the internet and computers. In this open world, there is no possibility of enclosing oneself in an impenetrable armored shell or being sequestered from the outside world, even if its influences are not always positive.

The world is changing so rapidly that those who cannot cope or adjust to the new reality will find themselves dragged back, like Alice in Wonderland.

It is our mission to prepare the new generation in Israel for the new, open and global era of the 21st Century, while also reinforcing and strengthening the components of its national and Jewish identity, its sense of attachment and its bonds to Israel. The way to this is through deepening historical awareness, acknowledging our heritage and faith, building a society based on solidarity, internal cohesion and what is called - with no cause for embarrassment - 'national pride.' Not arrogant pride, condescending to others, but pride which recognizes values, and identification identity with the historical collective memory of all Jewish ethnic groups, with the heritage of the generations and with the awesome contribution that our nation has made to human civilization.

Identification with the struggle for rebirth and with those who have fallen in Israel's wars, identification with the goals of the State - anchored in the vision of the Prophets and the Declaration of Independence. With the very name "Israel," which expresses courage, determination and victory. As the angel's blessing to Jacob in Genesis: "Your name shall no longer be Jacob, but Israel, for you have striven with God and with man - and have prevailed."

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

This government for which I seek your confidence is a government directed toward peace and security, education, health and welfare, directed toward full civil equality and social justice, directed toward a free and prosperous economy, growth and the eradication of unemployment and poverty, directed toward immigration and strengthening the ties between Israel and the Diaspora, directed toward the fortification of democracy and the supremacy of law. This is a government in which people will go hand-in-hand, combining their strengths.

The primary consideration which guided me in composing this government was the need to find the broadest possible common denominator in order to responsibly bring together representatives of parties and sectors from various, even opposing, sides of Israeli society. This is not simple, and it comes at a cost. We will first have to make the painful compromises among ourselves, via a policy which is the fruit of a broad-based, sober and realistic consensus - an honest policy, confident in our strength, which is not conceived of wishful thinking and vacuous arrogance, of haste, hesitation and missed opportunity, of vacillation and the intoxication of power, but which is marked by great love for all parts of our homeland and the painful acknowledgment of the ties of others as well.

This government will not turn its back on any group, portion, sector or ideological stream in Israeli society. This will be a government of constant dialogue, openness and attentiveness, a government that will aspire to a "new national consensus," but not shirk from decisions or resign itself to paralysis.
and be stalemated. I know and understand exactly where the government must head and the destination it must reach, and I intend to lead this march to the finish line.

Ultimately, as I have pledged, if and when cardinal historic decisions are required, the entire public will be called to take a decision, in accordance with its sovereign will, in a referendum.

I believe that bearing responsibility together will bring the extremes closer, blunt the contrasts in society and will require consideration, attentiveness and mutual balances - since it has already been said in the Torah, and about our Torah: "Its paths are paths of pleasantness, and all its ways are ways of peace." In this way, we will be able, together, to face the tests and decisions which await us. In this way, we will be stronger and more united, despite the disputes and the diversity of opinion among us. Perhaps we will become wiser, because we will be guided by shared wisdom.

The sun is about to set on this millennium. In the entire world, there is great anticipation of the coming millennium. The Hebrew calendar does not recognize this, and for most of us the change of date between 31 December and 1 January is not a day of celebration. But we are part of the world, and this new government will cross the line into the next millennium. It is my hope that the sense of a new beginning will not neglect over the Middle East, and that the start of the third millennium will also bring an atmosphere of reconciliation and momentum for peace to our area.

The Government of Israel will be there, prepared for the challenge, attentive to expectations and aspiring to bequeath a better future to our children.

Mr. Speaker,

I would now like to present the composition of the new government to the Knesset: Ehud Barak - Prime Minister and Defense Minister, Dalia Itzik - Environment Minister, Yossi Beilin - Justice Minister, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer - Communications Minister, Shlomo Benizri - Health Minister, Shlomo Ben-Ami - Public Security Minister, Eli Yishai - Labor and Social Affairs Minister, Avraham Shohat - Finance Minister, Yitzhak Cohen - Religious Affairs Minister, Ran Cohen - Industry and Trade Minister, David Levy - Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Mordechai - Transportation Minister, Eli Suissa - Infrastructure Minister, Shimon Peres - Regional Cooperation Minister, Haim Ramon - Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, responsible for Jerusalem, Yossi Sarid - Education Minister, Natan Sharansky - Interior Minister, Yitzhak Levy - Housing and Construction Minister. The following ministries, for now, will be under the purview of the Prime Minister: the Agriculture and Rural Development Ministry, the Absorption Ministry, the Tourism Ministry and the Science Ministry.

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

This, for now, is the current composition of the Government. In the coming days, I will bring before the Knesset a proposed to change the Basic Law: The Government, for an increase in the number of ministers, as required by the size of the coalition and the composition of the Knesset. In any form, this is the best government for the State of Israel at this time. We are the bearers of the torch which our predecessors have transferred to us, and we assume full responsibility for moving forward.

Today, the Government requests the confidence of the 15th Knesset in the knowledge that the eyes of all Israelis are focused thereon, in prayer and with great hope.

Today, millions of eyes in Israel, millions of eyes of Jews around the world, and millions of eyes around the whole world are focused on us, praying that we will know to lead the country, with determination and a sure hand toward a new path, momentum and a new page in the chronicles of the State of Israel. A new page of peace in an arena which, in recent generations, has known mostly pain, bereavement and suffering. Accompanied by the blessings and concern of everyone, we embark today on the long and arduous path. I would be most appreciative if you would express your confidence in the Government today and wish it well and Godspeed.

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ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BARAK, STATEMENT AT A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT, EREZ, 11 JULY 1999 [EXCERPTS]

Chairman Arafat and myself conducted a comprehensive meeting today here in order to find the way to promote the peace process once again. This meeting, so soon after I have been elected, emphasizes the importance that we relate to the role of the Palestinians in shaping peace in the Middle East.

Our primary objective was to establish, or in fact to resume the mutual trust which is so crucial to reaching a future agreement. Both sides have suffered enough. It's about time to find a way to nurture mutual respect, a kind of partnership, and to make peace together. I am confident that with trust and determination, and goodwill on all sides, we can and we have to achieve peace in the Middle East.

I am committed to the security of Israel. I spent all my life in uniform and was brought just four years ago into politics by the great leader of peace, Yitzhak Rabin. But I also want each Palestinian to feel secure, and thus we must do whatever we can to prevent terror and to make our region much safer in the future.

Today we embarked on a new road of trust in order to give a new momentum to the peace process. The new Israeli government abides by all its international commitments and all the agreements we signed. We are committed to the Wye agreement. We will implement Wye and we will shape and coordinate with the Chairman and the Palestinian Authority the way by which the advancement of the permanent status negotiations will be combined with the implementation of the Wye agreement. We are determined to find a way to overcome all the obstacles and to coordinate on the mutual understanding on the way that we move forward toward peace in this era.

Mr. Chairman, fathers, mothers and children, Palestinians and Israelis alike, are waiting, expecting us, the leaders, to provide them with a better and a safer future, and we should find both the determination and leadership to do the job and change the landscape of this region.

(In response to a question on settlements:)

I didn't go into details. I repeated our commitment to implement Wye, and the guidelines of the new government that has just been established in Israel say very clearly: We are not going to establish a new settlement and we are not going to dismantle one settlement, and we are going to check, reassess or bring into discussion a decision by previous governments in Israel that has not yet been implemented.

I have told the Israeli public that I am committed to blocs of settlements within the West Bank in the permanent settlement, but this issue, together with many tough issues will be discussed during the final status negotiations.

I have no illusions, and I believe that the Chairman has no illusions, that we are going into a tough and long process. There will be many ups and downs and we will have some crises. But I yet believe that with the kind of determination and conviction and commitment that I believe we all have here, we will be able to overcome the obstacles and reach the common goal of achieving peace and putting an end to the 100-year conflict in the Middle East.

UN CONFERENCE OF HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, STATEMENT, GENEVA, 15 JULY 1999

[On 25 April 1997, following the US veto of a UNSC resolution concerning Israel's decision to build the Har Homa settlement, the UNGA convened an Emergency Special Session, which overwhelmingly passed resolutions ES-10/3 (15 July 1997), ES-10/4 (13 Nov. 1997), and ES-10/5 (17 March 1998), all recommending, inter alia, that the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention convene a conference on measures to enforce the Convention in the OPT – an initiative opposed by the US. In Feb. 1999, UNGA Res. ES-10/6 formally called for convening the conference on 15 July.]
Though it fell far short of its original goals, Palestinians considered the fact it was held at all a major achievement. It was attended by 103 of the 188 signatories to the 1949 Geneva Convention and was the first conference convened to consider a specific case of violations of the convention.

This statement reflects the common understanding reached by the participating High Contracting Parties to the Conference.

After consultations among High Contracting Parties, the Conference, as recommended by UN GA Resolution ES-10/6 in its tenth Emergency Special Session, convened in Geneva on 15 July 1999.

The participating High Contracting Parties reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. Furthermore, they reiterated the need for full respect for the provisions of the said Convention in that Territory.

Taking into consideration the improved atmosphere in the Middle East as a whole, the Conference was adjourned on the understanding that it will convene again in the light of consultations on the development of the humanitarian situation in the field.

US PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER EHUD BARAK, JOINT STATEMENT, WASHINGTON, DC, 19 JULY 1999

During several days of close consultations, the President and the Prime Minister conducted a comprehensive review of the U.S.-Israel bilateral relations, the peace process, Israeli as well as regional security, economic and scientific development and cooperation. These fruitful discussions have produced important agreements and understandings in all of these areas.

Prime Minister Barak expressed his deep appreciation of President Clinton's special efforts to enhance the U.S.-Israeli relationship and advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.

President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak have reached a broad new understanding that significantly enhances the already unique bilateral relations between the United States and Israel, and raises their friendship and cooperation to an even higher level of strategic partnership. This new partnership is designed to underpin their joint effort to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict and achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

The President and the Prime Minister have agreed on the need to assign a top priority to the pursuit of peace in the Middle East. They have also reached a meeting of minds on the desirability of making an intensive effort to move ahead simultaneously on all tracks of the peace process, bilateral and multilateral, as well as on the important role that would be played by the United States in support of the process.

President Clinton assured Prime Minister Barak that the United States would be ready to assist and contribute in any way it can to achieving an historical reconciliation that will usher in a new era of peace, security, prosperity and cooperation in the Middle East. In this context, he reiterated the U.S. commitment to help Israel minimize the risks and costs it incurs as it pursues peace and affirmed the broad U.S. backing that would be accorded to Israel, to facilitate the pursuit of peace.

Recognizing that the U.S.-Israel relationship serves as a cornerstone for pursuing peace, they vowed to strengthen and deepen this unique relationship, which is based on shared democratic values, bonds of friendship, common interests and joint cooperation in so many areas of human endeavor. President Clinton reiterated the steadfast commitment of the United States to Israel's security, to maintain its qualitative edge, and to strengthen Israel's ability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or a possible combination of threats.
The United States and Israel will sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which will express their joint intention to restructure U.S. bilateral assistance to Israel. The MOU will state the United States’ intention to sustain its annual military assistance to Israel, and incrementally increase its level by one-third over the next decade to a level of $2.4 billion subject to Congressional consultations and approval. At the same time, the MOU will provide for a gradual phase-out of U.S. economic aid to Israel, over a comparable period, as the Israeli economy grows more robust, less dependent on foreign aid, and more integrated in world markets.

The two leaders also reviewed the status of the U.S.-Israeli defense relationship and agreed that existing defense channels of coordination and cooperation work effectively. These would have to be further consolidated and strengthened under a Defense Policy Advisory Group (DPAG) to meet the new challenges of WMD, counter proliferation (CP) and theater missile defense (TMD). The Group will coordinate and plan the cooperation between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

In addition, the two leaders agreed on the components of the $1.2 billion military aid package for Israel that the Administration has already requested from Congress. The President assured the Prime Minister of his intention to work closely with the Congress to seek expedited action for funding, starting in FY 1999, for this package to support Israel as it implements the Wye River Memorandum. The package will have three components:

- Assistance to the Israeli Defense Forces as they carry out further redeployments, including projects which will be managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
- Assistance in meeting Israel’s broader strategic requirements, including Theater Missile Defense (TMD), helicopters, and communications equipment and munitions.
- Assistance in meeting the increased cost of Israeli counter-terrorism efforts.

The two leaders also agreed on the importance of spreading the benefits of peace to all those who participate in the process. In that context, they expressed support for the $400 million in assistance to the Palestinian people and $300 million for Jordan that is part of the Administration’s request to Congress to support implementation of the Wye River Memorandum.

President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak agreed that Israel faces new challenges in the strategic arena, particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles that threaten to undermine Israel’s security. In this context, the two leaders agreed to step up the overall bilateral cooperation and coordination, as well as to implement a number of measures designed to help Israel meet these emerging threats:

- The United States will provide funding for Israel’s acquisition of a Third Arrow battery that will enhance the protection of Israel’s citizens from ballistic missile attacks.
- The United States and Israel will expand their collaborative efforts to develop new technologies and systems designed to deal with ballistic missiles.

The two leaders will establish a Strategic Policy Planning Group (SPPG), composed of senior representatives of the relevant national security entities of both countries. It will be tasked to develop and submit recommendations on measures to bolster Israel’s indigenous defense and deterrent capabilities, as well as the bilateral cooperation to meet the strategic threats Israel faces. The SPPG will also consider ways to minimize risks and costs, to enhance Israel’s security, and address its other needs related to national security which arise in the context of steps Israel might take to achieve a comprehensive peace. The SPPG will report to the President and the Prime Minister at four month intervals. The two leaders agreed to meet in joint session at regular intervals.

Another area of mutual concern that was discussed between the two leaders was the growing threat of WMD terrorism. This was acknowledged to be an area in which both countries stood much to gain from each other’s knowledge and experience. In order to enhance their capability to deal effectively...
with this threat, it was agreed to sign a new MOU between their respective national security institutions. It would facilitate broad cooperation between the various government agencies in both countries in all areas associated with preparing and responding to WMD terrorism.

One specific area of economic cooperation discussed between the two leaders pertains to water resources. They have noted the growing scarcity of water in the Middle East, and also recognized the potential inherent in bilateral, as well as regional, cooperation to turn water from a potential source of conflict into a force of regional stability and prosperity in the region. Toward that end, the United States has pledged to work with Israel, both bilaterally and with other regional partners and their private sectors, to promote the development of new and additional sources of water, including desalination, and to examine ways to transfer water to arid lands, and to manage existing water resources more efficiently. A joint task force will explore specific measures that could be carried out in this domain, and will submit its recommendations to President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak by the end of 1999.

The President and the Prime Minister have also agreed that promoting tourism to Israel and the entire region presents a unique opportunity to promote cooperation and spread economic benefits to the peoples of the Middle East. Both sides agreed to explore specific steps to develop this unique potential together, and with other interested regional partners and their private sectors, beginning the fall of 1999.

Finally, President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak agreed that scientific cooperation between Israel and the United States will benefit the peoples of both countries, as they enter the 21st century. In this context, they agreed to enhance cooperation in the peaceful uses of space. A joint working group of NASA and the Israel Space Agency (ISA) will be established to develop new areas of joint cooperation, including educational activities, scientific research and the development of practical applications in the peaceful use of space for the benefit of people around the world. The President also informed the Prime Minister that an Israeli astronaut and payload of Israeli experiments would fly on a shuttle mission in the year 2000.

Upon concluding the Prime Minister’s visit, the two leaders expressed their shared conviction that these meetings have laid the foundations for a vigorous effort to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as for even closer American-Israeli ties based on the U.S. ironclad commitment to Israel’s security. The two leaders called upon the other leaders of the region to lend their support to this effort to bring comprehensive peace, security, and prosperity to the peoples of the Middle East.
PNA in order to achieve a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East. We called on Israel to take steps for the immediate and full cessation of the construction of the settlement at Jabel Abu Ghneim and similar activities in the West Bank. […]

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COMMUNIQUÉ REGARDING THE SIGNING OF A POSTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PA, 18 AUGUST 1999

[This was the first Israel-PA agreement signed since the Oct. 1998 Wye River Memorandum.]

Coordinator of Activities in the Territories Major-General Ya’acov Orr and the Communications Ministry Director-General Danny Rosen, together with the PA official in charge of the Civil Affairs Ministry, Jamil Tarifi, and PA Deputy Minister for Communications Zohair Alham, on (Wednesday) 18.8.99, signed agreements for arranging the transfer of mail from the PA to Egypt and Jordan, and from Judea and Samaria to the Gaza Strip and vice versa. This is the first agreement to be signed since the Wye accords.

The agreements provide for the commercial regularisation of the transfer of mail from the PA to Egypt and Jordan, within the PA and from Israel to the PA. Transit times for postal items should be greatly shortened.

These are the first agreements to be signed between Israel and the Palestinians since the current government took office and were signed following intensive negotiations, chaired by Deputy Coordinator of Activities in the Territories Brigadier-General Yosef Mishlav.

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SHARM EL-SHEIKH MEMORANDUM ON IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE OF OUTSTANDING COMMITMENTS OF AGREEMENTS SIGNED AND THE RESUMPTION OF PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS, 4 SEPTEMBER 1999

[See also Map 4 in the annex.]

The Government of the State of Israel (“GOI”) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) commit themselves to full and mutual implementation of the Interim Agreement and all other agreements concluded between them since September 1993 (hereinafter “the prior agreements”), and all outstanding commitments emanating from the prior agreements. Without derogating from the other requirements of the prior agreements, the two Sides have agreed as follows:

1. PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS:
   i. In the context of the implementation of the prior agreements, the two sides will resume the Permanent Status negotiations in an accelerated manner and will make a determined effort to achieve their mutual goal of reaching a Permanent Status Agreement based on the agreed agenda i.e., the specific issues reserved for Permanent Status negotiators and other issues of common interest.
   ii. The two Sides reaffirm their understanding that the negotiations on the Permanent Status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
   iii. The two Sides will make a determined effort to conclude a Framework Agreement on all Permanent Status issues in five months from the resumption of the Permanent Status negotiations;
   iv. The two Sides will conclude a comprehensive agreement on all Permanent Status issues within one year from the resumption of the Permanent Status negotiations;
   v. Permanent Status negotiations will resume after the implementation of the first stage of release of prisoners and the second stage of the First and Second Further Redeployments and not later than September 13, 1999. In the Wye River Memorandum, the United States has expressed its willingness to facilitate these negotiations.
2. PHASE ONE AND PHASE TWO OF THE FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS:

The Israeli Side undertakes the following with regard to Phase One and Phase Two of the Further Redeployments:

i. On September 5, 1999, to transfer 7% from Area C to Area B;

ii. On November 15, 1999, to transfer 2% from Area B to Area A and 3% from Area C to Area B;

iii. On January 20, 2000, to transfer 1% from Area C to Area A, and 5.1% from Area B to Area A.

3. RELEASE OF PRISONERS

i. The two Sides shall establish a joint committee that shall follow-up on matters related to release of Palestinian prisoners.

ii. The Government of Israel shall release Palestinian and other prisoners who committed their offences prior to September 13, 1993, and were arrested prior to May 4, 1994. The Joint Committee shall agree on the names of those who will be released in the first two stages. Those lists shall be recommended to the relevant Authorities through the Monitoring and Steering Committee;

iii. The first stage of release of prisoners shall be carried out on September 5, 1999 and shall consist of 200 prisoners. The second stage of release of prisoners shall be carried out on October 8, 1999 and shall consist of 150 prisoners;

iv. The joint committee shall recommend further lists of names to be released to the relevant Authorities through the Monitoring and Steering Committee;

v. The Israeli side will aim to release Palestinian prisoners before next Ramadan.

4. COMMITTEES

i. The Third Further Redeployment Committee shall commence its activities not later than September 13, 1999;

ii. The Monitoring and Steering Committee, all Interim Committees (i.e., CAC, JEC, JSC, legal committee, people to people), as well as Wye River Memorandum committees shall resume and/or continue their activity, as the case may be, not later than September 13, 1999. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will have on its agenda, inter alia, the Year 2000, Donor/PA projects in Area C, and the issue of industrial estates;

iii. The Continuing Committee on displaced persons shall resume its activity on October 1, 1999 (Article XXVII, Interim Agreement); d. Not later than October 30, 1999, the two sides will implement the recommendations of the Ad-hoc Economic Committee (article III-6, WRM).

5. SAFE PASSAGE

i. The operation of the Southern Route of the Safe Passage for the movement of persons, vehicles, and goods will start on October 1, 1999 (Annex I, Article X, Interim Agreement) in accordance with the details of operation, which will be provided for in the Safe Passage Protocol that will be concluded by the two Sides not later than September 30, 1999;

ii. The two Sides will agree on the specific location of the crossing point of the Northern Route of the Safe Passage as specified in Annex I, Article X, provision c-4, in the Interim Agreement not later than October 5, 1999;

iii. The Safe Passage Protocol applied to the Southern Route of the Safe Passage shall apply to the Northern Route of the Safe Passage with relevant agreed modifications;

iv. Upon the agreement on the location of the crossing point of the Northern Route of the Safe Passage, construction of the needed facilities and related procedures shall commence and shall be ongoing. At the same time, temporary facilities will be established for the operation of the Northern Route not later than four months from the agreement on the specific location of the crossing-point;

v. In between the operation of the Southern crossing point of the Safe Passage and the Northern crossing point of the Safe Passage, Israel will facilitate arrangements for the movement between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, using non-Safe Passage routes other than the Southern Route of the Safe Passage;

vi. The location of the crossing points shall be without prejudice to the Permanent Status negotiations (Annex I, Article X, provision e, Interim Agreement).
6. GAZA SEA PORT
The two sides have agreed on the following principles to facilitate and enable the construction works of the Gaza Sea Port. The principles shall not prejudice or preempt the outcome of negotiations on the Permanent Status:

i. The Israeli side agrees that the Palestinian side shall commence construction works in and related to the Gaza Sea Port on October 1, 1999;

ii. The two sides agree that the Gaza Sea Port will not be operated in any way before reaching a joint Sea Port protocol on all aspects of operating the Port, including security;

iii. The Gaza Sea Port is a special case, like the Gaza Airport, being situated in an area under the responsibility of the Palestinian Side and serving as an international passage. Therefore, with the conclusion of a joint Sea Port Protocol, all activities and arrangements relating to the construction of the Port shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement, especially those relating to international passages, as adapted in the Gaza Airport Protocol;

iv. The construction shall ensure adequate provision for effective security and customs inspection of people and goods, as well as the establishment of a designated checking area in the Port;

v. In this context, the Israeli side will facilitate on an on-going basis the works related to the construction of the Gaza Sea Port, including the movement in and out of the Port of vessels, equipment, resources, and material required for the construction of the Port;

vi. The two sides will coordinate such works, including the designs and movement, through a joint mechanism.

7. HEBRON ISSUES

i. The Shuhada Road in Hebron shall be opened for the movement of Palestinian vehicles in two phases. The first phase has been carried out, and the second shall be carried out not later than October 30, 1999;

ii. The wholesale market-Hasbahe will be opened not later than November 1, 1999, in accordance with arrangements which will be agreed upon by the two sides;

iii. A high level Joint Liaison Committee will convene not later than September 13, 1999 to review the situation in the Tomb of the Patriarchs / Al Haram Al Ibrahimi (Annex I, Article VII, Interim Agreement and as per the January 15, 1998 US Minute of Discussion).

8. SECURITY

i. The two sides will, in accordance with the prior agreements, act to ensure the immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end, they will cooperate in

ii. the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities. Each side shall immediately and effectively respond to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence;

iii. Pursuant to the prior agreements, the Palestinian side undertakes to implement its responsibilities for security, security cooperation, on-going obligations and other issues emanating from the prior agreements, including, in particular, the following obligations emanating from the Wye River Memorandum:

1. continuation of the program for the collection of the illegal weapons, including reports;

2. apprehension of suspects, including reports;

3. forwarding of the list of Palestinian policemen to the Israeli side not later than September 13, 1999;

4. beginning of the review of the list by the Monitoring and Steering Committee not later than October 15, 1999.

9. The two sides call upon the international donor community to enhance its commitment and financial support to the Palestinian economic development and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

10. Recognizing the necessity to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement.
11. Obligations pertaining to dates, which occur on holidays or Saturdays, shall be carried out on the first subsequent working day. This memorandum will enter into force one week from the date of its signature.*

Made and signed in Sharm El-Sheikh, this fourth day of September 1999.

For the Government of the State of Israel: Prime Minister Ehud Barak
For the PLO: Chairman Yasser Arafat

Witnessed by: For the Arab Republic of Egypt: President Hosni Mubarak
For the United States of America: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
For the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: King Abdullah II

* It is understood that, for technical reasons, implementation of Article 2-a and the first stage mentioned in Article 3-c will be carried out within a week from the signing of this Memorandum.

★★★★★

ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER EHUD BARAK, SPEECH BY AT THE SIGNING OF THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH MEMORANDUM, 4 SEPTEMBER 1999

President Mubarak, His Majesty King Abdullah, Chairman Arafat, Secretary Albright, ladies and gentlemen,

Today we embark on a new road, which will hopefully lead us within five months to a major milestone, a framework agreement for permanent status. Today we are paving the way to the end of a century of conflict between us and the Palestinians. Reaching within a year the permanent status agreement, which resolves all outstanding issues, is bound to present us with numerous problems and obstacles and crises. But together, as partners, with trust, goodwill, consultation and above all determined leadership, we will prevail and achieve peace, security and prosperity for our peoples.

Tonight I wish to pay tribute to the memory of my mentor and friend, the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, whose legacy of peace and security will continue to guide us throughout the peace process.

I have said all along that my government is committed to the full implementation of the Wye River Memorandum. The logic for today’s accord is rooted in our desire to implement Wye in such a way that enhances the prospects of arriving at the permanent status talks with a minimum of pitfalls and landmines along the road. This is a common Palestinian-Israeli interest. Indeed, I believe that this accord facilitates a smooth transition from the Wye River Memorandum to permanent status negotiations.

I am committed to the security of Israel and will do my utmost to enhance it. I also want every Palestinian to feel secure and prosperous. Thus, we must prevent terrorism from derailing our peace efforts and fight it with all our might. The process of peace does not tolerate threats of violence and any kind of acts of terrorism.

I wish to say to our Palestinian neighbors: The bitter conflict between us has brought great suffering to both our peoples. I am not only aware of the suffering of my people, but also of that of the Palestinians. There is no sense in settling accounts over past mistakes, as we cannot change the past. But we do have an historic opportunity to shape a better future for our children and grandchildren, and for generations to come. My desire is to bring an end to violence and suffering and to work with the Palestinian leadership under Chairman Yasser Arafat, in partnership, respect, and in a forward-looking manner, in order to jointly arrive at a fair settlement for co-existence in peace, prosperity, and good neighborliness in this beloved land where our two peoples will always live.

We wish to resume the peace process with Syria and Lebanon as well. From here I call upon President Assad to put aside all past disagreements and together find the appropriate way to resume peace negotiations. Peace between Syria and Israel is an especially important element of the needs of both
sides. We intend to pursue the peace process on all tracks. All are equally important and vital in order to arrive at a comprehensive and stable peace in the Middle East.

The accord we sign today is the result of the major common effort of both Israel and the Palestinians. Chairman Arafat has proven to be a leader determined to protect the rights of his people, but at the same time committed to the constant search for peace. Both Chairman Arafat and the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin laid the foundation for the peace of the brave.

We would like this evening to thank all those who have contributed and will continue to contribute to the success of the process, particularly President Clinton, a great leader of the United States of America, and Secretary Albright; our host, President Mubarak; and King Abdullah. We attach great importance to the support given under the leadership of President Mubarak to the resumption of the peace process.

Mr. President, Your Majesty, Mr. Chairman, Madame Secretary, we are at the threshold of the 21st century and the new millennium. The people of the Middle East are ready for the dawn of a new era. I believe in a vision of peace and security, which ensures the needs of all parties and is achieved through dialogue, mutual respect, and good neighborliness. I believe that it is our duty, leaders of all parties, to pave the way and lead our peoples to the common destination of peace, security, and prosperity, without deviating from this clear goal. We must rise to the occasion, and for the sake of our fathers and mothers, children and grandchildren, turn the vision of a comprehensive peace into a lasting reality.

PLO CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT, SPEECH BY AT THE SIGNING OF THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH MEMORANDUM, 4 SEPTEMBER 1999

Mr. Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, His Majesty King Abdullah of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Mr. Ehud Barak, Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Madeleine Albright, the U.S. Secretary of State, ladies and gentlemen,

I would like to thank President Mubarak for hosting this ceremony to sign the agreement to implement the outstanding clauses of the Wye Agreement between the PLO and the government of Israel. In this respect, we would like to express our deep appreciation of the constructive role that has been played by Egypt under the leadership of President Mubarak and his top aides, who have expressed their full support to the peace process in the region. I would like also to extend my thanks to President Clinton and to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for the efforts that have been done by the United States as a guarantor of the peace process and to put the peace process back on track. It is a new occasion to go ahead within the significant role of the United States and the role and the efforts done by His Majesty King Abdullah, and the support that we have had from the European community, from Russia, from China, from Japan, from friendly countries, from the United Nations. It is with the help of all those that this ceremony is being held and the signing is taking place. On this occasion I would like to remind you of the role that was played by the late King Hussein, may his soul rest in peace, in achieving the Wye River Agreement and in supporting the peace process in the region.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen,

The signing of this memorandum tonight represents a complement to the peace process and to move forward to implement all the outstanding clauses and points. We have no time to waste and we have no chance to waste any more chances. It is an ongoing hope now for us to maintain the pace of the peace. We respect our commitments and implement them, and we implement all our commitments in the agreements, and we will continue our efforts to maintain the supremeness in the interests of all people and safeguarding the peace process, and we express our interest to go on forward to reach the final status settlement based on the UN Resolution 242 and on the basis of land for peace, and to build our independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem being its capital, to solve the problem of the Palestinian refugees according to resolutions of the international legitimacy.

Now, as we are ready to implement the Wye Memorandum, we will be seeing in a few coming days the PNA takeover of additional lands of the Palestinian territories, to open the safe passage between
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and we will be seeing too the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners. We would like to try to stress the need to stop all the settlement activities, the land expropriation and house demolition - all those have been stressed in our previous and former agreements that we signed together. The commitment to the peace process is very significant and important because it supplies the appropriate atmosphere to achieving progress towards the permanent status negotiations and to build confidence by implementing all the agreements signed, based on the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and the government of Israel.

We have succeeded with our partner the late Yitzhak Rabin and with Shimon Peres in the first years that followed the signing of the Oslo Agreement, the Taba Agreement, and the Cairo Agreement as well, to express a good mood of friendship and partnership, Palestinian and Israeli, and we have proved that this partnership is very important, based on mutual respect and commitment to signed agreements and combating enemies of peace on both sides. We have succeeded in establishing a strong infrastructure for maintaining peace - the peace of the brave - in our region.

I would like here to reiterate the commitment of the PLO and of the PNA and of the Palestinian people in the peace agreements. We hereby extend our hand to Mr. Barak as our main partner in the peace process, the peace of the brave, and we tell him: We are ready to resume the process of building the Palestinian-Israeli partnership for the sake of peace, and we are ready to continue to help maintain continuous cooperation between us to build the peace of the brave and make it reality. This is the real challenge that is facing both of us. Let us work together in order to achieve it, and let us work together in order to improve our capability to make peace the basic and fundamental ground of our daily life.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen,

More than three years ago this city in Egypt witnessed an international summit, when dozens of world leaders met to stress the unity of the world against terror and their support of the peace process. Today we meet again on this important occasion to reiterate the same meanings and the same goal, which is to lead the peace process to its final destination by means of achieving a just and a long-lasting peace in the region on all tracks, including the Syrian and the Lebanese tracks. Thank you.

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US SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT SPEECH AT THE SIGNING OF THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH MEMORANDUM, 4 SEPTEMBER 1999

President Mubarak, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat, His Majesty King Abdullah, and I must say King Hussein in spirit, distinguished colleagues, excellencies, special guests,

On behalf of President Clinton and the American people I am honored to be here with you to mark this moment of accomplishment and renewed resolve in a search for an Arab-Israeli peace. I begin by thanking our hosts, President Mubarak and Foreign Minister Moussa. For many years Egypt has merited the world's admiration as an unwavering and courageous champion of peace. This reputation has only been enhanced by Egypt's strong supporting role in the negotiations just completed.

I especially want to congratulate Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat and their respective negotiating teams headed by Gilad Sher and Saeb Erekat. They have toiled long hours, under great pressure, in a noble cause, and they have succeeded.

In addition I want to highlight the presence of such leading supporters of peace such as the King of Jordan, and distinguished representatives of Russia, the European Union, Norway, and Japan. The peace process could not survive without their backing, which will be even more crucial as we strive to build on the current agreement.

The accord Israeli and Palestinian leaders have just signed provides a long-awaited boost, both to the substance and spirit of the search for Middle East peace. By agreeing on a plan for implementing the Wye River Memorandum and other outstanding commitments, the two sides have begun to rebuild their partnership - a partnership that is central to the Oslo process and vital to the region's future.
For the first time in several years, Israelis and Palestinians are working together and solving problems together. Relationships of trust and shared convictions are being built through this process. The result is beneficial to both sides.

Under today's agreement further redeployments will be carried out, security cooperation will deepen, the fight against terror will continue, and prisoners will be reunited with their families. In addition, construction of a port for Gaza will begin, and a safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank will be opened.

These provisions are important in themselves, but there is an even larger significance to this agreement. First, the fact that Israelis and Palestinians negotiated this pact directly is a rich source of hope for the future. As one can see here tonight, the peace process has many sponsors and many supporters. But that process cannot succeed unless the parties are engaged with each other, gaining mutual confidence and building mutual trust. When that happens, agreements are not only more likely to be signed, they are more likely to be implemented. And if you ask the average Palestinian or Israeli, he or she will tell you - implementation is what counts.

Second, through this agreement the parties have cleared the way for the beginning of serious permanent status negotiations. Here is where the bold vision encompassed by the Oslo Declaration of Principles will meet its sternest test. The obstacles that permanent status negotiators will face are daunting. The issues are tough, laden with emotion and deeply rooted in the region's troubled past. They involve life and death issues for both sides. But the road to reconciliation has always been strewn with obstacles. Over the years, the peace process has been undermined by extremists, assaulted by terrorists, and shot by assassins. Still, the desire for peace has not been quenched, and the need for peace has never lessened.

If a permanent settlement is to be achieved, the friends of peace must be strong. Those who seek peace must be persistent and the advocates of peace must make the case over and over again, that negotiations are not just one option among many, they are the only way for either Israelis or Palestinians to realize their deepest aspirations. But permanent status negotiations will prosper only if they are conducted in the spirit of partnership that was born in Oslo. And that spirit has been absent in recent years, but is present today and marks a new beginning, and it must be maintained. It is the spirit of striving not to create obstacles but rather to overcome them, and seeking not to intimidate, but rather to persuade; searching not to defeat the other party but rather to find a way to a shared victory.

If we are to ask, where will the negotiators find the required strength and confidence, I can only think of the model provided by Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, by Yitzhak Rabin, and King Hussein. These leaders experienced war and understood therefore the need to prevent war. They believed that a people brave enough to fight must also be courageous enough to make peace, and they proved that negotiations can produce gains that alternatives cannot, such as the removal of security threats, the restoration of land, and the opening of new economic possibilities.

The legacy of their leadership guides us tonight and must continue to inspire us tomorrow. That is true with respect to peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, it is true as well in the search for a comprehensive settlement. We must help find the right way for Israel to resume negotiations with Syria and Lebanon, while also restarting the multilateral track so that what has been a regional conflict can end in a regional peace.

As President Clinton has affirmed, the United States will do all we can to facilitate and enhance this effort, and to help negotiations succeed. This reflects the interests we have, the commitments we have made, and the values we cherish. Let there be no doubt through the remaining months of this century and far into the next, America will stand by and with those who stand for peace. And once again, I want to thank President Mubarak, Foreign Minister Moussa, for Egypt's indispensable role in the peace process, and to extend my warmest congratulations to Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat. A great task has been completed and an even larger one remains. Thank you.
KING ABDULLAH OF JORDAN, SPEECH BY AT THE SIGNING
OF THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH MEMORANDUM, 4 SEPTEMBER 1999

President Hosni Mubarak, President Arafat, Prime Minister Barak, Madame Secretary, ladies and
gentlemen,

I am glad to be among you today, to witness a rebirth of all our efforts to bring about a compre-
hensive peace in the Middle East. I would like to take this opportunity to thank President Clinton and
Secretary Albright for their tireless efforts and enduring faith in peace. President Mubarak played a
key role in bringing about this agreement and deserves all our thanks and gratitude. I want to con-
gratulate President Arafat and Prime Minister Barak for their courage and will to bring the conflict to
an end once and for all. About a year ago, His Majesty King Hussein fought illness and took a stand
for peace. This agreement reminds us all of his spirit, his vision, his courage, and his commitment to
peace, and I hope and pray that we do not let him down. Thank you very much.

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ISRAELI CABINET, STATEMENT APPROVING THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH
MEMORANDUM, JERUSALEM, 5 SEPTEMBER 1999

The Cabinet today (Sunday), 5.9.99, approved the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement by a vote of 21-2.
(Interior Minister Natan Sharansky and Construction and Housing Minister Yitzhak Levy voted
against the agreement.)

The agreement secured a three-month postponement of the main part of the withdrawal thereby facili-
tating intensive discussion - in a positive atmosphere of mutual confidence - of a “framework agree-
ment” for the permanent settlement as a mutually agreed-upon goal. The agreement strengthens the
intimate dialogue between Israel and the US, as it existed during the Rabin era.

Prime Minister Ehud Barak spoke of the difficulty and pain necessarily entailed in separating from
parts of the Land of Israel, according to the Wye agreement, which was signed by the Netanyahu
government. The Prime Minister added that he has emotional connections, which stem from both the
power of our history and the fact that Israelis - under the aegis of successive governments - have in-
vested their lives and dreams in settling the land, which has public, emotional and security signifi-
cance. However, Prime Minister Barak said that he is convinced that the political process will
strengthen the long-term security of the State of Israel and its citizens.

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Map 1
Interim (Oslo II) Agreement, Taba, 28 September 1995.

Map: PASSIA, 1996
Map 2
Hebron Protocol, 15 January 1997

Old City
Settlement Locations
1 Beit Hadassah
2 Beit Hasom
3 Beit Romano
4 Tel Rumeida
5 Avraham Avinu

Map: M. Davies, 2001
Map 3
Wye River Memorandum, 23 October 1998

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Map 4
Sharm Esh-Sheikh Agreement, 4 September 1999.